PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME, FOR
PEOPLE WITHOUT A HOME,
MILLENNIUM FUTURE-PRESENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 10-1437
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
trading as Virginia Commonwealth
University; CITY OF RICHMOND,
VIRGINIA; HOMEWARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge.
(3:09-cv-00480-REP)
Argued: March 23, 2011
Decided: August 24, 2011
Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and
Ronald Lee GILMAN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Gilman wrote
the majority opinion. Judge Motz wrote a separate opinion
2 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge Wynn wrote
a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Henry Woods McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE
OF HENRY MCLAUGHLIN, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Eric Blaine Martin, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP,
Richmond, Virginia; Brian Kraig Telfair, CITY ATTOR-
NEY’S OFFICE, Richmond, Virginia; Stephen Michael Hall,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Peter R. Messitt, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee
Commonwealth of Virginia. Nicholas F. Simopoulos, CITY
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee
City of Richmond, Virginia. Christina M. Jones, Kenneth W.
Abrams, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee Homeward.
OPINION
GILMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant A Society Without a Name, For People
Without A Home Millennium Future-Present (ASWAN) is an
unincorporated association made up of homeless and formerly
homeless people that advocates for their rights. On February
17, 2009, ASWAN sued defendants-appellees Common-
wealth of Virginia, doing business as Virginia Common-
wealth University (VCU), City of Richmond (City),
Homeward, a Virginia nonprofit corporation, and unidentified
John Doe(s). It alleged that the defendants had conspired to
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 3
establish the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way, a site
removed from Richmond’s downtown community, for the
purpose of reducing the presence of the homeless population
in the downtown area by providing services for them in a
remote location. The Conrad Center began operating on Feb-
ruary 5, 2007.
ASWAN claimed that the relocation of homeless services
to the Conrad Center violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3),
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fair Hous-
ing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed all of ASWAN’s
claims either because they failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted or because they were barred by the appli-
cable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
I. Background
ASWAN filed suit in Virginia state court, but Homeward
removed the action to federal court in accordance with 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. In its second amended complaint,
ASWAN alleged that the Conrad Center is located about two
miles from downtown Richmond; that this location is isolated
and removed from Richmond’s downtown community and
VCU’s campus; that the defendants took various actions to
pressure organizations that provided services to the homeless
in the downtown area, such as the Daily Planet, to relocate to
the Conrad Center; that the defendants took these actions to
make the homeless less visible to, and segregate them from,
Richmond’s downtown community and the VCU campus;
that creating the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way makes it
difficult for homeless people to travel between the Center and
the downtown area, an area that includes open spaces such as
Monroe Park located near VCU’s campus; and that the efforts
to make the homeless less visible have their roots in class,
race, and disability prejudice. ASWAN contends there is a
strong link between homelessness and disability, asserting
4 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
that the public generally perceives and regards homeless peo-
ple as being disabled due to mental illness, alcoholism, and
substance abuse.
In addition to claiming that the defendants’ actions violated
the ADA, the FHA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), ASWAN
asserted that VCU retaliated against it in violation of the ADA
for bringing this suit by withdrawing VCU’s earlier promise
to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to and
from the Conrad Center. ASWAN separately alleged that the
City violated the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
In response to ASWAN’s complaint, all of the defendants
filed motions to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that
ASWAN’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and/or that the claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. The magistrate judge
assigned to the case recommended that the motions be granted
for the following reasons:
• ASWAN’s conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) should be dismissed "because it is
comprised of conclusory allegations unsupported
by concrete facts" and therefore fails to state a
plausible conspiracy claim.
• ASWAN’s ADA, FHA, equal-protection, and
§ 1983 claims should be dismissed because they
fall outside the applicable statute of limitations.
• ASWAN’s claim that VCU retaliated against
ASWAN for bringing this suit in violation of the
ADA should be dismissed because (1) ASWAN
failed to allege the necessary elements of a retali-
ation claim, and (2) VCU was not obligated to
help pay the cost of transporting homeless people
to and from the Conrad Center, so VCU’s with-
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 5
drawal of its earlier promise to help pay these
transportation costs, which occurred after
ASWAN filed suit, does not amount to a discrim-
inatory act or an adverse action.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendation in its entirety and dismissed ASWAN’s
lawsuit. ASWAN now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of review
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom-
bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court decides whether this
standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the
factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual alle-
gations, and then determining whether those allegations allow
the court to reasonably infer that "the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949-50. In other words, the
factual allegations (taken as true) must "permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at
1950.
Facts pled that are "merely consistent with" liability are not
sufficient. Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, sup-
ported by mere conclusory statements, [similarly] do not suf-
fice," because "we are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 1949-50
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition, where a conspiracy is alleged, the plaintiff
must plead facts amounting to more than "parallel conduct
and a bare assertion of conspiracy . . . . Without more, parallel
6 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allega-
tion of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply
facts adequate to show illegality." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-
57 (reasoning that allegations of parallel conduct were insuffi-
cient to state a claim for a conspiracy under the Sherman Act).
