RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2890-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.M.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued September 27, 2021 – Decided October 15, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cape May County, Accusation No. 19-11-
0614.
Melissa Rosenblum argued the cause for appellant.
Gretchen A. Pickering, Senior Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey H. Sutherland,
Cape May County Prosecutor, attorney; Gretchen A.
Pickering, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant C.M.1 appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea to first-degree aggravated sexual assault against eight-year-old M.R.,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), second-degree endangering the welfare of a child
against eleven-year-old J.R., N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), and second-degree sexual
assault by coercion against twenty-year-old mentally incapacitated C.S.
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1). He contends:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN DENYING DEFENDANT['S] [] MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS PURSUANT TO
R[ULE] 3:9-3[(e)]AND SLATER.2
POINT II
DEFENDANT['S] [] PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN
VACATED BECAUSE THE FACTUAL BASIS WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT, SEXUAL
ASSAULT, AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE
OF A CHILD.
POINT III
DEFENDANT [] PLEADED GUILTY WITHOUT
BEING INFORMED OF THE EFFECT OF
1
We use initials to protect the privacy and preserve the confidentiality of the
victims and this proceeding. N.J.S.A. 2A:82-46(a); R. 1:38-3(c)(9).
2
State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
A-2890-19
2
DEPORTATION RAMIFICATIONS ON HIS
3
MEGAN'S LAW AND PAROLE SUPERVISION
FOR LIFE REQUIREMENTS.
We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Bernard E. DeLury,
Jr. in his thorough and thoughtful oral opinion.
I
An investigation was conducted by the Cape May County Prosecutor's
Office regarding allegations of sexual abuse by defendant against M.R., J.R.,
and C.S. Defendant was subsequently charged with first-degree aggravated
sexual assault against M.R.; second-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
M.R., N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault, M.R., N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(b); second-degree sexual assault, J.R., N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); two counts
of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child against J.R.; first-degree
aggravated sexual assault upon a victim whom defendant knew was mentally
incapacitated, C.S., N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7); and second-degree sexual assault
against C.S.
Two months later, defendant waived his right to indictment by a grand
jury and pled guilty to the charges of first-degree aggravated sexual assault
against M.R., second-degree endangering the welfare of a child against J.R., and
3
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11.
A-2890-19
3
second-degree sexual assault against C.S. At the plea hearing, Judge Michael J.
Donahue questioned defendant concerning his status as a legal resident and the
immigration consequences that would flow from a guilty plea:
[THE JUDGE]: Are you a citizen of the United States?
[DEFENDANT]: No.
[THE JUDGE]: Now you have some residency status
apparently?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: You understand that by entering these
guilty pleas you may subject yourself to deportation
from the United States[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: You also have the right to speak to an
attorney about your immigration consequences and
you've already done that; is that right?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
Defense counsel explained defendant was a legal resident and defendant
understood his status would not be renewed as a result of the guilty pleas and
ensuing incarceration. Counsel then stated:
The likely outcome will be that when this case is
over . . . at such time as when he's paroled[,] he will be
taken into I[mmigration and] C[ustoms] E[nforcement]
custody and scheduled for deportation because he will
A-2890-19
4
not have his legal resident alien status renewed, and he
is aware of that.
After the judge asked defendant if he understood deportation was a likely
consequence and whether he wanted to proceed with the guilty pleas, defendant
responded "[y]es."
The hearing was then delayed because defendant advised the judge he did
not have the assistance of the interpreter when he completed the plea forms. The
hearing continued after an interpreter assisted defendant with the plea forms.
The judge then explained the requirements in the supplemental plea forms:
[THE JUDGE]: You have a couple of supplemental
plea forms related to the sexually related charges. First
of all, you will be subject at some point if you, when
you are released from prison at some point, to what's
called Megan's Law registration. That means at the
very least you will have to register your address with
local law enforcement. You could have to have your
information posted online. You might have to notify
various entities in the neighborhood or even the
neighbors themselves. Do you understand all that, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: You understand if you don't comply
with those requirements you may face new criminal
charges[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: Also, you'll be subject to parole
supervision for life [(PSL)] where parole would set
A-2890-19
5
certain conditions. If you did not comply with those
conditions, again, you could be subject to new criminal
charges, you could face parole violation and more time
in state prison. Do you understand all that, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: You have to submit for what's referred
to as an Avenel [4] evaluation to see if you qualify for a
certain type of sentencing which would include
spending time in a state treatment facility. Do you
understand that?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: It's also possible if you pursue that type
of treatment that at the end of the time frame the State
could move for what's called a civil commitment to
keep you in the facility for a longer period of time. Do
you understand all that, sir?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE JUDGE]: Do you have any questions about those
things?
