Poliner v. Texas Health Systems

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
July 23, 2008

No. 06-11235 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

LAWRENCE R POLINER, MD; LAWRENCE R POLINER, MD, PA

Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.

TEXAS HEALTH SYSTEMS, a Texas Non-Profit Corporation, doing business
as Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas; JAMES KNOCHEL, MD

Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
This appeal brings to us a judgment awarding some $33 million, including
prejudgment interest, against a major hospital and leading physician for alleged
defamations. As we will explain, this extraordinary judgment rests on limited
restrictions of Dr. Lawrence Poliner’s privileges at Presbyterian Hospital over
a period of fewer than twenty-nine days to investigate concerns involving his
handling of several patients. This peer review, which was headed by Dr. James
Knochel, led to a suspension of Poliner’s cardiac catheterization lab and
echocardiography privileges that lasted approximately five months. Poliner sued
Knochel, Presbyterian, and other doctors involved in the peer review alleging
 No. 06-11235

various federal and state law violations. The district court found that the
suspension enjoyed immunity from money damages under the federal Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA),1 and granted a partial summary
judgment. But the court concluded that whether the temporary restrictions of
privileges during the investigation enjoyed immunity from money damages
presented questions for a jury.
The case proceeded to trial solely on the temporary restrictions of
privileges. The jury found for Poliner on his defamation claims.2 Poliner was
able to offer evidence at trial of actual loss of income of about $10,000—but was
awarded more than $90 million in defamation damages, nearly all for mental
anguish and injury to career. The jury also awarded $110 million in punitive
damages. The district court ordered a remittitur of the damages and entered
judgment against Defendants. We hold that Defendants are immune under the
HCQIA from money damages for the temporary restrictions of Poliner’s
privileges. We reverse and render judgment for Defendants.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
A.
On May 12, 1998, Patient 36 presented in Presbyterian’s emergency room
with chest pains, and he was referred to Dr. Lawrence Poliner, an interventional
cardiologist who had a solo practice at Presbyterian Hospital. Diagnostic tests
indicated that the patient was suffering from a heart attack, and that the
patient’s right coronary artery (RCA) was partially blocked. Poliner performed
a procedure to open the artery. However, Poliner made a diagnostic mistake: the
patient’s left anterior descending artery (LAD) was completely blocked, and

1
See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq.
2
The jury also found for Poliner on his breach of contract, business disparagement,
interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
Poliner elected to recover under the defamation theory after trial.

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Poliner missed it. Another doctor, Dr. Tony Das, saw the LAD on a monitor in
the control room. Poliner learned that he missed the LAD sometime after
completing the procedure. Das spoke to him about the procedure and the LAD.
Dr. Charles Levin, the director of the catheterization lab, heard that day that
Poliner had performed an emergency procedure. He reviewed the patient’s films,
and then spoke with Poliner.
In an addendum to the chart, Poliner admitted that he missed the totally
blocked LAD. He wrote that “[i]n reviewing the films, it is apparent that the left
anterior descending coronary artery is totally occluded,” and that “[a]t the time
that this study was done and visualizing the anatomy in the laboratory from the
video, this was not apparent, but it is obvious from reviewing the films.” Poliner
indicated that he might have treated the LAD before the RCA had he seen it.
Patient 36 also suffered post-procedure complications. The patient
suffered internal bleeding and eventually went into shock, deteriorating to the
point that a critical care specialist, Dr. Kenney Weinmeister, was brought in.
Weinmeister testified that the patient was suffering from “severe metabolic
acidosis,” which “was due to what we call hypovolemia or essentially blood loss
so that he didn’t have enough fluid in his vessels to maintain blood pressure, and
that was due to a retroperitoneal hemorrhage or bleeding.” The patient was, in
his words, “near respiratory failure.” Weinmeister testified that, had he not
intervened, the patient could have died within an hour. Poliner was in the ICU
a number of times following the patient’s procedure. There were problems
contacting Poliner, although at trial there was testimony that he tried to call the
ICU several times but he could not get through. Poliner also sent his wife, who
is a nurse, over to check on the patient. As the patient’s condition deteriorated
in the afternoon, Poliner was not present. There was evidence at trial that he
had another procedure scheduled that afternoon, but the time line is not entirely

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clear. Dr. John Harper, the chief of cardiology, was told about Patient 36 on May
12, and he reviewed the patient’s chart and films.
Dr. James Knochel, the chairman of the Internal Medicine Department
(IMD), learned about Patient 36 from Das and Weinmeister the next day, May
13.3 This, however, was not the first of Poliner’s patients to come to Knochel’s
attention. Cardiology was part of the IMD, and four of Poliner’s other
patients—Patients 3, 9, 10, and 18—had been referred by the hospital’s Clinical
Risk Review Committee (CRRC) to Knochel and the Internal Medicine Advisory
Committee (IMAC), which Knochel chaired, for review.4

3
The trial testimony is somewhat unclear about what exactly Knochel knew on May
13 about the post-procedure care Patient 36 received. Knochel and Weinmeister testified that
they spoke about the patient. Weinmeister testified that he told Knochel about his concerns
regarding Patient 36’s post-procedure problems, while Knochel suggested in his testimony that
he may not have been aware of all of the post-procedure problems.
4
Generally, when an incident occurred at Presbyterian, including something relating
to patient care, a Committee Event Report Form (CERF) would be completed. The CERF was
sent to the hospital’s risk management department for processing. If the event involved
clinical issues, the CERF was forwarded to the CRRC. The CRRC would review the incident,
and if the committee had concerns, it would forward the case to the relevant department for
further review. When an incident involved the IMD, Knochel would receive the referral from
CRRC, and the IMAC would assist in determining whether the patient had received acceptable
care.

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Poliner’s care of Patients 3,5 9,6 10,7 and 188 involved different issues of
varying degrees of concern, but in each case, his medical judgment had been
questioned and, to some extent, criticized.9 Although Patient 10 had been
reviewed and cleared by the IMAC in March 1997, the other cases were of recent
vintage. The CRRC referred Patients 3 and 18 to the IMD in early 1998.
Knochel asked a cardiologist to review each case, and the IMAC considered the
cases at the end of April. The CRRC referred Patient 9 to the IMD in April.

5
In December 1997, Poliner treated Patient 3. The issue here was Poliner’s decision
to re-use a sheath site for a second procedure after the nurses expressed concern that the site
may have been contaminated by urine and blood. Poliner wanted to preserve the other sheath
site in case another procedure was required.
6
Poliner treated Patient 9 in October 1997. The procedure performed by Poliner was
not questioned, but other treatment decisions were. There were concerns about the amount
of blood thinner ordered pre-procedure, as well as orders for additional blood thinner and
another drug post-procedure. At approximately 2:00 a.m., the patient was experiencing
stroke-like symptoms. A nurse called Poliner, and he ordered a platelet infusion. Poliner did
not then return to Presbyterian to evaluate the patient, although there may have been little
else he could have done at the time. Nor did he order a CT scan or request a neurological
consult. Poliner returned to the hospital in the morning and requested the neurological
consult. The patient subsequently had CT scans and underwent surgery later in the day. The
case involved several nursing errors as well.
7
Poliner performed a catheterization on Patient 10 in the fall of 1996. The patient had
shellfish and Betadine allergies. There were concerns at the time that a shellfish allergy was
predictive of an allergy to iodine-containing contrast dye that was used in catheterizations.
The patient refused to be pretreated with Benadryl. Poliner decided to proceed with the
procedure. The patient developed a rash, although it is unclear whether the contrast-dye in
fact caused the rash. The primary concern was Poliner’s decision to proceed with the procedure
without any allergy pretreatment.
8
Patient 18, an 88-year-old woman, presented in the emergency room with a heart
attack in September 1997. She was referred to Poliner, and he decided to perform a
catheterization. The patient died during the procedure. The primary issue was whether it was
appropriate to attempt the procedure or whether she should have been treated medically.
9
One other case discussed at trial involved a mistake Poliner made during a
catheterization. Poliner accidentally threaded a catheter through Patient 39’s vein instead of
the artery. The primary concern was not that Poliner initially entered the vein by accident, but
that it took him too long to realize the mistake; indeed, the catheter reached the patient’s
heart. The parties dispute whether this case factored into Knochel’s decision, but for our
purposes, it does not matter whether it did or not.

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Levin completed a review of the case sometime before May 13, although the
IMAC had yet to take up the case. It was against this backdrop that Knochel
learned of Patient 36. Knochel consulted with Harper, Levin, various hospital
administrators and the members of the IMAC on May 13, and decided that he
would seek an abeyance—a temporary restriction—of Poliner’s cath lab
privileges to allow for an investigation as provided for in the Medical Staff
bylaws.10
Late on May 13, Knochel met with Poliner, Harper, and Levin, and asked
Poliner to agree to the abeyance. When Poliner asked what his options were,
Knochel told him that the alternative was suspension of his privileges.11 The
abeyance letter was delivered to Poliner the next afternoon, May 14, and
Knochel asked Poliner to sign and return it by 5:00 p.m. The letter advised
Poliner that Patient 36 was the catalyst, and that Patients 3, 9, and 18 had also
been referred by the CRRC to the IMD. The letter explained that Knochel was
going to appoint an ad hoc committee of cardiologists to conduct a review, and
that Poliner would have the opportunity to meet with Knochel and the IMAC to
respond to any concerns raised by the committee that could lead to corrective
action prior to the action being taken. Poliner requested more time so he could

10
Presbyterian’s Medical Staff bylaws provide that
[w]henever the activities or professional conduct of any physician are of such
concern that in the assessment of the department chairman, vice-chairman, or
advisory committee, further evaluation of the activities or professional conduct
is necessary, the department chairman, vice-chairman, or advisory committee
may hold certain clinical privileges of the physician in abeyance for a period of
up to fifteen (15) days (the initial action) while additional review is performed.
Such action shall be known as Abeyance. The physician must agree to the
abeyance prior to the taking of such action. If the physician does not agree to
the abeyance, the department will proceed with the corrective action or
suspension.
11
The bylaws allow for a summary suspension of clinical privileges “when the acts of
a practitioner through his lack of competence, impaired status, behavior or failure to care
adequately for his patients constitutes a present danger to the health of his patients.”

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consult a lawyer, but Knochel declined. Poliner signed the abeyance request.
Poliner subsequently engaged legal counsel.
Knochel immediately appointed an ad hoc committee of six cardiologists
to review a sample of Poliner’s cases. The committee reviewed 44 cases, and
concluded that Poliner gave substandard care in more than half. The IMAC met
on May 27, the thirteenth day of the abeyance, to consider the ad hoc committee
report, and recommended conducting additional reviews of echocardiograms and
obtaining an outside review. The IMAC also recommended extending the
abeyance of Poliner’s cath lab privileges as provided for in the bylaws.12 Knochel
had a letter hand delivered to Poliner requesting his consent to the extension.
The letter advised Poliner that the extension was investigational in nature and
that the ad hoc committee had reviewed 44 of his cases. The letter also stated
that Poliner would have an opportunity to meet with the IMAC to respond to the
ad hoc committee review. Knochel again told Poliner that the alternative to
abeyance was a suspension. Poliner signed the extension request on May 29.
A meeting of the IMAC was scheduled for June 11. On June 8, Knochel
sent Poliner a letter advising him of the June 11 meeting and asking him to
attend the meeting. Knochel provided Poliner with a list of the patients that had
been reviewed and the comments of the reviewers, and told him that the patient
records would be available to him. Poliner requested that the June 11 meeting
be delayed to allow him more time to review the patients’ files, but his request
was denied and the meeting was held as scheduled. The day after the meeting,
June 12, the IMAC agreed unanimously that Poliner’s cath lab and
echocardiography privileges should be suspended.13

12
The bylaws provide, “The department chairman, vice-chairman or advisory committee
may extend the abeyance for an additional fourteen (14) days.”
13
As will be seen, the district court later granted summary judgment to all defendants
participating in this suspension of privileges after finding immunity under federal law. It was
from this unchallenged grant of summary judgment that Poliner tacked to the argument that