The factual allegations must plausibly suggest agreement,
rather than being merely consistent with agreement. Id. at
557.
B. Conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)
The first issue on appeal is whether ASWAN’s complaint
stated a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. To state
such a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
prove the following:
(1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are
motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the
equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all,
(4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5)
a consequence of an overt act committed by the
defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995). More-
over, the plaintiff "must show an agreement or a meeting of
the minds by [the] defendants to violate the [plaintiff’s] con-
stitutional rights." Id. at 1377 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). "[W]e have specifically rejected section 1985 claims
whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely con-
clusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts."
Id.
ASWAN alleges that a conspiracy has existed since at least
1995 to "segregate . . . homeless people and to reduce the visi-
bility of black homeless people and ADA protected people
and handicapped homeless people from Richmond’s main-
stream, its downtown," which includes VCU’s main campus
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 7
and the surrounding majority-white neighborhoods. But on
the required element of a conspiracy of two or more persons,
the complaint alleges nothing more specific than statements
that the "Doe(s) and the City entered into a conspiracy," that
they had a "meeting of the minds that they would act in con-
cert with VCU" to pressure the Daily Planet to relocate to Oli-
ver Hill Way, and that "Homeward was created as part of the
conspiracy and . . . became part of the conspiracy."
ASWAN’s claim that the defendants conspired to force
homeless people out of downtown Richmond by relocating
homeless services to Oliver Hill Way fails because it is com-
prised almost entirely of conclusory allegations unsupported
by concrete facts. For example, the allegations that "Doe(s)
and the City entered into a conspiracy" and that "Homeward
was created as part of the conspiracy and . . . became part of
the conspiracy" are "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,"
and are therefore not sufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50.
As the magistrate judge found, "ASWAN fails to allege
with any specificity the persons who agreed to the alleged
conspiracy, the specific communications amongst the conspir-
ators, or the manner in which any such communications were
made." The allegations are thus insufficient to support a meet-
ing of the minds by the defendants. At most, ASWAN’s alle-
gations amount to "parallel conduct and a bare assertion of a
conspiracy." See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. This is not
enough to survive a motion to dismiss.
C. ADA, § 1983, and equal-protection claims
The next issue is whether ASWAN’s ADA, § 1983, and
equal-protection claims are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Answering this question requires that we first
determine the limitations period for each type of claim.
8 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
Title II of the ADA does not contain a statute of limitations.
Although "Congress enacted a catchall 4-year statute of limi-
tations for actions arising under federal statutes enacted after
December 1, 1990," Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541
U.S. 369, 371 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658), the ADA was
enacted on July 26, 1990, see 104 Stat. 327, 327. We there-
fore borrow the state statute of limitations that applies to the
most analogous state-law claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985), partially superseded
by statute as stated in Jones, 541 U.S. at 377-80.
The district court concluded that Virginia’s one-year limita-
tions period for claims under the Virginia Rights of Persons
with Disabilities Act (hereafter, the Virginia Disabilities Act),
Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-40 et seq., should apply to the ADA
claims here, and the parties do not dispute this conclusion on
appeal. See Childress v. Clement, 5 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388
(E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the Virginia Disabilities Act
constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for
claims brought under the ADA).
This court has not previously determined what limitations
period governs ADA claims brought in Virginia. But we have
held that the Virginia Disabilities Act provides the limitations
period for claims brought under the Federal Rehabilitation
Act in Virginia because of the similarities between these acts.
Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 225 (4th
Cir. 1993). And we have held that we apply the same substan-
tive analysis to both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
"[b]ecause the language of the two statutes is substantially the
same." Doe v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d
1261, 1264 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the Virginia Dis-
abilities Act itself expressly acknowledges its close connec-
tion to both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA: "The
Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy shall promulgate
such regulations as may be necessary to implement this sec-
tion. Such regulations shall be consistent, whenever applica-
ble, with regulations imposed under the federal Rehabilitation
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 9
Act of 1973, as amended, and the federal Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990." Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-40 (footnotes
omitted). We therefore agree with the district court’s conclu-
sion that the one-year limitations period in the Virginia Dis-
abilities Act applies to ADA claims brought in Virginia.
With regard to the § 1983 and equal-protection claims, the
statute-of-limitations period for both is two years. Lewis v.
Richmond City Police Dept., 947 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir.
1991) (§ 1983 claims); Al-Amin v. Shear, 325 F. App’x 190,
193 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009) (equal-protection claims). The parties
do not dispute this conclusion.
The applicable statute of limitations begins to run once a
claim accrues, and federal law controls that determination.
Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975). A civil rights
claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to
know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id. At the
very latest, ASWAN knew or should have known of its pur-
ported injury stemming from the alleged conspiracy to relo-
cate homeless services from downtown to Oliver Hill Way
when the Conrad Center opened on February 5, 2007. So even
for the claims with a two-year limitations period, ASWAN’s
suit should have been filed no later than February 5, 2009.
Because ASWAN’s complaint was not filed until February
17, 2009, those claims are time barred.
ASWAN attempts to avoid this result by claiming that cer-
tain acts of the defendants constituted a continuing violation
of the ADA. "In general, to establish a continuing violation[,]
the plaintiff must establish that the unconstitutional or illegal
act was a fixed and continuing practice." Nat’l Adver. Co. v.
City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166 (4th Cir. 1991) (brack-
ets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, if the plaintiff can show that the illegal act did not
occur just once, but rather "in a series of separate acts[,] and
if the same alleged violation was committed at the time of
each act, then the limitations period begins anew with each
10 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
violation." Id. at 1167 (internal quotation marks omitted). But
continual unlawful acts are distinguishable from the continu-
ing ill effects of an original violation because the latter do not
constitute a continuing violation. Id. at 1166.
ASWAN claims that the following actions constitute a con-
tinuing violation of the ADA: (1) VCU’s withdrawal of its
promise to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people
to and from the Conrad Center, which withdrawal was alleg-
edly made in retaliation for ASWAN’s filing the present law-
suit; (2) the attempt by VCU and Homeward in 2009 to
persuade various organizations to relocate feeding programs
from Monroe Park to the Conrad Center; and (3) the City’s
communication to homeless people in 2009 that they would
need to travel to the Conrad Center to sign up for the down-
town overnight shelter.
The first action does not establish a continuing violation
because it is an allegation of an entirely new violation—a
retaliation claim instead of a discrimination claim. See id. at
1167 (concluding that a continuing violation requires that "the
same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). And the second and third
actions essentially deal with decisions to add new services for
the homeless at the Conrad Center. The fact that the Conrad
Center is still located on Oliver Hill Way and continues to
offer services to the homeless—including new services that
are added from time to time—does not amount to a continuing
violation, but rather amounts to the continuing effect of the
original decision to locate the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill
Way. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening,
174 F.3d 180, 189 (4th Cir. 1999) ("At bottom, appellants’
continuing violation argument rests on the alleged ongoing
effects of the original decision to locate the highway in prox-
imity to Jersey Heights.") ASWAN’s ADA, § 1983, and
equal-protection claims are therefore time barred.
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 11
D. FHA claims
We will now address whether the district court erred in dis-
missing ASWAN’s FHA claims. The district court determined
that ASWAN’s FHA claims, which have a two-year statute of
limitations, see 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), were also time
barred because ASWAN filed suit more than two years after
the opening of the Conrad Center.
ASWAN responds by arguing that the accrual date for its
FHA claims is not the opening of the Conrad Center in Febru-
ary 2007, but rather when the Center first offered intake ser-
vices to the homeless that allowed them to sign up for the
overnight shelter that continued to be located downtown. This
took place in April 2007. ASWAN alleges that the relocation
of the intake services violated the FHA by running afoul of
the statutory sections that prohibit discrimination in the provi-
sion of housing services. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(2). Sim-
ilarly, ASWAN contends that the FHA was violated by the
City’s communication to homeless people in 2009 that they
would need to travel to the Conrad Center to sign up for the
downtown overnight shelter using the intake services.
There are two problems with ASWAN’s argument. One is
that the time gap between the opening of the Conrad Center
and the actions complained of is not material because
ASWAN knew or should have known that intake services
were going to be shifted there from the very conception of the
Center. In other words, the relocation of intake services is
simply another continuing effect of the original decision to
locate the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way. Indeed,
ASWAN admits as much by arguing in its own brief that if
the defendants had not conspired to establish the Conrad Cen-
ter on Oliver Hill Way, then "there would have been no Con-
rad Center on Oliver Hill Way to receive relocation of the
[intake services] and the City’s processing of applications for
access to overflow shelter downtown on very cold nights."
12 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
The other problem with ASWAN’s argument is that the
intake services to sign up for overnight shelter do not consti-
tute "services" within the meaning of the FHA. As explained
by this court in Jersey Heights:
The Fair Housing Act’s services provision simply
requires that "such things as garbage collection and
other services of the kind usually provided by
municipalities" not be denied on a discriminatory
basis. [Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d
419, 424 (4th Cir. 1984).] It does not extend to every
activity having any conceivable effect on neighbor-
hood residents. See id. (hazard insurance is not a
"service"); Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United
Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(elevator manufacturer is not a provider of "ser-
vices"); Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n
[v. St. Clair County, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir.
