Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
January 3, 2008

Nos. 06-20386 & 06-20446 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

DOUGLAS BAUM

Movant - Appellant
v.

BLUE MOON VENTURES, LLC; RANDY W WILLIAMS,
Chapter 11 Trustee for the estate of Zouhair “Danny” Hilal

Parties-in-Interest - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Douglas Baum (“Baum”), appeals the modification of an
injunction issued by the district court that enjoins Baum from directly or
indirectly filing claims in any federal or state court or agency in Texas without
the express written permission of Judge Lynn N. Hughes. Baum argues that the
district court had no jurisdiction to sua sponte modify the permanent injunction,
or alternatively, that the modification was too broad and an abuse of discretion.
I. Factual & Procedural History
Douglas Baum purports to run an asset recovery business. He researches
various unclaimed funds, tries to locate the rightful owner, and then gets paid
either with a finder’s fee or by taking an assignment. Although he claims to work
 Nos. 06-20386 & 06-20446

alone, the district court has determined that Douglas Baum acts in concert with
his brother, Brian Baum, and his father, Sheldon Baum (“the Baums”).
In September 2002, the Baums injected themselves into a federal district
court case styled Clark v. Mortenson, by recruiting investors—through
misrepresentation—to sue a receiver, the receiver’s attorney, other investors,
and those investors’ attorneys. 256 F. Supp. 2d 661, 663 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“the
Mortenson case”). The district court, Judge Hughes presiding, determined that
the Baums’ pleadings were “gratuitous, malicious attacks with legal propositions
that were wholly disconnected from the facts of the defendants’ behavior.” Id. at
663. The district court admonished the Baums for wrongfully interfering in the
case, wrongfully holding themselves out to be attorneys licensed to practice in
Texas, lying to the parties and the court, and for generally abusing the judicial
system. The district court stated:
This case is an example of guerilla warfare through litigation. The
Baums brought this suit to satisfy their illusion of hidden funds or
to extort deals for their other clients. These claims were fraudulent.
Once instituted, the Baums maintained them with singular
ineptitude. When asked to explain their case—or anything else—
Brian and Sheldon Baum did not tell the truth.

Mortenson, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
The Baums have wasted the time and money of the defendants and
the scarce resources that the taxpayers entrust to the judiciary.
They have flouted the authority of this court—an authority they
invoked. They have no concept of the purpose and function of the
courts. They must compensate, and they must be excluded.

Id. at 666.
The district court sanctioned both Brian and Sheldon Baum to ten days in
jail and ordered them to pay $100,000 in attorney’s fees to the defendants. Id.
at 666-67. The court also issued a permanent pre-filing injunction against all
three Baums. Id. Douglas Baum was prohibited from “fil[ing] claims, directly

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or indirectly, in courts or with agencies in the state of Texas without the express
written permission of Judge Lynn N. Hughes.” Id. at 667. (“December 2002
Injunction”).
The Baums appealed the sanctions and December 2002 Injunction to this
Court. In March 2004, this Court upheld the sanctions order in an unpublished
opinion, but it limited the scope of the December 2002 Injunction. Clark v.
Mortenson, 93 F. App’x 643, 655 (5th Cir. 2004). This Court noted that the
December 2002 Injunction made permanent a preliminary pre-filing injunction
that forbade the Baums from making any claims against the Mortenson
defendants and related parties. Id. at 654. Therefore, this Court determined
that the December 2002 Injunction was intended to only apply to the Mortenson
defendants and related parties, and not act as a bar to all future filings
unrelated to the Mortenson case. Id. at 655. Thus, this Court limited the scope
of the December 2002 Injunction by interpreting it narrowly. Id. (“March 2004
Injunction”). However, this Court did not rule out the possibility that a broader
pre-filing injunction may be necessary in the future. This Court stated the
following:
We note that our statement in Farguson [v. MBank Houston, N.A.,
808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986)], that “a broader injunction,
prohibiting any filings in any federal court without leave of that
court” may be “appropriate if a litigant is engaging in a widespread
practice of harassment of different people,” could potentially apply
to the Baums. If the Baums persist in a widespread practice that is
deserving of such a broad sanction, then such an injunction could be
appropriate. But here, as of now, we interpret this injunction as
more narrow and appropriate based on the Baums’ actions in
relation to [the Mortenson case].

