RENDERED: MAY 13, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1113-MR
CRAIG SNOWDEN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LUCY ANNE VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-00454
KEVIN SNYDER ART, M.D.; SAINT
JOSEPH UROLOGY ASSOCIATES;
AND KENTUCKYONE HEALTH
MEDICAL GROUP, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Craig Snowden has appealed from the June 25, 2019,
opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing his medical negligence
claim pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02 on statute of
limitations grounds. The circuit court held that the statute of limitations was not
tolled by 1) Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 216C.040, the tolling provision in
the Medical Review Panel Act (the MRP Act), which has now been declared
unconstitutional and repealed; 2) KRS 413.270, Kentucky’s savings statute; or 3)
the doctrine of equitable tolling. We reverse.
Because this appeal concerns, in part, the application of the MRP Act,
it will be useful to discuss that legislative enactment and the ensuing litigation that
ultimately resulted in a declaration that it was unconstitutional. The MRP Act,
KRS 216C.005 et seq., became effective June 29, 2017, and through it the General
Assembly established “medical review panels to review proposed malpractice
complaints against health care providers covered by this chapter.” KRS 216C.005.
KRS 216C.020, in turn, sets forth the requirement of review by a Medical Review
Panel (MRP):
(1) All malpractice and malpractice-related claims
against a health care provider, other than claims
validly agreed for submission to a binding arbitration
procedure, shall be reviewed by a medical review
panel. Such an action may not be commenced in a
court in Kentucky before:
(a) The claimant’s proposed complaint has
been presented to a medical review panel
established under this chapter; and
(b) An opinion is given by the panel. If the
panel has not given its opinion within
nine (9) months after the filing of the
proposed complaint, the plaintiff may
commence the action in court.
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(2) Any action involving a dependent claim accruing
after June 29, 2017, shall be immediately and
automatically stayed until:
(a) The claimant’s proposed complaint against
the health care provider has been presented
to a medical review panel established under
this chapter and an opinion is given by the
panel; or
(b) Nine (9) months after the filing of the
proposed complaint if the panel has not
given its opinion.
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to a cause of action
filed before June 29, 2017.
In addition, KRS 216C.040(1) included a tolling provision: “The filing of a
proposed complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of
limitations is tolled until ninety (90) days after the claimant has received the
opinion of the medical review panel.” And in KRS 216C.190, the General
Assembly provided that “[i]f the panel has not given its opinion within nine (9)
months after the filing of the proposed complaint, the plaintiff may commence the
action in court. The panel shall submit a report to the parties, stating the reasons
for the delay, and may continue its work to reach an opinion.”
Litigation to contest the validity of the MRP Act began immediately,
and this was ultimately successful, as explained in Smith v. Fletcher, 613 S.W.3d
18 (Ky. 2020):
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On June 29, 2017, an action was filed in Franklin
Circuit Court challenging the validity of the MRPA. In
that case, Claycomb v. Commonwealth, Civil Action No.
17-CI-00708, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
that the MRPA was unconstitutional, as well as
temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit the
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (hereinafter, “the
Cabinet”) from enforcing the MRPA. The circuit court
issued its opinion on October 30, 2017. In that decision,
the court found the MRPA to be unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined the Cabinet from enforcing the
MRPA. By separate order, the court also granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and certified the
class for declaratory and injunctive relief purposes. The
class included “all persons who presently or
prospectively have ‘malpractice’ or ‘malpractice-related’
claims against a ‘health care provider’ subject to” the
MRPA.
On November 1, 2017, the Cabinet filed (1) a
Notice of Appeal and (2) an independent motion for
emergency relief from the Court of Appeals under
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) CR 65.08. In
the CR 65.08 motion, the Cabinet sought emergency
relief to stay the permanent injunction, claiming that the
injunction “jeopardizes the timeliness of the claims that
are currently pending before the medical review panels.”