1984)] (maintenance of county-owned neighborhood
property is not a "service"); Laramore v. Illinois
Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (stadium site selection is not the provision
of a "service"). "To say that every discriminatory
municipal policy is prohibited by the Fair Housing
Act would be to expand that Act to a civil rights stat-
ute of general applicability rather than one dealing
with the specific problems of fair housing opportuni-
ties." Clifton Terrace Assocs., 929 F.2d at 720 (quot-
ing Vercher v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 454 F.
Supp. 423, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1978)).
Although Jersey Heights dealt with the meaning of "ser-
vices" in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), the term has the same meaning
in § 3604(f)(2) because the relevant language is materially the
same. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(2); see also Smith v. Pac. Prop. and Dev. Corp.,
358 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the lan-
guage of § 3604(f)(2), which governs discrimination based on
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 13
handicap, is otherwise materially identical to § 3604(b),
which governs discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin).
Intake services to sign up for a homeless shelter are simply
not within the type of services covered by the FHA because
they are unlike "services generally provided by governmental
units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection."
See Southend, 743 F.2d at 1210. Indeed, in the present case,
the intake services are provided by Catholic Charities, a non-
profit organization, and not by any governmental unit.
Because the intake services in question do not fall within the
ambit of the FHA, ASWAN’s FHA claims are barred by the
two-year statute of limitations and, more fundamentally, they
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
E. Retaliation claim under the ADA
The final issue on appeal is whether the district court erred
in dismissing ASWAN’s ADA retaliation claim against VCU.
ASWAN contends that VCU retaliated against ASWAN by
retracting VCU’s earlier promise to help pay the cost of trans-
porting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center.
The ADA’s retaliation provision provides, in relevant part,
that "[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual . . . made a charge . . . under this
Chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie
retaliation claim under the ADA, plaintiffs must allege (1)
that they engaged in protected conduct, (2) that they suffered
an adverse action, and (3) that a causal link exists between the
protected conduct and the adverse action. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C.,
257 F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001). ASWAN argues that it sat-
isfies this test because (1) its ADA claims against VCU in this
lawsuit constitute protected conduct, (2) VCU’s withdrawal of
its earlier promise to help pay the cost of transporting home-
less people constitutes an adverse action against ASWAN and
14 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
its members, and (3) the reason for VCU’s reversal was to
retaliate against ASWAN for bringing this lawsuit.
As ASWAN admits, however, VCU was under no obliga-
tion to help pay the cost of transporting homeless people to
and from the Conrad Center. And retracting a gratuitous
promise does not amount to a discriminatory act or an adverse
action. See Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473,
1482-84 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the employ-
er’s revocation of gratuitous healthcare benefits did not vio-
late ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision). Although Stiltner
involves ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision (29 U.S.C.
§ 1140), that provision and the ADA’s retaliation pro-
vision (42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)) use the identical
phrase—"discriminate against"—to describe what constitutes
an adverse action, and Stiltner expressly held that revoking a
gratuitous benefit does not fit within this language. Id.
Because VCU’s alleged promise to help pay the cost of
transporting homeless people to and from the Conrad Center
is gratuitous, VCU’s retraction of this promise does not
amount to an adverse action. We therefore conclude that the
district court properly dismissed ASWAN’s ADA retaliation
claim against VCU.
III. Conclusion
For all of the reason set forth above, we affirm the judg-
ment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
I concur in Judge Gilman’s opinion with one exception. In
my view, the text of the ADA and controlling precedent
require the conclusion that ASWAN has alleged a cognizable
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 15
ADA retaliation claim against VCU. ASWAN may not be
able to prove this claim, but it should have been afforded the
opportunity to do so. My colleagues err in affirming the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of this claim.
I.
On February 17, 2009, ASWAN filed its first complaint in
state court. After defendants removed the case to federal court
and filed motions to dismiss, the district judge denied the
motions without prejudice but ordered ASWAN to clarify the
complaint in separately numbered counts identifying the "spe-
cific statute alleged to have been violated."
On November 19, 2009, ASWAN filed its second amended
complaint and in it alleges a retaliation claim against VCU in
separately numbered counts and identifies the ADA as the
source of this cause of action. Specifically, ASWAN alleges
that sometime in 2008 or 2009, the Daily Planet (an affiliate
of ASWAN) acquired a passenger van to transport homeless
people from downtown to the Conrad Center; many of these
homeless people were disabled. ASWAN alleges that VCU
agreed to "provide some funding to the Daily Planet" to offset
a portion of these transportation costs. ASWAN further
alleges that after it filed its original complaint in February
2009, VCU retracted its "agreement" with the Daily Planet in
order to "punish" ASWAN by (1) "depriving its members . . .
of the benefit of transportation"; and (2) "showing" ASWAN
that "its decision to file a civil rights lawsuit against VCU had
backfired, hurting the very homeless people" ASWAN seeks
to serve.
II.
