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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
VENEESA, INC., JOSEPH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
VENTRESCA, AND KATHLEEN : PENNSYLVANIA
VENTRESCA :
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
: No. 505 EDA 2021
:
THOMAS STEVENSON
Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 2007-07016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 8, 2022
Veneesa, Inc. (“Veneesa”) and Joseph and Kathleen Ventresca
(collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the February 17, 2021 order denying
their request for an injunction pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1531 that would have
prohibited Thomas Stevenson (“Stevenson”) from prosecuting a separate civil
suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.
The factual and procedural history of the instant case was set forth at
length in a prior memorandum of this Court. See Veneesa, Inc. v.
Stevenson, et al., 237 A.3d 491 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision
at 1-3). In pertinent part, Stevenson was a corporate officer of Veneesa. He
was named as one of several defendants in a civil complaint filed by Appellants
in August 2007, which described an “embezzlement scheme spanning years”
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and alleged Stevenson had “misappropriated the funds and assets of Veneesa
for his own personal benefit.” Id. at 2. Stevenson filed counterclaims alleging
that he was entitled to $400,000 in unpaid profit-sharing and also asked for
an additional $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages for allegedly
slanderous statements made by Joseph Ventresca. Stevenson’s Answer, New
Matter and Counterclaims, 10/4/07, at ¶¶ 140-171. Thereafter, the parties
engaged in approximately eleven years of contentious litigation. Stevenson
also faced criminal prosecution, wherein he “pled guilty to conspiracy to
receive stolen property and theft by unlawful taking, and agreed to pay
$516,696.32 in restitution.” Veneesa, supra at 2.
It is undisputed amongst the parties that Stevenson had a twenty-five
percent ownership stake in Veneesa during his employment tenure. See
Appellants’ Response to Motion In Limine, 4/26/18, at 1-4. In a pre-trial
motion in limine, Stevenson argued he should be entitled to twenty-five
percent of any judgment entered in favor of Veneesa in the above-captioned
case. This request was denied without prejudice and deferred until the time
of trial by the court. See Order, 8/15/18, at 1.
The current controversy centers upon the extensive pre-trial
negotiations amongst the parties, which largely appears to have taken place
in the trial court’s chambers and were not transcribed. Thus, no precise record
of these discussions exists. Appellants claim that, during the course of this
dialogue, Stevenson accepted civil liability in the amount of his
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aforementioned restitution order and “agreed to drop all claims,
counterclaims, and/or cross claims against all parties” in exchange for
Appellants withdrawing all claims against his wife, Terri Stevenson. See
Appellants’ Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 10/9/18, at ¶ 21(2). Concomitantly,
Appellants assert that all relevant parties agreed “to drop any claims,
counterclaims, and/or cross claims against the Stevensons and Terri
Stevenson [agreed] not to sue [Appellants] under any circumstances.” Id. at
¶ 21(3). The only corroboration of these claims is an October 3, 2018 trial
court order, which provides as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, this 1st day of October, 2018, Thomas
and Terri Stevenson will not appear on the caption or on the
verdict slip and a statement will be made to the jury indicating
that in a prior hearing, Thomas Stevenson had been ordered to
pay restitution to [Appellants] in the amount of $516,696.32.
Further, as there is no evidence against Terri Stevenson, the jury
is informed that she has been dismissed from this case, and Terri
Stevenson will not sue [Appellants] pursuant to agreement of all
counsel to the parties.
Order, 10/3/18, at 1 (cleaned up; emphasis omitted).
A jury trial was held from September 24 through October 2, 2018.
Neither Appellants’ claims against Stevenson nor Stevenson’s counterclaims
against Appellants appeared on the verdict slip. The only mention of
Stevenson on the verdict slip was the following statement: “It has already
been determined that [Stevenson] is liable to [Appellants] in the amount of
$516,696.32.” Verdict Slip, 10/2/18, at 1. The jury did not issue any findings
or assign damages in connection with the claims implicating Stevenson.
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The parties filed petitions for post-trial relief that culminated in an
omnibus order. See Order, 10/29/18, at 1-2. Thereafter, Appellants filed the
aforementioned appeal and the trial court entered judgment on behalf of the
various parties, which did not include Stevenson. See Order, 1/18/19, at ¶¶
1-2. While the appeal in Veneesa was pending, Appellants filed a praecipe
for the entry of a judgment against Stevenson in the amount of $516,696.32,
which was issued. Following an application from Stevenson, the trial court
struck the judgment in anticipation of this Court’s adjudication in Veneesa.
