Case: 20-50494 Document: 00516021081 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/20/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
___________
FILED
September 20, 2021
No. 20-50494
___________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Irick Dron Oneal,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:19-CV-96
______________________________
Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Irick Dron Oneal was convicted of sex trafficking of children and
sentenced to life in prison. The district court denied his Section 2255 petition
and denied him a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). He moved for a
COA in this court, was denied, and moved for reconsideration of that denial.
We granted that motion and now deny his motion for a COA.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-50494 Document: 00516021081 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/20/2021
No. 20-50494
Oneal seeks a COA on numerous ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. We reduce them to three categories: (1) ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial for choice of strategy; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing because Oneal’s sentence was enhanced for various reasons; and
(3) ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Oneal also argues that the
district court erred by not granting him an evidentiary hearing.
To receive a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district
court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, a petitioner “must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner
must show (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
Oneal first argues that his counsel was ineffective at trial. Courts will
not second-guess counsel’s decisions of strategy “if based on informed and
reasoned practical judgment.” Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir.
1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). At trial, counsel sought to shift
responsibility to one of Oneal’s alleged co-conspirators. That shifting
required Oneal to testify and claim he had made a mistake as to the victim’s
age because he did not have a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.
Trial counsel and the district court informed Oneal of his right not to testify
and the consequences of doing so. The district court found no constitutional
2
Case: 20-50494 Document: 00516021081 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/20/2021
No. 20-50494
ineffectiveness. Oneal has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s conclusion to be debatable or wrong.
Oneal next argues that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for
failing to request a special jury verdict and for failing to prevent various
enhancements to Oneal’s sentence. Trial counsel, though, requested an
unanimity instruction regarding aiding and abetting and preserved it for
appeal. Trial counsel also timely objected and argued against enhancements
for Obstruction, Pattern of Activity, and Leadership Role and was overruled.
Trial counsel was not required to object to the Undue Influence enhancement
because, given the 27-year age difference between Oneal and his victim, it
would be a “meritless objection [that could not] be grounds for a finding of
deficient performance.” Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 429 (5th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court found
there was no constitutional ineffectiveness, and Oneal has not demonstrated
that reasonable jurists would find that assessment debatable or wrong.
Oneal also argues for the first time that his appellate counsel on direct
appeal was ineffective. We need not, and here do not, “address a claim raised
for the first time in a COA motion in this court.” See Henderson v. Cockrell,
333 F.3d 592, 605 (5th Cir. 2003).
Finally, we hold that the district court did not err in denying an
evidentiary hearing. A petition “challenging an evidentiary ruling may only
be entertained as corollary to a constitutional violation.” Norman v. Stephens,
817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 2016). Because we have determined that no such
violation exists, “we do not address the merits of his request for an
evidentiary hearing.” Id.
The application for a COA and the request for an evidentiary hearing
are DENIED.
3