The ADA provides that "[n]o person shall discriminate
against any individual because such individual has opposed
any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA]." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a). To state an ADA retaliation claim, ASWAN must
16 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
allege that (1) it engaged in protected conduct, (2) suffered an
adverse action, and (3) a causal link exists between the pro-
tected conduct and the adverse action. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257
F.3d 373, 392 (4th Cir. 2001).
VCU does not maintain that it arrived at its decision not to
provide funding for transportation to the Conrad Center inde-
pendent from this lawsuit. Rather, VCU conceded at oral
argument that there was a "causal link" between its decision
not to honor the transportation funding agreement and the fil-
ing of this lawsuit by ASWAN. See also Hunt-Golliday v.
Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 104 F.3d
1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding "suspicious timing" as
"circumstantial" evidence to support retaliation claim). VCU
maintains, however, that this causal link does not provide the
basis for an ADA retaliation claim.
VCU’s principal contention on appeal is that ASWAN
lacked any "reasonable, good faith belief" that VCU violated
the ADA and that ASWAN’s lawsuit therefore did not consti-
tute the sort of activity protected by the ADA. As a fallback
position, VCU asserts that its agreement to fund transporta-
tion to the Daily Planet constitutes a gratuitous benefit and so
its decision to withdraw this benefit cannot amount to unlaw-
ful retaliation.
Given that the majority relies on VCU’s fallback position,
I first address that argument and then VCU’s principal argu-
ment on this point.
III.
Five years ago, in the Title VII context, the Supreme Court
interpreted precisely the same language as that at issue here—
"discriminated against"—and held that it "refers to distinc-
tions or differences in treatment that injure protected individu-
als." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
59 (2006). The Court explained that Congress intended this
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 17
broad language to "prevent[ ]" a public entity from "interfer-
ing . . . with . . . efforts to secure or advance enforcement of
the" underlying statute. Id. at 63. The retaliation must merely
be "materially adverse" to a reasonable person, i.e. sufficient
to "dissuade[ ] a reasonable [person] from" charging discrimi-
nation. Id. at 68 (internal quotation omitted). Ultimately,
"[c]ontext matters," making discovery particularly appropriate
to flesh out factually plausible allegations. Id. at 69.
Faithfully applying these principles seems to me to require
the conclusion that ASWAN has alleged a clear case of ADA-
barred retaliation. Revoking funding for transportation repre-
sents a "materially adverse" action that could dissuade a rea-
sonable disabled homeless person from asserting his or her
rights under the ADA.
Our holding in Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d
1473, 1484 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), that revocation of gratu-
itous benefits fails to qualify as an adverse action for purposes
of ERISA’s retaliation provision, does not counsel a different
result. In Stiltner, we explained that Congress modeled
ERISA’s retaliation provision on parallel language in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and so we looked to
the NLRA to determine the meaning of that language. Id. at
1482-84. It was this NLRA-focused inquiry that led us to con-
clude that revoking gratuitous benefits does not constitute
adverse action for purposes of ERISA. Id. But that holding,
which we based on the labor-specific statutory context that
confronted us, provides little guidance here.
In interpreting the ADA, we must look not to unrelated
labor statutes, but to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See A
Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, MD, 515 F.3d 356,
362 (4th Cir. 2008). Given that the ADA’s anti-retaliation
provision is identical to Title VII’s, the standard laid out by
the Supreme Court for purposes of Title VII controls in this
ADA case.* See Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d
*That Title VII generally governs employment discrimination does not
render the Title VII standard any less applicable. The Supreme Court has
18 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
408, 417 (6th Cir. 1997); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Chesh-
ire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). And
under that standard, the retraction of gratuitous benefits con-
stitutes adverse action. See Thompson v. Potomac Electric
Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 650-51 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that
Title VII retaliation encompasses "any retaliatory act" that
"adversely affected . . . benefits" (internal quotation omitted));
see also Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 36 (1st
Cir. 2010) (noting that Title VII "adverse employment
actions" include the imposition of "a less distinguished title"
or "a material loss in benefits" (internal quotation omitted));
Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc., 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(rejecting argument that cancellation of a voluntary sympo-
sium was the withdrawal of a "mere ‘gratuity’" and thus inca-
pable of constituting retaliation).
IV.
Perhaps recognizing that its fallback argument lacks any
doctrinal support, VCU principally argues that ASWAN’s
retaliation claim fails because ASWAN assertedly had no
"reasonable, good faith belief" that the ADA had been vio-
lated. Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d
205, 216 (4th Cir. 2002). Specifically, VCU contends that
ASWAN could not have reasonably believed that "[1] a hill
is a ‘barrier’ under the ADA; [2] filing this suit years later
could prevail; [3] a donor of land can be treated like a segre-
gating zoning authority; or [4] segregating someone from ‘the
specifically rejected the argument that the unique context of employment
animates Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. See Burlington Northern,
548 U.S. at 64-67. Instead, the Court has broadly construed that provision
to encompass retaliation outside of the workplace, recognizing that the
"primary purpose" of that provision is not to address employment discrimi-
nation per se, but instead to "maintain[ ] unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms." Id. at 64 (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
It is this concern—protecting access to a civil rights remedial mechanism
—that demands we give the ADA the same broad construction.