The Court of Appeals granted the requested
emergency relief on November 9, 2017, thereby staying
the circuit court’s injunction. In its Order Granting
Emergency Relief, the Court of Appeals noted that
eighty-nine cases were, at that time, pending before the
Cabinet pursuant to the MRPA. The court concluded that
“no provision was undertaken to avoid the fatal effect of
limitations statutes on the claims of persons who, in
obedience to the Act, failed to timely file a lawsuit in
court.” As a result, the Court of Appeals stayed the
circuit court’s injunction “until further order of this
Court.” In other words, the Cabinet was no longer
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enjoined from enforcing the MRPA, and potential
medical malpractice claimants were still required to
proceed through the medical review panel process.
Meanwhile, in Franklin Circuit Court, the class
members filed a Motion to Modify Injunctive Relief. On
November 22, 2017, the Franklin Circuit Court entered
an order holding that motion in abeyance “pending a final
ruling of the appellate courts on the Defendants [sic]
motion under CR 65.08.” In that order, the court
addressed the Court of Appeals’ concerns about the
statute of limitations. That court specifically referenced
KRS 413.270, suggesting that this “savings statute”
provided claimants ninety days from the date that the
MRPA is declared unconstitutional to file in circuit court.
On December 6, 2017, this Court granted transfer
of the Cabinet’s appeal. The parties briefed the
constitutional issues but did not challenge class
certification or the Court of Appeals’ Order Granting
Emergency Relief. The members of the class, however,
briefed the statute of limitations issue and “request[ed]
guidance for the bench and bar regarding the
applicability of the saving statute and/or equitable tolling
principles for MRP claims filed with the Cabinet that
should now proceed to court.”
On November 15, 2018, this Court issued its
opinion in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202
(Ky. 2018), in which we held that the MRPA was
unconstitutional. We did not address the statute of
limitations or tolling issues. The class members then
filed a Petition for Modification and/or Extension
pursuant to CR 76.32, asking this Court to address the
statute of limitations issues. In doing so, the class
members asked the Court to consider the MRPA’s tolling
provisions, Kentucky’s savings statute, and equitable
tolling principles. We denied that petition on February
14, 2019, and Claycomb became final on that day.
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Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 20-21. A Legislative Research Commission Note dated
November 15, 2018, states, “[o]n November 15, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme
Court ruled that the 2017 Medical Review Panel Act, of which this section is part,
violated Kentucky Constitution Section 14’s guarantee of a right of access to the
courts to obtain a remedy for injury, and is, therefore, void in its entirety.”
Turning to the present case, in 2015, Snowden became a patient of
Kevin Snyder Art, M.D., to whom he had been referred for the evaluation and
treatment of a urological disorder. Dr. Art is a physician and surgeon who
practices as a urologist with Saint Joseph Urology Associates and KentuckyOne
Health Medical Group, Inc. As a result of this treatment, Snowden alleged that he
had been injured between December 15, 2015, and October 14, 2016. Just prior to
the running of the one-year statute of limitations and in accordance with the MRP
Act, Snowden filed a proposed complaint with the MRP on October 12, 2017,
alleging medical negligence (Case No. MRP-2017-0073.) Snowden never received
an opinion from the MRP.
The underlying circuit court medical negligence action began with
Snowden’s filing of a complaint with the Fayette Circuit Court on February 7,
2019, one week before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Claycomb became final.
Snowden named Dr. Art, Saint Joseph Urology Associates, and KentuckyOne
Health Medical Group, Inc. (collectively, the defendants or the appellees) as the
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defendants. Snowden stated that he had timely filed this claim with the MRP. The
defendants filed answers seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, which included failing to file the claim within the applicable
statute of limitations.
Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 2019, the defendants moved the court
to dismiss Snowden’s complaint pursuant to CR 12.02 as barred by the one-year
statute of limitations in KRS 413.140(1). They stated that Snowden filed his
complaint with the MRP on October 12, 2017, while litigation as to the
constitutionality of the MRP Act was pending. The Supreme Court ultimately held
that the MRP Act was unconstitutional on November 15, 2018. See Claycomb,
supra. In their motion, the defendants argued that Snowden did not act to preserve
his rights by filing a civil action during that litigation. Instead, he waited until
February 7, 2019, to file his complaint in the circuit court. Based upon Snowden’s
allegations that his injuries had occurred between December 15, 2015, and October
14, 2016, the statute of limitations on Snowden’s claim would have expired on
October 14, 2017, unless the tolling provision in the MRP Act applied to extend it.
