IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 31, 2007
No. 06-31018 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WAYNE LEE PALMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
This interlocutory appeal involves the district court’s grant of the
Government’s motion to involuntarily medicate Wayne Lee Palmer to render him
competent to stand trial. Because we conclude that this motion is
constitutionally permissible under the particular circumstances shown in this
record, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Palmer has had a long history of involvement with federal authorities. In
October 2003, he entered the Clerk of Court’s office for the Middle District of
Louisiana, demanding to know why the pro se lawsuit he had previously filed
had been dismissed. He became irrate, and court security was called. As Palmer
No. 06-31018
was leaving the building, he threatened to kill a court security officer (“CSO”)
who had attempted to retrieve his visitor’s badge. Federal authorities, including
FBI Agent McNulty, were subsequently sent to Palmer’s house to arrest him.
Though Palmer initially resisted, he was eventually subdued and arrested; he
had a semi-automatic handgun in his back pocket.
On October 29, 2003, Palmer was indicted on one count of threatening to
murder a federal official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). He was found
to be incompetent to stand trial, and committed to Butner Federal Medical
Center (“Butner FMC”) for a mental health evaluation. Dr. Angela Walden-
Weaver, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Robert Lucking, a psychiatrist, issued
a report of their evaluation in August 2004, concluding that Palmer was
suffering from a delusional disorder. Palmer was then referred for an evaluation
to determine whether he was eligible for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. §
4246. During that evaluation, he stated that he had no interest in acquiring
another weapon, and based on that statement, as well as community support
and his lack of a violent history, the clinicians found that Palmer’s release would
not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage
to the property of others. The indictment against Palmer was dismissed on
November 19, 2004.
Less than a month later, Palmer bought a gun at a pawn shop in Baton
Rouge. On the form accompanying the purchase, he falsely answered “no” to the
question of whether he had ever been adjudicated mentally incompetent or
committed to a mental institution.
On May 12, 2005, U.S. marshals, when securing the campus of Louisiana
State University Law School for a Federal Bar Association seminar scheduled
to be held there, found Palmer sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle in the
parking lot. When the marshals approached the vehicle and requested to speak
with him, Palmer stated: “I know who you are and I am calling the police.” The
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marshals observed a gun on the front passenger seat, and drew their weapons
and ordered Palmer out of the car. He disobeyed, and instead began driving
away. The marshals pursued him, and he was apprehended. After they placed
him under arrest, the marshals searched his vehicle, finding a firearm as well
as a box of pistol ammunition and a loaded pistol magazine.
On May 26, 2005, Palmer was indicted on one count of possession of a
firearm by a person adjudicated mentally defective, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(a)(6), and one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person
that has been adjudicated as mentally defective and committed to a mental
institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Palmer’s appointed counsel filed
a motion to determine competency and notice of intent to use the insanity
defense. The district court appointed Dr. John Thompson, Jr., Chief of Staff of
the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System and Vice Chair of Adult
Psychiatry and Director of Forensic Neuropsychiatry at Tulane University, to
examine Palmer and file a report with the court.
In his report, Dr. Thompson found that Palmer was incompetent to stand
trial because he did not have a complete awareness of the charges against him,
nor did he appreciate the seriousness of the charges. Dr. Thompson diagnosed
Palmer with a form of schizophrenia. His report concluded that Palmer
presented a danger to the public, and recommended that he be returned to
Butner FMC with an order for forced medication. On August 18, 2005, the
district court remanded Palmer to the custody of the Attorney General for an
evaluation of his competency to stand trial.
Palmer was returned to Butner FMC, and once again evaluated by Dr.
Walden-Weaver and Dr. Lucking, who also diagnosed him with a form of
schizophrenia. In their report, the doctors recommended involuntary medication
to render him competent to stand trial. Thereafter, Palmer filed a motion for a
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competency hearing, while the Government filed a motion to involuntarily
medicate Palmer to restore his competency for trial.
The magistrate judge conducted a competency hearing on February 2,
2006. The parties jointly introduced the reports from Palmer’s previous
evaluations, and stipulated that the sentencing guidelines range for the charged
offenses was from fifteen to twenty-one months. Dr. Lucking testified for the
Government, recommending that Palmer receive Haldol injections to restore
competency. While he acknowledged that there were newer anti-psychotic drugs
with less serious side effects available, Dr. Lucking testified that he preferred
Haldol because of its overall efficacy. Dr. Thompson testified on behalf of
Palmer. He also recommended involuntary medication, but preferred the use of
a second-generation anti-psychotic drug, although he agreed that both Haldol
and the newer medications would be sufficiently safe and effective. Agent
McNulty testified about the charges brought against Palmer in 2003.
The magistrate judge issued a thorough and detailed report and
recommendation where he found Palmer incompetent to stand trial and
recommended involuntary medication to restore his competency. The district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and, over Palmer’s
objection, granted the motion. Palmer now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Even though the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
inmates have an “important, constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,” it has held that
involuntary medication does not violate the due process clause if the inmate is
a danger to himself or others and treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221, 226 (1990). In Sell v. United States,
the Court explained that the involuntary medication of a defendant solely to
render him competent to stand trial for a serious, but nonviolent, crime is
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permissible in rare circumstances, “but only if the treatment is medically
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine
the fairness of the trial, and taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is
necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related
interests.” 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). The Court declared that lower courts,
when making such a determination must consider four factors: (1) whether
important governmental interests are at stake; (2) whether involuntary
medication will significantly further those interests; (3) whether involuntary
medication is necessary to further those interests; and (4) whether the
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate. Id.
Palmer does not contest the district court’s finding that the administration
of drugs is medically appropriate.1 Thus, the issue before this court is whether
the district court properly assessed the other three Sell factors: (1) that
important governmental interests are at stake; (2) that involuntary medication
will further the government’s interest; and (3) that forced medication is
necessary to further the government’s interest. We have not had a prior
opportunity to consider the appropriate standard of review for Sell cases.
However, the Second Circuit has determined that whether the government’s
asserted interests are sufficiently important is a legal issue subject to de novo
review, while the other Sell factors involve factual findings which are reviewed
for clear error. United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004). We
formally adopt the standard set forth in Gomes, and apply it in this case.
In Sell, the Court recognized that there is an important governmental
interest in ensuring that individuals accused of serious crimes are brought to
trial. 539 U.S. at 180. In this case, the Government argues that the offense for
which Palmer was charged is serious, as he faces a maximum sentence of ten
1
He does argue that in the event he is involuntarily medicated, the newer drugs, rather
than Haldol, should be used.
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No. 06-31018
years and his behavior created a substantial risk of harm to himself and others.
Palmer contends that because his United States sentencing guidelines range is
only fifteen to twenty-one months, the Government is characterizing his crime
more seriously than it actually was. While that may be, Palmer’s argument still
fails. Not only have courts held that crimes authorizing punishments of over six
months are “serious,” they have also concluded that it is appropriate to consider
the maximum penalty, rather than the sentencing guidelines range, in
determining “seriousness” in involuntary medication proceedings. See United
States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237-38 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Algere,
396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 (E.D. La. 2005). Furthermore, given the fact that
Palmer threatened the life of a federal officer and caused substantial disruption
on and near the LSU campus, it is possible a court may find it appropriate, if he
is convicted, to upwardly depart from the guidelines recommended sentencing
range. Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court erred by finding that
important governmental interests are at stake.
Neither do we conclude that the district court clearly erred by finding that
Palmer’s involuntary medication will significantly further the government’s
interest. In Sell, the Court explained that this factor requires the trial court to
determine that the administration of the drugs is substantially likely to both
render the defendant competent to stand trial as well as substantially unlikely
to have side effects that would significantly interfere with the defendant’s ability
to assist his counsel. 539 U.S. at 181. Palmer argues that the lower court
attached too little significance to the dangerous side effects accompanying the
administration of anti-psychotic drugs, particularly Haldol. Dr. Lucking
testified that there is a one-in-three chance that Palmer could develop
extrapyramidal symptoms, such as tardive dyskinesia (involuntary movements)
and akathisia (restlessness), if he is forced to take Haldol. While the newer
drugs do not have as many neurological side effects, there are other, mainly
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metabolic, side effects associated with those as well. Yet, all the doctors who
testified at the hearing agree that no matter which drug is used, in the vast
majority of cases the side effects can be treated or minimized. Palmer’s
argument fails because while he has demonstrated that the side effects will be
unpleasant, he has not shown how his ability to assist in his defense will be
substantially undermined by the medication.
Finally, we turn to the last factor: whether forced medication is necessary
to further the government’s interest. The Supreme Court has instructed that
courts must only involuntarily medicate a defendant if “alternative, less
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same result.” Id.
It is undisputed that other treatment options, such as psychotherapy or
education would be ineffective in restoring Palmer’s competency. However,
Palmer asserts that before resorting to involuntary medication, he should be re-
evaluated for civil commitment. He also argues that if he is made competent it
is probable that he will be found not guilty by reason of insanity, and even if he
is convicted, given that he has been confined since May 2005, he will likely have
already served his sentence. While there is some force to Palmer’s contentions,
we cannot conclude that the district court’s determination was clearly erroneous.
Palmer was considered for civil commitment in 2004 and found not to be a
suitable candidate at that time. It is possible that a similar outcome will result
if he is evaluated again. Additionally, despite the fact that Palmer may serve
very little, and possibly no, prison time even if he is tried, the governmental
interest, as the court explained in Sell, is not in seeing him convicted, but rather
in ensuring that he is brought to trial. Id. at 180 (“Power to bring an accused to
trial is fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social
justice and peace” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan,
J. concurring))). Because Palmer can only be brought to trial if he is competent,
involuntary medication is necessary under the circumstances of this case.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because we find that the record in this case supports the need to
involuntarily medicate Palmer in order to render him competent to stand trial,
we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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