Mortenson, 93 F. App’x at 655.
A little over a year later, in June 2005, the Baums entered an appearance
in another bankruptcy case, In re: Zouhair (Danny) Hilal, Cause No. 05-36909

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(“the Hilal case”). Prior to bankruptcy, Danny Hilal owned and operated several
limited liability companies, including Appellee, Blue Moon Ventures L.L.C. Blue
Moon’s primary business was purchasing real property at foreclosure sales and
leasing those properties to residential tenants. Most of the assets of the Hilal
estate consisted of interests in these limited liability companies. After Danny
Hilal (individually) filed for bankruptcy, Randy W. Williams (“the Trustee”), the
other Appellee, was appointed Chapter 11 trustee over the Hilal estate.
Sheldon Baum claimed to be a secured, judgment creditor in the Hilal
case, but he would not identify his claim. Brian Baum was again misleading the
parties and the court as to being a licensed attorney in Texas, and Douglas
Baum participated in the scheme by posting a fake notice of federal tax lien on
property related to the estate.
At the same time, Appellee Blue Moon was involved in litigation in Texas
state court over its right to receive a deed to certain real property, referred to as
the “Kelliwood property.” The Baums took an assignment of a right of
redemption for the Kelliwood property and, based on this alleged right, took up
residence on the property. Blue Moon believed that the right of redemption was
expired or invalid, so it filed a trespass to try title suit in state court to clarify
ownership to this property. A second suit was simultaneously proceeding in
state court in which the Baums used Linda Chepolis, the girlfriend of Brian
Baum, to file suit against the taxing authority, the constable, and an individual
claiming to own an interest in Blue Moon (“the Chepolis suit”).
In the bankruptcy court, counsel for the Trustee filed a Motion to Show
Cause to identify the creditors that the Baums represent and for explanation of
the basis of the Baums’ claims. In August 2005, after a hearing, the bankruptcy
court, Judge Steen presiding, issued a Memorandum and Order Imposing
Corrective Sanctions, which described the similarity between the Baums’

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conduct in the Mortenson case and the Hilal case. The bankruptcy court
concluded the following:
Both in Judge Hughes’ case and in this one, the Baums had no
apparent connection to the parties or to the events until after the
filing of legal proceedings. The Baums injected themselves into both
cases by recruiting, or seeking to recruit, defrauded creditors. The
Baums recruit by asserting that the efforts of the receiver (trustee)
are insufficient. In Judge Hughes’ case, the Baums promoted a suit
against the state court receiver. In this case, the Baums seek to
bypass the efforts of the bankruptcy trustee to promote a proposal
that apparently is designed to benefit the Baums.
Brian Baum’s letter to creditors, Douglas Baum’s notices posted on
property related to the estate, and Sheldon Baum's Preliminary
Outline of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are a continuation of
a pattern of conduct identified by Judge Hughes that are materially
misleading to creditors and parties in interest in this case. The
Court concludes that the following corrective sanctions are
appropriate at this time, but reserves imposition of more severe
sanctions if the pattern of conduct does not stop.

Judge Steen ordered that all three Baums were not to interfere further
with the administration of the Hilal bankruptcy estate. Judge Steen also
ordered that the clerk forward his Memorandum and Order to the district court
“for consideration of matters related to Judge Hughes’ case and for such further
action as that court deems appropriate.”
The district court, Judge Hughes presiding, then issued on its own motion,
an Order to Show Cause, directing the Baums, including Douglas Baum, to
appear and show why they should not be prohibited from, “directly or indirectly,
entering the court house, filing papers of any nature, or representing to anyone
that they are playing any part in a proceeding in or related to this court.” The
Baums were also ordered to appear to “show why they should not be held in
contempt for violating the permanent injunction of December 23, 2002.”
The court conducted two three-hour hearings in which the Baums all
testified, as well as counsel for the Appellees (collectively referred to as “Blue