The defendants asserted that nine months after filing his claim with the MRP,
Snowden could have filed his complaint in circuit court pursuant to KRS
216C.190, but he waited seven more months before filing it.
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The defendants went on to argue that because the MRP Act had been
declared unconstitutional, the tolling provision in KRS 216C.040(1) could not
work to extend the applicable limitations period. And they argued that equitable
tolling principles did not apply under the circumstances of this case as the missed
deadline was not due to extraordinary circumstances beyond Snowden’s control.
Finally, the defendants argued that KRS 413.270, the savings statute, did not apply
under the circumstances of this case. In sum, the defendants insisted that Snowden
had failed to promptly preserve his rights in the event the MRP Act was declared
unconstitutional but waited 16 months after the deadline had passed to file his
complaint. It would be inequitable to them, the defendants argued, if the court
permitted Snowden’s claim to proceed.
Snowden objected to the motion to dismiss. He pointed out that the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Claycomb was not yet final when he filed his
complaint in circuit court. He also argued that his complaint was timely filed
pursuant to Kentucky’s savings statute and the doctrine of equitable tolling.
Because he filed his complaint in circuit court seven days prior to finality in
Claycomb, Snowden asserted that the court should not dismiss his complaint.
In reply, the defendants argued that the savings statute could not apply
to the MRP Act as such panels are not judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals. They
also argued that the tolling provision in the MRP Act could not apply because the
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entire statute had been declared void ab initio. And they argued that Snowden had
not met his burden to establish that equitable tolling should apply in his case.
The court heard oral arguments from the parties, and on June 25,
2019, it entered an opinion and order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The court held that: 1) because the MRP Act was declared void ab initio as of
February 14, 2019, the date Claycomb became final, the tolling provision could not
apply; 2) KRS 413.270, the savings statute, did not apply as the MRP was not a
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal; and 3) the equitable tolling doctrine did not
apply after July 12, 2018, which was nine months after Snowden filed his proposed
complaint with the MRP without having received an opinion, as he could have
filed his circuit court complaint at that time. This appeal now follows.
Our standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to CR 12.02(f) is
set forth in Benningfield v. Pettit Environmental, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Ky.
App. 2005):
A motion to dismiss should only be granted if “it appears
the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under
any set of facts which could be proved in support of his
claim.” Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union v. Kentucky Jockey
Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977). When ruling on
the motion, the allegations in “the pleadings should be
liberally construed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff and all allegations taken in the complaint to be
true.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. App.
1987). In making this decision, the trial court is not
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required to make any factual findings. James v. Wilson,
95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002). Therefore, “the
question is purely a matter of law.” Id. Accordingly, the
trial court’s decision will be reviewed de novo. Revenue
Cabinet v. Hubbard, 37 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ky. 2000).
More specifically to this appeal,
This Court has long held that “[w]here the
pertinent facts are not in dispute, the validity of the
defense of the statute of limitations can and should be
determined by the court as a matter of law.” Emberton v.
GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565, 572-73 (Ky. 2009) (quoting
Lynn Min. Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Ky.
1965)). In this case, “there is no dispute concerning the
operative facts concerning the time elements involved.”
Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods., 580
S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979). Therefore, our review is of
a question of law, and we review questions of law de
novo. Community Financial Servs. Bank v. Stamper, 586
S.W.3d 737, 741 (Ky. 2019).
Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 24.
After the parties filed their appellate briefs, Snowden moved this
Court to hold the appeal in abeyance pending a final decision in the then-pending
circuit court cases of Smith v. Fletcher, Case Nos. 19-CI-00201 and 19-CI-00251,
which had also been assigned to the Third Division in Fayette Circuit Court and
addressed the same issue. After those actions were dismissed, the Smith plaintiffs
appealed to this Court, and that appeal was ultimately transferred to the Supreme
Court of Kentucky (Appeal No. 2019-SC-0503-TG). Over the appellees’
objection, this Court granted Snowden’s motion and placed the appeal in abeyance
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pending the final outcome of the Supreme Court’s review in Smith. The Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Smith on December 17, 2020, and that decision
became final on January 7, 2021.
