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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ADOPTION OF: K.J.-L.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.I.B., MOTHER :
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:
:
:
: No. 1381 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2021-0136a
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.B.L.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: J.I.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1382 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2021-0138a
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.J.-L.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: K.B.B., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1383 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2021-0136a
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.B.L.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
J-S08026-22
J-S08027-22
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.B.B., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1384 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2021-0138a
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: MAY 4, 2022
Appellants J.I.B. (Mother) and K.B.B. (Father) collectively, (Parents)
appeal1 from the decrees granting the petitions of the York County Office of
Children, Youth and Families (CYF, or the Agency) and involuntarily
terminating their parental rights to their minor children, K.B.L.B. (born June
2019) and K.J.-L.B. (born June 2020) (collectively, the Children), pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). We affirm.
On January 3, 2021, Parents brought six-month-old K.J.-L.B. to the
emergency room at Hanover Hospital, stating that he had been fussy and
“went limp” when Father picked him up. See Order of Adjudication, 2/8/21,
at 1-3. K.J.-L.B. had one complex skull fracture along the entire length of the
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1 Both Mother and Father filed separate appeals from the decrees involuntarily
terminating their parental rights to the Children. However, both Parents are
represented by Ashley A. Messoline, Esq., on appeal, and their briefs present
identical arguments. Accordingly, we address Mother’s and Father’s appeals
from the decrees terminating their parental rights to K.B.L.B and K.J.-L.B. in
a single memorandum.
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right side of his skull, and a second fracture from the top-right to top-left side
of his skull. Id. After transfer to Hershey Medical Center, K.J.-L.B. was
examined again. Id. The large fracture was a few weeks old, and the smaller
fracture was new. Id. K.J.-L.B. had hemorrhaging behind both eyes and
hematomas in his spine, indicative of shaken baby syndrome. Id.
On January 6, 2021, the orphans’ court issued an order for emergency
protective custody. See Order for Emergency Protective Custody, 1/6/21, at
1. The orphans’ court issued a shelter care order on January 8, 2021 and
placed the Children with a kinship resource parent.2 See Shelter Care Order,
1/8/21, at 1; See Order of Adjudication, 2/8/21, at 1-3.
Following an adjudicatory hearing on February 8, 2021, the orphans’
court declared the Children dependent and found that K.J.-L.B. was a victim
of child abuse. See Order of Adjudication, 2/8/21, at 3. The Order suspended
visits between Parents and the Children. Id.
On February 10, 2021, a CYF caseworker completed a home visit with
the family. See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 2. Mother showed the
caseworker child’s toys, explaining that K.B.L.B. could have dropped the toys
on K.J.-L.B. to cause the injuries. See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 2.
Visitation remained suspended. Id.
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2 Maternal Grandparents separately initiated a custody action, in which they
were granted standing, and sought leave to intervene in the instant
dependency matter. See Response to Pet. to Intervene, 5/10/21, at 1-3. At
the time the Children were placed, they had not been approved as potential
kinship foster parents. Id.
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On February 21, 2021, Mother and Father were arrested and charged
with aggravated assault – attempt to cause serious bodily injury with extreme
indifference; endangering the welfare of a child; aggravated assault – victim
less than six-years old; and simple assault.3
On April 7, 2021, the orphans’ court held a status review hearing and
entered an order noting that Mother had admitted that the Parents shook K.J.-
L.B. and demonstrated the movement “rapidly and aggressively,” but the
Parents claimed they did not think they shook the baby hard enough to cause
shaken baby syndrome. See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 1-2. The
orphans’ court made findings that K.J.-L.B.’s treatment team at Hershey
Medical Center determined that his injuries were the result of non-accidental
blunt force trauma to the skull and were consistent with “a violent amount of
force to [the Child’s] skull by striking it against a hard object and then shaking
his body in the process.” Id. K.J.-L.B. was in the sole care of Mother and
Father at the time the injuries occurred. Id. The injuries were not consistent
with accidental trauma and neither Parent could provide an explanation for
the injuries consistent with the medical findings. Id. Visitation remained
suspended. Id.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court entered a finding of
aggravated circumstances against the Parents, because K.J.-L.B. was the
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3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 2702(a)(8), and 2701(a)(1),
respectively.
