IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 20, 2009
No. 08-30665 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
RODNEY MICHAEL COLLIER; SARAH ELIZABETH COLLIER,
Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
PERRY GREG MONTGOMERY, Individually; GLENN PAUL SPROLES,
Individually; RODNEY D. HARRIS, Individually; KEN MICHAEL HALPHEN,
Individually,
Defendants–Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Before GARWOOD, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:
Officers Perry Greg Montgomery, Glenn Paul Sproles, Rodney D. Harris,
and Ken Michael Halphen appeal the district court’s denial of their summary
judgment motion based on qualified immunity. We reverse and render.
I
Harris, a Bossier City officer working on the Seat Belt Task Force, saw
Rodney Collier driving a pickup truck with the seatbelt not extending forward
No. 08-30665
and across Collier’s shoulder as required by Louisiana law. Harris made a
traffic stop and decided to issue a ticket.
As Harris was attempting to explain the consequences of failing to honor
a written promise to appear, as required by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 32:391,
Collier interrupted and attempted to grab a pen from Harris’s hand. Harris
retrieved a pair of handcuffs from his belt and informed Collier that he was
under arrest. When Harris reached for Collier’s left wrist, Collier pulled his
hand back and turned away from the officer. The two men grappled as Harris
attempted to place the handcuffs on a resisting Collier. At one point during the
struggle, Harris pushed Collier onto the hood of the police cruiser and forced
Collier’s right arm behind his back. After Harris placed the handcuffs on Collier,
he directed Collier into the back seat of the police cruiser.
At that point, Collier began complaining of chest pain, and Harris
immediately called the Bossier City Fire Department to the scene. However,
Collier refused treatment and executed a Fire Department Patient Refusal
Information Sheet. Collier was later taken to the LSU Health Sciences Center,
but he also refused treatment there.
Collier was charged with resisting arrest, simple battery, and failing to
wear his seatbelt. During his criminal trial, Collier admitted that he told Harris
that he did not have his shoulder harness on but that he had the lap belt
fastened. The City of Bossier Court found that “Officer Harris had probable
cause to initiate the stop when he saw what he reasonably believed was an
unbelted driver.” But the City Court found that there was reasonable doubt as
to whether the seatbelt was being utilized and, therefore, found Collier not guilty
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No. 08-30665
of the seatbelt violation. Collier was also acquitted of the other charges against
him.
Rodney Collier and Sarah Elizabeth Collier subsequently filed suit
claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Bossier City, Coregis
Insurance Company, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and Officers
Michael Stanley Szempruch, Montgomery, Sproles, Harris, and Halphen.
The claims against Coregis Insurance Company and Officer Szempruch
have been dismissed. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. In a one-page opinion, the district court denied the
defendants’ motion, stating, “[h]aving reviewed the film of the arrest, the Court
finds that genuine issues of material fact remain in the case.” The defendants
timely appealed. This court later dismissed the appeal as to all parties except
Montgomery, Sproles, Harris, and Halphen, in their individual capacities.
II
Although nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden
to negate the assertion of qualified immunity once properly raised.1 This court
reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit de novo.2
In Saucier v. Katz,3 the Supreme Court held that a court addressing a
claim of qualified immunity must determine first whether the plaintiff has
1
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).
2
Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007).
3
533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
3
No. 08-30665
adduced facts sufficient to establish a constitutional or statutory violation 4
before determining “whether [the officers’] actions were objectively unreasonable
in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.” 5 In
Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court has since held that this sequential two-
step analysis was no longer mandatory.6 Instead, lower courts are “permitted
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances of the particular case at hand.” 7 The Court noted, however, that
the Saucier formulation often is the appropriate analytical sequence.8 In this
case, we find it appropriate to determine initially whether a constitutional
violation occurred.
III
A
Collier argues that Harris violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
making an unlawful arrest. Harris stopped Collier based on a belief that Collier
was not wearing his seatbelt properly. According to Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 32:295.1(A)(1), a driver is required to have a “safety belt properly fastened
about his or her body at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion.”
4
Id. at 201; see McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2002)
(en banc).
5
Freeman, 483 F.3d at 411.
6
129 S. Ct. at 821.
7
Id. at 818.
8
Id.