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 19
downtown mainstream’ segregates them because of a disabil-
ity." Appellee’s Br. at 14. Each of these contentions fail.
First, governing regulations clearly prohibit public entities
from "mak[ing] selections" for "determining the site or loca-
tion of a facility" that "have the effect of excluding" the dis-
abled. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(4). Thus, ASWAN could
reasonably believe that selecting a hill for the location of a
facility frequented by a substantial disabled population vio-
lates this regulation.
Second, limitations is an affirmative defense that a defen-
dant, not a plaintiff, must prove; ASWAN opposed an "act or
practice made unlawful" by the ADA, which limitations does
not necessarily bar. Moreover, no case law exists assessing
whether a clearly meritorious affirmative defense negates a
"reasonable, good faith belief" of an "act or practice made
unlawful" by the ADA. Further, no appellate court had even
settled the question of which statute of limitations applies in
Virginia, making it hard for ASWAN to "reasonably believe"
its claims time-barred given that the ADA itself does not pre-
scribe a limitations period.
Third, a public entity that donates land may well be treated
as a segregating zoning authority because the regulations pro-
hibit "a public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service
. . . directly or through contractual, licensing, or other
arrangements," from denying a disabled person access to the
benefit. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)-(vii) (emphasis added).
Finally, the governing regulations also provide that a public
entity may not "subject[ ]" a disabled person to "discrimina-
tion," including segregationist policies. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a);
see also § 35.130(d) ("A public entity shall administer ser-
vices . . . in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of [the disabled]."); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,
588-89 (1999) (Congress specifically identified "segregation"
of the disabled as a problem addressed by the ADA).
20 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
V.
In sum, I believe ASWAN has pled allegations sufficient to
state an ADA retaliation claim. Accordingly, I would reverse
the contrary judgment of the district court as to that claim.
WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
Like Judge Motz, I join Judge Gilman’s conclusion that the
conspiracy claim was properly dismissed because an agree-
ment was not sufficiently alleged. I also join Judge Gilman’s
conclusion that the retaliation claim was properly dismissed
because Virginia Commonwealth University’s ("VCU")
alleged promise to provide transportation was merely gratu-
itous. However, I disagree with Judge Gilman’s and Judge
Motz’s conclusion that A Society Without A Name’s
("ASWAN") claims under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Equal Protection
Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrued when the Conrad Cen-
ter opened and that subsequent acts alleged in the Second
Amended Complaint do not constitute continuing violations.1
Because I conclude that ASWAN plausibly alleged continu-
ing violations against Homeward, VCU, and the City of Rich-
mond, I must respectfully dissent in part.
The majority opinion correctly observes that ASWAN’s
FHA, equal protection and § 1983 claims are subject to a two-
year limitations period, and its ADA claims are subject to a
one-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (FHA);
Al-Amin v. Shear, 325 F. App’x 190, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (equal protection and § 1983 claims); Wolsky v.
Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 223 (4th Cir.
1993) (ADA). When considering whether a continuing viola-
tion is alleged, however, "The Supreme Court has ‘stressed
1
For convenience, I hereafter refer to this particular conclusion as "the
majority opinion."
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 21
the need to identify with care the specific [discriminatory]
practice that is at issue.’" Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456,
462 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 624 (2007)); see also
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982)
(focusing on "the continuing nature of the alleged violation");
Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1991) (examining the "nature of the wrongful conduct
and harm alleged") (quotation marks omitted). Here, ASWAN
alleges at length in its ninety-five-page Second Amended
Complaint that the defendants have engaged, since at least the
early 1990s, in a series of calculated and discriminatory acts
designed to isolate homeless persons from Richmond’s down-
town, mainstream community.2 ASWAN alleges that the
2
I give here only a brief summary of the exhaustive and detailed allega-
tions of historical facts (many of which are substantiated by documents in
the Joint Appendix) leading to the recent isolation efforts that are the gra-
vamen of the Second Amended Complaint. ASWAN alleges that through
most of the ‘80s and ‘90s, the Daily Planet provided overnight shelter,
daytime residency, meals, and employment assistance services to Rich-
mond’s homeless population at the Street Center, which was located on
West Canal Street downtown. ASWAN further alleges that: In 1993, the
City of Richmond sold the West Canal Street location and promised to
assist in finding a new site for the Street Center. The Daily Planet settled
on a site on West Grace Street "in Richmond’s mainstream near VCU’s
campus." Despite a substantial grant from the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development to purchase and develop the West
Grace Street site, the Daily Planet did not pursue the site because VCU
and the City threatened to curtail financial support. VCU and the City con-
certedly dissuaded the Daily Planet from pursuing other locations, includ-
ing the City’s restrictive zoning ordinances, which became the subject of
a 1997 lawsuit. VCU and the City persistently urged the Daily Planet to
relocate its services for the homeless on 17th Street (later renamed Oliver
Hill Way). In 1997, the City adopted the Downtown Plan, which stated a
policy of relocating services for homeless and other defined "street per-
sons" away from downtown. Because of the Daily Planet’s unwillingness
to accept the Oliver Hill Way location, the defendants allegedly proposi-
tioned Freedom House, another provider of homeless services in Rich-
mond. Freedom House accepted the proposal, leased the Oliver Hill Way
site from VCU, obtained from the City a special use permit to build a
homeless shelter, and opened the doors of the Conrad Center on February
5, 2007.