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victim of physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury. See Agg.
Circumstances Order, 4/7/21, at 1-2; N.T. Term. Hr’g, 9/28/21, at 8. The
Order provided that no efforts were to be made to preserve the family and
reunify the Children with their Parents. Id.
On May 5, 2021, the orphans’ court held a permanency review hearing,
and found that the Parents had been in minimal compliance with the
permanency plan. See Permanency Review Order, 5/4/21, at 1. On June 5,
2021, following a permanency review hearing, the orphans’ court changed the
Children’s permanency goal to adoption. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 9. On June 14,
2021, Maternal Grandparents filed petitions for adoption and petitions to
confirm consent to adoption of the Children. See Pet. for Adoption, 6/14/21,
at 1-3. On July 7, 2021, CYF filed petitions seeking to involuntarily terminate
the parental rights of Mother and Father.
On September 28, 2021, the orphans’ court held a termination hearing.4
Mother and Father did not attend the hearing because Mother had severe
abdominal pain and was taken to a local hospital. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 5. Mother
was not admitted to the hospital; rather, she was given a note that she could
return to work and follow up with her primary care physician. Id. at 10. The
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4 Gillian Woodward, Esq., represented the Children during the dependency
proceedings as guardian ad litem and appeared at the termination hearing to
argue the Children’s best interests. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 4. Daniel Worley, Esq.,
served as Children’s legal counsel during the termination proceedings, and
appeared at the hearing on their behalf. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Adoption
of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020).
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court stated on the record that there was no reason Mother could not attend
the hearing in person or remotely. Id.
Attorney Janine Vinci, representing both Parents at the hearing, filed a
motion for special relief the day before the hearing, requesting a continuance
so that she could present witnesses. Id. at 3-4. She argued that K.J.-L.B.
had a vitamin B deficiency which could have caused a bone density issue,
resulting in the severe injuries. Id. at 4. CYF responded that neither Parent
had requested a continuance prior to the hearing or appealed the adjudication
of dependency or goal change. Id. at 9. Accordingly, the circumstances
leading to the placement of the Children, including the finding of child abuse,
were res judicata. Id. at 9. The orphans’ court denied the Parents’ motion
for a continuance. Id. at 14. The orphans’ court incorporated the dependency
records into the termination hearing record, and CYF presented the testimony
of Alexis Torres, a CYF caseworker. Id.
Ms. Torres testified that she is a reunification and permanency
caseworker for CYF. Id. at 17. As the assigned caseworker for the Children,
she worked with the family for eight months. Id. at 19. As of the date of the
termination hearing, Mother’s and Father’s criminal cases related to the abuse
of K.J.-L.B. remained unresolved. Id. at 19-20.
Both Mother and Father signed a family service plan. Id. Parents’
original goals were to ensure that the Children’s basic needs were being met,
which included cooperating with Early Intervention and attending medical
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appointments, as well as cooperating with various treatment programs and
evaluations. Id. at 32. Initially the reunification goal was “return to parent
or guardian,” but as noted above, following the aggravated circumstances
determination, the goal was changed to adoption. Id. at 31.
Beyond completing adult alternatives to violence evaluations, neither
Parent completed any objectives or goals in the plan. Id. at 19-20. Further,
neither Parent provided a required “formal addendum” of the evaluation. Id.
at 39-41. In addition, neither Parent followed through with any
recommendations provided in those evaluations. Id. at 34. Nor did either
Parent complete a “threat of harm” evaluation. Id. at 36-42. One of Mother’s
goals was to take her medication as prescribed by medical professionals, but
she indicated to a caseworker that she had stopped taking her medication. Id.
at 36. Mother did not complete a required psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 36-
37. Neither Parent complied with the goal to complete individual mental
health counseling. Id. at 38-41. Nor did either Parent provide documentation
of parenting classes focusing on discipline, coping skills, and stress
management prior to the termination hearing.5 Id.
Both Parents were living with the woman who had been Mother’s foster
mother when Mother was a minor but did not provide any documentation of
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5 Although there was some discussion that both Parents had attended
parenting classes and informed Ms. Torres of this fact on the morning of the
termination hearing, they did not provide written documentation showing that
they had completed the parenting classes. N.T. Term. Hr’g at 38-39.
