It is stated in the report that the Harvard Bank, soon after taking possession of the premises under the lease of January 1, 1861, put in a counter, a portable furnace with its necessary connections, and a fire-proof safe or vault, for the removal of which, in 1875, this action is brought. In 1864, the Harvard Bank was organized as the First National Bank of Cambridge. No question is made that all the proceedings were according to law. The right to the personal property of the old *574bank passed therefore to the defendant upon the execution of the necessary papers and the approval of the proper officers, no other assignment was necessary. Atlantic National Bank v. Harris, 118 Mass. 147, 151.
The right of the defendant to occupy the premises under the lease to the Harvard Bank for five years, and to exercise the option contained in the lease to hold the premises for five years more at the same rent, seems to have been conceded by the lessors ; for the defendant continued in possession, paying rent during the whole term of ten years contemplated by the lease, which expired January 1, 1871. We must assume that the title, not merely to movable chattels upon the premises, but also to trade fixtures put in by the Harvard Bank, passed to the defendant, as the plaintiff does not deny that the defendant could have removed such of the articles as are trade fixtures at any time before the final expiration of the lease on January 1, 1871.
In October, 1870, about three months before the final expiration of the term of the old lease, the plaintiff, one of the original lessors, who had in the mean time acquired the whole title to the premises, executed a new lease to the defendant, then in occupation, for a much higher rent, containing different stipulations from those in the old lease, particularly in regard to abatement of rent in case of fire. This lease was to take effect January 1, 1871, but made no reference to the existing lease or to the removal of any trade fixtures then upon the premises. It was in no proper sense a renewal of the old lease. It contained the usual covenants on the part of the lessee to quit and deliver up the premises at the end of the term in as good order and condition “ as the same now are.” Although executed before the expiration of the earlier lease, it can have no other or different effect than if given on the day it was to become operative, and its stipulations and conditions are to be considered as if made on that day. And the question arises whether the acceptance of the new lease and occupation under it on January 1,1871, was equivalent to a surrender of the premises to the lessor at the expiration of the first term. If it did amount to a surrender, it is very clear that the defendant could not afterwards recover the articles alleged to be trade fixtures.
*575The general rnle is well settled that trade fixtures become annexed to the real estate; but the tenant may remove them during his term, and, if he fails to do so, he cannot afterwards claim them against the owner of the land. Poole’s case, 1 Salk. 368. Gaffield v. Hapgood, 17 Pick. 192. Winslow v. Merchants Ins. Co. 4 Met. 306, 311. Shepard v. Spaulding, 4 Met. 416. Bliss v. Whitney, 9 Allen, 114, 115, and cases cited. Talbot v. Whipple, 14 Allen, 177. Lyde v. Russell, 1 B. & Ad. 394. Baron Parke, in Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450. This rule always applies when the term is of certain duration, as under a lease for. a term of years, which contains no special provisions in regard to fixtures. But where the term is uncertain, or depends upon a contingency, as where a party is in as tenant for life, or at will, fixtures may be removed within a reasonable time after the tenancy is determined. Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43, 49. Doty v. Gorham, 5 Pick. 487, 490. Martin v. Roe, 7 E. & B. 237. See also Whiting v. Brastow, 4 Pick. 310, 311, & note.
There is another class of cases which forms an exception to the general rule. Where a lease was given by an agent without sufficient authority during the absence of the owner, and was terminated by the owner on his return from abroad, it was decided by this court that the lessees became tenants at sufferance, and could remove their fixtures within a reasonable time after such termination. Antoni v. Belknap, 102 Mass. 193. In Penton v. Robart, 2 East, 88, it was held that a tenant, who had remained in possession after the expiration of the term, had the right to take away his fixtures, and Lord Kenyon said, “ He was in fact still in possession of the premises at the time the things were taken away, and therefore there is no pretence to say that he had abandoned his right to them.” In Weeton v. Woodcock, 7 M. & W. 14, a term under a lease had been forfeited by the bankruptcy of the lessee, and the lessor entered upon the assignees to enforce the forfeiture, and it was held that they might have a reasonable time to remove fixtures; and Baron Alderson said that “ the tenant’s right to remove fixtures continues during his original term, and during such further period of possession by him, as he holds the premises under a right still to consider himself as tenant.” Mr. Justice Willes, commenting on these two last cases, in Leader v. Homewood, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 546, said: “It *576is perhaps not easy to understand fully what is the exact meaning of. this rule, and whether or not it justifies a tenant who has remained in possession after the end of his term, and so become a tenant at sufferance, in severing the fixtures during the time he continues in possession as such tenant. But the rule, whatever its exact meaning may be, is plainly inconsistent with the argument relied on by the counsel for the plaintiff in the present case, viz., that the right of the tenant continues till he has evinced an intention to abandon his right to the fixtures.” In Mackintosh v. Trotter, 3 M. & W. 184, Baron Parke, after stat ing that whatever is planted in the soil belongs to the soil, remarked “ that the tenant has the right to remove fixtures of this nature during his term, or during what may, for this purpose, be considered as an excrescence on the term.” He also refers to Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450, as authority, wherein he stated in the most emphatic manner that “the right of a tenant is only to remove during his term the fixtures he may have put up, and so to make them cease to be any longer fixtures.” It is clear from these cases that the right of a tenant, in possession after the end of his term, to remove fixtures within a reasonable time, does not rest merely on the fact that he is in occupation, or has not evinced an intention to abandon, but because he is still, in contemplation of law, in occupation as tenant under the original lease, and, as Baron Parke says, under what may be considered an excrescence on the term, that is, as tenant at sufferance.