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Moon”). The court concluded that the Baums had continued in their abusive
litigation practices, and thus a modification of the March 2004 Injunction was
necessary. On April 25, 2006, the district court specifically enjoined Douglas
Baum from “directly or indirectly [filing] claims in courts or with agencies in the
state of Texas without the express written permission of Judge Lynn N.
Hughes.” (“April 2006 Injunction”). Thus, the district court modified the March
2004 Injunction so that it was identical in scope to its original December 2002
Injunction. The district court qualified the modification with the following
statement: “Because he has been consistently less-culpable and swore that he
intends to separate himself from his brother and father, after January 2007, the
court will revisit the portions of this injunction that apply to Douglas Baum.”
The district court’s Order also stated that Douglas Baum had agreed to vacate
the Kelliwood property and dismiss the Chepolis suit in state court in exchange
for Blue Moon dismissing their state court claims against him.
Douglas refused to agree to any modification of the March 2004 Injunction
on the grounds that it would impede his business. Three days after the district
court modified the March 2004 Injunction, Blue Moon and the Trustee filed a
motion to be added as real parties in interest. The district court granted this
motion and entered an order designating the Appellees real parties in interest
nunc pro tunc. Douglas Baum filed a timely notice of appeal.
To summarize, the “December 2002 Injunction” was issued by the district
court and references the pre-filing injunction that barred Douglas Baum from
filing any claims with any federal or state court or agency in Texas without the
express written permission of Judge Hughes. The “March 2004 Injunction” was
issued by this Court and limited the scope of the pre-filing injunction to the
Mortenson defendants and related parties. The “April 2006 Injunction” was
issued by the district court and expanded the scope of the pre-filing injunction

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to its original dimensions. These three labels refer to the same pre-filing
injunction at different points in time.
II. Analysis
A. The district court had jurisdiction to sua sponte modify the
pre-filing injunction in order to prevent Douglas Baum from
engaging in vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo on appeal.
Bissonnet Invs. L.L.C. v. Quinlan (In re Bissonnet Invs. L.L.C.), 320 F.3d 520,
522 (5th Cir. 2003). Douglas Baum argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to sua sponte modify the pre-filing injunction. We disagree.
A district court has jurisdiction to impose a pre-filing injunction to deter
vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation. Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A.,
808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the district court’s inherent power
to protect its jurisdiction and judgments and to control its own dockets); Day v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a district
court may impose a pre-filing injunction, which would bar a litigant from filing
any additional actions without first obtaining leave from the district court, to
deter vexatious filings) (citing Martin-Trigona v. Lavien (In re Martin-Trigona),
737 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1984)). A pre-filing injunction “must be tailored
to protect the courts and innocent parties, while preserving the legitimate rights
of litigants.” Farguson, 808 F.2d at 360. This Court will review the district
court’s decision to grant or modify an injunction under the abuse of discretion
standard. Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2002) (grant of
injunction); ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp., 445 F.3d 841, 850
(5th Cir. 2006) (modification of injunction). A district court clearly has the power
to impose a pre-filing injunction in the appropriate factual circumstances.
Farguson, 808 F.2d at 360; see also Collum v. Edwards, 578 F.2d 110, 112 (5th

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Cir. 1978) (“The Judge’s broad and flexible equitable powers govern the granting
and dissolution of permanent as well as temporary injunctions.”).
Baum does not dispute that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the
December 2002 Injunction. Baum only argues that the district court could not
sua sponte modify the March 2004 Injunction when no party from either the
Mortenson case or the Hilal case filed a motion to modify that injunction.1
Baum argues that the district court’s sua sponte modification of the March
2004 Injunction violated the principles of res judicata, law of the case, and
double jeopardy. Baum cites to United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932), for the proposition that a court is not allowed to reverse itself under the
“guise” of modification. Id. at 119. Swift stands for the proposition that “the
availability of modification is not a substitute for a direct appeal from a
judgment” and “modification is not a means by which a losing litigant can attack
the court’s decree collaterally.” 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2961 (2d ed. 1995); see Swift, 286 U.S. at 119 (“The
injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its
application to the conditions that existed at its making.”). In Swift, Justice
Cardozo held that changed factual circumstances did not warrant modification
to alleviate or eliminate restrictions contained in the original consent decree. Id.
at 119. The crux of Baum’s argument is that the district court had no
jurisdiction to “sua sponte attempt to reverse the ruling of the [Fifth] Circuit,”
i.e. the March 2004 Injunction. In support of this argument, Baum observes that
the district court’s modification of the March 2004 Injunction resulted in a pre-

1
Neither the Trustee’s Motion to Show Cause, which was filed with the bankruptcy
court, nor Judge Steen’s Memorandum and Order, which referred the matter to Judge Hughes,
recommended that the March 2004 Injunction should be modified. Judge Steen referred the
matter to Judge Hughes, who sua sponte issued his Order to Show Cause regarding whether
the March 2004 Injunction should be modified.

