UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHANTE C. LEE, AS PARENT AND NEXT
FRIENDS OF M.L., A MINOR
Plaintiffs
v. Civil Action No. 18-2786 (CKK)
SEED PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL OF
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
(October 15, 2021)
In this case, Plaintiff Chante Lee, on behalf of her minor child M.L., brings claims against
the Seed Charter Public School of Washington, D.C., for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as well as common law torts of gross negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 52, at ¶¶ 95–129. These claims arise out of alleged
instances of violence and bullying M.L. experienced while he was a student at the Seed charter
school in 2016 and 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 11–23. The parties have now reached a settlement agreement
to resolve this dispute. See Jt. Status Rep., ECF No. 62, at 1. But because this settlement
agreement involves a minor, the parties were required seek court approval for the final settlement
before it went into effect. See D.C. Code § 21-120(a). On August 9, 2021, the parties jointly
moved for this Court’s settlement approval, but filed both their joint motion and the settlement
documents under seal. On October 14, 2021, the Court issued an order granting the parties’ request
for approval of their settlement agreement. See Order, ECF No. 68, at 1–4.
Now pending before the Court is the parties’ [63] Joint Motion for Leave to File the Joint
Motion for Court Approval of a Settlement Involving a Minor and to Fund a Structured Settlement
Under Seal (the “Motion to Seal”). Therein, the parties jointly request that this Court place the
following settlement documents under seal: (1) the Joint Motion for Court Approval of a
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Settlement Involving a Minor and to Fund a Structured Settlement, and (2) the parties’ Settlement
Agreement and Release and its Addendum. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES
the parties’ Motion to Seal these documents. Instead, the Court will ORDER the parties to file an
appropriately redacted version of these documents for this Court’s subsequent review.
I. DISCUSSION
The D.C. Circuit has unequivocally “‘recogniz[ed] this country’s common law tradition of
public access to records of a judicial proceeding,’ noting that ‘[a]ccess to records serves the
important functions of ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings.’” Metlife, Inc. v. Fin.
Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Hubbard,
650 F.2d 293, 314–15 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). This “common law right” to the public access of judicial
records “is fundamental to a democratic state.” Metlife, Inc., 865 F.3d at 665 (citations omitted).
“Accessing judicial records” is also essential “to ‘the rule of law’ and ‘important to maintaining
the integrity and legitimacy of an independent Judicial Branch.’” CNN v. FBI, 984 F.3d 114, 118
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Leopold, 964 F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). For these reasons,
there exists a “strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings.” Metlife, Inc.,
865 F.3d at 665 (citations omitted).
The right to access judicial records, however, is not absolute. CNN, 984 F.3d at 118.
Rather, “competing interests may outweigh the strong presumption favoring disclosure.” Id. “In
Hubbard, [the D.C. Circuit] crafted a six-factor test to balance the interests presented by a given
case.” Metlife, Inc., 865 F.3d at 665. These Hubbard factors are: (1) the need for public access to
the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that
someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property
and privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6)
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the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings. See
Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317–22. “Under the Hubbard test, a seal may be maintained only if the
district court, after considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case, and after
weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the
courts, concludes that justice so requires.” In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1131 (citation omitted).
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the parties’ Motion to Seal. In addressing
this motion, the Court will first determine whether the documents the parties seek to maintain
under seal are “judicial records” subject to the presumption of openness discussed above. If so,
the Court will then apply the Hubbard balancing test to determine whether justice requires sealing
the documents in question. See Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897,
902 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that “whether a document must be disclosed pursuant to the
common law right of access involves a two-step inquiry”).
A. The Settlement Documents Are “Judicial Records”
As noted above, the Court’s threshold task is to determine whether the documents the
parties seek to seal are “judicial records” subject to the presumption of openness. “Whether
something is a judicial record depends on the role it plays in the adjudicatory process.” CNN, 984
F.3d at 118 (quoting SEC v. American International Group, 712 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). The
touchstone of this “judicial records” inquiry turns on the purpose for which a document is filed:
“If the goal in filing a document is to influence a judge’s decisionmaking, the document is a judicial
record.” CNN, 984 F.3d at 118.
