NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 21-2810
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ALLEN DUPREE GARRETT
Appellant
v.
PHIL MURPHY,
Governor of the State of New Jersey;
REBECCA FRANCESCHINI,
Captain of Camden County Correctional Facility
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 1-20-cv-05235)
District Judge: Hon. Noel L. Hillman
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Submitted: February 1, 2022
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Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and RENDELL
Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 2, 2022)
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OPINION
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
We previously discussed the background of this appeal in our decision denying
Allen Dupree Garrett’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th
419, 424 (3d Cir. 2021). Garrett paid his filing fee on time. We now consider the merits
of his appeal.
Garrett’s complaint seeks “[i]mmediate release and $100,000,000.00” under
section 1983. Complaint at 2, 6, Garrett v. Murphy, No. 1:20-cv-05235-NLH-JS (D.N.J.
Apr. 28, 2020), ECF No. 1. The grounds for his asserted relief are less clear, but the
District Court reasonably construed his complaint as asserting violations of his right to a
speedy trial based on the duration of his pre-trial detention and due process based on his
conditions of confinement. Garrett, 17 F.4th at 424.
The District Court properly dismissed Garrett’s speedy trial claim brought under
section 1983. A speedy trial claim necessarily seeks dismissal of the indictment and leads
to immediate release from confinement, so it must be brought through a habeas petition
after exhausting state remedies. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79–80 (2005)
(immediate release claims must be brought in habeas); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
522 (1972) (speedy trial violation requires “severe remedy of dismissal of the
indictment”); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 447 (3d Cir. 1975) (speedy trial habeas
claimant must exhaust state remedies).
The District Court separately dismissed Garrett’s due process claim because his
complaint was devoid of facts that could give rise to a plausible due process violation.
Garrett, 17 F.4th at 424. Because Garrett elected to stand on his complaint, we consider
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only Garrett’s complaint before the District Court and ignore his post-judgment filings.
Garrett’s complaint contains generalized assertions that the COVID-19 pandemic poses a
risk to vulnerable inmates like him, but does not allege that he has been denied medical
care or otherwise been subjected to extreme prison conditions that shock the conscience.
We agree with the District Court that Garrett has not asserted a plausible due process
claim.
Once again, Garrett has failed to state any claims under section 1983, so we will
affirm the District Court.
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