FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 2 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-10289
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
4:18-cr-00403-HSG-1
v. 4:18-cr-00403-HSG
JOSE GRANADOS,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, IKUTA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Jose Granados appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, of one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The district court did not err in denying Granados’s motion to suppress
because, considering the totality of the circumstances, see United States v. Burkett,
612 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010), the officers had reasonable suspicion that
Granados was armed and dangerous. Officer Leach was concerned that Granados
was involved in a drug-related operation based on the strong odor of marijuana
emanating from Granados’s vehicle and Officer Leach’s suspicion that Granados
may be transporting illegal quantities for the purpose of selling, which contributes
to the reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. See United
States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2008). Officer Leach’s
determination, after a records check, that Granados had been convicted only two
years earlier of a violent felony that resulted in an eight-year sentence, further
contributed to the officers’ reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Cotterman,
709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Based on Officer Gomez’s training
and experience, Granados’s fidgeting and reaching towards something on the
floorboard of his vehicle, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Granados was
trying to conceal something such as a weapon. See Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d
864, 877 (9th Cir. 2016). And, finally, based on Officer Glenn’s training and
experience, the fact that Granados “kept looking around” and was “sweating
profusely” even though it was “a very cold evening,” and was “rubbing down on
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his legs and rubbing his hands off on his pants,” indicated that Granados might be
preparing to attack a police officer. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 5, 11
(1989); United States v. Wilson, 7 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1993).
Considering that “whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981), and with “appropriate regard for the specific reasonable inferences which
an officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his or her experience,”
United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), we
conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Granados was armed and
dangerous. The district court therefore did not err in denying Granados’s motion
to suppress.
We reject Granados’s arguments that none of the circumstances present
during the search independently support a finding of reasonable suspicion, because
the Supreme Court has expressly rejected a “divide-and-conquer analysis” that
evaluates factors “in isolation from each other.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 274 (2002).
AFFIRMED.
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