But a very different question is presented when the same tenant continues in possession under a new lease containing different terms and conditions, making no reference to the old lease, reserving no rights to the lessee in fixtures annexed during the previous term and not removed before its expiration, and containing the covenant to deliver up the premises at the end of the term in the same condition. This is not the extension of or holding over under an existing lease; it is the creation of a new tenancy. And it follows that whatever was a part of the freehold when the lessee accepted and began his occupation under the new lease must be delivered up at the end of the term, and cannot be severed on the ground that it was put in, as a trade fixture, under a previous lease which has expired. The failure of the *577lessee to exercise his right to remove during the former term, or to reserve it in his new contract, precludes him from denying the title of his landlord to the estate and the fixtures annexed which have become part of it. The occupation under the new lease is in effect a surrender of the premises to the landlord under the old.
This view is supported by the authorities. The earliest case on the subject is Fitzherbert v. Shaw, 1 H. Bl. 258. A purchaser of lands having brought ejectment against a tenant from year to year, the parties entered into an agreement that judgment should be signed for the plaintiff, with a stay of execution for a given period; and it was held that the tenant could not, during the interval, remove the fixtures erected during the term and before action brought — on the ground that the tenant could do no act to alter the premises in the mean time, but they must be delivered up in the same situation they were in when the agreement was made and the judgment signed. This case was followed in Heap v. Barton, 12 C. B. 274, where there was a similar agreement, and Jervis, C. J., said that, “if the tenants meant to avail themselves of their continuance in possession to remove the fixtures, they should have said so.” In Thresher v. Fast London Waterworks, 2 B. & C. 608, it was held that a lessee, who had erected fixtures for purposes of trade on the premises, and afterward took a new lease to commence at the expiration of the former one, which contained a covenant to repair, would be bound to repair the fixtures, unless strong circumstances were shown that they were not intended to pass under the general words of the second demise ; and a doubt was expressed whether any circumstances, dehors the deed, can be alleged to show they were not intended. to pass. The case of Shepard v. Spaulding, 4 Met. 416, touches the question. A lessee erected a building on the demised premises, which he had a right to remove, but surrendered his interest to the lessor without reservation; afterward he took another lease of the premises from the same lessor, but it was held that his right to remove did not revive. When the new lease was made, it was of the whole estate, including the building. This differs from the case at bar only in the fact that there was an interval between the surrender of the interest under the first lease and the granting of the second, *578when the lessor was in actual possession. But the acceptance of the new lease and occupation under it are equivalent to a surrender of the premises at the end of the term. In Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, it was held that, if a tenant, having a right to remove fixtures erected by him on the demised premises, accepts a new lease of such premises, including the buildings, without reservation or mention of any claim to the buildings, and enters upon a new term thereunder, the right to removal is lost, notwithstanding his occupation has been continuous. See also Abell v. Williams, 3 Daly, 17; Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Jungerman v. Bovee, 19 Cal. 354; Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38; Taylor on Landlord & Tenant, (5th ed.) § 552; 2 Smith’s Lead. Cas. (7th Am. ed.) 228, 245, 257.
We are therefore of opinion that the defendant had no right during the second term to remove any trade fixtures placed there during the first. If any of the articles named were movable chattels, as the defendant contends, the plaintiff cannot recover for them; but if they were permanent or trade fixtures, the plaintiff may recover for their removal. Case to stand for trial.