NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-30100
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:19-cr-00158-DCN-3
v.
HARLAN HALE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 11, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Harlan Hale appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
participate in a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (“Count
1”) and attempted murder and assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of
racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(3), (a)(5), and 18 U.S.C. § 2
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“Count 2”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Hale argues that the district court improperly calculated his sentencing
range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We disagree. The district
court properly applied Section 3D1.1, which governs the total offense level
calculation when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts. Under Section
3D1.1, the district court correctly began with the “highest offense level” between
the counts of conviction. U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1, 3D1.3, 3D1.4. In Hale’s case, that
was Count 2, which had an adjusted offense level of 43, compared to Count 1’s
adjusted offense level of 36. The district court then properly adjusted the resulting
offense level, which for Hale included one unit for Count 2 and one-half unit for
Count 1, resulting in a one-level increase. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. The district
court reduced the offense level by three to give Hale credit for acceptance of
responsibility under Section 3E1.1, resulting in a total adjusted offense level of 41.
Applying Hale’s criminal history category of VI, which he does not dispute, the
total Guidelines sentence range was 360 months to life imprisonment. See
U.S.S.G. § 5A.
Because Hale’s two sentences could run concurrently, the district court then
determined the total punishment to be imposed on both counts to the extent
permitted by law. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b). Considering the total Guidelines range as
well as each count’s statutory maximum—life imprisonment for Count 1 and 20
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years for Count 2—the district court imposed a life sentence for Count 1 and a 20-
year sentence for Count 2 to run concurrently. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(c).
Hale cites no support for his argument that the district court should have
begun its calculation with the lower offense level from Count 1 because it carries a
higher statutory maximum than Count 2. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. “When
sentencing on multiple counts of conviction, the total sentence imposed may be
greater than the statutory maximum for a particular count.” United States v.
Temkin, 797 F.3d 682, 695 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015). As we have clarified, “[t]he
[G]uidelines provide a separate and elaborate scheme for sentencing defendants
guilty of multiple counts,” recognizing that “any given offense, when committed
along with other crimes, is more serious than the same offense committed alone.”
United States v. Moreno-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1995). It was
therefore proper for the district court to consider both counts when calculating
Hale’s sentence.
2. Hale also argues that the district court failed to adequately explain his
sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51 (2007) (listing “failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence” as a procedural error for review). To the
contrary, the district court considered the statutory maximums and individual
Guidelines ranges for Hale’s two offenses, heard arguments from both sides,
explained its calculation of the combined offense level and Guidelines range,
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analyzed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that justified imposing the
maximum sentence permitted by law, and explained its reasons for Hale’s
sentence. See id. “At bottom, the sentencing judge need only ‘set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis’” for the sentence imposed. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 1959, 1964 (2018) (internal citation omitted). The district court more than met
that requirement here.
AFFIRMED.
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