United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 18, 2007
July
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-41544
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
MEHDI KHANALIZADEH
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:05-CR-96-31
Before JOLLY, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mehdi Khanalizadeh appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress illegal drugs found in his Dodge Durango following a traffic stop.
Finding no error, we AFFIRM.
I.
In June 2004, the district court authorized a wire tap for FBI agents to
monitor phone calls by suspected drug dealers. Based on intercepted phone
calls, authorities believed that several kilograms of cocaine would be transported
from Dallas to Memphis on June 30, 2004. That day, authorities observed Janali
Sefidkar driving a black Dodge Durango to Dallas and then leaving Dallas en
route toward Memphis.
No. 06-41544
In July 2004, authorities intercepted calls that led them to believe
Sefidkar would be transporting cocaine to Memphis again. Authorities observed
Sefidkar driving the same Durango to Dallas and back to his residence in Plano.
From there, Sefidkar drove a rental car while another individual drove the
Durango, both vehicles traveling together along the same route toward
Memphis. According to FBI Special Agent Mark Pfleghaar, who testified at the
suppression hearing, rental vehicles are often used in drug trafficking operations
to provide a decoy for the vehicle transporting drugs and to alert others if the
transport vehicle is stopped by authorities.
On August 3, 2004, authorities intercepted a call by a Memphis buyer to
a Dallas supplier, followed by a call to Sefidkar to transport another load.
Authorities observed Sefidkar driving the Durango to an alleged drug “stash
house” in Dallas. They later observed the Durango and a red Mitsubishi leaving
Sefidkar’s Plano residence with Sefidkar driving the Mitsubishi and defendant
Mehdi Khanalizadeh driving the Durango. On August 6, 2004, the vehicles
followed the same route as before, toward Memphis. This trip resulted in the
stop and search of the Durango and the arrest and ultimate conviction of
Khanalizadeh, which are the subject of this appeal.
The officer who made the traffic stop of Khanalizadeh on August 6 was
Sergeant Harry Washington, an officer with the Ark-La-Tex narcotics task force
and an eighteen-year veteran police officer. Washington had received a call on
August 5 or 6 from an FBI agent telling him that a black Durango would
probably be transporting drugs from Dallas and that Washington would be
receiving a call from Texas Department of Public Safety agent Bill Ferrell.
Ferrell contacted Washington on August 6 and told him authorities believed the
Durango contained fourteen to fifteen pounds of cocaine. Ferrell told
Washington that the Durango was missing its front license plate, a violation of
Texas traffic laws, and would give him probable cause to stop the Durango.
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No. 06-41544
Additionally, Ferrell told Washington that the Durango would be traveling with
a red decoy vehicle.
Washington stopped Khanalizadeh in the Durango at 8:29 PM on August
6. He obtained Khanalizadeh’s driver’s license and proof of insurance and
advised him that he was being stopped because his Durango was missing its
front license plate. Washington noted that although the insurance card was
under Khanalizadeh’s name, it was for a Mercedes, not the Durango.
Khanalizadeh then gave conflicting stories about when he acquired the Durango,
stating he purchased it one week, then eight days, then two weeks prior.
Subsequently, he stated that the Durango was “put into his name” three weeks
prior. All of this conflicted with the dispatcher, who stated that the vehicle had
been registered in May 2004.1 When asked about his travel plans, Khanalizadeh
said he was going to pick up his wife, later stating she was not his wife but his
girlfriend or fiancée. He did not know her birthday.
After checking Khanalizadeh’s driver’s license, insurance card, and
registration, Washington informed Khanalizadeh that it is part of his job to
“make sure nobody’s trafficking in any illegal narcotics” and asked Khanalizadeh
several times if he had drugs or weapons and if officers could “look.”
Khanalizadeh responded in the affirmative. Washington specifically stated, “We
want to search your vehicle for illegal narcotics and weapons,” to which
Khanalizadeh replied, “Sure, that’s your job.”
While searching the vehicle, Washington noticed fresh glue on the carpet,
which was of a different color, and tool marks on the back seat’s bolts.
Washington told Khanalizadeh that he believed drugs were in the vehicle and
that he would be taking the Durango to a mechanic’s shop nearby.
1
Later, Khanalizadeh produced evidence that he registered the Durango under his
name on June 29, 2004. Regardless, Khanalizadeh clearly gave conflicting answers to
Washington.
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No. 06-41544
Khanalizadeh objected but agreed when given the option of going to the shop or
waiting for a drug-sniffing dog. At the shop, which was about eight miles away,
officers discovered a hidden compartment behind the back seat, and in it, fifteen
pounds of cocaine.
Khanalizadeh was later indicted along with fifty-six co-defendants for
conspiracy to distribute and possess illegal drugs. Before the district court,
Khanalizadeh moved to suppress evidence obtained in the traffic stop and search
of the Durango, and the district court denied the motion. Khanalizadeh entered
a guilty plea, conditioned on the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress, which he then appealed.
II.
A.
Khanalizadeh challenges Washington’s initial stop of his Durango.
Because Khanalizadeh did not raise this argument below, his argument is
subject to the plain error standard of review. See United States v. Villegas, 404
F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2005). “This court finds plain error when: (1) there was
an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. “If all three conditions are met an appellate
court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 358-59.
“A police officer may stop a vehicle if he has probable cause to believe a
traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Cole, 444 F.3d 688, 689 (5th Cir.