On February 23, 2021, shortly after Smith became final, Snowden
moved this Court to remand his case to the circuit court for further proceedings
based upon the holding in Smith, which he argued supported his argument that his
complaint was timely filed and should not have been dismissed. A three-judge
panel of this Court denied the motion to remand on September 2, 2021. Snowden
moved this Court to reconsider that ruling, noting that the appellees had not
responded to or opposed his motion to remand. In the alternative, he asked for
additional briefing to address the Supreme Court’s recent opinion. This Court
denied the motion to reconsider but permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing the holding in Smith. Both parties filed supplemental briefs, which we
have reviewed in addition to their initial briefs.
In his supplemental brief, Snowden argues that Smith is determinative
in this case based on its holdings that KRS 413.270, Kentucky’s savings statute,
applied in that case, that Claycomb became final on February 14, 2019, and that the
90-day tolling period in KRS 413.270 did not begin to run until the date Claycomb
became final. Because he filed his civil action prior to Claycomb even reaching
finality, Snowden argues that his complaint was timely filed.
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The appellees, on the other hand, argue that there are factual
distinctions between the two cases, which meant that Smith did not necessarily or
entirely resolve the issue in the present appeal. They point to the fact in this case
that the MRP never issued an opinion regarding Snowden’s claim, as was the case
in Smith, and that the Smith Court did not address this situation. And they argue
that the MRP lost its power or jurisdiction to conduct hearings, weigh evidence,
and issue an opinion, nine months after the proposed complaint was filed.
Therefore, if Smith applies here, they argue that the 90-day period would have
started to run from July 12, 2018, and expired on October 11 of that year, making
Snowden’s complaint untimely filed.
We agree with the defendants, to an extent, that the Smith plaintiffs
were in a different posture than Snowden. While Claycomb was pending in the
Supreme Court, the Smiths filed their proposed complaint with the MRP on
February 8, 2018, which tolled the statute of limitations that would otherwise have
expired on April 12, 2018. Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 21-22. The MRP issued an
opinion on October 29, 2018, which meant that the statute of limitations was tolled
for another 90 days from that date under the MRP Act. Id. The Smiths filed their
suit in Fayette Circuit Court on January 18, 2019, which was within the 90-day
window and prior to Claycomb becoming final on February 14, 2019. Id. The
circuit court dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. Id. However, the
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differences between the two cases have no effect on our resolution of the present
appeal, as we shall discuss.
The Smiths raised several issues in support of their appeal, including
many of the same issues asserted in the present case, namely that their complaint
was tolled by operation of KRS 216C.040, that the savings statute (KRS 413.270)
applied, and that the doctrine of equitable tolling applied. Smith, 613 S.W.3d at
23-24. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s savings statute, KRS 413.270,
was determinative in that case as the MRP was a quasi-judicial body and therefore
came under the purview of the statute. Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 24-28.
In Smith, the Supreme Court extensively discussed KRS 413.270,
Kentucky’s savings statute, which states as follows:
(1) If an action is commenced in due time and in good
faith in any court of this state and the defendants or any
of them make defense, and it is adjudged that the court
has no jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff or his
representative may, within ninety (90) days from the time
of that judgment, commence a new action in the proper
court. The time between the commencement of the first
and last action shall not be counted in applying any
statute of limitation.
(2) As used in this section, “court” means all courts,
commissions, and boards which are judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals authorized by the Constitution or
statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or of the
United States of America.
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The Supreme Court recognized “that KRS 413.270 is remedial in nature” and that
“[t]he intention of the statute ‘is to enable a litigant in such a situation to obtain a
trial on the merits and not to penalize it for filing its original action in a court of the
wrong venue.’” Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 25 (citations omitted).