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An addendum to the IMAC meeting minutes reflects the following
concerns about Poliner: (1) poor clinical judgment; (2) inadequate skills,
including angiocardiography and echocardiography; (3) unsatisfactory
documentation of medical records; and (4) substandard patient care. Knochel
accepted the recommendation of the IMAC and suspended Poliner’s cath lab and
echocardiography privileges on June 12.
On July 10, Poliner requested a hearing on the June 12 suspension.
Although he had a right to an expedited hearing under the bylaws, and the letter
informing Poliner of his suspension advised him so, Poliner did not request an
expedited hearing.14 The hospital notified Poliner on August 14 that a hearing
had been set for September 14, and identified who would be on the Hearing
Committee. On August 19, Poliner requested a continuance. On October 5, the
hospital notified Poliner that the hearing had been rescheduled for the first week
of November, as Poliner had apparently requested.
The hearing was held as re-scheduled, and on November 9, the Hearing
Committee issued its recommendations. The Committee concluded that the
June 12 suspension should be upheld based on the evidence that was available
at the time of the suspension but that Poliner’s privileges should be reinstated
with a condition.15 Presbyterian’s Medical Board accepted the Committee’s

the temporary restriction of privileges during the investigation was distinct from the June 12
suspension.
14
It is unclear from the bylaws whether the suspended physician must specifically
request the expedited hearing or is entitled to it as of right. The bylaws state that “a hearing
for a practitioner who is under suspension which is then in effect shall be held as soon as
arrangements may reasonably be made, but not later than ten (10) days from the date of
receipt of such petitioner’s request for hearing.” The bylaws then provide, “A physician under
suspension who requests an expedited hearing shall have waived his right to the 30-day
hearing notice requirement.” This uncertainty is of no moment.
15
Specifically, the Hearing Committee recommended that “Poliner should be required
to have a mandatory consultation with another cardiologist on staff who has interventional
cardiology privileges in the Cardiac Cath Lab. Consultation should be for concurrence with
documented indications for the selected procedure to be performed prior to the procedure.” The

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recommendations. Poliner appealed the Medical Board’s decision to uphold the
June 12 suspension to Presbyterian’s Committee on Professional Affairs (CPA).
The appeal was limited to determining whether Poliner had substantially
received the procedural due process provided for in the bylaws. The CPA
determined he had, and Presbyterian’s Board of Trustees upheld that decision.
B.
In May 2000, Poliner and his professional association sued Knochel,
Harper, Levin, Presbyterian, and other doctors who had been involved in the
peer review process. Poliner brought federal antitrust claims as well as state
antitrust, Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and numerous tort claims. Defendants
moved for summary judgment on, among other grounds, immunity under the
HCQIA. On September 30, 2003, the district court issued its decision.
In analyzing HCQIA immunity, the district court concluded that there
were two peer review actions, the May 14 abeyance and June 12 suspension.
The court held, as to the May 14 abeyance, that fact questions precluded
summary judgment. The court found a fact issue as to whether Knochel’s threat
to summarily suspend Poliner if he did not agree to the abeyance vitiated
Poliner’s consent. If Poliner had not freely agreed, the court reasoned that the
abeyance was then in fact a summary suspension. If this was so, the court
concluded that there were fact issues as to whether Defendants satisfied the
HCQIA’s standards. Thus, the court denied HCQIA immunity, as well as state
law immunity, to Knochel, Harper, Levin, and Presbyterian.

pre-procedure consultation was to apply to the first 30 patients “for which intervention is
contemplated,” at which point Harper was to review those 30 cases and “make a
recommendation to Dr. Knochel about Dr. Poliner’s clinical performance before unrestricted
privileges are to be granted.” Approximately a month after the Medical Board approved this
condition, it changed the condition from pre-procedure consultation to post-procedure review
of the first 30 cases. This review was to be conducted by an outside reviewer, who would also
review at least 30 other comparable cases from other cardiologists, ostensibly for the purpose
of comparison. The outside reviewer’s conclusions would be given to the cardiology chief who
would then make a recommendation to Knochel for further action.

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The court ruled that the remaining defendants, who had served on the ad
hoc committee and on the IMAC, were entitled to HCQIA and state law
immunity. The court dismissed some of Poliner’s claims but ruled that fact
issues remained as to Poliner’s remaining tort claims, including defamation,
against Knochel, Harper, Levin, and Presbyterian.
The district court’s summary judgment decision reshaped the case. As
Poliner explained in his motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint,
The Court found that there was an issue of fact with respect to
whether the May 14, 1998 Abeyance (the “Forced Abeyance”) was in
fact a de facto summary suspension. The Summary Judgment
Ruling centers on the action of the Defendants in imposing the
Forced Abeyance, shifting the majority of the focus of the case to the
time period before and on May 14, 1998, when the Forced Abeyance
was imposed. . . . Given the Summary Judgment Ruling and the
Court’s recent comments, it is clear that the focus of the case has
shifted from an emphasis on the [June 12] Summary Suspension to
an emphasis on the Forced Abeyance, a shift that the parties could
not have reasonably foreseen. Now that such shift has occurred,
Plaintiffs request leave to amend their Complaint for the purpose of
conforming the complaint to the issues that the Court has indicated
will be submitted to the jury.

Indeed, one of the amendments Poliner offered as an example in his motion was
“add[ing] allegations regarding the Forced Abeyance that will allow the jury to
decide whether or not the Forced Abeyance, in reality, was a summary
suspension.”
In a subsequent order, dated July 7, 2004, the district court clarified that
Poliner could not recover any damages from the June 12 suspension: “Based on
the Court’s finding that all of the participants in the June 12, 1998 suspension
were entitled to immunity, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover damages flowing from that suspension.” The order also stated that, “[i]n
light of this ruling, the propriety of the [ad hoc committee’s] review and the
IMAC’s recommendation is no longer at issue. Accordingly, evidence of malice

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or the motive of any of the participants in the June 12, 1998 suspension is not
relevant, nor is any evidence regarding the [ad hoc committee’s] analysis of the
patients’ files examined.”
C.
After four years of litigation, Poliner’s trial theory tracked this new course:
he was forced to agree to the abeyances, the consequence of which was that
Knochel had summarily suspended him. This mattered, he said, because, under
the Medical Staff bylaws, a summary suspension was allowed when a doctor
posed a “present danger to the health of his patients,” and he posed no such
danger. Rather, Poliner suggested that he was suspended because his solo
practice was a competitive threat to the dominant cardiology groups at
Presbyterian, that Knochel “had it in for” him.
The trial evidence largely focused on the propriety of Poliner’s treatment
of Patients 3, 9, 10, 18, 39, and especially 36, and whether the mistakes Poliner
had made rendered him a “present danger.” Consistent with the court’s July 7
order, the jury was not told about the ad hoc committee’s conclusions and the
IMAC’s responses, although the jury was told that there was an investigation,
that Poliner was summarily suspended on July 12, and that after the November
hearing, his privileges were reinstated.
During the charge conference, the district court raised the issue of whether
the abeyance period involved one or two peer review actions, and eventually
decided to charge the jury that the May 14 abeyance and the extension of the
abeyance were separate peer review actions.
The case was submitted to the jury, which found for Poliner on all of his
remaining claims. The jury awarded in aggregate more than $360 million in
damages, $90 million of which were for the defamation claims. Almost all of the
damages awarded were for mental anguish, injury to career, and punitive
damages. Harper and Levin settled with Poliner after trial. Poliner elected to

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recover under his defamation theory against Knochel and Presbyterian. The
district court remitted the defamation damages to $10.5 million for injury to
career, $10.5 million for mental anguish, and $1.5 million in punitive damages,
and further ordered prejudgment interest, which totals over $11 million.
Defendants appealed. Poliner cross-appealed but subsequently dismissed his
appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review the denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.16
A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when “a reasonable jury would
not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue.”17 “In entertaining a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law the
court must review all of the evidence in the record, draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.”18 “Nonetheless, ‘[i]f the facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party
that the reviewing court believes that reasonable jurors could not have arrived
at a contrary verdict, then we will conclude that the motion should have been
granted.’”19
III. Health Care Quality Improvement Act
Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act because it was
concerned about “[t]he increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the
need to improve the quality of medical care,” and because “[t]here is a national
need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State

16
Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2007).
17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
18
Ellis v. Weasler Eng’g, Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001).
19
Dixon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 F.3d 311, 313-314 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cramer, 6 F.3d 1102, 1109 (5th Cir. 1993)).

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without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s previous damaging or
incompetent performance.”20 Congress viewed peer review as an important
component of remedying these problems, but recognized that lawsuits for money
damages dampened the willingness of people to participate in peer review.21
Accordingly, Congress “grant[ed] limited immunity from suits for money
damages to participants in professional peer review actions.”22
When a “professional review action” as defined by the statute meets
certain standards, the HCQIA provides that participants in the peer review
“shall not be liable in damages under any law of the United States or of any
State (or political subdivision thereof) with respect to the action.”23 The statute
establishes four requirements for immunity:
For purposes of the protection set forth in section 11111(a) of this
title, a professional review action must be taken--

(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of
quality health care,

(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,

(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the
physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the
physician under the circumstances, and

20
42 U.S.C. § 11101(1), (2).
21
See Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“Before passage of the HCQIA in 1986, threats of antitrust action and other lawsuits often
deterred health care entities from conducting effective peer review.”).
22
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d Cir. 1996).
23
42 U.S.C. § 11111(a); see also id. §11151(9) (defining “professional review action”).
The act includes exceptions for certain civil rights actions that are not at issue here. See id.
§ 11111(a).

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(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the
facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after
meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).24

“The Act includes a presumption that a professional review [action] meets the
standards for immunity, ‘unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance
of the evidence.’”25 We agree with our sister circuits that the HCQIA’s
“reasonableness requirements were intended to create an objective standard of
performance, rather than a subjective good faith standard.”26
A.
HCQIA immunity extends to “professional review actions.” The Act
defines a “professional review action” in part as
an action or recommendation of a professional review body which is
taken or made in the conduct of professional review activity, which
is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health
or welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect)
adversely the clinical privileges, or membership in a professional
society, of the physician.27

24
Id. § 11112(a).
25
Mathews, 87 F.3d at 633 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)).
26
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 1994); see
also Singh, 308 F.3d at 32 (“Our sister circuits have uniformly applied all the sections of §
11112(a) as objective standards. We apply these objective standards here.” (citations omitted));
Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Further, we have held
that the reasonableness requirements contained in section 11112(a) necessitate an objective
inquiry.”); Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“Courts apply an objective standard in determining whether a peer review action was
reasonable under 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).”); Mathews, 87 F.3d at 635 (“We agree with our sister
circuits that § 11112(a) imposes an objective standard.”); Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1485
(9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “the ‘reasonableness’ requirements of § 11112(a) were intended
to create an objective standard, rather than a subjective standard”). We previously indicated
in an unpublished opinion that the “reasonableness” requirements impose an objective
standard. See Doe v. La. Psychiatric Med. Ass’n, No. 96-30232, 1996 WL 670414, at *3 (5th
Cir. Oct. 28, 1996).
27
42 U.S.C. § 11151(9).