22 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
defendants have only recently achieved this discriminatory
isolation, essentially by two means: first, by the siting and
construction of the Conrad Center in an allegedly remote
location; and second, by the piecemeal relocation of services
for homeless persons from the downtown community to the
Conrad Center. See, e.g., Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City
of St. Paul, Minn., 923 F.2d 91, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1991)
(upholding city ordinance tending to integrate and refusing to
"agree that Congress intended the Fair Housing Amendment
Act of 1988 to contribute to the segregation of the mentally
ill from the mainstream of our society"); see also Human Res.
Research & Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 687 F. Supp.
2d 237, 253-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Bryant Woods Inn,
Inc. v. Howard Cnty., Md., 911 F. Supp. 918, 946 (D. Md.
1996)).
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the system-
atic relocation of services—not the siting, construction or
opening of the Conrad Center—is the practice that is causing
homeless persons to be isolated from downtown Richmond.
Therefore, I cannot join the view of the Magistrate Judge and
the majority opinion that "ASWAN knew or should have
known of its purported injury stemming from the alleged con-
spiracy to relocate homeless services from downtown to Oli-
ver Hill Way when the Conrad Center opened on February 5,
2007." Ante at 9.
Certainly, ASWAN suffered no discriminatory treatment
by the mere construction or opening of the Conrad Center if
its members could continue to receive needed services in the
downtown, mainstream community. Rather, it is the reloca-
tion of those services, allegedly with the discriminatory
motive of isolating homeless persons from downtown, that is
the actionable injury. Cf. Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d
476, 489 (5th Cir. 2010) (in action alleging that city’s impass-
able, and thus ADA noncompliant, sidewalks and pathways
inhibited access by disabled persons to city’s services, pro-
grams or activities, statute of limitations ran from date plain-
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 23
tiff knew she was denied access to program, service or
activity, not date pathway was constructed), reh’g en banc
granted, 632 F.3d 177 (2011); Fair Housing Council, Inc. v.
Village of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 F. App’x 469, 480 (6th
Cir. 2006) (in FHA inaccessibility case, statute of limitations
runs from date plaintiff attempts to rent or buy the inaccessi-
ble unit, not the date it was built).
Accordingly, the majority errs by holding that ASWAN’s
claims accrued on the date the Conrad Center opened and by
dismissing the subsequent relocation of services to the Conrad
Center as mere effects of its opening. As this Court has previ-
ously explained:
If the discrimination alleged is a single act, the stat-
ute begins to run at the time of the act. If, on the
other hand, the statutory violation does not occur at
a single moment but in a series of separate acts and
if the same alleged violation was committed at the
time of each act, then the limitations period begins
anew with each violation and only those violations
preceding the filing of the complaint by the full limi-
tations period are foreclosed.
Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1991). The limit to this rule is that subsequent effects
from an earlier discriminatory act do not begin the limitations
period anew; rather, "[t]he challenged action must be repeated
within the statute of limitations period." Id.; see also Jersey
Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180,
189 (4th Cir. 1999) (where location of highway was alleged
discriminatory act, post-construction refusals to reconsider
location or to mitigate impact of highway on neighborhood
were mere effects of original alleged violation); Moseke v.
Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 507-08 (E.D. Va.
2002) (where plaintiffs alleged that condominiums did not
comply with FHA, continued existence of noncompliant fea-
24 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
tures were mere effects of original noncompliant construc-
tion).
To make out a continuing violation, ASWAN must there-
fore allege a discrete act of discrimination—related to the
larger asserted isolation effort—that occurred within the
applicable limitations period. Glendening, 174 F.3d at 189.
ASWAN has done so in this case by alleging that discrete acts
of the defendants between 2007 and 2009 caused in piecemeal
fashion the isolation of homeless persons from downtown
Richmond.
