2022 IL App (1st) 192189-U
FIFTH DIVISION
MARCH 4, 2022
No. 1-19-2189
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 14 CR 02252 (01)
)
BRANDON VEGA, ) Honorable
) William B. Raines,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman and Connors concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment summarily dismissing the defendant’s postconviction
petition is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
¶2 The defendant-appellant, Brandon Vega, filed a pro se postconviction petition in the circuit
court of Cook County, alleging that his 61-year sentence for two counts of attempted first degree
murder is unconstitutional. The circuit court summarily dismissed the defendant’s postconviction
petition and the defendant now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County and remand the case for further postconviction proceedings.
No. 1-19-2189
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In 2016, the defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder and
sentenced to a total of 61 years’ imprisonment. He was 18 years old at the time of the offense. For
a full recitation of facts leading up to the defendant’s conviction and sentence, see People v. Vega,
2018 IL App (1st) 160619.
¶5 On direct appeal, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that his 61-year sentence was
unconstitutional because it is a de facto life sentence that was imposed without proper
consideration of his youth and its attendant characteristics pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012). Id. ¶ 48. In rejecting the defendant’s argument, this court noted that the defendant had
not raised his constitutional challenge in the trial court, and so there was no evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the tenets of Miller applied to him. Id. ¶ 57. Consequently, we found that the
record was “insufficient to consider the defendant’s constitutional challenges.” Id. In declining to
remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, we held that the defendant’s
constitutional claims would be “more appropriately raised in a postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 58.
Thus, we affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 46, 70.
¶6 On June 26, 2019, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which is the subject
of this appeal. The petition alleged that, because the defendant was 18 years old at the time of his
offense, his 61-year sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to both the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The defendant’s petition asserted that in
accordance with Miller and its progeny, including recent case law discussing the science of brain
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No. 1-19-2189
development in young adults, he is entitled to the Miller protections; and without their application,
his sentence is unconstitutional.
¶7 In support of his argument, the defendant provided the following details regarding his
childhood and background:
“[The defendant’s] mother was not involved in his life growing up. Instead,
[the defendant] was raised by his father, who had a drug problem and often left [the
defendant] unsupervised. [The defendant] sometimes went to his aunt’s house, but
was bullied by his older cousins and spent much of his time in the streets.
[The defendant] joined a gang, the Maniac Latin Disciples, at age 12, and
left school after eighth grade. [The defendant] also started drinking alcohol at that
age, and drank a large amount of alcohol almost every day. He passed out and had
to have his stomach pumped a couple of times when he was a teenager. His co-
defendant Jacqueline Mendoza testified at her trial that [the defendant] drank a lot,
got ‘out of control’ when he drank, and was drunk on the night of this incident.
[The defendant] also used marijuana nearly every day since age 12, and
occasionally used cocaine and LSD.
***
About three years before this trial [sic], [the defendant’s] father had an
accident that left him paralyzed below the neck. [The defendant] learned how to
take care of his father, helping him with personal hygiene as well as his
rehabilitation.”
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No. 1-19-2189
The defendant attached, to the petition, an affidavit from his cousin, Daisy Maldonado, which
attested that the defendant grew up in a “violent, unstable, and harsh environment” and confirmed
the details provided by the defendant. He also attached certificates he had earned, during his
incarceration, in two different disciplines. The defendant argued that the trial court did not consider
his youth and its attendant characteristics or his rehabilitative potential in sentencing him, and
therefore, his 61-year sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him.
¶8 On August 15, 2019, the trial court summarily dismissed the defendant’s postconviction
petition on the basis that it was frivolous and patently without merit. In its written order, the trial
court noted that the defendant relied upon “recent developments in the field of neuroscience
showing that the young adult brain is fundamentally different than that of a fully grown adult” and
then the court discussed the evolving case law surrounding the sentencing protections for juveniles
and young adults pursuant to Miller. The trial court also noted the importance of a factually
developed record for as-applied constitutional challenges, such as the defendant’s, and found the
record in this case to be insufficiently developed. In so finding, the trial court cited this court’s
decision in the defendant’s direct appeal, which found that the record was insufficiently developed
in order for this court to find the defendant’s sentence unconstitutional. The trial court further
found that the defendant’s petition did not provide any new facts that were not previously available
in the record. Thus, the trial court held that the defendant’s postconviction petition could not
survive the first stage of proceedings. This appeal followed.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Initially, this court entered an order in this case ruling that we lacked jurisdiction to
consider the defendant’s appeal because he failed to file a timely notice of appeal in accordance
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No. 1-19-2189
with Illinois Supreme Court Rules 606(b) and 373 (eff. July 1, 2017). The defendant petitioned the
Illinois Supreme Court to exercise its supervisory power to allow this court to consider his appeal
notwithstanding his failure to comply with Rules 606(b) and 373. Subsequently, our supreme court
issued a supervisory order directing us to vacate our judgment in which we found that we lacked
jurisdiction. Thus, we now consider the merits of this appeal.