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The jury was charged that the May 14 abeyance and the extension of the
abeyance were both professional review actions. We agree.
Both restrictions on Poliner’s cath lab privileges meet the substantive
elements of this definition. While there could be no extension of the abeyance
without the initial abeyance, the extension of the abeyance resulted from an
independent decision that another period of restriction was needed. To put it
differently, the May 14 abeyance and the extension, although imposing the same
substantive restrictions, enjoyed distinct justification and in this sense
independently limited Poliner’s privileges.28 Thus, we evaluate the abeyance and
the extension separately for compliance with § 11112(a).
To be clear, the abeyances are temporary restrictions of privileges, and we
use that terminology, which comes from the Medical Staff bylaws, in our
discussion; but for the purposes of HCQIA immunity from money damages, what
matters is that the restriction of privileges falls within the statute’s definition
of “peer review action,” and what we consider is whether these “peer review
actions” satisfy the HCQIA’s standards, and not whether the “abeyances” satisfy
the bylaws.
We deal with one other preliminary matter now. The decision to extend
the abeyance was made after the ad hoc committee reported the results of its
review to Knochel and the IMAC; however, because of the district court’s
pre-trial order of July 7, the jury did not learn of this. This does not impede our
consideration of the evidence because the district court’s summary judgment and

28
Cf. Mathews, 87 F.3d at 634 (“The definition of ‘professional review action’
encompasses decisions or recommendations by peer review bodies that directly curtail a
physician’s clinical privileges or impose some lesser sanction that may eventually affect a
physician’s privileges.”); Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 883 F. Supp. 1016, 1027 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (explaining that “the term ‘professional review action’ refers to the decision that results
from a review of the facts obtained”); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1054,
1065 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that the § 11112(a) standards “apply to discrete decisions,
not to an ongoing course of conduct”).

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July 7 orders establish the relevant historical facts29 and the propriety of the ad
hoc committee review for HCQIA purposes. The district court found that the ad
hoc committee members were entitled to HCQIA immunity, and more to the
point, the ad hoc committee’s review undergirded the grant of HCQIA immunity
for the June 12 suspension. Neither of the orders has been challenged on appeal.
They are the law of the case.
B.
We begin with whether each peer review action was taken “in the
reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care.”
It is plain that they were by the controlling standards. Other circuits have
explained, as relevant under the facts of this case, that “[t]he ‘reasonable belief’
standard of the HCQIA is satisfied if ‘the reviewers, with the information
available to them at the time of the professional review action, would reasonably
have concluded that their action would restrict incompetent behavior or would
protect patients.’”30 “[T]he Act does not require that the professional review
result in an actual improvement of the quality of health care,”31 nor does it
require that the conclusions reached by the reviewers were in fact correct.32 It

29
It is not clear whether the committee concluded that Poliner gave substandard care
in 26 or 29 cases. Some evidence and the district court’s summary judgment order states that
it was 29 cases, while the minutes from the IMAC meeting on May 27 list 26 cases. For our
purposes, it makes no difference whether the number is 26 or 29.
30
Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1323).
31
Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1994); see also
Meyers, 341 F.3d at 468 (same).
32
See Imperial, 37 F.3d at 1030 (“But more importantly to the issue at hand, even if
Imperial could show that these doctors reached an incorrect conclusion on a particular medical
issue because of a lack of understanding, that does not meet the burden of contradicting the
existence of a reasonable belief that they were furthering health care quality in participating
in the peer review process.”).

16
 No. 06-11235

bears emphasizing that “the good or bad faith of the reviewers is irrelevant”;33
rather it is an objective inquiry in which we consider the totality of the
circumstances.34
It is indisputable that Poliner’s treatment of Patient 36 raised serious
questions about what had happened and why. Missing the LAD was a critical
diagnostic error, made all the more troubling by the fact that Das and Levin saw
the LAD; indeed, Poliner described the LAD as obvious and clear in his
addendum. The concerns that flow from the LAD are amplified by the problems
with Poliner’s other patients that had been brought to Knochel’s attention. It
was in relatively quick succession that Knochel was presented with separate
cases that called into question Poliner’s medical judgment. That Poliner had
over 20 years of experience and an apparently clean record before these cases
only serves to heighten the concern: why was this experienced physician now
having these problems? On May 14, there was ample basis for concern.
The ad hoc committee’s review, upon which the extension of the abeyance
rested, speaks for itself. A group of six cardiologists reviewed 44 of Poliner’s
cases and concluded that he gave substandard care in more than half of the
cases. We conclude that, as to both peer review actions, the belief that
temporarily restricting Poliner’s cath lab privileges during an investigation
would further quality health care was objectively reasonable.
Poliner defends the jury’s verdict by arguing that the evidence
demonstrates that had Poliner “actually administered the purported ‘care’
demanded by the critics, he would have affirmatively endangered his patients.”
Setting aside the fact that the evidence is not so unequivocal, this argument
suffers from two interrelated flaws. First, our inquiry focuses on the information

33
Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 840 (3d Cir. 1999).
34
Imperial, 37 F.3d at 1030.

17
 No. 06-11235

available to Defendants when they made the critical decisions. Defendants did
not have the benefit of post-hoc expert analyses at that time.35 Second, this
focuses on whether Defendants’ beliefs proved to be right. But the statute does
not ask that question; rather it asks if the beliefs of Poliner’s peers were
objectively reasonable under the facts they had at the time.36 If a doctor
unhappy with peer review could defeat HCQIA immunity simply by later
presenting the testimony of other doctors of a different view from the peer
reviewers, or that his treatment decisions proved to be “right” in their view,
HCQIA immunity would be a hollow shield.
Poliner’s urging of purported bad motives or evil intent or that some
hospital officials did not like him provides no succor. We have serious doubts
that Poliner proved that the restrictions resulted from anti-competitive motives,
and more to the point, the inquiry is, as we have explained, an objective one.

35
See Singh, 308 F.3d at 41 (explaining that “[t]he appropriate ‘inquiry is whether the
decision was reasonable in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, not in
light of facts later discovered” (quoting Sklaroff v. Allegheny Health Educ. Research Found.,
No. Civ. A. 95-4758, 1996 WL 383137, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 1996))); Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d
at 916-17 (explaining that expert opinions prepared for litigation did not rebut the
presumption because the opinions were not known at the time the peer review action was
taken).
36
See Lee v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 408 F.3d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Even if Dr.
Lee could show that ‘the [peer review actions] reached an incorrect conclusion . . . [that] does
not meet the burden of contradicting the existence of a reasonable belief that [the hospital]
w[as] furthering health care quality.’” (quoting Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d at 916)); Meyers, 341
F.3d at 469 n.5 (“Our review, however, is not directed at whether each of the complaints were
undisputedly true, but whether Defendants acted reasonably in considering and relying upon
them.”); Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d at 913 (explaining that such an argument “miss[es] the mark”
because “[t]he focus of our inquiry is not whether the Executive Committee’s initial concerns
ultimately proved to be medically sound”); Mathews, 87 F.3d at 636 n.9 (“While the conflicting
reports raise an issue of fact as to whether Mathews provided acceptable care, they do not call
into question whether the Board’s decision in relying on the Wilson report was reasonable.”).