Instructive on this point is Lendo v. Garrett County Board
of Education, 820 F.2d 1365, 1367 (4th Cir. 1987), where this
Court found no cause and effect relationship between alleg-
edly discriminatory evaluations of a teacher’s performance
and his subsequent denial of tenure. The Court rejected the
characterization of the tenure denial as a mere effect of the
earlier discriminatory performance evaluations; the tenure
denial and performance evaluations were alleged as discrete
acts of discrimination. Id. Although the evaluations and the
denial of tenure were related, the teacher "could not have
known with any degree of certainty [at the time of the evalua-
tions] that he would eventually be denied tenure." Id. Thus,
the teacher was entitled "to develop his contentions" on the
discrete denial-of-tenure claim, which accrued within the lim-
itations period. Id. at 1368.
Similarly, in this case, the opening of the Conrad Center is
related to the relocation of services there only insofar as the
location of the Conrad Center has enabled the isolation of
homeless persons from downtown Richmond. As demon-
strated by Lendo, however, this relationship does not mean
that the relocation of a service to the Conrad Cen-
ter—allegedly motivated by isolationist animus—is not a dis-
crete act of discrimination. Indeed, the opening of the Conrad
Center in no sense caused homeless persons to be isolated
from downtown Richmond. Rather, defendants’ alleged acts
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 25
that caused services to relocate from downtown to the Conrad
Center are responsible for the alleged isolation. See Lendo,
820 F.2d at 1368 (the denial of tenure did not "inevitably fol-
low the [discriminatory] evaluations so as to be an effect of
them"). Any such discrete acts during the limitations period
are not time-barred. Nat’l Adver. Co., 947 F.2d at 1167.
ASWAN plausibly alleges that the City of Richmond,
Homeward, and VCU in April 2007 "pressured and encour-
aged Commonwealth Catholic Charities to locate at the Con-
rad Center on Oliver Hill Way a service called ‘Central
Intake’ for homeless people to sign up for and be processed
to obtain overnight shelter provided at local churches by
CARITAS." Joint Appendix at 294, 307, 327. ASWAN
alleges that Central Intake was previously located at "517
West Grace Street in Richmond’s mainstream and in its
downtown." Joint Appendix at 330. This plausible allegation
of a discrete discriminatory act, related to the larger isolation
effort, occurred less than two years before this lawsuit was
filed on February 17, 2009. Therefore, I conclude that the
FHA claims against Homeward, VCU, and the City, as well
as the equal protection and § 1983 claims against the City, are
not time-barred.
Additionally, ASWAN alleges additional discrete acts in
2009. ASWAN alleges that, in 2009, "City officials advised
homeless people . . . that during the winter of 2009-2010,
homeless people would be required to go through Central
Intake at the Conrad Center in order to receive shelter at the
City’s overflow shelter on very cold nights." By relocating
access to the overflow shelter, ASWAN claims that the City
has "succeeded in materially segregating disabled homeless
people during daylight hours from Richmond’s mainstream
because of their ADA protected status." Joint Appendix at
328. This is a plausible allegation of a discrete discriminatory
act by the City less than one year before the complaint was
filed, rendering ASWAN’s ADA claim against the City
timely.
26 A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
Similarly, ASWAN makes the following allegation against
VCU:
As part of VCU’s actions against disabled homeless
people, after Catholic Charities located Central
Intake at the Conrad Center, VCU has sought to per-
suade faith-based providers of homeless meals now
at Monroe Park to relocate their homeless feeding
programs to the Conrad Center. Such actions by
VCU . . . have included actions in 2009 to persuade
faith-based organizations to move homeless meals
programs to the Conrad Center. VCU’s purpose in
seeking to persuade such faith-based organizations to
relocate such programs from Monroe Park to the
Conrad Center have been to reduce the visibility of
homeless people . . . near VCU’s main campus.
Joint Appendix at 294. This too is a plausible allegation of a
discrete discriminatory act by VCU less than one year before
the complaint was filed, rendering the ADA claim against
VCU timely.
In contrast, I find no allegation of a discrete discriminatory
act by Homeward less than one year before the complaint was
filed. Therefore, I agree that the ADA claim against Home-
ward is time-barred. I also agree with the dismissal of all
claims against the Doe(s) defendants because I find no plausi-
ble allegation of any discriminatory act by them after 1996.
The only act plausibly alleged against Doe(s) is an offer to
contribute $2 million toward the construction of a facility for
homeless persons on Oliver Hill Way in "late 1995 or early
1996." Joint Appendix at 282. Absent some discrete act during
the limitations period, no continuing violation has been
alleged against Doe(s). Glendening, 174 F.3d at 189.
In sum, I conclude that ASWAN has plausibly alleged con-
tinuing violations of the FHA against the City of Richmond,
VCU, and Homeward. In my view, ASWAN also makes out
A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA 27
continuing ADA violations against the City of Richmond and
VCU. I would also permit the equal protection and § 1983
claims against the City of Richmond to proceed under the
continuing violation doctrine. To the extent that the majority
opinion holds differently, I respectfully dissent.