See Order, 4/11/19, at 1. On May 27, 2020, we affirmed the jury’s verdict.
In response, the trial court filed an order permitting Appellants to re-file for a
judgment against Stevenson. See Order, 6/26/20, at ¶ 3.
Appellants sought and were granted a second judgment against
Stevenson in the same amount. Stevenson filed another motion to strike,
arguing that the judgment was illusory. See Motion to Strike, 7/7/20, at ¶
5(w) (“[T]here was no verdict entered against Thomas Stevenson.”). The trial
court issued a rule to show cause as to why Stevenson’s motion to strike
should not be granted. Appellants responded that Stevenson was attempting
to circumvent the agreement it described in its post-trial motions. See
Appellants’ Reply to Rule to Show Cause, 7/30/20, at 23-25. The trial court
did not issue an order concerning its rule to show cause prior to this appeal.
Contemporaneously, Stevenson filed a separate civil action in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on January 8, 2020. See Appellants’
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Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 7/30/20, at Exhibit 1. Therein,
Stevenson averred that he still possessed a twenty-five percent ownership
interest in Veneesa, whose operations he claimed had been transferred
“without interruption” to two successor corporations: (1) The Joseph
Ventresca Group Builders & Renovators, LLC; and (2) JVBG, LLC. Id. at ¶¶ 1-
9. Stevenson argued that these actions were taken to “deprive [him] of his
portion of corporate profits to which he was entitled[.]” Id. at ¶ 15. Thus,
he requested an accounting, along with damages.
In the above-captioned case, Appellants filed a petition for an injunction,
which asserted that Stevenson had previously surrendered the claims raised
in his Philadelphia complaint by agreement in this case. Accordingly, Appellant
requested that the trial court issue “an immediate emergency injunction
prohibiting Stevenson from pursuing any claims or relief in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas or any other court until this Court concludes the
matters before it relevant to [Appellants] and [Stevenson].” Emergency
Motion for Special Relief Per Pa.R.C.P. 1531, 2/14/21, at 11. On February 17,
2021, the trial court denied the requested injunction.
Appellants filed a timely appeal.1 Both Appellants and the trial court
have complied with their obligations pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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1 The trial court’s order denying the injunction sought by Appellants is
interlocutory and appealable as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4) (“An appeal
may be taken as of right and without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellants have presented a single question for our consideration:
When victims of theft are awarded restitution in the criminal court
in one county (Bucks County) and then prevail in civil litigation
against the same criminal in the same county, is it an abuse of
discretion and an error of law for the court in that county to deny
the victims of crime and victors in the civil litigation an injunction
to prevent the criminal/unsuccessful civil litigant from relitigating
the same claims in a different county (i.e., Philadelphia)?
Appellants’ brief at 4.
Appellants’ petition arises under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1531, which empowers courts to issue “preliminary or special” injunctions to
prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” See Pa.R.C.P. 1531(a). A
preliminary injunction is “intended to preserve the status quo and prevent
imminent and irreparable harm that might occur before the merits of the case
can be heard and determined.” Lindeman v. Borough of Meyersdale, 131
A.3d 145, 151 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2015). By contrast, our Supreme Court has
described a “special injunction” as granting “relief which is auxiliary to the
main relief requested in the complaint.” Matter of Franklin Twp. Bd. of
Sup’rs, 379 A.2d 874, 879 (Pa. 1977). Additionally, “[a] special injunction
may be asked for during the pendency of an equity action, and it may be
granted at any stage of the proceedings, whenever it is necessary to preserve
____________________________________________
order that grants or denies . . . an injunction[.]” (emphasis added)). Thus,
our jurisdiction in this case is proper. See Petry v. Tanglwood Lakes, Inc.,
522 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.3 (“[A]n order refusing injunctions, although
interlocutory, is now appealable as right.”).
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the status quo.” Turner Const. v. Plumbers Local 690, 130 A.3d 47, 53
n.6 (Pa.Super. 2015).