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their own residence, contribution to household expenses, or lawful source of
income. Id. at 20-22. Neither Parent provided any cards, gifts, or presents
to the Children while the Children were in kinship placement. Id. at 27. Nor
did either Parent request increased visitation with the Children, such that the
last visit for both Parents occurred around January or February of 2021. Id.
at 22-23. Both Parents did contact CYF about the Children’s progress with
dental, medical, or therapeutic services at the beginning of the case, but as
of the date of the involuntary termination hearing, Ms. Torres had not been
contacted by either Parent for “about five months.” Id. at 27-28. Ms. Torres
testified that Mother and Father did not have the parental capacity to care for
the Children. Id. at 30.
Ms. Torres testified that the Children were not bonded with Mother or
Father. Id. at 24. She testified that there were attempted supervised Zoom
visitations, but the result was chaotic. Id. at 33. K.B.L.B. wanted “nothing
to do with the phone” but would scream and cry if Parents gave attention to
K.J.-L.B. Id. at 33.6 Parents were not able to calm the Children. Id. Ms.
Torres could not specify how many visits occurred. Id. at 35.
The Children are developmentally on target, and K.J.-L.B. is receiving
physical therapy services due to concerns regarding his mobility. Id. at 29.
Neither of the Children have requested to visit Parents. Id. at 43. Both
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6During the COVID-19 pandemic, all supervised visits occurred via Zoom. Id.
at 35.
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Children have an excellent bond with the resource family and are very close
with them. Id. at 25. The Children view the kinship resource family as
parental figures. Id. A pre-adoptive resource has been identified for the
Children.7 Id. at 27. In Ms. Torres’ opinion, the Children would not suffer
long-term negative impacts if the orphans’ court granted the petitions to
terminate the Parents’ parental rights. Id. at 30.
Attorney Worley, as legal counsel for the Children, stated that he had
had the opportunity to meet with them at the kinship home and they seemed
very bonded to the kinship resource. Id. at 45-46. He testified that the
Children needed permanency, and that the petitions should be granted. Id.
at 45-46. Attorney Woodward, as guardian ad litem for the Children, also
stated that it was in the Children’s best interests for the petition to be granted.
Id. at 46. At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court terminated the
parental rights of both Parents pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
and (b).
Both Parents timely appealed and simultaneously filed concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i). The orphans’ court issued a responsive opinion.
On appeal, Parents raise the following issue for our review:
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7 It is unclear from the record whether the pre-adoptive resource was the
kinship resource family or the Maternal Grandparents, who filed a petition for
consent to adoption. See, e.g., Pet. for Adoption, 6/14/21, at 1-3.
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1. Whether the court erred in finding that Children and Youth
Services proved the elements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
and (b) through clear and convincing evidence?
Mother’s Brief at 5; Father’s Brief at 5 (formatting altered).
We begin by stating our standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note
that we need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating
parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc).
Section 2511(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
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the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of [Section] 2511(a)(2), the moving
party must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. The
grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct,
but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Further, this Court has explained:
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied,
are not limited to affirmative misconduct.
Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a
parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead
emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2)
should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a
stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy
of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This is
particularly so where disruption of the family has already occurred
and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.
Thus, while sincere efforts to perform parental duties, can
preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(1), those same
efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under
subsection (a)(2). Parents are required to make diligent efforts
toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period
of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.
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In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted and
formatting altered).
Further, this Court has stressed that “a child’s life cannot be held in
abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (citation omitted and formatting altered).
Section 2511(a)(2)
Parents argue that CYF did not prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the statutory grounds under Section 2511(a)(2) were met. Mother’s Brief
at 16; Father’s Brief at 16. The Parents contend, specifically, that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied, because there is nothing in the record
to support that conclusion. Id. Parents argue that the court relied on
outdated information from nearly five months prior to the hearing and used
the wrong standard of proof because it found that Parents were “unlikely” to
remedy their incapacity. Id. at 16-17. Finally, Parents argue that due to the
finding of aggravated circumstances and lack of services provided, it was
“absurd” to expect that they could remedy the incapacity. Id. at 18.
