dissenting. A portion of the temporary restraining order and also of the interlocutory injunction was not only mandatory, but final in its nature, and was therefore void. Civil Code (1910), § 5499; and see Kerr v. Black, 137 Ga. 832 (74 S. E. 535); Dekle v. McLeod, 144 *428Ga. 289 (2) (86 S. E. 1082); Rudolph Wurlitzer Company v. Jackson, 134 Ga. 333 (67 S. E. 879). There is enough in the bill of exceptions containing the court’s order to enable the court to ascertain what part of-the injunction complained of was mandatory. Civil Code (1910), § 6183. See Kirkland v. A., B. & A. Ry. Co., 126 Ga. 246 (55 S. E. 23); Patterson v. Beck, 133 Ga. 701, 703 (66 S. E. 911); Cook v. Hendricks146 Ga. 63 (90 S. E. 383); Anderson v. Newton, 123 Ga. 512 (51 S. E. 508).
No. 3023. November 15, 1922. John P. & Dewey Knight, E. J. Quincey, and B. D. Smith, for plaintiffs in error. J. Q. Smith, B. A. Kendricks, and W. D. Buie, contra.