The opinion of the Court, after a continuance for advisement, was drawn up by
It is insisted that the relation of master and apprentice or servant did not exist between the plaintiff and the minor, for the enticing and harboring of whom, this action is brought. Two objections are taken to the indenture, as a binding under the statute; first, that the consent of the minor is not expressed in the deed ; secondly, that the consideration allowed by the master, for the services of the minor is not secured to his sole use. He does “ agree” to the indenture ; and he binds himself to the true performance of the “ agreement” stated therein. His consent then is expressed in terms not to be misunderstood.
The master is to board the apprentice, to allow him a month in each year for his own benefit, and to pay him and his father, every year, the sum of fifty dollars. But it is very manifest, that whatever might be received by the father was in trust for the son, to be applied to his use. It was to purchase his clothing, and to pay for medical attendance, whenever it might be necessary. The three years, in which he was to serve the plaintiff, were from
We are of opinion, that the indenture may be sustained, as a binding under the statute ; and that the relation of master and apprentice was thereby created. It is unnecessary therefore to consider the question, whether if the statute had not been complied with, the minor was an apprentice or servant de fado, or what rights may remain to the father at common law, in disposing of the services of his minor son.
Judgment on the verdid.