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No. 08-30665
Probable cause for such violation “shall be based solely upon a law enforcement
officer’s clear and unobstructed view of a person not restrained as required by
[Louisiana law].” 9
At the time of the arrest, Louisiana had not identified what “properly
fastened about his or her body” meant. However, the Louisiana Attorney
General later issued an opinion in an unrelated matter stating that “when the
driver’s clasp is fastened, but the shoulder and/or chest harness is not properly
across the chest and shoulder, then the safety belt is not ‘properly fastened about
the body’ and La. R.S. 32:295.1 has been violated.” 10
Although Collier claims that Harris had an obstructed view of Collier’s
seatbelt due to the distance between the vehicles and because Collier’s tinted
window was up, the video evidence shows that no cars passed between Harris
and Collier at the applicable time. Additionally, during his criminal trial and in
his deposition, Collier admitted that he was not wearing his seatbelt with the
shoulder strap across his chest. Therefore, we agree with the criminal trial court
that Harris had probable cause to arrest Collier. Accordingly, Harris did not
violate the Fourth Amendment in making the arrest.11
9
LA . REV . STAT . § 32:295.1(F).
10
La. Att’y. Gen. Op. No. 06-0189, 2006 WL 3616631 (Nov. 9, 2006).
11
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (finding an arrest for the
failure to wear a seatbelt constitutional and holding that “an officer [who] has probable cause
to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence . . . may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender”).
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No. 08-30665
B
Collier contends that Harris used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.12 To prevail on an excessive-
force claim, Collier must establish: “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and
only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of
which was clearly unreasonable.”13 “[A]n injury is generally legally cognizable
when it results from a degree of force that is constitutionally
impermissible—that is, objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.”14
“The objective reasonableness of the force, in turn, depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, such that the need for force determines how
much force is constitutionally permissible.” 15 The test for reasonableness must
consider “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.” 16
Collier suffered abdominal bruising and bruises on his back and legs, and
he claims that he experienced episodes of chest pain with significantly elevated
blood pressure and heart rate during the arrest. We conclude that the force
applied was constitutionally permissible under these particular circumstances.
12
See Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable seizures of the person has been applied in causes of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to impose liability on police officers who use excessive force against
citizens.”).
13
Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005).
14
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2008).
15
Id.
16
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (emphasis added).
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No. 08-30665
The video evidence shows that Collier physically resisted when Harris attempted
to place handcuffs on him. Harris grappled with Collier for several seconds and
was able to subdue Collier after pushing him onto the hood of the cruiser.
Harris’s use of force and the resulting bruises were not excessive under the
circumstances. Additionally, Collier’s alleged chest pain and elevated blood
pressure and heart rate did not make Harris’s use of force unreasonable.17
Accordingly, we hold that Harris did not violate Collier’s Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable seizure.
C
Collier asserts that Harris’s failure to advise Collier of his Miranda rights
was a violation of the Fifth Amendment and that Sergeant Kevin Peddington of
the City of Bossier Police Department used a statement by Collier in Collier’s
criminal trial against him. Sergeant Peddington testified that Collier told him
“I just want to let you know that this officer didn’t do this. . . . He didn’t do
anything wrong. I did this when I fell against the car.”
The alleged statements made by Collier did not relate to whether Collier
had committed a crime. Instead, the statements pertained to whether Harris
had used excessive force to subdue Collier during the arrest. Therefore,
regardless of whether Collier was read his Miranda rights, such statements were
17
See Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that an arrest
was not made unreasonable by the fact that the plaintiff was left in an unventilated vehicle
for approximately thirty minutes, despite the plaintiff’s allegation that “her multiple sclerosis
was exacerbated by the heat”).
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No. 08-30665
not introduced in an incriminating manner.18 Accordingly, Collier’s Fifth
Amendment rights were not violated.
D
Collier further argues that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Collier claims that “[t]he
treatment, or lack thereof, by the EMT was woefully inadequate and insulting.”
However, Collier does not claim that the officers failed to provide him with
medical care; Collier only complains that the officers refused to contact his
cardiologist, Dr. Cole. We have previously held that liability will not attach
“unless the official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that
risk.” 19 Collier twice refused treatment for his complained-of chest pains.
Because the officers attempted to provide Collier with medical care, the officers
did not violate Collier’s Eighth Amendment rights.
E
Collier also claims that Officers Montgomery, Sproles, and Halphen failed
to intervene to prevent the aforementioned alleged constitutional violations from
occurring. It is undisputed that no other officer was present at the scene during
the arrest. Therefore, Montgomery, Sproles, and Halphen could not have failed
to intervene to prevent the alleged unlawful arrest and alleged use of excessive
force. Additionally, because we conclude that Collier’s constitutional rights were
not otherwise violated, this claim fails.
18
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.33 (1966) (stating that a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated “if his conviction is based, in whole or in
part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity”).
19
Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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No. 08-30665
F
Collier’s final argument is that the officers conspired to violate his First
and Eighth Amendment rights. Collier has not produced any evidence of an
agreement between the officers to violate Collier’s constitutional rights.
Therefore, this argument is meritless.
* * *
Because we hold that the officers did not violate Collier’s constitutional
rights, we REVERSE the decision of the district court denying summary
judgment and RENDER judgment for the officers in their individual capacities.
9