United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4043.
HAITIAN REFUGEE CENTER, INC., Andre Joseph, Lorilus Achat,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Warren CHRISTOPHER, Secretary of State, William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense, Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Janet Reno, Attorney General, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Michael Williams, Brigadier General,
Commander, Joint Task Force, Defendants-Appellees.
Jan. 18, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 95-22-CV-KMM), K, Michael Moore, Judge.
Before KRAVITCH, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
In this case we determine whether Haitian migrants in safe
haven outside the physical borders of the United States should have
been granted injunctive relief to prevent their repatriation to
Haiti. The district court denied their motions for a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, and they appeal. We
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual background of the Haitian migrants' arrival in
safe haven at Guantanamo Bay is documented in our opinion issued
today, Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, Nos. 94-5138, 94-5231,
& 94-5234, slip op., --- F.3d ---- (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995)
[hereinafter CABA ], and thus, here we address only those facts
which give rise to this appeal. On December 29, 1994, the
government announced its offer of approximately $80.00 American
dollars to each Haitian migrant who volunteered to return to Haiti
by January 5, 1995. The migrants were informed that if they failed
to volunteer to return to Haiti, they would not receive any
compensation and likely would be involuntarily repatriated
beginning on January 5, 1995. The government began the involuntary
repatriation process as anticipated.
On January 5, 1995, the plaintiffs-appellants, Haitian Refugee
Center ("HRC") and two individual Haitian migrants at Guantanamo
Bay, initiated suit in the Southern District of Florida requesting
a temporary restraining order to prevent the involuntary
repatriation of Haitian migrants scheduled to begin that evening.
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Christopher, No. 95-0022-CIV-MOORE
(S.D.Fla.1995). During the evening of January 5, the district
court heard oral arguments regarding HRC's and the individual
Haitian migrants' claims that the defendants-appellees ("the
government") were violating the Haitian migrants' putative equal
protection and due process rights by repatriating them without
their consent. After a two hour hearing, the district court orally
converted HRC's and the individual Haitian migrants' request for a
temporary restraining order into a request for preliminary
injunctive relief so that appeal could be taken. The district
court then orally denied injunctive relief to HRC and the
individual Haitian migrants. On January 9, 1995, HRC and the two
individual Haitian migrants moved in this court for summary
reversal of the district court's denial of injunctive relief or in
the alternative, an expedited briefing schedule for appeal on the
merits. We held their request pending release of our opinion in
CABA.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
The district court with consent of the parties, converted
HRC's request for a temporary restraining order into a request for
preliminary injunctive relief so that, in light of the similarity
of issues presented in this case and those pending before us in
CABA, the losing party could appeal directly to this court. We
have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the
district court denying injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
B. Standard of Review
Because of the extraordinary and " "drastic' " nature of
preliminary injunctive relief, "we will disturb the denial of a
preliminary injunction only if the district court abused its
discretion." Crochet v. Housing Auth. of Tampa, 37 F.3d 607, 610
(11th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (quoting Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns
County, 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam)). Only
where the district court misapplies the law will we refuse to defer
to its conclusions supporting its denial of relief. See Speer v.
Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.1994).
C. The Merits
A party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show:
"(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) its own injury
outweighs the injury to the nonmovant; and (4) the injunction
would not disserve the public interest." Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam).
The requesting party's failure to demonstrate a "substantial
likelihood of success on the merits" may defeat the party's claim,
regardless of its ability to establish any of the other elements.
See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th
Cir.1994).
HRC and the individual Haitian migrants in this case contend
that the United States is violating Haitian migrants' statutory and
constitutional rights by involuntarily repatriating them to Haiti.
They contend that the government has created a protectable liberty
and property interest in remaining in safe haven. Thus, they
argue, the migrants should not be removed from safe haven without
due process.
The district court concluded that HRC and the individual
Haitian plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of
their claim that the government violated migrants' due process and
equal protection rights. The court reasoned that "the law with
respect to the rights of such individual[ ] [migrants] that has
been decided," indicates no cognizable claim. Additionally, it
found no support as a matter of law that provision of safe haven
created a protectable liberty interest, deprivation of which would
require that the government's actions comport with due process.
Hr'g Tr. at 72. We agree. See CABA, slip. op. at ----, --- F.3d
at ----, ("[P]roviding safe haven residency is a gratuitous
humanitarian act which does not in any way create a liberty
interest.").
HRC's attempt to liken the conduct by the government in
repatriating the individual Haitian migrants with conduct
proscribed by the Supreme Court in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846,
105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985), aff'g, 727 F.2d 957 (11th
Cir.1984), also fails. In Jean, the Court was addressing
individualized parole decisions by lower-level immigration
officials who were constrained by statutory and regulatory
provisions which did not allow those decisions to be based on
national origin. Jean did not address the Executive Branch's
plenary authority over the immigration and foreign policy decision
to repatriate from safe haven Haitian migrants. Under the binding
law of this circuit, there is no statutory provision which prevents
the President or the Attorney General from repatriating the Haitian
migrants. See CABA, slip op. at ----, --- F.3d at ----; Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1245, 117 L.Ed.2d
477 (1992). Moreover, HRC and the individual Haitian migrants have
not identified, nor have we found, any applicable regulations
constraining lower-level immigration officials that would possibly
change the result in this case. Hence, the district court
correctly interpreted the precedents of this circuit, and thus, did
not abuse its discretion in denying HRC's and the two individual
Haitian migrants' meritless request for injunctive relief from
alleged equal protection and due process violations.
III. CONCLUSION
HRC and two individual Haitian migrants sought to enjoin the
government's repatriation of Haitian migrants from safe haven
outside the physical borders of the United States. The district
court, correctly interpreting the law of this circuit, denied them
relief. The court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM.