20-3657-cv
Gupta v. Headstrong, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
in the City of New York, on the 19th day of October, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Arvind Gupta,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 20-3657
Headstrong, Inc., Genpact Limited,
Secretary of the United States Department
of Labor,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ARVIND GUPTA, pro se, New York, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: DANA G. WEISBROD, (Anna K.
Broccolo, Leo Ernst, on the brief),
Jackson Lewis, P.C., New York, NY
(for Headstrong, Inc. and Genpact
Limited);
Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, for Damian Williams,
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New
York, NY (for the Secretary of Labor).
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Abrams, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Arvind Gupta, proceeding pro se, appeals from (1) the
denial of his motion for attorney’s fees and litigation costs, and (2) the grant of
attorney’s fees to Defendants-Appellees Headstrong, Inc. and Genpact Limited
(together “Headstrong”). With respect to Gupta’s motion, the district court
concluded that no statute or contract provided for attorney’s fees, and that, in any
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event, Gupta was not a prevailing party who would be entitled to attorney’s fees
or litigation costs. As for Headstrong’s motion for attorney’s fees, the court found
that Gupta and Headstrong entered into a settlement agreement in 2008 stating
that Gupta would pay attorney’s fees to Headstrong if he breached the settlement
agreement by initiating further litigation, which is exactly what Gupta did. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.
McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2010). An abuse of
discretion occurs “when (1) the court’s decision rests on an error of law (such as
application of the wrong legal principle) or clearly erroneous factual finding, or
(2) its decision – though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly
erroneous factual finding – cannot be located within the range of permissible
decisions.” Id. (quoting Kickham Hanley P.C. v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 558 F.3d
204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (alteration omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gupta attorney’s
fees. Under the “American rule,” “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees,
win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Peter v. Nantkwest,
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Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365, 370 (2019). To determine whether Congress intended to depart
from the American Rule presumption, we look first to the language of the statute
at issue. Id. at 372. “Congress must provide a sufficiently ‘specific and explicit’
indication of its intent to overcome the American Rule’s presumption against fee
shifting.” Id. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240,
260 (1975)).
Gupta, who was hired by Headstrong on an H1-B visa, 1 principally alleged
in his complaint that Headstrong failed to pay him wages he earned during the
course of his employment there. Gupta argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i)(I),
the provision of the statute that governs H1-B visas, permits him to obtain
attorney’s fees in pursuing any allegedly withheld wages. But, as the district
court concluded, this provision does nothing of the sort. Instead, the statute
permits the Secretary of Labor to impose “administrative remedies (including civil
monetary penalties in an amount not to exceed $1,000 per violation) as the
Secretary determines to be appropriate” for violations of the H1-B visa program.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i)(I). On its face, the statute does not provide that a court
1 The H-1B visa program permits nonimmigrant foreign workers to work temporarily in the United States
in “specialty occupation[s].” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 1182(n).
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may award attorney’s fees, nor does it offer any “‘specific and explicit’ indication
of its intent to overcome the American rule[.]” Peter, 140 S. Ct. at 372. The
reference in the statute to “administrative remedies” is not sufficient to “invoke
attorney’s fees with the kind of clarity” required to depart from the American rule.
See id. (concluding that a statute’s reference to “expenses” was not sufficient to
permit award of attorney’s fees).
Gupta does not argue that any contractual provision provided him with the
right to recover attorney’s fees, nor could he. The 2008 settlement agreement
executed by the parties provides that Gupta would pay “reasonable attorneys’
fees” to Headstrong if Gupta breached the settlement agreement, App’x at 158, but
it contains no parallel provision permitting Gupta to recover fees from
Headstrong. Accordingly, Gupta cannot recover attorney’s fees under any
statute or contractual provision.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying litigation costs to
Gupta. Gupta primarily argues that he was a prevailing party and was entitled
to recover litigation costs. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1),
litigation costs other than attorney’s fees “should be allowed to the prevailing
party.” But a plaintiff is the prevailing party in a litigation only when “he has
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received a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.”
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 578 U.S. 419, 422 (2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Usually, this occurs “when a plaintiff secures an enforceable
judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.” Id. (alterations
omitted). But it can occur in other contexts, such as when the plaintiff secures a
settlement of the litigation that grants him the same kind of relief he sought in the
complaint. See Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950 F.2d 101, 103–04 (2d Cir. 1991).
Here, Gupta has not obtained any change in the relationship between
Headstrong and himself that would merit an award of litigations costs. As the
district court concluded, the parties have remained in the same positions
throughout the entire litigation, with Headstrong refusing to pay any additional
wages to Gupta after the settlement, and no administrative agency or court
requiring Headstrong to do otherwise. And while Gupta is correct that a plaintiff
may, in some circumstances, be deemed a prevailing party if he is involved in
litigation that ends in a settlement, see id., that authority is of no relevance here,
since the 2008 settlement was executed before any of the litigation began.
Consequently, the parties’ relationship remained unchanged throughout the
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administrative and court proceedings, such that Gupta is decidedly not a
prevailing party entitled to costs.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s
fees to Headstrong under the parties’ settlement agreement. “[P]arties may agree
by contract to permit recovery of attorneys’ fees, and a federal court will
enforce contractual rights to attorneys’ fees if the contract is valid under
applicable state law.” McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir.
1993). Although New York follows the American Rule, it permits parties to
recover attorney’s fees in a contract if the intention to provide for such fees “is
unmistakably clear from the language of the [contract].” Hooper Assocs., Ltd. v.
AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487, 492 (1989). Here, the settlement agreement
expressly stated that Gupta would pay any “reasonable attorneys’ fees” incurred
by Headstrong as a result of Gupta’s breach of the settlement agreement. App’x
at 158. Gupta clearly breached that agreement – which provided that Gupta
would not subsequently sue or file any claims relating to unpaid wages – when he
filed a Department of Labor complaint, followed by this federal lawsuit, in 2017.
In light of that breach, Headstrong was entitled to attorney’s fees under the terms
of the agreement.
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Gupta next argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding
fees to Headstrong because Headstrong is a wealthy company. When
determining whether the requested amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable, courts
consider “the difficulty of the questions involved; the skill required to handle the
problem; the time and labor required; the lawyer’s experience, ability and
reputation; the customary fee charged by the Bar for similar services; and the
amount involved.” F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250,
1263 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
appropriately applied these factors and did not abuse its discretion by imposing
approximately $100,000 in attorney’s fees.
We have considered all of Gupta’s remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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Gupta v. Headstrong, Inc.
Combined Opinion