NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENNETH W. REED, Nos. 18-17123
20-15571
Plaintiff-Appellant,
D.C. No. 4:15-cv-00470-RCC
v.
CORIZON, LLC, entity under contract to
the State of Arizona; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
B. JOHNSTON; UNKNOWN PARTY,
named as Pat Doe (fictitiously named), an
administrator for Corizon LLC at ASPC
Tucson,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 14, 2021**
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
**
The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
In these consolidated appeals, Arizona state prisoner Kenneth W. Reed
appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the
district court’s dismissal under its local rules. Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391,
395 (9th Cir. 1993). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Henry
v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.
Although the district court erred by granting summary judgment for
defendants Corizon and Ryan based solely on Reed’s failure to file a timely
opposition to these defendants’ motion for summary judgment as required by Local
Rule 7.2(i), see Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1995), summary
judgment for Ryan and Corizon was nonetheless proper, see Henry, 983 F.3d at
950 (an unopposed motion for summary judgment may be granted if the movant’s
papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face
reveal a genuine dispute of material fact); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or
she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Reed’s claims
against defendants Johnston and Goodman because Reed failed to effect proper
service of the summons and amended complaint after being given notice and an
2 18-17123 & 20-15571
opportunity to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (outlining requirements for proper
service and explaining that a district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for
failure to serve after providing notice to the plaintiff); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1-4.2
(outlining requirements for proper service); In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 511-12
(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and discussing Rule 4(m)’s good
cause notice standard).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reed’s motion for
reconsideration because Reed failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist.
No. 1J Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule
59(e)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reed’s second
motion for reconsideration because Reed had already filed a notice of appeal. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1.
Reed’s motion for correction of the record on appeal (Docket Entry No. 67
in Appeal No. 18-17123; Docket Entry No. 38 in Appeal No. 20-15571) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-17123 & 20-15571