IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 11, 2008
No. 07-30696
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRANDON KEITH DIAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Before JONES, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Dial appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty of mail
fraud and uttering false securities. Dial was an insurance adjuster who defraud-
ed his employer by paying himself and others for invalid insurance claims. He
No. 07-30696
contends that the district court erred by increasing his offense level under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for abusing a position of trust. He argues that he was merely
a “run-of-the-mill” claims adjuster without significant professional or managerial
responsibility.
We review for clear error the district court’s application of § 3B1.3 to the
facts, including its factual determination that Dial held a position of trust. See
United States v. Smith, 203 F.3d 884, 893 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ehr-
lich, 902 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1990). This court recently applied de novo re-
view to whether the defendant held a position of trust. See United States v. Kay,
513 F.3d 432, 460 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Apr. 9, 2008) (No.
07-1281). The panel in Kay, 513 F.3d at 460 & n.125, relied on United States v.
Sudeen, 434 F.3d 384, 391 n.19 (5th Cir. 2005), which based its statement on
United States v. Hussey, 254 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 2001), after observing that
the standard of review would not affect its decision.
De novo review appears foreclosed, however, by this circuit’s earlier ruling
that a “district court’s application of § 3B1.3 is a sophisticated factual determin-
ation that will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.”1 Despite whatever persua-
siveness Kay and Sudeen may have, our rule of orderliness directs that “‘one
panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of another panel.’”2
Dial had discretionary authority to settle and pay claims of up to $10,000
and de facto discretion to settle and pay up to $25,000 for some property claims.
That authority placed him in a posture to commit the offense superior to that of
the general public, thereby putting him in a position of trust that he abused. See
1
Ehrlich, 902 F.2d at 330; see Smith, 203 F.3d at 893; United States v. Fisher, 7 F.3d
69, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.
1989) (rejecting a dissection of the issue into legal and factual components and noting “that
findings which require both assessment of complex evidence as well as sensitivity to legal pur-
poses may nevertheless be factual”).
2
Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1997); accord Barrientes
v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 780 n.30 (5th Cir. 2000).
2
No. 07-30696
United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court did
not commit clear error by imposing the increase. See Smith, 203 F.3d at 893;
Ehrlich, 902 F.2d at 330.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
3