[DEFENDANT]: No.
4
Under the Sex Offender Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 to -7, a defendant can be
sentenced to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center at Avenel, if the judge
is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct
was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior. State v.
Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 126-131 (1988). See Annotation, "Standard of Proof
Required Under Statute Providing for Commitment of Sexual Offenders or
Sexual Psychopaths," 96 A.L.R. 3d 840.
A-2890-19
6
Defendant gave the following factual basis for his pleas:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. [M.], do you know a
juvenile who goes by the initials of M.R. . . . ?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And in fact, this is your wife's
granddaughter, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you would agree that
between the months of May and August 2017 when
M.R. was staying at [your] house you digitally
penetrated her anus with your finger[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you knew at the time
that she was six years old[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you knew . . . that was
against the law[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. [M.], during the summer
of . . . 2019, were you entrusted with the care of
children when other people in your immediate family
were working on the weekends?
A-2890-19
7
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And included in the children
that you were in charge of babysitting or watching was
J.R., correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And at the time, specifically
on August 10[,] . . . [2019], J.R. was eleven years old,
correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And in fact, while in your
care on that weekend on August 10th you massaged or
rubbed J.R. including fondling her breasts, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you did this directly on
the skin[?] In other words, there was no clothing in
between your hands and her breasts[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And when you did this you
understood that this was not just simply massaging but
touching J.R. in a sexual nature[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you understand that in so
doing you were endangering J.R.'s welfare by exposing
her to inappropriate sexual contact[?]
A-2890-19
8
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[THE JUDGE]: [D]o you agree that by touching the
child in a sexual manner such as this that that would
impair or debauch the morals of the child?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [Do] [y]ou know who C.S. is?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: C.S. is, in fact, your wife's
daughter, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And even though C.S. is
twenty years old you know that she suffers from mental
incapacity, correct?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And . . . in the month of
August of 2019, you were involved in a sexual
relationship with C.S.[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: More specifically, the nature
of this sexual relationship was that you would have
sexual intercourse with her[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
A-2890-19
9
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And as part of this
relationship[,] you would, shall we say[,] coerce or
entice her into having sex with you by buying her gifts,
notably fidget spinners[?]
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: C.S. has the mental capacity
of a child; is that not true?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
....
[THE JUDGE]: Mr. [M.], would you agree that given
C.S.'s mental limitations that you offering her gifts and
convincing her essentially to have sex with you[,] that
you . . . coerced[,] made her have sex with you
essentially by offering her these gifts?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
Defendant acknowledged he was pleading guilty because he was guilty.
Defendant confirmed he wanted to be sentenced in accordance the State's
recommendation in the plea agreement to concurrent sentences of twenty-three
years with a fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility for first-degree aggravated
assault;5 eight years for second-degree endangering a child; and eight years
5
The sentence was a downward departure in accordance with the Lunsford Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a).
A-2890-19
10
subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for second-degree
sexual assault. Judge Donohue accepted defendant's plea.
About a month later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
before he was sentenced. Judge DeLury denied the motion and sentenced
defendant in accordance with the plea agreement.
II
Before sentencing, a judge considering a plea withdrawal motion applies
"the interests of justice" standard. R. 3:9-3(e). "Generally, representations
made by a defendant at plea hearings concerning the voluntariness of the
decision to plead, as well as any findings made by the trial court when accepting
the plea, constitute a 'formidable barrier' which defendant must overcome before
he will be allowed to withdraw his plea." State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444
(1999) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). Accordingly,
"courts are to exercise their discretion liberally to allow plea withdrawals" and
"[i]n a close case, the 'scales should usually tip in favor of defendant.'"
State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 441 (2012) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 156 and State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 365 (1979)).
Nevertheless, the Munroe Court explained that "[l]iberality in exercising
discretion does not mean an abdication of all discretion, and, accordingly, any
A-2890-19
11
plea-withdrawal motion requires a fact-specific analysis." Id. at 441-42
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, we will reverse the trial
court's determination of whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
"only if there was an abuse of discretion which renders the [trial] court's decision
clearly erroneous." Simon, 161 N.J. at 444 (citing State v. Smullen, 118 N.J.
408, 416 (1990)).
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
is governed by balancing the four Slater factors. See State v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323,
331-32 (2014). These factors are: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a
colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons
for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal
would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused."
Slater, 198 N.J. at 157-58.
