I dissent. As the majority opinion states, Macias alleges he was injured while participating in a work-hardening program. However, the summary judgment record conclusively establishes this program was agreed to and prescribed by Dr. John A. Evans, Macias' treating physician, not Macias' employer; therefore, section 1 of article 8309, TEX.REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., does not apply. Likewise conclusively established is that Dr. Evans prescribed the work-hardening program as treatment for Macias' March 3, 1990 back injury. Accordingly, the aggravation of Macias' back condition while participating in the work-hardening program is covered by the Compromise Settlement Agreement and is not a separately compensable injury. Cigna Ins. Co. v. Rubalcada,960 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, n.w.h. (quoting United Employers Casualty Co. v. Marr, 144 S.W.2d 973, 976 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.)). The majority therefore errs not only in its interpretation of article 8309 but in reversing the summary judgment.