Prior to examining the merits of Parents’ claim, we must determine
whether they have preserved their claims for purposes of appeal. While
Parents cite generally to the statute, they make no meaningful citation to, nor
discussion of case law in support of their arguments regarding Subsection
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2511(a)(2). This Court has held that “[w]here an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to
develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim
is waived.” In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the argument section of
appellate brief shall contain discussion of issues raised therein and citation to
pertinent legal authorities). Because the Parents have failed to provide any
support or relevant authority supporting their claim of error, we conclude that
this claim is waived. Therefore, on this record, no relief is due.
However, even if we did not find waiver, the Parents would not be
entitled to relief on the merits. The orphans’ court discussed its findings under
this subsection as follows:
[I]t is clear from the record that CYF offered clear and convincing
evidence that the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal by the
parents have caused the children to be without essential parental
care necessary for their mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, and refusal will not be
remedied by the parent. As stated above, K.J.-L.B. suffered abuse
consistent with shaken baby syndrome. The baby suffered from
neglect and abuse while in Mother and Father’s care, experiencing
trauma from physical abuse. Six-month-old K.J.-L.B. presented
to the emergency room with two skull fractures, one newer and
one older, a subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and
bleeding around his spine. As a result of this “non-accidental,
blunt force trauma,” the child may suffer from long-term
impairment of cognitive, neurological, and ocular functioning.
Mother and Father’s explanation of how K.J.-L.B. sustained such
injuries was not consistent with the medical findings. Parents
asserted that minor child, two-year old K.B.L.B., may be the cause
of both of the baby’s skull fractures and other injuries. A month
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into the investigation, Mother and Father admitted that they both
shake K.J.-L.B. to quiet him.
On February 10, 2021, [CYF] caseworker completed a home
visit to the mother and father’s home to review the family
service plan with the two. During the visit, mother showed
the caseworker various toys that she thought [K.B.L.B.]
could have dropped on [K.J.-L.B.’s] head to cause the
injuries. Mother stated during the home visit that both she
and father would shake [K.J.-L.B.] to calm him down; she
demonstrated the shaking movement and moved her body
left and right rapidly and aggressively. She also indicated
that they shook in the car seat in the car to calm him down
too. She said this is the only thing that could have caused
his brain to bounce around from shaking, but then said she
didn’t think that was what caused the injuries. As present
during this discussion and indicated that he had Googled
how hard one must shake a child to cause these types of
injuries and that it would have had to have been 40 miles
per hour and he did not believe they shook him that hard.
[See Status Review Order, 4/7/21, at 1-2.]
Mother and Father blame two-year-old [K.B.L.B.] for [K.J.-L.B.’s]
newest fracture. Mother even made a video of [K.B.L.B.] saying,
“I boomed baby, I’m sorry.” Also Mother and Father blame
K.B.L.B. for K.J.-L.B.’s older fracture as well. No objection was
raised for the admission of these exhibits on the record during the
Permanency Review hearing on May 5, 2021. An Aggravated
Circumstances Order was entered on April 7, 2021. Given this,
no efforts were made to reunify the children with Mother and
Father. Since Mother and Father continue to blame two-year-old
K.B.L.B. for his brother’s shaken baby syndrome, it is unlikely that
the condition and causes of the abuse will be remedied by Mother
and Father. CYF has provided sufficient evidence . . . that the
Mother and Father’s incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has
caused the child to be without essential parental care necessary
for [their] well-being and the conditions and causes of the abuse,
neglect, and refusal will not be remedied by Mother or Father.
Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6-8 (some citations omitted and formatting altered).
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Were we to reach the merits of this issue, we would find no abuse of
discretion or error of law in the orphans’ court’s conclusion that the Agency
presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of Parents’
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; see
also R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. The record reveals that Ms. Torres testified
that an initial family service plan was provided to Parents, and that Parents
did not complete the majority of their goals. See N.T. Term. Hr’g at 35-41.
The sole goal completed was attendance at an anger management evaluation,
but Parents failed to complete the required formal addendum. See id. While
the aggravated circumstances order meant that CYF was not required to
provide services, Parents could have arranged for services on their own but
did not. See id. As a result of their failure to follow through with these
recommendations, Ms. Torres testified that neither Parent had the capacity to
care for the Children. See id. at 30.
