Ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from a decision (see Family Ct Act § 1112; Schicchi v J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509 [1984]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant’s contentions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]; Matter of Jamal C., 186 AD2d 562 [1992]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the “physical injury” element of aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree (see Penal Law § 130.67 [1] [a]). “Physical injury” is defined as “impairment of physical condition” or “substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). The complainant’s testimony established that the appellant’s action of putting his fingers in her vagina “hurt” so badly that she was unable to move her legs, felt the need to lie down, and was taken to the hospital. She further testified that she continued to feel pain for “[a]bout two or three days after” and that “[i]t
The appellant’s contention that the presentment agency failed to timely turn over Brady material (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]) is without merit. To be deemed Brady material, the material must be exculpatory and within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution (see People v Hearns, 33 AD3d 722 [2006]; People v Carnett, 19 AD3d 703 [2005]). In the instant case, there was no Brady violation with regard to the presentment agency’s failure to produce a surveillance videotape because there is no evidence that the presentment agency possessed this videotape (see People v Hearns, 33 AD3d at 722; People v Carnett, 19 AD3d at 703). Nor was there any Brady violation with regard to the complainant’s medical records. There is no evidence that the presentment agency failed to timely disclose these records, which were not in its possession until just prior to the fact-finding hearing, at which time they were promptly forwarded to the appellant’s counsel (see People v Darling, 276 AD2d 922, 923 [2000]). Furthermore, the appellant’s attorney was given a meaningful opportunity to use the medical records either to cross-examine the presentment agency’s witnesses or to use as evidence during his case (see People v Cortijo, 70 NY2d 868, 870 [1987]; People v Myron, 28 AD3d 681, 684 [2006]).
The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in placing the appellant with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months. The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders (see Family Ct Act § 141). The court is required to choose the least restrictive available alternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the juvenile and the need for the protection of the community (see Family Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]; Matter of Benjamin J., 10 AD3d 608 [2004]; Matter of Naiquan T., 265 AD2d 331 [1999]; Matter of Jamil W., 184 AD2d 513 [1992]). On this record there