While Rule 1531 “expressly recognizes special injunctions, the rule does
not define the term or differentiate it from a preliminary injunction.” Id. As
a practical matter, “because of the many similarities between preliminary and
special injunctions, the two types tend to merge into one and the words are
used interchangeably.” Hendricks v. Hendricks, 175 A.3d 323, 329 n.9
(Pa.Super. 2017). Moreover, “the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure treat
them exactly alike.” Id. Thus, while Appellants have neglected to explicitly
identify the type of injunction sought, the distinction is immaterial in this case.
In reviewing a trial court’s disposition of a preliminary or special
injunction, “an appellate court is to conduct a searching inquiry of the record”
in a manner that is “highly deferential” to the trial court’s findings. Id. at 330.
Our standard of review is, as follows:
When reviewing a trial court’s grant or refusal of a preliminary
injunction, an appellate court does not inquire into the merits of
the controversy, but rather examines only the record to ascertain
whether any apparently reasonable grounds existed for the action
of the court below. We may reverse if the trial court’s ruling
amounted to an abuse of discretion or a misapplication of law.
Id. The scope of our review is plenary. Id.
It is well-established that “[a] trial court may grant an injunction only if
the plaintiff seeking that extraordinary remedy establishes a clear right to the
requested relief.” WPNT Inc. v. Secret Communication Inc., 661 A.2d
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409, 410 (Pa.Super. 1995). Specifically, a party seeking the entry of a
preliminary or special injunction has the burden of establishing:
1) that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and
irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by
damages; 2) that greater injury would result from refusing an
injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly, that issuance
of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties
in the proceedings; 3) that a preliminary injunction will properly
restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior
to the alleged wrongful conduct; 4) that the activity it seeks to
restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the
wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely
to prevail on the merits; 5) that the injunction it seeks is
reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and, 6) that a
preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.
Warehime v. Warehime, 860 A.2d 41, 46-47 (Pa. 2004) (cleaned up).
Therefore, “[w]e will find that a trial court had apparently reasonable grounds
for its denial of injunctive relief where the trial court has properly found that
any one of the [foregoing] essential prerequisites for a preliminary injunction
is not satisfied.” Id. at 46 (citing Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. Shoe
Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. 2003)).
Here, the injunction requested by Appellants concerned restraint of
litigation. As a general matter, this type of injunctive relief is cognizable under
the venerable case law of our Commonwealth:
If suits may be perpetually brought to litigate the same questions
between the same parties, or their privies, as often as either
should choose, it is obvious that remedial justice would become a
mockery, for the termination of one suit would only become the
signal for the institution of a new one, and the expense might be
ruinous to all the parties. The obvious ground of the jurisdiction
of courts of equity in cases of this sort is to suppress useless
litigation and to prevent a multiplicity of suits.
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Lyons v. Importers’ & Traders’ Nat. Bank, 63 A. 827, 829 (Pa. 1906).
Therefore, “[t]he court first acquiring jurisdiction of a case will protect that
jurisdiction by enjoining an action by the same parties on the same subject
matter in another court[.]” Trees v. Glenn, 181 A. 579, 581 (Pa. 1935); see
also, e.g., Signora v. Liberty Travel, Inc., 846 A.2d 145, 147 (Pa.Super.
2004) (affirming scope of injunctive relief that enjoined defendants from
challenging default judgment “in the courts of the state of New Jersey, or in
the courts of any other foreign state”). However, “the power should be
exercised only in extreme cases.” Trees, supra at 581.
Overall, Appellants’ framing and discussion of this issue is lackluster and
consists largely of repeating, ad nauseam, portions of the following block
quotation from our Supreme Court’s holding in Trees:
Where a court whose power is adequate to the administration of
complete justice in the premises has acquired jurisdiction of a
case, the litigation should be confined to that forum, and any
attempt by either party to divert the litigation to another court will
be restrained by injunction, especially after an adverse decision
on the claim of the party seeking relief in a new forum. The
observance of this rule is essential to the due and orderly
administration of justice and the integrity of judgments and
decrees, and in order to render valid its operation it is not
essential that the element of irreparable damage should be
involved. Furthermore, the propriety of the remedy by injunction
is not affected by the fact that the court subsequently acquiring
jurisdiction of the matter has equity as well as common law
powers.