Under the first prong, "[a] bare assertion of innocence is insufficient to
justify withdrawal of a plea." Id. at 158. A defendant "must present specific,
credible facts and, where possible, point to facts in the record that buttress [his]
claim." Ibid. A court "should simply consider whether a defendant's assertion
of innocence is more than a blanket, bald statement and rests instead on
particular, plausible facts." Id. at 159.
A-2890-19
12
The second prong concerns the "the basic fairness of enforcing a guilty
plea by asking whether defendant has presented fair and just reasons for
withdrawal, and whether those reasons have any force." Ibid. "The nature and
strength of a defendant's reasons for withdrawal of a plea will necessarily
depend on the circumstances peculiar to the case." Munroe, 210 N.J. at 442.
The third prong, involving the presence of a plea bargain, receives the
least weight because of the prevalence of plea bargaining to resolve cases.
Slater, 198 N.J. at 160-61. The fourth prong considers "whether the passage of
time has hampered the State's ability to present important evidence." Id. at 161.
"Thus, the trial court must consider the delay to the State in presenting its case
to the jury because of the plea-withdrawal motion." Munroe, 210 N.J. at 443.
"No single Slater factor is dispositive; 'if one is missing, that does not
automatically disqualify or dictate relief.'" State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 16-
17 (2012) (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 162).
Guided by these principles, Judge DeLury did not abuse his discretion in
denying defendant's motion as his decision is fully supported by h is factual
findings. The judge determined defendant failed to establish a colorable claim
of innocence, the first Slater factor. He reasoned:
I have carefully considered the submissions of
the parties, as well as the available discovery at the time
A-2890-19
13
of not only [] defendant's detention, but his original
plea, and I conclude that his [c]ertification . . . is no
more than a bare assertion of innocence, insufficient to
justify withdrawal of the plea.
The specificity of [] defendant's statements to
police, the total circumstances of the case, the State's
evidence, and the allocution afforded at the time of the
plea all indicate that there is a credible basis to accept
[] defendant's original sworn testimony that he was
guilty of the offenses charged, to which he admitted his
guilt, and that [] defendant's submissions here today are
no more than a bare assertion of innocence . . . .
There are no particular plausible facts that I can
glean from his assertions that would support a colorable
claim of innocence.
We agree with the judge. Defendant's certification in support of his
motion merely asserted he did not penetrate M.R. with his finger, fondle J.R. 's
breast, or coerce C.S. to have sex with him. These bare assertions are not
supported by any facts in the record, and thus, are woefully short of satisfying
the first Slater factor.
With regards to the second Slater factor, the nature and strength of
defendant's reason for withdrawal, defendant essentially asserts an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. He contends his trial counsel forced and threatened
him to accept the guilty plea, failed to provide him with full discovery and had
no opportunity to see the video statements of the alleged victim , and failed to
A-2890-19
14
challenge violation of his right to counsel during his police interrogation. The
judge rejected this contention, stating:
I'm convinced that the plea transcript adequately
reflects that this defendant had at the time demonstrated
to the [c]ourt that he understood what he was doing, that
he understood his guilt, and that he was undertaking and
accepting his guilt in entering the plea.
....
I am confident that Judge Donahue would not have
taken the plea if he was not satisfied by [] defendant's
demeanor and candor at the time of the plea, that he was
making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
his rights and supplying an adequate factual basis.
We agree with the judge. We also add that "[o]ur courts have expressed
a general policy against entertaining ineffective[ ]assistance of counsel claims
on direct appeal because such claims involve allegations and evidence that lie
outside the trial record." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 313 (2006) (quoting
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992)). Typically, a "defendant must
develop a record at a hearing at which counsel can explain the reasons for his
conduct and inaction and at which the trial judge can rule upon the claims
including the issue of prejudice." State v. Sparano, 249 N.J. Super. 411, 419
(App. Div. 1991); see also McDonald, 211 N.J. at 30. Because the record here
is not sufficiently developed to consider defendant's ineffective assistance of
A-2890-19
15
counsel claims, we decline to address defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
As to the third Slater factor, defendant's plea was a part of a plea bargain.
The judge ruled:
The defendant has had the advantage of a very
favorable plea bargain in my judgment. The defendant
faced life imprisonment, with a [twenty-five] year
parole disqualifier, potential consecutive sentencing on
other serious second[-]degree offenses, and indeed,
perhaps other offenses that may have been charged by
the State had the matter gone to indictment.
All of that was apparently negotiated and
discussed with prior counsel at great length and at great
detail, and that gives even greater weight to the
existence of a plea bargain in this case, and that weighs
against [] defendant's withdrawal of his plea in this
case.