Additionally, we agree with the orphans’ court that Parents’ continuing
unwillingness to accept responsibility for K.J-.L.B.’s injuries is troubling and
indicates a continuing incapacity that they are unwilling to remedy. See, e.g.,
Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 6-8. Rather than acknowledging the harm caused to K.J.-
L.B., who was in their sole care, Parents continually minimized the harm to
him or blamed K.B.L.B. for the injuries, despite a finding of abuse and
aggravated circumstances that they did not appeal. Neither Parent appeared
at the termination hearing nor attempted to attend the hearing via Zoom.
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These considerations in combination with Parents’ refusal to complete
parenting classes or other programs to help alleviate safety concerns for the
Children if they were returned to the care of Parents, is sufficient to prove by
clear and convincing evidence such an incapacity and Parents’ unwillingness
to remedy it. See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117-18.
For these reasons, were we to reach the merits, we would conclude that
the orphans’ court properly found that the termination of Parents’ parental
rights best served the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2).
Section 2511(b)
We next review the orphans’ court’s conclusion that involuntarily
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights best serves the Children’s
developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare pursuant to Section
2511(b), which states:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under
Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). We have
explained:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent
and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond
analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). The question
is whether the bond between the parent and the child “is the one worth saving
or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the child. Id.
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at 764. “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation” and
caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations of the bond. Z.P., 994
A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted).
In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),
“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are
young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their
healthy development quickly. When courts fail, . . . the result, all too often,
is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. Finally, we reiterate that the
court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Parents argue that CYF did not prove by clear and convincing evidence
that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Mother’s Brief at 24;
Father’s Brief at 24. Specifically, they contend that the caseworker was not
able to witness the parent-child relationship in person, and thus, based on the
testimony and evidence presented, it is impossible to conclude that severing
the parent-child bond would be in the best interest of the Children. Id.
The orphans’ court observed:
In regard to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), it is clear from the record that
CYF offered clear and convincing evidence for the [c]ourt’s
consideration that the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the children are best served by terminating
parental rights. The [C]hildren in this case have no bond with the
biological parents.
K.J.-L.B. is now about a year old and has not seen Mother or
Father for the past eight months. K.B.L.B. has also had no contact
in the past eight months. The [C]hildren’s caseworker testified
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that the [C]hildren “have an excellent bond with the resource
family.” The [C]hildren view the resource parents as their
parental figures. K.B.L.B. is developmentally on target. He was
evaluated through Early Intervention and is not in need of
services. K.J.-L.B. has special needs and is receiving physical
therapy through Early Intervention for concerns regarding his
mobility. His other medical needs have been addressed. CYF has
provided sufficient evidence under 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b) that the
termination of parental rights best serves the interest of [the
Children].
Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 13-14 (citations to the record omitted).
On this record we agree with the orphans’ court’s finding that the
Children have no bond with the Parents. During visitation with the Parents,
both Children appeared upset and “chaotic,” and throughout the pendency of
the case neither of the Children has inquired about or mentioned either Parent.
See N.T. Term. Hr’g at 33-35. Ms. Torres testified: 1) neither of the Children
has a bond with either Parent; 2) both Children are bonded with their foster
parents; and 3) severance of the bond would not cause long-term harm to the
Children. See id. at 24-25, 30. Thus, it was reasonable for the orphans’ court
to conclude within its discretion that no bond exists. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at
762-63; see also Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
Finally, we note that the record reflects that neither Parent has accepted
responsibility for K.J.-L.B.’s injuries, and that both have continually minimized
or blamed K.B.L.B. for the injuries. See, e.g., Status Review Order, 4/7/21,
at 2. Neither Parent has completed any required program or treatment for
mental health issues, stress management, or parenting, and accordingly, the
safety of the Children cannot be assured. On this record, severance of the
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bond is in the best interests of the Children due to these safety concerns. See
C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.
For these reasons we conclude that the record supports the orphans’
court’s conclusions that there was no bond between the Children and the
Parents, and that the resource family is fulfilling parental roles for the
Children. Likewise, the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination
that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights served the best
interests of the Children. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009-10.
In sum, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion
in terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/04/2022
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