First, the Supreme Court held that the MRP is quasi-judicial:
Although the panels are not adjudicative,
adjudication is not the sole measure of whether an
administrative body is quasi-judicial. It is not so much
about the outcome or end result of the actions, but rather
what actions were taken and how that outcome was
reached. In determining whether actions of a
governmental agency are quasi-judicial in nature, we
must look at whether the agency’s action required the use
of discretion and whether the agency was “required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for [its] official action.” [Roach v.
Kentucky Parole Board, 553 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Ky.
2018)]. This is exactly what medical review panels did.
Id. at 25-26. The Court went on to review the various statutes in the MRP Act that
provided for a panel’s review and bestowed specific rights to act. See KRS
216C.160(2) (providing for review of records and witness depositions and
affidavits); KRS 216C.160(4) (providing for the power to issue administrative
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum); KRS 216C.170(2) (providing for the right
to request information and conduct a hearing); and KRS 216C.180(1) (providing
the MRP with the sole duty to issue an opinion as to the proposed complaint after
which the panel would be dissolved). Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 26.
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It is clear that the medical review panels
investigated facts and weighed evidence. They were
permitted to hold hearings and subpoena witnesses.
Panel members used their discretion in reaching a
conclusion, and their final official action was the
issuance of an opinion. As such, we conclude that
medical review panels were quasi-judicial in nature.
Id.
The Supreme Court then discussed the question of jurisdiction:
In this case, the MRPA bestowed power on the
medical review panels to “hear cases” in that, as noted
above, the panels were empowered to review evidence,
subpoena witnesses and documents, and conduct hearings
at which panel members could question the parties and
their attorneys. After reviewing the evidence, the panels
had the duty to issue opinions. A medical malpractice
claimant was required to proceed through the medical
review panel process before he or she could file a claim
in an appropriate circuit court. In that sense, the medical
review panels had “jurisdiction” to hear a medical
malpractice case prior to any other court obtaining
jurisdiction. However, when the MRPA was struck
down as unconstitutional in Claycomb, the medical
review panels no longer had jurisdiction over medical
malpractice claims to prevent their filing in circuit court,
as they no longer had “power to do anything at all.”
[Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Ky. 2014)
(quoting Daugherty v. Telek, 366 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Ky.
2012)).]
We believe the above interpretation of KRS
413.270 is consistent with its remedial nature and its
intention to allow parties to obtain a trial on the merits
despite some kind of mistake in location of filing. See
[Jent v. Commonwealth, Natural Res. and Envtl. Prot.
Cabinet, 862 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ky. 1993)]; [D. & J.
Leasing, Inc. v. Hercules Galion Products, Inc., 429
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S.W.2d 854, 856 (Ky. 1968)]. We find this particularly
true in this case where the “mistake of location” was one
created by statute and the plaintiff’s proper reliance on
the statute and was not created by the plaintiff’s own
error. It is also consistent with the overarching purpose
behind statutes of limitations. “Statutes of limitations
‘promote justice by preventing surprises through
[plaintiffs’] revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’” CTS Corp. v.
Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8-9, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 189 L. Ed.
2d 62 (2014) (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-349, 64 S. Ct.
582, 88 L. Ed. 788 (1944)). In a case such as this, no
surprise or injustice is created by a holding that the
Smiths’ claims were timely filed in circuit court. These
claims were litigated and defended during the medical
review panel process. The defendants knew the nature of
the claims and the facts underlying those claims; these
claims were not left to “slumber” in a manner that placed
the defendants’ ability to defend the claims against them
at risk.
Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 27.
Having held that KRS 413.270 applied, the Smith Court went on to
address when the 90-day period for the filing of a new action in the proper court
began to run:
We have previously held that the judgment referred to in
this statute
is the decision which finally determines the
disputed issue over the court’s jurisdiction –
the trial court’s judgment if there is no
appeal, but the appellate court’s ruling if
there is an appeal. This view is consistent
with the prime purpose of the statute – to
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afford a full opportunity for a hearing on the
merits.
Ockerman v. Wise, 274 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Ky. 1954). In
this case, the MRPA was struck down as unconstitutional
when we rendered Claycomb on November 15, 2018.