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filing injunction that was identical in scope to its original December 2002
Injunction.
This Court previously stated that the scope of the pre-filing injunction
could be broadened in the future based on changed factual circumstances. ICEE
Distribs., 445 F.3d at 850. If the district court had reinstated the original
December 2002 Injunction after the Mortenson appeal without a change in the
factual circumstances, then Baum’s argument might have some merit, but the
facts clearly indicate that Baum continued to engage in abusive litigation
practices after the December 2002 Injunction was narrowly construed by this
Court in 2004. Baum’s reliance on Swift is misplaced because the district court
did not attempt to “reverse” or “modify” the March 2004 Injunction in the
absence of changed factual circumstances. Swift does not indicate whether the
district court may sua sponte modify the permanent pre-filing injunction or
whether changed factual circumstances support a modification that imposed
additional restrictions on Douglas Baum.
Furthermore, in Swift, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the lower
court had jurisdiction to review and modify the consent decree in question. See
Swift, 286 U.S. at 114 (“We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to
modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions, though it was entered
by consent . . . . A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is
subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need.”). Swift supports
the proposition that the district court had jurisdiction to modify the injunction
based on changed factual circumstances. Although the December 2002
Injunction did not expressly reserve a power to modify, Swift held that “if the
reservation had been omitted, power [to modify] . . . still [exists] by force of
principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery.” Id. at 114.
Blue Moon argues that the district court retained jurisdiction over the pre-
filing injunction insofar as necessary to effectuate the purpose of that injunction.

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In support of this argument, Blue Moon cites to Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor
Exchange of Houston, Inc., which recognized that “an injunction may be modified
to impose more stringent requirements on a defendant when the original
purposes of the injunction are not being fulfilled in any material respect.” 628
F.2d at 503 (internal quotations omitted). Blue Moon argues that the purpose
of the pre-filing injunction was to prevent waste of judicial resources, and
because the Baums continued their vexatious filings after the Mortenson appeal
was decided, the district court’s modification of the March 2004 Injunction was
proper. In Exxon Corp., this Court did not address whether modification can be
sought on the district court’s own motion when no other party has sought
redress.
Blue Moon observes that other circuits have expressly allowed district
courts to sua sponte impose pre-filing injunctions if the party enjoined is given
notice and a hearing. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3rd Cir. 1982) (notice and
hearing required before the district court imposes a pre-filing injunction against
prisoner litigant); Martin-Trigona,737 F.2d at 1261-62. In Martin-Trigona, the
Second Circuit has held that “[w]here the jurisdiction of the federal courts is in
need of protection, we need not await the arrival of a litigant able to show
private relief . . . . A history of litigation entailing vexation, harassment and
needless expense to other parties and an unnecessary burden on the courts and
their supporting personnel is enough.” 737 F.2d at 1262 (internal quotations
omitted). We have previously cited Martin-Trigona in support of the proposition
that the district court has authority to impose a pre-filing injunction. Day, 788
F.2d at 1115. We agree with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that a district court
may sua sponte impose a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious filings, and we
agree with its rationale for this conclusion:
Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional
obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs

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their ability to carry out Article III functions. If such power did not
exist, or if its exercise were somehow dependent upon the actions of
another branch of government or upon the entitlement of a private
party to injunctive relief, the independence and constitutional role
of Article III courts would be endangered.

Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1261. Because the district court has jurisdiction to
sua sponte impose a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious filings, it also has
jurisdiction to sua sponte modify an existing permanent injunction to accomplish
the same goal.
In determining whether it should impose a pre-filing injunction or should
modify an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings, a court must weigh all
the relevant circumstances, including the following four factors:
(1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed
vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party
had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended
to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other
parties resulting from the party's filings; and (4) the adequacy of
alternative sanctions.

Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004). We agree
that “the traditional standards for injunctive relief, i.e. irreparable injury and
inadequate remedy at law, do not apply to the issuance of an injunction against
a vexatious litigant.” Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1262.
Notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes
a pre-filing injunction or sua sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter
vexatious filings. In Western Water Management, Inc. v. Brown, the defendants
complained of the district court’s sua sponte modification of a permanent
injunction, which imposed additional restrictions on the defendants. 40 F.3d
105, 109 (5th Cir. 1994). Without addressing whether the district court had the
authority to sua sponte modify the injunction, we vacated the injunction as an
abuse of discretion because the modification “was not preceded by appropriate

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notice and an opportunity for hearing.” Id. Brown implies that the district court
may sua sponte modify a permanent injunction if the parties are given prior
notice and an opportunity for hearing.
We agree with the Second Circuit’s holding in Martin-Trigona that a
district court has jurisdiction to sua sponte impose a pre-filing injunction, and
we believe that the rationale of that decision is equally applicable to a
modification. Although Martin-Trigona and Brown imply that a district court
may sua sponte modify an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings, they do
not explicitly adopt this holding. Based on our precedent, we conclude that the
exercise of this power is permitted by Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Rule 60(b)(5) states the following: “On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment [or] order [when]
. . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.” See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997) (holding that a
party may obtain relief from a district court’s permanent injunction pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(5)). The one-year limitation period applicable to some of the grounds
of relief in Rule 60(b) “is not applicable to the federal courts’ power to modify .
. . a continuing decree of injunction.” Ridley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 427 F.2d
19, 23 (10th Cir. 1970); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). A Rule 60(b)(5) motion is the
appropriate vehicle for modifying a permanent injunction that has prospective
effect, regardless of whether the modification expands restrictions or eliminates
restrictions in the injunction. Cook v. Birmingham News, 618 F.2d 1149, 1151-
52 (5th Cir. 1980); see Brown, 40 F.3d at 109 (“[A] district court retains
jurisdiction to modify an injunction to the defendants’ detriment under certain
circumstances . . . .”). We have previously held that the motion requirement of
Rule 60(b) can be satisfied on the district court’s own motion. McDowell v.
Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1962); see Dr. José S. Belaval, Inc. v. Peréz-

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Perdomo, 465 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting circuit split on whether Rule
60(b) bars a district court from sua sponte issuing relief from judgment). Rule
60(b)(5) “need not necessarily be read as depriving the court of the power to act
in the interest of justice in an unusual case in which its attention has been
directed to the necessity for relief by means other than a [party-initiated]
motion.” United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1961).
In this unusual case, the district court concluded that the interest of
justice required the modification of the March 2004 Injunction to deter vexatious
filings. We hold that if the modification is preceded by appropriate notice and
an opportunity for hearing, the district court may sua sponte modify an
injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) in order to deter vexatious filings.2 Because
the issue is not before us, we express no opinion on whether the district court
may sua sponte modify a permanent injunction that does not involve vexatious
filings.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the
pre-filing injunction.

A district court’s modification of an injunction is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. ICEE Distribs., 445 F.3d at 850. “Modification of an injunction is
appropriate when the legal or factual circumstances justifying the injunction
have changed.” Id.
Federal courts have the power to enjoin plaintiffs from future filings when
those plaintiffs consistently abuse the court system and harass their opponents.
See Farguson, 808 F.2d at 359-60. However, an “injunction against future filings

2
A district court, however, may not grant a Rule 60(b) motion if it has been divested
of jurisdiction by the filing of a notice of appeal. Shepherd v. Int’l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 329
(5th Cir. 2004). While the validity of an injunction is on appeal, the district court’s power is
limited to “maintaining the status quo” pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1989). In this
case, the Mortenson appeal was no longer pending when the district court sua sponte modified
the pre-filing injunction to impose additional restrictions.

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must be tailored to protect the courts and innocent parties, while preserving the
legitimate rights of litigants.” Id. at 360. Based on this principle, this Court
previously limited the December 2002 Injunction to only enjoin Baum from filing
any additional claims against the Mortenson defendants and related parties.
However, this Court cautioned Baum that “[i]f the Baums persist in a
widespread practice that is deserving of such a broad injunction, then [a broader]
injunction could be appropriate.” Mortenson, 93 F. App'x at 655.
Both Judge Hughes and Judge Steen determined that Baum continued in
his abusive litigation practices in both federal and state court. Specifically,
Judge Steen found that Douglas Baum “posted notices that are deceptive in that
they suggest that a notice of [federal] tax lien has been posted by the IRS related
to property that is, or may be, claimed by the [Hilal bankruptcy] estate.” At the
hearing, Douglas Baum did not deny that he posted this fake notice of federal
tax lien, and counsel for the IRS informed the bankruptcy court that the IRS had
not authorized the posting. Judge Steen ordered the Baums not to interfere with
the administration of the Hilal bankruptcy estate, “including without limitations
the publication of misleading information regarding tax liens and/or lis pendens
and the publication of false or misleading documents concerning the estate.”
Furthermore, Judge Hughes found that Douglas Baum had conspired with his
father and brother to wrongfully interfere in the Hilal bankruptcy.
The district court could consider Baum’s conduct in the state court
proceedings in determining whether his conduct before the bankruptcy court was
undertaken in bad faith or for an improper motive. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. St.
Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (5th Cir. 1994) (regarding
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927). Limiting the injunction to any particular
defendants did not stop Baum from repeating his pattern of abusive litigation
practices; therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that a broader injunction is necessary to protect both the court and future

