Case: 19-60533 Document: 00516268565 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/05/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 5, 2022
No. 19-60533 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Santos Wilfredo Andrade-Vindel, also known as Wilfredo Vindel,
also known as Pilar Enrique Ramos-Pineda,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A205 006 187
Before Barksdale, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Santos Wilfredo Andrade-Vindel, a native and citizen of Honduras,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirming
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 19-60533 Document: 00516268565 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/05/2022
No. 19-60533
the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his claims for withholding of removal
and cancellation of removal.
In considering the BIA’s decision (and the IJ’s decision, to the extent
it influenced the BIA), legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual
findings, for substantial evidence. E.g., Orellano-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d
511, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard,
petitioner must demonstrate “the evidence is so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion”. Chen v. Gonzales,
470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006).
Andrade asserts the BIA erred in deciding he was not entitled to
withholding of removal because he failed to show a nexus between his feared
persecution and his proposed particular social group (PSG): his family.
Threats or attacks motivated by purely personal or criminal motives do not
constitute persecution on account of a protected ground. See Thuri v.
Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 792–93 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (denying relief
because officers’ conduct was personal or criminal). Given the record
evidence supporting that Andrade and his relatives had previously been
targeted for purely personal or criminal reasons, the BIA acted substantially
reasonably in finding that Andrade-Vindel failed to show that his
membership in his asserted PSG was a central reason for any feared future
persecution. See Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 863–64 (5th Cir. 2009)
(explaining court “afford[s] considerable deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of immigration statutes unless the record reveals compelling
evidence that the BIA’s interpretation is incorrect” (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, Andrade’s claim for withholding of removal fails.
Additionally, relying upon Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018),
Andrade contends the BIA erred in determining he had not established the
requisite ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States to
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Case: 19-60533 Document: 00516268565 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/05/2022
No. 19-60533
qualify for cancellation of removal. In Pereira, the Court held: a notice to
appear that neglects to inform a noncitizen of when and where to appear for
removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule and, therefore, does
not end the period of continuous presence. Id. at 2109–10. Although our
court subsequently approved of a two-step notice process, see Pierre-Paul v.
Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2019), the Court recently overruled that
decision, clarifying that “a single compliant document” is necessary to stop
the accrual of time in this context. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474,
1485 (2021).
Because the BIA evaluated Andrade’s request for cancellation of
removal by applying the stop-time rule under the now-invalid two-step notice
process, the BIA’s denial of Andrade’s request for cancellation of removal is
VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED to the BIA for further
consideration in the light of Niz-Chavez.
DENIED IN PART; GRANTED IN PART; REMANDED.
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