In this case, the documents subject to the parties’ Motion to Seal are indeed “judicial
records.” The first of these documents is the parties’ Joint Motion for Court Approval of a
Settlement Involving a Minor and to Fund a Structured Settlement. See Jt. Mot., ECF No. 63-2,
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at 2–6. District of Columbia law required the parties to seek such Court approval for their
settlement agreement, because it involves a minor child. See D.C. Code § 21-120(a). Accordingly,
the parties’ joint motion duly requested the Court’s approval for their settlement agreement and
explained why such approval would be appropriate and reasonable. See Jt. Mot., ECF No. 63-2,
at 2–5. After a thorough review of this joint motion, the Court ultimately granted the parties’
request for settlement approval in an October 14, 2021 order. See Order, ECF No. 68, at 1–4. In
this way, the parties’ joint motion, which successfully sought the Court’s settlement approval, is
clearly a document that was intended “to influence a judge’s decisionmaking.” CNN, 984 F.3d at
118; see also League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 963 F.3d 130, 136 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (“[E]very part of every brief filed to influence a judicial decision qualifies as a ‘judicial
record.’”). Therefore, the parties’ joint motion for settlement approval is a “judicial record” subject
to the presumption of openness.
The second document under consideration is the parties’ Settlement Agreement and
Release and its corresponding Addendum, which are collectively attached to the joint motion for
settlement approval as “Exhibit 1.” See Settlement Agreement, ECF No. 63-2, at 12–36. This
settlement agreement sets forth the specific terms of the settlement recently considered by the
Court, given the parties’ request for settlement approval. Put otherwise, the parties submitted the
settlement documents in Exhibit 1 for the Court to review and evaluate before ultimately granting
the parties’ joint motion for approval of the settlement under D.C. Code § 21-120(a). See Jt. Mot.,
ECF No. 63-2, at 2–5 (describing the settlement agreement and requesting court approval thereof).
Framed as such, the settlement documents in Exhibit 1 were also intended “to influence a judge’s
decisionmaking,” i.e., the undersigned’s decision regarding the validity of the settlement
documents themselves. CNN, 984 F.3d at 118; see also In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F.
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Supp. 2d 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that minor settlement documents subject to D.C. Code § 21-
120(a) were “judicial records”). The settlement documents in Exhibit 1, therefore, are also
“judicial records.”
In sum, the Court finds that the parties’ joint motion for settlement approval and the
corresponding settlement agreement documents in Exhibit 1 are “judicial records” subject to the
presumption of openness. See CNN, 984 F.3d at 118. In their Motion to Seal, the parties implicitly
concede this point by moving directly to an application of the Hubbard balancing test. See Mot.
to Seal, ECF No. 63, at 1–3. For these reasons, the Court will also move to the second step of its
inquiry and determine whether, under the Hubbard factors, justice requires the sealing of the
parties’ settlement documents.
B. The Hubbard Factors Weigh In Favor Of Disclosure
The Court begins its analysis with the first Hubbard factor, which accounts for “the need
for public access to the documents at issue.” In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1131. Here, the parties
broadly argue that “there is no need for public access” to the joint motion for settlement approval
or to the settlement documents in Exhibit 1. Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 63, at 2. The parties contend
that “[a]ny individuals with reason to be interested in th[is] information . . . are already aware of
the terms of the settlement.” Id.
But the Court is not persuaded by this assertion, which appears to assume that only the
litigants currently before the Court have an interest in the settlement of this case. Not so. To start,
the Seed charter school is a public institution formed under District of Columbia law for the
purpose of providing public educational services to local students. See Third Am. Compl., ECF
No. 52, at ¶ 8 (citing D.C. Code § 38-1802.01, et seq.). As such, the public writ large, and District
of Columbia residents in particular, have an enhanced interest in the transparent operation of this
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publicly-funded institution, including the terms of its litigation settlements. See EEOC v. Nat’l
Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960
F. Supp. 2d at 7. In fact, Plaintiffs’ own pleadings corroborate this public interest by noting that
local media outlets have already reported on instances of bullying at the the Seed charter school.
See, e.g., Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 52, at ¶ 27 (“On January 25, 2018 Fox 5 reported, ‘The
parents say bullying is rampant at the SEED School of Washington D.C. and that the school doesn’t
do enough to keep students safe.’”).