That opinion, however, was not finalized until this Court
denied the Claycomb class’s petition for modification or
extension on February 14, 2019.[1] As such, the 90-day
period permitted under KRS 413.270 did not begin to run
until February 14, 2019. The Smiths filed their
complaint in Fayette Circuit Court on January 18, 2019.
Accordingly, their complaint was timely filed, and the
circuit court erred in dismissing it as untimely.
Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 27-28.
We agree with Snowden that the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith
applies in his case as well. And we reject the appellees’ argument that Smith does
not apply or the limitations period expired at a different time because the MRP
never issued an opinion in Snowden’s case. On the contrary, the Supreme Court’s
discussion in Smith about the quasi-judicial nature of the MRP applies whether or
not it issued an opinion in a particular case. We find the following language in
1
The Claycomb class’s petition for modification or extension urged
this Court to predetermine how our decision in Claycomb would
impact the running of the statute of limitations for plaintiffs who
had filed complaints with the medical review panel. Having had
no particular defendants in front of us to argue the merits of that
issue, we declined to address it. Our denial of that petition was not
a decision on the merits of the issues presented in the petition. The
defendants’ argument that our denial of the petition was an
effective ruling on the merits is inaccurate.
Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 28 n.3.
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Smith to be most compelling as to why that holding should be extended to
Snowden’s case and believe it bears repeating here:
We believe the above interpretation of KRS
413.270 is consistent with its remedial nature and its
intention to allow parties to obtain a trial on the merits
despite some kind of mistake in location of filing. We
find this particularly true in this case where the “mistake
of location” was one created by statute and the plaintiff’s
proper reliance on the statute and was not created by the
plaintiff’s own error. It is also consistent with the
overarching purpose behind statutes of limitations.
Smith, 613 S.W.3d at 27 (citation omitted).
The Smith Court’s holding that the 90-day period under KRS 413.270
began to run on February 14, 2019, equally applies in Snowden’s case. We
likewise reject the appellees’ assertion that the 90-day period began to run nine
months after Snowden filed his proposed complaint with the MRP when no
opinion had been issued.
KRS 216C.020(1)(b) provided that “[i]f the panel has not given its
opinion within nine (9) months after the filing of the proposed complaint, the
plaintiff may commence the action in court.” And in KRS 216C.190, the General
Assembly provided that “[i]f the panel has not given its opinion within nine (9)
months after the filing of the proposed complaint, the plaintiff may commence the
action in court . . . and [the panel] may continue its work to reach an opinion.”
Neither of these provisions required a claimant such as Snowden to file his
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complaint in the circuit court within 90 days of the expiration of the nine-month
period the MRP had to issue an opinion. Rather, the use of the word “may”
denoted that it was merely permissible for a claimant to file a circuit court action
and would permit a claimant to wait to see if the MRP eventually issued an
opinion, as it had the option to do. The General Assembly certainly permitted the
MRP to continue its work after the 90-day period had ended.
“The primary purpose of judicial construction is to carry out the intent
of the legislature” and “[t]he first principle of statutory construction is to use the
plain meaning of the words used in the statute.” Monumental Life Ins. Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 294 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Ky. App. 2008). The MRP never lost
jurisdiction by failing to issue an opinion within the nine-month period. Instead,
the expiration of that period without the issuance of an opinion merely lifted the
statutory mandate that a claimant was not able to file a claim in circuit court.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith, Snowden had 90
days from the date Claycomb became final to file his complaint in circuit court.
Snowden filed his complaint on February 7, 2019, one week prior to the date of
finality in Claycomb. Therefore, Snowden’s complaint was timely filed, and the
circuit court erred as a matter of law in dismissing his action.
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For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court
dismissing Snowden’s complaint is reversed, and this matter is remanded for
further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
Escum L. Moore, III Jeffery T. Barnett
Lexington, Kentucky Holly R. Iaccarino
Lexington, Kentucky
Christopher D. Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT:
Christopher D. Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
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Craig Snowden v. Kevin Snyder Art M.D.
Combined Opinion