¶ 11 The defendant presents the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing his postconviction petition. He argues that the factual allegations in his
petition made an arguable claim that his 61-year sentence is unconstitutional, as applied to him.
The defendant claims that his petition should advance to second-stage proceedings.
¶ 12 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism through which a
criminal defendant can assert that his constitutional rights were substantially violated in his
original trial or sentencing hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2018); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205
Ill. 2d 444, 455 (2002). A postconviction proceeding contains three distinct stages. People v.
Gallano, 2019 IL App (1st) 160570, ¶ 22. The trial court may dismiss a petition during the first
stage if it determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. Id. As most
postconviction petitions are drafted by pro se defendants, the threshold for a petition to survive the
first stage of proceedings is low. People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24. We review de novo a trial
court’s first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition. People v. Shipp, 2015 IL App (2d)
131309, ¶ 7.
¶ 13 The basis for the defendant’s postconviction petition in this case is that his 61-year sentence
is unconstitutional pursuant to both the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. His argument is premised upon
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No. 1-19-2189
recent case law governing the sentencing of juveniles and young adult offenders, which is an
evolving area of law. The United States Supreme Court in Miller held that mandatory life sentences
without the possibility of parole, imposed upon juvenile defendants (those who are under 18 years
old), are unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution because
such sentences prevent the trial court from considering the mitigating qualities of youth, such as
the defendant’s age, background, and mental and emotional development. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476,
489.
¶ 14 The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted Miller in a manner applicable to juvenile
defendants convicted and sentenced under Illinois law. Under that interpretation, our supreme
court has determined that a life sentence, whether natural or de facto, whether mandatory or
discretionary, is unconstitutional for juveniles where the trial court did not consider the mitigating
qualities of youth described in Miller. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 (“sentencing a juvenile
offender to a mandatory term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility
of parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment”); People
v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 (life sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile
defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial court considers
the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics). And in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327,
our supreme court drew the line at 40 years in order for a prison term to be considered a de facto
life sentence. Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 15 In light of Miller and new sentencing protections for juveniles, the Illinois Supreme Court
opened the door for young adult offenders (those between the ages of 18 and 20) to demonstrate
that their own specific characteristics at the time of their offense were so like those of a juvenile
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No. 1-19-2189
that the imposition of a life sentence, absent the safeguards established in Miller, violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st)
171738, ¶ 25; see People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44 (the 19-year-old defendant could not
challenge his sentence as unconstitutional as applied to him pursuant to Miller for the first time on
direct appeal but was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting the claim in postconviction
proceedings). In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed this court’s
holding that the 18-year-old defendant’s sentence of 76 years violated the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 40. The court explained, however, that the defendant did
not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, which meant that the trial court
did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional claim and therefore did not make any
findings of fact on the defendant’s specific circumstances. Id. Our supreme court reasoned that, in
turn, this court “held [the] defendant’s sentence violated the Illinois Constitution without a
developed evidentiary record on the as-applied *** challenge.” Id. In so ruling, the supreme court
set in motion a method for young adult offenders to demonstrate, through an adequate factual
record, that the tenets of Miller apply to them. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25. Notably,
Illinois courts consider the sentencing claims of young adult offenders under the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution rather than the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution. People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51.
¶ 16 Since our supreme court has opened the door for the Miller tenets to apply to young adult
offenders in sentencing, this court has remanded numerous cases for further postconviction
proceedings where the defendants, between the ages of 18 and 20, have yet to have the opportunity
to ask a court to consider whether they were more akin to juveniles than adults at the time of their
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No. 1-19-2189
offenses. See Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 63 (noting the recent trend in treating
offenders under 21 years old differently than adults in remanding the 18-year-old defendant’s
postconviction petition for further proceedings); Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 34
(remanding for further postconviction proceedings on the 18-year-old defendant’s petition because
the law has continued to trend in the direction of increased protections for youthful offenders);
People v. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 27 (ordering further proceedings on the 19-year-old
defendant’s petition to allow the trial court to determine whether the defendant’s individual
characteristics at the time of the offense rendered him functionally younger than 19 years old); and
People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d) 170705, ¶ 14 (held that the defendant, who was 19 years old at
the time of his offense, pled enough facts to warrant further proceedings on his claim that Miller
applies to him where he had been diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder and exhibited
symptoms similar to characteristics of juveniles).
