The question presented by the People’s appeal from an order of suppression is whether a police officer had probable cause for defendant’s warrantless arrest, incident to which a search of defendant was conducted and the suppressed material uncovered.
Walten was detained at the police station while the police went to the rendezvous point and waited for defendant. Defendant did not appear, however, but telephoned the gas station two or three times for Walten, who was not there. The police then brought the latter to the gas station where he received a call from defendant between 10:00 and 10:30. A new meeting place was agreed upon at Porter and Normal Avenues where defendant would be waiting. Walten immediately relayed the substance of that conversation to the police officers and Officer Sperazz got into Walters car and lay down in the back seat.
Walten then drove to the meeting place at the corner of Porter and Normal and told Sperazz that he saw defendant standing on the street corner. Walten stopped the car, got out and walked across the street to where defendant was standing; Officer Sperazz observed the two having a few words then walking back to the car together. At that point the officer left the ear,
On this appeal defendant argues, as he did successfully in County Court, that his arrest, incident to which the search was conducted, was made by an officer without reasonable cause to believe that a crime had been committed by defendant and was therefore illegal under CPL 140.10. With this contention we cannot agree.
“The standard of probable cause to be applied in a situation where a police officer makes an arrest without a warrant is the standard of what would be probable cause to ‘ “ a reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer ” ’ ([People v. Brady] 16 N Y 2d 186,189).” (People v. Valentine, 17 N Y 2d 128, 132.) The standards applicable in obtaining a search warrant on an informer’s tip are also applicable in making an arrest without a warrant (see People v. Castro, 29 N Y 2d 324).
The traditional test ^or probable cause based in part on an informant’s story, as gleaned from Aguilar v. Texas (378 U. S. 108)., is set forth in People v. Hendricks (25 N Y 2d 129): there must be a showing that the informant is in fact reliable and that the underlying circumstances as to how the informant came by his information demonstrate probability of credibility. These requirements may be met by information known to the police officer, by a separate objective checking of the informant’s tale and by independent observations made by the officer. (People v. Cerrato, 24 N Y 2d 1, cert. den. 397 U. S. 940; People v. Malinsky, 15 N Y 2d 86; People v. Coffey, 12 N Y 2d 443, cert, den. 376 U. S. 916.)
In the present case, both the informant’s reliability and the credibility of his information had been established by information known to Officer iSperazz, by objective checking of Walten’s story and by independent observations by the officer prior to the time of the arrest.
The foregoing facts demonstrate that the officer’s knowledge of Walten’s involvement in drug activities and his observations in overhearing the telephone conversation concerning past and future appointments for the delivery of drugs by defendant supported the credibility of the informant and verified the information supplied by him.
Further verification of Walten’s ‘ ‘ lead ” that defendant would be in possession of narcotics on the evening in question may be found in the telephone call received by Walten at the gas
In view of the limited testimony given by defendant as a witness, we see no error in the restriction .of the District Attorney’s cross-examination of him.
'Since the record established probable cause for the arrest of defendant, the material disclosed by the search of his person should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, the order should be reversed.
Marsh, P. J., Mottle, ‘Cardamons and .Simons, JJ., concur.
Order unanimously reversed on the law and facts and motion denied.