We agree with the judge. Defendant did not satisfy his "heavier burden
in seeking to withdraw pleas entered as part of a plea bargain." Slater, 198 N.J.
at 160 (citing Smullen, 118 N.J. at 416-17; State v. Huntley, 129 N.J. Super. 13,
17 (App. Div. 1974)). Defendant provides no meritorious basis why this factor
should not be considered. Thus, the third Slater factor weighs against
defendant's request.
A-2890-19
16
Finally, regarding the fourth Slater factor, whether withdrawal would
result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to defendant, the judge
determined the factor weighed against defendant. He reasoned:
[T]he State's not required to show prejudice if the
defendant fails to offer proof of other factors that would
support withdrawal of his plea. Only when the
defendant has asserted colorable reasons in conjunction
with an assertion of innocence should the [c]ourt delve
further into the inquiry of unfair prejudice or
advantage.
Based on my analysis of the first three factors,
which all balance against the defendant being permitted
to withdraw his plea, a complete analysis of prejudice
or advantage is not necessary.
However, I will state for the record that I have
considered unfair prejudice that may attend to the State
being put to its proofs now to try this case. We're
dealing with very young victims, we're dealing with the
passage of time from the allegations under the
[i]ndictment until the date of the plea, and indeed, to
the date of trial.
Young persons are involved whose memory may
diminish over time. Also, we're dealing with a victim
who has certain cognitive difficulties, which may
impact the ability of that witness to go forward. All of
those factors work an unfair prejudice to the State in its
prosecution of the case and would give an advantage to
this defendant being able to mount a defense in the face
of weakening and withering State's proofs.
We agree with the judge. Defendant's contention that there will be no
prejudice to the State if his guilty plea is withdrawn because his motion was
A-2890-19
17
made shortly after his plea was not supported by "specific, credible facts . . .
[outside or] in the record." Slater, 198 N.J. at 158.
Accordingly, the Slater factors were properly weighed by Judge DeLury
to deny defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
III
It is well-established "a defendant may . . . challenge the sufficiency of
the factual basis for his guilty plea on direct appeal." State v. Urbina, 221 N.J.
509, 527-28 (2015). The question of whether a defendant's factual admissions
established the essential elements of the offense is an issue of law, which we
review de novo. See State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 229-30 (2013).
Before accepting a defendant's guilty plea, the court must determine "by
inquiry of the defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that there is a
factual basis for the plea." R. 3:9-2. The court "must not accept a guilty plea
unless it is satisfied that the defendant is in fact guilty." Lipa, 219 N.J. at 331.
"[I]t is essential to elicit from the defendant a comprehensive factual basis,
addressing each element of a given offense in substantial detail." State v. Perez,
220 N.J. 423, 432 (2015) (quoting Campfield, 213 N.J. at 236). The defendant
may either "explicitly admit guilt with respect to the elements" or may
acknowledge "'facts constituting the essential elements of the crime.'"
A-2890-19
18
Campfield, 213 N.J. at 231 (quoting State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987)).
The defendant must "acknowledge all of the facts that comprise the essential
elements of the offense to which the defendant pleads guilty." Perez, 220 N.J.
at 434. Once the court is "satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he
committed every element of the crime charged," the court may accept the plea.
Id. at 432-33 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Defendant's plea allocution demonstrated he committed aggravated sexual
assault, sexual assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant
voluntarily and knowingly admitted he: digitally penetrated M.R.'s anus with his
finger knowing she was six years old at time; rubbed and fondled J.R.'s breasts
knowing she was eleven years old at the time; and coerced C.S. to have sex with
him by giving her gifts knowing she had the mental limitations of a child.
There is no merit to defendant's argument that he failed to provide a
factual basis because he solely answered "yes" to the questions asked of him by
his attorney. His colloquy is similar to the defendant's guilty plea in Smullen,
where the Court held the use of leading questions to establish a factual basis was
sufficient. 118 N.J. at 415. Thus, Judge DeLury correctly determined defendant
provided an adequate factual basis for committing the charged offenses against
his three victims.
A-2890-19
19
IV
Defendant contends his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary because he was not advised that if he is deported, he will be opening
himself up to third-degree charges for violating Megan's Law and PSL. This
contention lacks sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a wri tten
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Suffice to say, the record demonstrates defendant was
fully informed his conviction would subject him to Megan's Law requirements
and PSL. And, if defendant is deported, he obviously would not be required to
satisfy those sentencing conditions while he remains outside of the United
States.
Affirmed.
A-2890-19
20