¶ 17 The instant case, where the defendant was 18 years old at the time of his offense, is
analogous to the body of recent cases on this subject. Importantly, the defendant explicitly pled,
in his petition, details about his troubled childhood, including abuse and neglect; his substance
abuse; and his lack of education. He also referenced the budding science surrounding young adult
brains and pled facts demonstrating his potential for rehabilitation, with supporting documentation.
All of those details have a potential bearing on the trial court’s evaluation of the defendant’s
emotional and mental development and are therefore sufficient to warrant further proceedings in
the trial court under current Illinois law. “Because most petitions are drafted at [the first] stage by
defendants with little legal knowledge or training, this court views the threshold
for survival as low.” People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. See also, People v. Evans, 2021 IL App
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No. 1-19-2189
(1st) 172809, ¶ 19 (at the pleading stage, the defendant is not required to prove anything, he only
needs to plead some facts justifying further proceedings).
¶ 18 During the pendency of this appeal, the defendant filed a motion to cite additional
authority, People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, which we consider and resolve within the context of
our ruling on appeal. We now grant that motion and consider House in our analysis. In House, our
supreme court confirmed that an evidentiary hearing, where the record is fully developed, is needed
for a reviewing court to find that a young adult offender’s sentence violates the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. Id. ¶ 31. This is because, “by
definition, as-applied constitutional challenges are dependent on the specific facts and
circumstances of the challenging party.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 19 As the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider the facts, which the defendant has
now put before us, nor did it have the opportunity to hold an evidentiary hearing in this case, we
cannot yet determine whether the defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional. However, we do find
that the defendant adequately pled sufficient facts to advance his petition to second-stage
postconviction proceedings. If the defendant’s petition survives second-stage postconviction
proceedings, the petition shall advance to the third-stage, where the trial court shall conduct an
evidentiary hearing. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10. Such an evidentiary hearing will allow the trial
court to determine, based on a fully developed record, whether the defendant’s individual
characteristics at the time of his offense rendered him functionally younger than 18 years old, and
consequently, whether his 61-year sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to the Illinois Constitution
as applied to him. See Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶¶ 54-55 (when a young adult raises claims
that the Miller line of cases applies to him, he must first plead, and ultimately prove, that his
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No. 1-19-2189
individual characteristics render him functionally younger than his stated age, such that the
application of Miller is required).
¶ 20 The State argues that all of the facts alleged in the defendant’s petition were already
available for the trial court to consider during his sentencing hearing, and so he cannot now simply
point to those same facts to invoke Miller. However, there is a distinction between facts regarding
the defendant’s youth and background being available for the trial court’s consideration as
mitigating factors and those same facts being considered by the trial court for the purposes of a
Miller analysis. See People v. Morris, 2017 IL App (1st) 141117, ¶ 32 (although the trial court
commented on the defendant’s youth and upbringing and acknowledged that it read the defendant’s
PSI, this court did not find those observations “to be [] equivalent to a full consideration of those
special characteristics contained within the PSI report”). This is especially true since the defendant
was not a juvenile and so there was never an evidentiary hearing to determine if the tenets of Miller
even applied to him. To accept the State’s argument would be to put the cart before the horse. See
Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 27 (the first step is for the young adult offender to prove that
Miller and its progeny apply to him; then the trial court goes on to consider whether the original
sentencing hearing complied with Miller). Accordingly, it is premature to determine whether the
defendant’s original sentencing hearing complied with Miller.
¶ 21 In sum, at this stage, the merits of the defendant’s claim that his 61-year sentence violates
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as it applies to him, cannot be
determined. Nonetheless, the facts pled in the defendant’s postconviction petition warrant further
proceedings in order to make a determination. It is important to establish, however, that the
defendant’s claim pursuant to the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution does not
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No. 1-19-2189
have merit within the context of this case, as the law has drawn the line at 18 years old for a
defendant to seek relief under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution in the
manner that the defendant is attempting to do here. See Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51
(“federal cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of age [citation] and *** the proportionate
penalties clause offers a broader path to the same types of relief”); see also, People v. Patterson,
2014 IL 115102, ¶ 110; People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 33. While the defendant’s claim
pursuant to the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution is meritless (see People v.
Harris, 2018 Il 121932, ¶ 61), his entire petition shall nevertheless advance to the second stage of
proceedings since we found that his claim pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution warrants further proceedings. In so doing, we follow the established principle
that, “[i]f a single claim in a multiple-claim postconviction petition survives the summary
dismissal stage of proceedings under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act, then the entire petition
must be docketed for second-stage proceedings regardless of the merits of the remaining claims in
the petition.” People v. Romero, 2015 IL App (1st) 140205, ¶ 27. Thus, we remand the case to the
trial court for second-stage proceedings. Additionally, we order the appointment of counsel to
represent the defendant upon remand to the trial court.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and
remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
¶ 24 Vacated and remanded.
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