NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANK MAHUKA, Jr.; JOAKIM No. 20-16369
MAHUKA,
D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00177-LEK-RT
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM J. AILA, Jr., Deputy Director,
Department of Hawaiian Home Lands; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Frank Mahuka, Jr. and Joakim Mahuka appeal pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of
the Takings Clause and due process. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034,
1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Mayfield v. United
States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal for lack of standing). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against defendant
United States because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim against the United States or challenge the eligibility requirements under the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (“HHCA”). See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); Arakaki v. Lingle,
477 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (the United States is an indispensable party to
actions challenging the eligibility requirements for leases under the HHCA).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the State
defendants because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that
they had suffered an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest. See Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
for Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that he “suffered an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the district court properly construed
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plaintiffs’ opposition to the State defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for
reconsideration of the district court’s order dismissing the United States from the
action. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion
for reconsideration because plaintiffs failed to present any basis for relief. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth requirements for reconsideration).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as meritless plaintiffs’ contention that the district court failed to
liberally construe their pleadings.
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the United States’ answering brief, set forth in
plaintiffs’ reply brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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