Trees, supra at 581-82 (emphasis added); see also Appellants’ brief at 37,
39-41. Critically, Appellants have not addressed their arguments to the six
elements that form their burden of proof either in the trial court or in this
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Court. Rather, Appellants’ discussion suggests that this precedent is somehow
self-executing and automatically results in the issuance of an injunction. See
Appellants’ brief at 43 (“Until [Trees] is overruled, it remains binding
precedent which requires the employment of an injunction[.]”). We disagree.
As discussed above, Appellants have the burden of establishing that
each of the six prerequisites for the issuance of a preliminary or special
injunction. See Warehime, supra at 46. At this juncture, it bears
mentioning that “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080,
1088-89 (Pa.Super. 2014). While Trees and the related case law cited above
provide that a party is permitted to seek an injunction to restrain allegedly
duplicative litigation, these precedents do not obviate the petitioner’s well-
established burden of proof. In order to secure an injunction arresting
litigation, a party must still satisfy the applicable legal standards.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellant is excused from compliance
with the irreparable-harm prong pursuant to the highlighted portion of Trees
quoted above, Appellants have failed to offer any affirmative argument as the
other five necessary elements. In particular, we conclude that there is
insufficient evidence to establish that: (1) an injunction restraining Stevenson
from pursuing legal action in Philadelphia would properly restore the status
quo between the parties; and (2) Appellants’ right to relief is clear.
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In this context, “[t]he status quo to be maintained by a preliminary
injunction is the legal status that preceded the pending controversy.” The
York Group, Inc. v. Yorktowne Caskets, Inc., 924 A.2d 1234, 1244
(Pa.Super. 2007). With respect to the likelihood of success, “[w]e do not
attempt to determine whether the party seeking the preliminary injunction is
guaranteed to prevail because our review of a decision regarding a preliminary
injunction does not reach the merits of the controversy.” Ambrogi v. Reber,
932 A.2d 969, 980 (Pa.Super. 2007). Specifically, the petitioner seeking an
injunction must establish a prima facie right to relief. See Synthes USA
Sales, LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa.Super. 2013).
At a basic level, Appellants’ position is that Stevenson’s civil action in
Philadelphia is duplicative of this proceeding. Instantly, Stevenson raised
counterclaims as to his alleged ownership interests in Veneesa. However,
those issues were withdrawn prior to trial and never addressed on the merits
by the jury. Moreover, Stevenson’s admission of civil liability in the amount
of the restitution ordered in his criminal case would not, and did not,
negatively impact the potential viability of his counterclaims. While the trial
court’s October 3, 2018 order provided that Stevenson’s wife had surrendered
any future legal claims against the parties in this case, no such limiting proviso
was made with respect to Stevenson. See Order, 10/3/18, at 1. Thus, there
is no indication that these claims were withdrawn with prejudice and no
preclusive holding has been made regarding Stevenson’s ownership interest.
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Furthermore, the issues raised in Stevenson’s Philadelphia complaint
appear to be distinct from this case. That civil action concerns corporate
actions taken after the instant lawsuit, whereby the operations of Veneesa
allegedly were transferred to corporate successors-in-interest to avoid paying
Stevenson profit shares. Indeed, the party-defendants in Philadelphia are not
named or otherwise involved in this case. Additionally, as the trial court
explained, it is not clear why Appellants have resorted to the extreme remedy
of an injunction arresting litigation instead of pleading various affirmative
defenses in the Philadelphia action. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/1/21, at 3 (“If,
in fact, the pending case in Philadelphia County is the same case or
controversy, then Appellants may assert their affirmative defenses under
Pa.R.C.P. 1030 and seek a prompt dismissal.”).
As detailed above, the gravamen of Appellants’ arguments is that
Stevenson’s withdrawal of charges should preclude him from filing a lawsuit
in Philadelphia. However, no factual or legal determinations were made
concerning Stevenson’s alleged ownership interest in Veneesa. Furthermore,
there is no corroboration in the certified record that Stevenson’s claims were
otherwise surrendered with prejudice. Accordingly, Appellants have failed to
demonstrate the legal status quo requires restoration. For the same reason,
Appellants’ ability to prevail on the merits of its arguments concerning the
preclusion of Stevenson’s civil claims appears equally dubious.
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Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the trial court had
reasonable grounds for denying Appellants’ request for an injunction.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/8/2022
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