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parties. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d
546, 579 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Generally, a court should only modify an injunction to
achieve the original purposes of the injunction, if those purposes have not been
fully achieved.”). The remaining issue, however, is whether the modified
injunction is too broad and not tailored so as to “protect the legitimate rights of
litigants.” Baum makes three arguments regarding whether the injunction is too
broad and violates his constitutional and due process rights.
1. The district court abused its discretion in extending the
pre-filing injunction to filings in state courts, state agencies,
and this Court.

Baum argues that the district court abused its discretion in extending the
injunction to prohibit Baum from filing any claims in state courts or with state
agencies. Baum argues that even if the injunction is proper for federal courts,
“[a]buse of state judicial process is not per se a threat to the jurisdiction of
Article III courts and does not per se implicate other federal interests.”
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1263. In Martin-Trigona, the Second Circuit
concluded that the district court “erred in its blanket extension of the [pre-filing]
injunction to state courts,” but it upheld those provisions of the injunction
requiring Martin-Trigona to alert state courts of his history of vexatious filings
in the federal courts. Id.
Blue Moon does not cite to any authority that upholds a federal court’s pre-
filing injunction against state court and state agency filings. Furthermore, in
Baum’s prior appeal, this Court noted that “a broader injunction, prohibiting any
filings in any federal court without leave of that court may be appropriate.”
Mortenson, 93 F. App’x at 655 (emphasis added).
Recently, the Tenth Circuit held that (1) a district court’s pre-filing
injunction may extend to filings in lower federal courts within the circuit that
the issuing court is located, (2) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not

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extend to filings in any federal appellate court, and (3) a district court’s pre-filing
injunction may not extend to filings in any state court. Sieverding v. Colo. Bar
Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir. 2006). Based on the facts of this case, we
find that the district court abused its discretion in extending the pre-filing
injunction to filings in state courts, state agencies, and this Court.3 In the words
of Sieverding, “those courts [or agencies] are capable of taking appropriate action
on their own.” Id. We uphold those provisions of the pre-filing injunction that
prevent Douglas Baum from filing claims in federal bankruptcy courts, federal
district courts, and federal agencies in the state of Texas without the express
written permission of Judge Hughes.
2. The pre-filing injunction did not improperly stay state court
proceedings.

Baum argues that the modified injunction improperly stayed state court
proceedings, in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and in
violation of the principals set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Baum appears to argue that the district court’s pre-filing injunction stayed the
two pending state court proceedings. However, the Order clearly states that
Baum voluntarily agreed to dismiss his state court claims; the district court did
not order him to dismiss these cases. Because the district court’s Order did not
actually stay any state court proceedings, neither the Younger abstention
doctrine or the Anti-Injunction Act are implicated. Furthermore, we have
already held that the pre-filing injunction in this case may not extend to state
court proceedings.

3
We express no opinion on whether a district court’s pre-filing injunction may extend
to state court or state agency filings in other factual circumstances.

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3. The pre-filing injunction did not constitute a criminal
contempt.

Finally, Baum argues that his due process rights were violated because he
was denied the rights guaranteed a defendant in a criminal contempt action.
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-27 (1994).
Blue Moon asserts that while the Order to Show Cause contemplated the
possibility of a criminal contempt hearing, the two hearings never developed into
such.
Baum concedes there are no findings that the proceedings were criminal
contempt proceedings, but he urges this Court to look to the substance of the
order to determine whether it is criminal or civil in nature. S. Ry. Co. v.
Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968). Baum fails to acknowledge that the
district court’s Order specifically states that Judge Hughes will reconsider the
sanctions imposed on Baum if he can show that he has separated himself from
his father and brother. Baum also fails to acknowledge that he can seek to
modify or dissolve the pre-filing injunction at a later date pursuant to Rule
60(b)(5). Blue Moon argues that the hearing transcripts clearly show that the
district court focused only on whether the Baums’ conduct required a
modification of the March 2004 Injunction, not on whether the Baums had
violated that injunction.
The Court finds that the district court’s sua sponte modification of the
injunction to deter vexatious filings did not constitute criminal contempt. First,
a pre-filing injunction “does not impose punishment; rather, it acts prospectively
to curtail [Baum’s] future access to the courts.” Shuffman v. Hartford Textile
Corp. (In re Hartford Textile Corp.), 613 F.2d 388, 391 (2d Cir. 1979). “The right
of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional and there is no
constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous
or malicious.” Sieverding, 469 F.3d at 1343 (citing Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d

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351, 353 (10th Cir.1989)). Second, we have been unable to locate any authority,
and Baum has cited to none, holding that a pre-filing injunction constitutes
criminal contempt. On the contrary, Martin-Trigona held that a pre-filing
injunction does not constitute criminal contempt. 737 F.2d at 1260. Third, a
pre-filing injunction is not a recognized penalty for criminal contempt. See 18
U.S.C. § 401 (“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority . . . .”);
see United States v. Ortlieb, 274 F.3d 871, 879 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
suspension from the practice of law was not a recognized penalty for criminal
contempt under § 401). Fourth, unless Congress has expressly provided to the
contrary, an injunction is an equitable remedy that does not invoke a
constitutional right to a jury trial. United States v. State of La., 339 U.S. 699,
706 (1950); Rodriguez v. Munoz, 808 F.2d 138, 142-43 (1st Cir. 1986). Fifth, we
disagree with Baum’s argument that he has no opportunity to purge himself of
the restrictions imposed by the pre-filing injunction. In the future, Baum may
file a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify or dissolve the pre-filing injunction if
changed factual circumstances warrant that action, and the district court’s
ruling on that motion will be appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). This pre-filing
injunction is not a punishment; it is merely a tool to ensure that Baum does not
continue to engage in abusive litigation practices. If Baum violates the pre-filing
injunction, as modified by this opinion, then he would be subject to a criminal
contempt prosecution.
In this case, the Order to Show Cause gave notice (1) that Douglas Baum
might be held in criminal contempt and (2) that the district court might impose
a broad pre-filing injunction. See Cromer, 390 F.3d at 819-20 (holding that
notice of a possible finding of contempt rarely provides adequate notice of a pre-
filing injunction). Baum was given notice and an opportunity to be heard

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regarding the imposition of the pre-filing injunction, which satisfies the
requirements of due process in this case.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by designating the
Appellees real parties in interest nunc pro tunc.

Baum argues that the district court erred by designating the Appellees
real parties in interest nunc pro tunc. The court’s decision to enter a nunc pro
tunc order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wells Fargo Bank of Texas, N.A.
v. Sommers (In re Amco Ins.), 444 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2006). Rule 60(a) of
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure allows the court to make corrections for
clerical mistakes and errors arising from oversight or omission.
Baum argues that the nunc pro tunc order was improper because it “was
simply an attempt to supply a required procedure that was never taken . . .
[because] no real-party-in-interest ever began this action, and all action was
wrongly taken sua sponte by the district court.” Based on our finding that the
district court had jurisdiction to sua sponte modify the permanent injunction to
deter vexatious filings, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by designating the Appellees real parties in interest nunc pro tunc. We note that
the Appellees were present and participated in both hearings before Judge
Hughes. If a district court has the authority to sua sponte modify an injunction
to deter abusive litigation practices, we see no reason why a party harmed by
those practices should not be able to represent its own interests and the interests
of the court and public on appeal.
III. Conclusion
After the district court discovered that the March 2004 Injunction did not
deter Baum from engaging in abusive litigation practices, the district court had
the authority to order Baum to appear and show cause why the injunction
should not be modified. The district court had jurisdiction to sua sponte modify
the injunction to deter Baum’s abusive litigation practices. The modification was

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based on the factual findings of Judges Steen and Hughes, and Baum was given
notice and an opportunity to be heard before the modified injunction was issued.
The decision to broaden the injunction was not an abuse of discretion; however,
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to extend the injunction to
filings in state courts, state agencies, and this Court. The pre-filing injunction
is amended as follows: Douglas Baum is enjoined from directly or indirectly
filing claims in federal bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, and federal
agencies in the state of Texas without the express written permission of Judge
Lynn N. Hughes.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

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