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has previously recognized that where documents address
alleged wrongdoing at a local institution that “provides services to children,” “the public interest
in disclosure is compelling.” Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d at 1410. The settlement
documents in this case fall into that category, given that they relate to alleged neglect at a public
educational institution in Washington, D.C. Finally, this Court has approved the terms of the
parties’ settlement agreement. See Order, ECF No. 68, at 1–4. Standing on its own, judicial
approval of settlement agreements is a matter of public interest, “which the public has the right to
know about and evaluate.” In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (quoting LEAP
Sys., Inc. v. MoneyTrax, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2011)). “The public has an interest in
knowing what terms of settlement a federal judge would approve and perhaps therefore nudge the
parties to agree to.” Id. (quoting Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002)). Altogether,
these myriad factors indicate that the need for public access to the parties’ motion for settlement
approval and settlement agreement is substantial. The first Hubbard factor, therefore, weighs
strongly in favor of disclosure.
Next, the Court considers the second Hubbard factor: “the extent of previous public access
to the documents.” In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1131. Here, the parties assert that “the Joint Motion
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for Court Approval and the Settlement Agreement and Release and its Addendum have not been
available to the public at any point.” Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 63, at 3. Upon review of the record,
the Court finds no indication to the contrary. Therefore, it appears that the parties’ joint motion
for settlement approval and the corresponding settlement agreement have never been previously
accessible to the public. See CNN, 984 F.3d at 119. Consequently, the second Hubbard factor
weighs modestly against disclosure. See In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 8;
but see Am. Pro. Agency, Inc. v. NASW Assurance Servs., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 3d 21, 24 (D.D.C.
2013) (concluding that “the second Hubbard factor is ‘neutral’ where there has been no previous
access”).
The third, fourth, and fifth Hubbard factors are “interrelated” and often evaluated together.
Am. Pro. Agency, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 3d at 25; see also Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3
(D.D.C. 2016). Respectively, these factors consider “the fact that someone has objected to
disclosure, and the identity of that person,” “the strength of any property and privacy interests
asserted,” and “the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure.” In re Leopold, 964 F.3d
at 1131. Under these factors, the parties first make clear that they both “object to the public
disclosure of the Settlement Agreement and Release and its Addendum.” Mot. to Seal, ECF No.
63, at 3. The parties’ mutual accession to sealing does weigh against disclosure here, although the
potency of this factor is diluted by the absence of any third-party objection to the disclosure of the
parties’ settlement documents. See Hyatt v. Lee, 251 F. Supp. 3d 181, 185 (D.D.C. 2017) (“While
the strength of [the plaintiff’s] objections to disclosure are noted, they do not have the same
strength as a third-party objection.”). Furthermore, the parties indicate that the settlement
documents contain sensitive personal information, such as the full name of the minor M.L. and the
social security number of Ms. Chante Lee. Id. The Court agrees that the disclosure of this personal
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information would cause prejudice to the Plaintiffs. In particular, disclosing M.L.’s identity and
publicly associating him with this case would be directly prejudicial to his privacy interests. This
threat to the Plaintiffs’ privacy rights also weighs against public disclosure. See, e.g., In re Fort
Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
The parties remaining arguments under the third, fourth, and fifth Hubbard factors are
somewhat less compelling. To start, the parties argue that the joint motion and settlement
documents involve “significant property” interests. Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 63, at 3. But to
substantiate this assertion the parties reference only the “monetary amount of the settlement.” Id.
Such a generalized reference to a settlement amount, without further explanation or specificity,
does not carry considerable persuasive import. Next, the parties contend that that disclosure of the
settlement agreement would undermine the confidentiality clause in that agreement and thereby
prejudice the parties. Id. To be sure, the settlement agreement does contain a confidentiality
provision, which compels the parties to hold the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement
in confidence. See Settlement Agreement, ECF No. 63-2, at § 14. And the D.C. Circuit has stated
that consideration of confidentiality provisions, in the context of a motion to seal, is “appropriate.”
Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d at 1409. That said, the D.C. Circuit and multiple courts in this
district have reasoned that such confidentiality provisions are but one, non-dispositive factor
weighing against disclosure, which may well be overcome by the public interest in judicial
transparency. See id. at 1410 (reversing decision to seal consent decree containing confidentiality
provision); Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Although confidentiality
agreements between private parties may weigh against disclosure, they do not dictate whether
documents can be filed under seal.”); In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F. Supp. 2d 2, 9–11
(D.D.C. 2013) (ordering disclosure even though confidentiality agreements weighed against it).