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 No. 06-11235

Our sister circuits have roundly rejected the argument that such subjective
motivations overcome HCQIA immunity,37 as do we.
C.
“The HCQIA does not require the ultimate decisionmaker to investigate
a matter independently, but requires only a ‘reasonable effort to obtain’ the
facts.”38 We consider “the totality of the process leading up to” the professional
review action.39
No reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants failed to make a
“reasonable effort to obtain the facts.” Prior to May 14, Patients 3, 9, and 18 had
been reviewed by the CRRC, which identified the care issues involved and
forwarded the cases to Knochel. Each of these cases was reviewed by a
cardiologist for Knochel and the IMAC. As to Patient 36, Knochel spoke with
Weinmeister, Das, Levin, and Harper. Levin reviewed the films and spoke with
Poliner briefly about the case, while Harper reviewed the patient’s chart and
films. Das saw the LAD while the procedure was occurring and spoke with
Poliner. Weinmeister had treated the patient post-procedure. And, as to the
abeyance extension, Knochel relied on the review of 44 cases conducted by the
ad hoc committee. As explained above, the district court’s summary judgment
established the propriety of the ad hoc committee review, and that remains

37
See, e.g., Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d at 914 (“In the HCQIA immunity context, the circuits
that have considered the issue all agree that the subjective bias or bad faith motives of the
peer reviewers is irrelevant.”); Mathews, 87 F.3d at 635 (explaining that other circuits “have
held that a defendant’s subjective bad faith is irrelevant under § 11112(a) and have upheld a
finding of immunity if, on the basis of the record, the court could conclude that the professional
review action would further quality health care”); Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1335 (“Moreover, Bryan’s
‘assertions of hostility do not support his position [that the Hospital is not entitled to the
HCQIA’s protections] because they are irrelevant to the reasonableness standards of §
11112(a). The test is an objective one, so bad faith is immaterial. The real issue is the
sufficiency of the basis for the [Hospital’s] actions.’” (quoting Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d
728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992))).
38
Gabaldoni v. Wash. County Hosp. Ass’n, 250 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2001).
39
Mathews, 87 F.3d at 637; see also Meyers, 341 F.3d at 469 (same).

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 No. 06-11235

unchallenged, for good reason. Knochel was entitled to rely on the information
provided to him by the other doctors,40 and there is nothing to suggest that the
information was facially flawed or otherwise so obviously deficient so as to
render Defendants’ reliance “unreasonable.”41
Poliner urges that omissions in the investigation and Knochel’s admission
at trial that further investigation was necessary before Poliner’s privileges could
be summarily suspended—that is, there was insufficient evidence to denominate
Poliner a “present danger” under the bylaws—support the jury’s findings that
a “reasonable effort” was lacking. As to the former, Poliner was entitled to a
reasonable effort, not a perfect effort.42
Poliner’s latter argument is unavailing because HCQIA immunity is not
coextensive with compliance with an individual hospital’s bylaws. Rather, the
statute imposes a uniform set of national standards. Provided that a peer review
action as defined by the statute complies with those standards, a failure to
comply with hospital bylaws does not defeat a peer reviewer’s right to HCQIA
immunity from damages.43

40
See Gabaldoni, 250 F.3d at 261 (explaining that “it was permissible for the Board to
rely on the reports and investigations of the various committees . . . in rendering its decision”);
Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1335 (same).
41
Cf. Brader, 167 F.3d at 843 (explaining that “the reports of Diamond and Ochsner
were not so obviously mistaken or inadequate as to make reliance on them unreasonable”).
42
Singh, 308 F.3d at 43.
43
See Meyers, 341 F.3d at 469-70 (rejecting an argument that failure to comply with
hospital bylaws defeated immunity because “even assuming LMH did violate the bylaws, the
notice and procedures provided complied with the HCQIA’s statutory ‘safe harbor’”); Ricks, 31
F.3d at 1487 n.8 (rejecting an argument that violations of state law and professional
organization guidelines defeat HCQIA immunity “because once the immunity provisions of the
HCQIA are met, defendants ‘shall not be liable in damages under any law of the United States
or of any State’ based on a professional review action” (quoting § 11111(a)(1))); Bakare v.
Pinnacle Health Hosps., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 272, 290 n.33 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (“HCQIA
immunity attaches when the reviewing body satisfies the requirements under HCQIA,
regardless of its own policies and procedures.”).

20
 No. 06-11235

It bears emphasizing that this does not mean that hospitals and peer
review committees that comply with the HCQIA’s requirements are free to
violate the applicable bylaws and state law. The HCQIA does not gainsay the
potential for abuse of the peer review process. To the contrary, Congress limited
the reach of immunity to money damages. The doors to the courts remain open
to doctors who are subjected to unjustified or malicious peer review, and they
may seek appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief in response to such
treatment.44 The immunity from money damages may work harsh outcomes in
certain circumstances, but that results from Congress’ decision that the system-
wide benefit of robust peer review in rooting out incompetent physicians,
protecting patients, and preventing malpractice outweighs those occasional
harsh results; that giving physicians access to the courts to assure procedural
protections while denying a remedy of money damages strikes the balance of
remedies essential to Congress’ objective of vigorous peer review.45 The doctor
may not recover money damages, but can access the court for other relief
preventive of an abusive peer review. It is no happenstance that this
congressional push of peer review came in a period of widespread political efforts
at the state level to achieve tort reform and protect medical doctors from the
debilitating threat of money damages. It would have been quixotic at best if
those efforts were accompanied by tolerance of money damages suits by doctors

44
Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d at 918; see also Singh, 308 F.3d at 44 (“HCQIA immunity only
covers liability for damages. It does not shield covered defendants from suit and other forms
of relief.”); Imperial, 37 F.3d at 1031 (explaining that “the actual protection given by the Act
is limited to damages”). To the extent we suggested otherwise in Doe, see 1996 WL 670414,
at *4, we decline to follow, and are not bound by, that unpublished opinion, see 5th Cir. 47.5.4
(providing that “[u]npublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent”).
45
See Imperial, 37 F.3d at 1028 (“To assure that hospitals and doctors cooperate with
the system and engage in meaningful professional review, Congress found it essential to
provide qualified immunity from damages actions for hospitals, doctors, and others who
participate in the professional review process.”).

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facing peer review—where tort reformers assured that discipline of doctors
would be found.
D.
Section 11112(a)(3) imposes certain procedural requirements, namely that
a peer review action is taken “after adequate notice and hearing procedures are
afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to
the physician under the circumstances.” Section 11112(b) provides a “safe
harbor” set of procedures that, if given, means that the “health care entity is
deemed to have met the adequate notice and hearing requirement.” Finally, §
11112(c) provides,
(c) Adequate procedures in investigations or health emergencies

For purposes of section 11111(a) of this title, nothing in this section
shall be construed as--

(1) requiring the procedures referred to in subsection (a)(3) of this
section--

(A) where there is no adverse professional review action
taken, or

(B) in the case of a suspension or restriction of clinical
privileges, for a period of not longer than 14 days, during
which an investigation is being conducted to determine the
need for a professional review action; or

(2) precluding an immediate suspension or restriction of clinical
privileges, subject to subsequent notice and hearing or other
adequate procedures, where the failure to take such an action may
result in an imminent danger to the health of any individual.

The peer review actions satisfy the HCQIA’s procedural requirements.
The May 14 restriction falls squarely within § 11112(c)(1)(B)’s scope. The
abeyance was a restriction of privileges that was imposed to allow for an
investigation to determine whether other action, such as a suspension, was

22
 No. 06-11235

necessary. Poliner urges that the provision does not apply because the
restriction lasted for 15 days, one day longer than is permissible. We are not
persuaded. The ad hoc committee completed its review and reported its results
to Knochel and the IMAC on May 27. Upon receipt of the ad hoc committee
report, Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis to take another peer
review action. The IMAC decided that same day that a further restriction of
Poliner’s privileges was necessary. For immunity purposes it is of no moment
that they requested Poliner’s consent to the extension of the abeyance on May
29, the purported fifteenth day, because the decision to further restrict his
privileges was made within the required 14 days.
We conclude that the extension of the abeyance falls within § 11112(c)(2)’s
curtilage,46 and in any event, Defendants imposed the restriction after
procedures that were fair to Poliner under the circumstances. The “emergency”
provision requires only that a failure to act “may result in an imminent danger
to the health of any individual.” That the ad hoc committee concluded that
Poliner gave substandard care in half of the cases reviewed, and considering the
seriousness of the diagnostic error with Patient 36 and the serious risks that
attend cardiac catheterizations, Defendants were fully warranted in concluding
that failing to impose further temporary restrictions “may result” in an
imminent danger. Poliner contends that this provision applies in “extraordinary
cases in which a physician suddenly becomes impaired or grossly incompetent.”
Poliner cites no authority for this proposition, and the plain language of the
statute is not so limited. Moreover, authority from our sister circuits and the

46
The parties dispute whether § 11112(c)(2) relieves compliance with all of § 11112(a)’s
standards or is limited to § 11112(a)(3)’s “notice and hearing” requirement. We need not, and
do not, wade into this dispute because we conclude that the extension of the abeyance satisfies
the requirements of § 11112(a)(1), (2), and (4).

23
 No. 06-11235

district courts conclude that the provision is not so narrow,47 as does an
unpublished decision from our court.48
Poliner received the “subsequent notice and hearing or other adequate
procedures” that the provision contemplates. To the point, the district court
ruled at summary judgment that, as to the June 12 suspension, Poliner received
notice and hearing adequate to satisfy the HCQIA. That ruling, which has not
been challenged, establishes that Poliner received adequate process for purposes
of the “emergency” provision.
Our review confirms this, and further leads us to conclude that the
extension was imposed “after such other procedures as are fair to the physician

47
See Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d at 917 (indicating that the Executive Committee’s decision
to impose a “precautionary suspension” would fall under the emergency provision after a
clinical review committee reviewed 24 of the doctor’s patients and reported multiple areas of
concern); Brader, 167 F.3d at 836-37, 842 (holding that a summary suspension of a surgeon’s
privileges to perform an operation fell under the emergency provision where a review of the
mortality rates for the procedure at the hospital showed that the surgeon was responsible for
half of the mortalities, and an outside reviewer reported numerous complications and instances
of “poor surgical judgment”); Johnson v. Christus Spohn, No. C-06-138, 2008 WL 375417, at
*12 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2008) (“Based on the purportedly negligent treatment of RM [who
eventually died], the Court has little trouble finding Dr. Johnson’s summary suspension was
appropriately based on the reasonable belief he failed to care for a patient and thus may have
represented an imminent danger to the health of an individual.”); Schindler v. Marshfield
Clinic, No. 05-C-705-C, 2006 WL 2944703, at *13 (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 12, 2006) (explaining that,
where a surgeon “was performing surgery, a surgical instrument slipped and plaintiff's patient
was rendered quadriplegic for an unspecified period of time,” and the surgeon was temporarily
suspended during an investigation, the emergency provision was “satisfied”); Bakare, 469 F.
Supp. 2d at 282, 289 & n.31 (holding that the emergency provision applied to a precautionary
suspension that was imposed after an outside reviewer reviewed ten of the plaintiff’s cases and
concluded that “beyond a reasonable degree of medical certainty [Dr. Bakare’s] medical
management falls below the established standards”); Pfenninger v. Exempla, Inc., 116 F. Supp.
2d 1184, 1202 (D. Colo. 2000) (concluding that the emergency provision was applicable where
“the Executive Committee found that Dr. Pfenninger had exercised poor judgment in three
recent cases; that he had a history of similar problems, and that summary suspension was
‘necessary to protect patients’”).
48
See Payne v. Harris Methodist HEB, No. 01-10212, 2002 WL 1396969, at *1 n.1 (5th
Cir. June 7, 2002) (holding, in considering the emergency provision, that “[g]iven the serious
allegations of incompetence made against Payne, we agree with the district court that the
hospital was permitted to suspend him temporarily while sorting out the truth of the
allegations”).

