Case: 21-30220 Document: 00516233567 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/10/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 10, 2022
No. 21-30220
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
John Price,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
International Paper Company,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Case No. 5:19-CV-1362
Before Jones, Haynes, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
After being terminated, John Price sued his employer, International
Paper Company, for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of International Paper,
and Price appealed. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM in part and
REVERSE and REMAND in part.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-30220
A. Background
John Price worked for International Paper, a paper packaging and
manufacturing company, from 2011 until his termination on August 30, 2018.
International Paper maintains an “Attendance Policy” that its employees are
required to abide by. Under the Attendance Policy, if an employee misses
work, the absence counts as an “occurrence.” If an employee has more than
three occurrences within a six-month period, a guidance committee is
appointed, which reviews and determines what action, if any, should be taken
with regards to that employee.
From 2017 to 2018, Price incurred several occurrences under the
Attendance Policy. According to International Paper, Price either missed
work or left early on seven separate occasions during a twelve-month period.1
Price alleges that during this period, he suffered “serious medical issues and
complications,” which frequently required him to be out of the office. Due
to these medical issues, Price sought and took three separate periods of
approved FMLA leave: from December 25, 2017 to January 20, 2018; from
May 8, 2018 to July 16, 2018; and from July 23, 2018 to August 5, 2018.
At issue on appeal is the third period of FMLA leave. Price asserts
that he became ill on July 20, left work early, and sought a medical
certification to support his leave request. Price’s medical providers
1
International Paper cites the following seven dates as Price’s occurrences:
November 28, 2017; December 22, 2017; February 21, 2018; April 13, 2018; April 24, 2018;
July 20, 2018; and August 7, 2018.
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submitted information requesting that Price be permitted to take
“intermittent leave,” and International Paper approved the leave request.
Price returned to work on August 6.2 On August 7, Price interacted
with Chad Deas, an Operations Manager at International Paper. Deas told
Price that he had to go home and could only return with a medical release
from his doctor. Although Price had taken FMLA-approved leave before, he
had not been required to provide a medical release to return to work for those
periods. Because Price was forced to leave work (and did leave) on August 7,
International Paper contended that he incurred another occurrence under the
Attendance Policy.
International Paper appointed a guidance committee, which
recommended that Price be terminated. John Woodall, one of Price’s
supervisors, stated that Price was terminated because he left early on August
7. Woodall explicitly testified that if Price had not left early that day, there
would not have been a guidance committee meeting, and there would have
been no issue for termination.
Shortly after his termination, Price filed the present suit against
International Paper. As relevant here, Price alleges that International Paper
(1) interfered with his rights under the FMLA and (2) retaliated against him
for taking FMLA leave. International Paper moved for summary judgment
2
Some facts in the record indicate that Price may have been at work at some point
on July 28; however, he fell ill that day and returned home.
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on Price’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims, which the district court
granted. Price timely appealed.
B. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards as the trial court.” Griffin v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper where
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Smith v. Reg’l Transit
Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). In addition, when reviewing, we
“refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
C. Discussion
The FMLA guarantees eligible employees the right to take a total of
twelve weeks of medical leave during any twelve-month period for a serious
medical condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). As such, the FMLA prohibits
employers from “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or deny[ing] the exercise”
of “any right provided.” Id. § 2615(a)(1). Concomitantly, the FMLA also
prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] or in any other manner
discriminat[ing] against any individual for opposing any practice made
unlawful” by the Act. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
Price alleges that International Paper violated the FMLA by
interfering with his rights and retaliating against him for exercising such
rights. We discuss both claims below.
1. FMLA Interference
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The district court granted summary judgment on Price’s interference
claim, concluding that Price could not establish a prima facie case. To
establish a prima facie interference case, Price must prove the following
elements: “(1) he was an eligible employee; (2) his employer was subject to
FMLA requirements; (3) he was entitled to leave; (4) he gave proper notice
of his intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) his employer denied him the
benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA.” Caldwell v. KHOU-TV,
850 F.3d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 2017).3
Price theorizes that International Paper interfered with his FMLA
rights by improperly subjecting him to return-to-work requirements
associated with continuous leave, rather than intermittent leave. The district
court concluded that Price (1) “was not certified by his treating physician”
for the July 20 absence, and (2) did not notify “[International Paper] of his
intention to take August 7, 2018, as FMLA leave”; therefore, Price could not
establish two elements of his prima facie case. Nevertheless, the court went
on to conclude that “Price took continuous leave, not intermittent leave, and
[International Paper] was within its rights to require Price to submit a
doctor’s certification as to Price’s fitness to return to work.” Therefore,
summary judgment was warranted because Price had not been denied any
benefits under the FMLA.
The district court’s reasoning suffers from three fatal flaws. First, at
the outset, we note that the district court’s focus on the July 20 absence was
misplaced. Woodall, one of Price’s supervisors, testified that if Price had not
left early on August 7, he would not have been terminated. Indeed, Woodall
confirmed that, but for the August 7 occurrence, “there wouldn’t have been
3
Neither party disputes that Price is an eligible employee, that International Paper
was subject to FMLA requirements, or that Price was entitled to leave.
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a committee meeting” and “there would be no issue for termination.”