2006) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). “The rule
established by the Supreme Court in Whren allows officers to justify a stop by
the occurrence of a traffic violation even though this is not the real reason for the
stop.” Id. However, the legal justification for the traffic stop must be
“objectively grounded.” Id.
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No. 06-41544
Here, Washington had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Before
pulling over Khanalizadeh, Washington verified that the Durango’s front license
plate was missing. Therefore, Washington had an “objectively grounded” legal
justification for initiating the traffic stop -- a violation of Texas traffic laws
requiring the display of a front license plate. See Cole, 444 F.3d at 689. Under
Whren, it is irrelevant whether Washington’s “real reason for the stop” was the
missing plate. See id. The district court did not commit plain error.
B.
Khanalizadeh argues that even if the initial stop was lawful, Washington
did not have reasonable suspicion to continue detaining Khanalizadeh after
clearing his driver’s license and registration. In assessing whether reasonable
suspicion existed, “we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error
and its determination of reasonable suspicion de novo.” United States v.
Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2006). “We view the evidence introduced
at a suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id.
“Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and an
officer’s initial suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end
unless there is additional reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts.”
Id. at 631. “Officers must base their reasonable suspicion on ‘specific and
articulable facts,’ not merely ‘inarticulate hunches’ of wrongdoing.” United
States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1999). However, “courts
must allow law enforcement officers to draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained
person.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court did not err in determining that Washington had
reasonable suspicion to continue his questioning, given the discrepancies in
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No. 06-41544
Khanalizadeh’s story and the FBI drug alert. Washington testified that in his
experience drug traffickers often tell stories that “just don’t add up” and often
purchase vehicles for “mules” to use in drug trafficking, thus explaining the
insurance card and registration date discrepancies. Additionally, Washington
correctly relied on the drug alert. The FBI’s wire taps and surveillance during
June, July, and August of 2004 gave the FBI agents reasonable suspicion to
believe that the Durango contained drugs. Under the “collective knowledge”
doctrine, Washington could rely on the FBI’s drug alert, even though he did not
have personal knowledge of the evidence uncovered by the FBI, to establish his
reasonable suspicion that the Durango contained drugs. See Ibarra-Sanchez,
199 F.3d at 758-60. It is immaterial to the length of the detention in this case
that Washington actually stopped the Durango based on the missing front
license plate. See id. The FBI drug alert distinguishes this case from cases in
which the detaining officers did not possess reliable information that the
detainees were presently engaged in drug trafficking. See United States v.
Jenson, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336
(5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d
193 (5th Cir. 1999); cf. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 510 (distinguishing Santiago,
Jones, and Dortch by noting that the detaining officers in those cases continued
to detain the drivers without reasonable suspicion).
Nor did the district court err in concluding that Washington’s subsequent
search of the vehicle was reasonably related to dispelling his justifiable
suspicion. Washington became particularly suspicious when observing the fresh
tool marks on the back seat’s bolts and fresh glue on carpet of a different color.
In Washington’s experience, this evidence suggested a hidden compartment,
which warranted a trip to the mechanic’s shop to resolve his suspicion.
Washington’s actions were reasonable.
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No. 06-41544
C.
Khanalizadeh challenges his consent to the search. The district court did
not address the validity of his consent, and the parties disagree as to the proper
standard of review. Regardless, we need not decide which standard applies
because, even under de novo review, see Jenson, 462 F.3d at 403, we conclude
that the district court did not err.
First, the district court did not err by failing to address whether
Khanalizadeh’s consent was voluntary. Washington asked Khanalizadeh four
times for consent to search, and each time Khanalizadeh responded in the
affirmative. Although an Iranian national, Khanalizadeh spoke and understood
English fairly well, as evidenced by the video transcript.2 As the government
points out, the facts here are very similar to the facts in United States v. Sutton,
850 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1988). In Sutton, this Court held that the district court’s
finding of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous where the officer did not
physically restrain the defendant, did not brandish weapons, and did not use
deception. Id. at 1085-86. As far as the record shows, none of these negative
elements were present here. Nor is it problematic that Khanalizadeh did not
know that he could refuse consent when all other factors point to the
voluntariness of the consent. See id. at 1085. In short, all of the circumstances
present here establish that his consent was voluntary.
Likewise, the district court did not err by failing to consider whether
Khanalizadeh’s consent was an independent act of free will, given that
Washington’s initial traffic stop was constitutional. See Jenson, 462 F.3d at 407.
Finally, the district court did not err by failing to consider whether
Khanalizadeh revoked his consent when Washington decided to take the
2
Khanalizadeh argues that the videotape of the traffic stop, not its transcript, should
have been relied upon as the best evidence. Khanalizadeh did not object below, and
accordingly, waived this argument. See BGHA, LLC v. City of Universal City, Tex., 340 F.3d
295, 299 (5th Cir. 2003).
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No. 06-41544
Durango to the mechanic’s shop, because at this point, the officers had probable
cause to search the vehicle, given the FBI alert to Washington that the vehicle
likely carried drugs, the inconsistent statements by Khanalizadeh, the incorrect
insurance card, the red decoy vehicle, and now, the evidence of a hidden
compartment. See Estrada, 459 F.3d at 633 (“under the law of this circuit,
evidence of a hidden compartment supports ‘probable cause’ for a search/arrest”);
United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding probable
cause where officers stopped motorist believed to be following a decoy car on a
remote private road known for its drug traffic, and where officers suspected a
hidden compartment due to evidence of new paint and a truck bed that was
higher than normal).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of Khanalizadeh’s
motion to suppress, and consequently, his conviction, are
AFFIRMED.
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