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the confidentiality provision in the parties’ settlement agreement
weighs against disclosure, but does not compel this Court to seal that document.
Lastly, the Court considers the sixth Hubbard factor, which accounts for “the purposes for
which the documents were introduced during the judicial proceedings.” In re Leopold, 964 F.3d
at 1131. Here, the parties introduced their joint motion and the settlement documents for the
purpose of seeking this Court’s mandatory approval of their settlement agreement, under D.C.
Code § 21-120(a). See Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 63, at 3. This provision of the D.C. Code “reflects
a well-established ‘policy that a minor plaintiff, under certain circumstances, requires special
consideration from the court not ordinarily accorded other litigants.’” In re Fort Totten Metrorail
Cases, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (quoting Godfrey v. Washington, 653 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C. 1995)).
“And this policy of protecting minors is vindicated, rather than undermined, by the disclosure of
records generated in connection with a court’s approval of a minor settlement, for such disclosure
facilitates public scrutiny of the judicial approval process.” Id. At bottom, “[b]ecause § 21–120(a)
is designed to protect minors from disadvantageous settlements, and because disclosure of the
minor settlement documents would advance this goal by inviting public scrutiny of the Court’s
decisions approving those settlements, the sixth Hubbard factor weighs heavily in favor of
disclosure.” Id.
****
In sum and as set forth above, the Court finds that the second, third, fourth, and fifth
Hubbard factors weigh moderately against disclosure. Conversely, the first and sixth Hubbard
factors weigh decidedly in favor of disclosing the parties’ joint motion and settlement agreement.
In particular, the public has a considerable interest in the disclosure of documents related to public
educational institutions like the Seed charter school, as well as settlement documents involving
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minors like M.L. On balance, the Court finds that these public interest factors outweigh the parties’
individualized desire to keep their settlement agreement confidential and withhold its terms from
the public eye. The Court reaches this conclusion “after considering the relevant facts and
circumstances of th[is] particular case, and after weighing the interests advanced by the parties in
light of the public interest and the duty of the courts.” In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1131. In short,
the Court finds that the parties have not overcome the baseline presumption of judicial openness
and that justice does not require sealing the parties’ joint motion for settlement approval and their
corresponding settlement agreement.
Nonetheless, a narrow caveat is warranted. The public interest upon which the Court relies
in this opinion is connected to the operation of the Seed charter school as a public educational
institution and the substantive terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. The public, however,
does not have any apparent interest in the Plaintiffs’ personal identifying information, such as Ms.
Chante Lee’s social security number, M.L.’s full name, or other related information that might
implicate their privacy interests, especially those of a minor child. See Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 63,
at 3. And, as explained above, the disclosure of this information would prejudice these Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the Court finds that redactions of this type of personalized information are
appropriate under the Hubbard framework. The Court, therefore, will allow the parties to submit
an appropriately redacted version of the joint motion and settlement agreement for filing on the
public docket. See, e.g., In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (denying motion
to seal minor settlement documents but allowing limited redactions of personal information
therein).
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II. CONCLUSION
For the seasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion & Order, the Court DENIES the
parties’ [63] Motion to Seal, which pertains to their [63-2] Joint Motion for Court Approval of a
Settlement Involving a Minor and to Fund a Structured Settlement and their [63-2, Ex. 1]
Settlement Agreement and Release and its Addendum. These documents, however, which are
presently filed under seal on the public docket, shall remain sealed at this time until further order
of the Court.
Instead, the Court ORDERS that by or before OCTOBER 22, 2021, the parties shall file
under seal proposed redacted versions of their [63-2] Joint Motion for Court Approval of a
Settlement Involving a Minor and to Fund a Structured Settlement and their [63-2, Ex. 1]
Settlement Agreement and Release and its Addendum. Therewith, the parties shall file a motion
requesting this Court’s approval of their proposed redactions. That motion shall also note any
disputes that the parties have regarding the proposed redactions. After reviewing and approving
of the parties’ proposed redactions, the Court shall post a final redacted version of the parties’ [63-
2] settlement documents on the public docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 15, 2021
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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