Drawing all factual inferences in Price’s favor then, we must assume that
Price would not have been terminated if he had not left work early on August
7. Accordingly, whether or not July 20 was FMLA-approved leave is
irrelevant.
Second, the district court assumed that Price intended to miss work
on August 7 as part of his FMLA leave. That assumption is incorrect. Price
did not take FMLA leave on August 7; rather, the uncontroverted evidence
establishes that Price returned to work at the conclusion of his FMLA leave
period on August 6. Despite his return, Deas, a supervisor, asked Price to
leave because he did not have a medical release. Thus, as Price argues, he
was absent only because International Paper refused to allow him to work
without a medical release. But according to Price, International Paper was
not permitted to demand such a release because his leave was intermittent.
This leads us to the third error in the district court’s holding: the
district court concluded that, because Price was absent from work for a
sixteen-day period, his leave was continuous, rather than intermittent. As
such, “[International Paper] was within its rights to require a doctor’s
certification as to Price’s fitness to return to work.” This conclusion was
incorrect.
The FMLA permits employees to seek either continuous leave or
intermittent leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1). Admittedly, the FMLA and its
accompanying regulations do not provide clear parameters on what qualifies
as intermittent leave versus continuous leave. The regulations merely note
that intermittent leave is “leave taken in separate blocks of time due to a
single qualifying reason.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a). The distinction between
the types of leave is important, however, as the regulations permit employers
to require medical releases as a condition to return to employment for non-
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intermittent leave. Id. § 825.312(e) (“An employer may delay restoration to
employment until an employee submits a required fitness-for-duty
certification.”). However, the regulations do not contemplate such a
demand for intermittent leave. See id. § 825.312(f) (“An employer is not
entitled to a certification of fitness to return to duty for each absence taken
on an intermittent . . . schedule.”).
Price maintains that his leave was intermittent; therefore, he was
under no obligation to provide a fitness-for-duty certification or any other
medical release before he could return to his position. Price cites to evidence
in the record which supports this contention, namely the documentation
from his medical provider. In this document, Price’s medical provider
certified a request only for intermittent leave; the provider did not indicate that
Price was taking a combination of continuous leave and intermittent leave.
International Paper approved this FMLA intermittent leave request and has
not provided any contradicting evidence establishing that it denied
intermittent leave or otherwise substituted continuous leave. International
Paper nevertheless argues that “Price’s leave was not intermittent because it
was not ‘several days’” as the regulations guide. However, it fails to direct
us to any analogous authority holding that a sixteen-day period is per se
continuous leave and cannot be categorized as intermittent leave.
Additionally, whether or not Price was actually gone for a sixteen-day
period is disputed. According to Price, he attempted to return to work on
July 28 but fell ill. If true, Price was not absent for sixteen days straight as
International Paper argues and as the district court concluded. Regardless,
this is precisely the kind of factual dispute that is inappropriate for resolution
at summary judgment. See Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 389 (5th
Cir. 2013). Because there are disputed facts, and in the absence of any
contrary precedent, we find International Paper’s argument unavailing.
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Even assuming arguendo that the absence was continuous,
International Paper fails to show that it satisfied its own requirements for
requesting a medical release. We recognize that, for continuous leave, an
employer is permitted to require a “fitness-for-duty certification” prior to an
employee’s return. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(a). But an employer cannot
simply demand such a certification from an employee without adequate
notice. Rather, “[i]f the employer will require the employee to present a
fitness-for-duty certification to be restored to employment, the employer
must provide notice of such requirement,” id. § 825.300(d)(3), “at the same
time [the employer] issues the designation notice,” id. § 825.312(f). A
“[f]ailure to follow the notice requirements . . . may constitute an
interference with” FMLA rights. Id. § 825.300(e).
Nothing in the record indicates that, at the same time it issued the
designation notice, International Paper informed Price that he would need a
fitness-for-duty certification or any other medical release. Instead, the record
supports a contrary conclusion. Taking Price’s evidence as true for purposes
of this appeal, one could conclude that International Paper waited for Price
to show up to work on August 7 before letting him know of the certification
requirement, made Price leave work for failing to meet the requirement, and
then consequently terminated Price because he left. That was inconsistent
with the fact that International Paper had not required Price to submit a
medical release after he returned from his prior FMLA leave and that Price
had even returned to work on August 6—the day before—without any
controversy. At bottom, the notion that Price was sent home on August 7 by
International Paper but then fired for going home on August 7 creates, at the
very least, a fact issue on this point.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Price, we
conclude that the district court erred in finding that Price’s leave was
continuous or, alternatively, that they gave him appropriate notice of the
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need for a medical release. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude
that International Paper interfered with Price’s FMLA-protected rights
when it sent Price home on August 7, rather than allowing him to return to
work. Because the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Price would not
have been subject to termination despite the August 7 occurrence, and
International Paper caused the occurrence as more fully discussed above, we
conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
Price’s interference claim.
2. FMLA Retaliation
The district court also granted summary judgment on Price’s
retaliation claim, concluding that (1) Price failed to state a prima facie
retaliation case, and (2) even if he could, International Paper had a non-
discriminatory reason for Price’s termination. We conclude that the district
court did not commit any reversible error on this claim.
We therefore REVERSE the district court’s summary judgment order
in so far as it pertains to the interference claim and REMAND the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the
remainder of the district court’s judgment.
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