24
 No. 06-11235

under the circumstances.” The May 14 letter provided notice to Poliner of the
peer review, which patient triggered it, the other patients then-of concern, that
an ad hoc committee review would be taken and a general description of how
that review would be conducted, and finally that Poliner would have “an
opportunity to meet with the [IMAC] and me in person to respond to or clarify
any clinical concerns that could result in a recommendation for corrective action
prior to that action being taken.” Poliner and his lawyer knew what was
happening and why before the extension.
The ad hoc committee’s conclusions justify Defendants’ decision to impose
another period of the same restrictions without immediately giving a hearing.
The committee review raised serious problems with Poliner’s cases, and rather
than acting precipitously, Defendants sought out further information. It is
difficult to conceive of a meaningfully different response from Defendants. Upon
receipt of the ad hoc committee’s review, it would have been untenable to restore
full privileges while a hearing was scheduled and Poliner was given time to
prepare. Had Defendants immediately held a hearing, there would have been
no opportunity for Poliner to review the cases at issue, and we have no doubt
that we would be considering whether such a hearing was “fair.” Further
informing our analysis is the fact that Poliner had engaged counsel prior to the
extension of the abeyance. It bears emphasizing that the restriction on
privileges was temporary in nature and limited in scope, tailored to the objective
facts before the hospital officials. Poliner received “fair” procedures under these
circumstances.
Once the decision was made, Poliner was quickly notified that the
extension was needed, given further details of the ad hoc committee review, and
told again that he would have an opportunity to address the IMAC. Ten days
after extending the restrictions, a date for a hearing was set and Poliner was
notified of the hearing, told which patients had been reviewed and the concerns

25
 No. 06-11235

in those cases, and given access to the patient records. The hearing, in which
Poliner personally participated, was promptly held on June 11.
This case demonstrates how the process provisions of the HCQIA work in
tandem: legitimate concerns lead to temporary restrictions and an investigation;
an investigation reveals that a doctor may in fact be a danger; and in response,
the hospital continues to limit the physician’s privileges. The hearing process
is allowed to play out unencumbered by the fears and urgency that would
necessarily obtain if the physician were midstream returned to full privileges
during the few days necessary for a fully informed and considered decision
resting on all the facts and a process in which the physician has had an
opportunity to confront the facts and give his explanations. The interplay of
these provisions may work hardships on individual physicians, but the
provisions reflect Congress’ balancing of the significant interests of the physician
and “the public health ramifications of allowing incompetent physicians to
practice while the slow wheels of justice grind.”49 Defendants satisfied the notice
and hearing requirements, and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
E.
Finally, we consider whether each peer review action was taken “in the
reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such
reasonable effort to obtain facts.” “Our analysis under § 11112(a)(4) closely
tracks our analysis under § 11112(a)(1).”50 In both instances, the temporary
restrictions were “tailored to address the health care concerns” that had been
raised51—procedures in the cath lab—leaving untouched Poliner’s other
privileges. Nor was the information relayed to Knochel “so obviously mistaken

49
Rogers v. Columbia/HCA of Cent. La., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 229, 236 (W.D. La. 1997).
50
Brader, 167 F.3d at 843; see also Meyers, 341 F.3d at 471 (same); Singh, 308 F.3d at
38 n.13 (same); Sugarbaker, 190 F.3d at 916 (same).
51
Mathews, 87 F.3d at 638.

26
 No. 06-11235

or inadequate as to make reliance on [it] unreasonable.”52 There was an
objectively reasonable basis for concluding that temporarily restricting Poliner’s
privileges during the course of the investigation was warranted by the facts then
known, and for essentially the reasons given above, we hold that Defendants
satisfy this prong.
To allow an attack years later upon the ultimate “truth” of judgments
made by peer reviewers supported by objective evidence would drain all meaning
from the statute. The congressional grant of immunity accepts that few
physicians would be willing to serve on peer review committees under such a
threat; as our sister circuit explains, “‘the intent of [the HCQIA] was not to
disturb, but to reinforce, the preexisting reluctance of courts to substitute their
judgment on the merits for that of health care professionals and of the governing
bodies of hospitals in an area within their expertise.’”53 At the least, it is not our
role to re-weigh this judgment and balancing of interests by Congress.
IV. Conclusion
Not only has Poliner failed to rebut the statutory presumption that the
peer review actions were taken in compliance with the statutory standards, the
evidence independently demonstrates that the peer review actions met the
statutory requirements. Because Defendants are immune under the HCQIA, we
have no occasion to consider Defendants’ other substantial arguments that we
must reverse and render judgment based on state law immunity54 and because
Poliner failed to prove the substantive elements of his claims. One of the largest
difficulties lies in causation, that is, whether Poliner proved that any of the
purported damages were caused by the abeyance and abeyance extension as

52
Id.
53
Lee, 408 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1337).
54
See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 160.010.

27
 No. 06-11235

opposed to the June 12 suspension that was immunized before trial. Nor need
we reach the compelling arguments that, at the very least, we would have to
reverse and remand for a new trial because of the jury’s excessive verdict55 and
manifest trial errors.
We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and RENDER judgment
for Defendants.

55
See Wells v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 793 F.2d 679, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining
that “when an award is ‘so exaggerated as to indicate bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or
other improper motive,’ remittitur is inadequate and the only proper remedy is a new trial”
(quoting Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983))).

28