United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-9364
Non-Argument Calendar.
Buelah Magdalene PICKENS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Deputy Timothy HOLLOWELL, individually and as a Deputy Sheriff in
the County of Rockdale; Deputy Douglas Wilson, individually and as
a Deputy Sheriff in the County of Rockdale, Defendants-Appellants,
Rockdale County Sheriff Department; Rockdale County, Defendants.
July 31, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:93-00830-CV-ODE), Orinda D. Evans,
Judge.
Before BIRCH, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises from Buelah Pickens' 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint alleging that she was arrested in violation of her
constitutional rights. Timothy Hollowell and Douglas Wilson,
deputies in the Rockdale County Sheriff's Department, appeal the
district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. We reverse that denial.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts as found by the district court are not in
dispute. On September 13, 1992, Buelah Pickens arrived at the
Rockdale County Jail to visit her son, an inmate in the jail.
Pursuant to the Rockdale County Sheriff's Department's normal
practice of conducting a criminal record check on all visitors,
Deputy Wilson checked the computer and discovered that there were
four warrants for Pickens' arrest on bad check charges. Wilson
called the Sheriff's Department's Warrant Division, and was
informed that the warrants were still outstanding.
After verifying the identity of Pickens by questioning her and
examining her driver's license, Wilson called his superior, Deputy
Hollowell, and apprised him of the situation. Hollowell then
obtained the actual warrants from the Warrant Division and met
Wilson and Pickens in the booking area of the jail. Pickens
testified in her deposition about the statements she made to Wilson
and Hollowell upon learning that she would be arrested:
Q. And you say he took the purse from you?
A. Snatched the purse from me and said, you're under arrest.
And I said, this has to be on charges on checks that were
stolen out of my car. And he said, I wouldn't know. And I
said, what's the date on it? And he said, '87. And I said,
I filed forgery charges on this. You need to check into
your—he said, my computer says 12 charges on you, and you're
under arrest.
And I said, well, check in your computer a little bit
closer because I filed for forgery on this. They were stolen
from me. I didn't write these checks, and I said, I thought
the statute of limitations was two years on a misdemeanor.
Pickens also gave Hollowell the name of one of the investigators
that she claimed had knowledge of her forgery complaint. Hollowell
contacted the investigator, who acknowledged that Pickens had
reported forgery of her checks but was unable to remember any other
details.
Despite her protests, Hollowell placed Pickens under arrest.
She was held in the jail for several hours before being released on
a cash bond. The Rockdale County District Attorney subsequently
dismissed the charges because she had a valid statute of
limitations defense. The misdemeanor offenses upon which the
arrest warrants were based had a two-year statute of limitations,
and Pickens' arrest had occurred five years after the arrest
warrants were issued.
Pickens filed suit under § 1983 against Wilson, Hollowell, the
Rockdale County Sheriff's Department, and Rockdale County. The
district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Sheriff's Department subsequently was dismissed from the case
pursuant to a stipulation approved by the district court. Wilson
and Hollowell appealed. We have jurisdiction over their
interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
II. DISCUSSION
A.
In its denial of summary judgment on the qualified immunity
issue, the district court stated that the only issue in the case
was whether the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by
1
arresting Pickens. Finding that "the right to be free from
unlawful arrest is a clearly established constitutional right" and
that a factual dispute existed about whether Wilson and Hollowell
knew that the statute of limitations for the charged offenses had
expired, the district court concluded that the "officers' knowledge
regarding the statute of limitations issue will have to be
1
As the district court observed, Pickens' complaint is
somewhat unclear as to what constitutional provisions she alleges
were violated by her arrest and detention. The district court
analyzed the complaint as a Fourth Amendment claim, and Pickens
treats it as such in her brief to this Court. Accordingly, we
also use a Fourth Amendment analysis in reviewing the district
court's order.
submitted to the fact finder at trial before the court is able to
resolve the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity."
We review de novo the denial of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds. L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 683 (11th
Cir.1995). This Court uses a two-part analysis to evaluate a
qualified immunity defense:
First, the defendant government official must prove that he
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. If the defendant
meets this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that
the defendant violated clearly established law based upon
objective standards.
Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir.1995). There is
no question that Wilson and Hollowell were acting within their
discretionary authority when they arrested Pickens. Therefore, the
issue in this appeal is whether Pickens has met her burden under
the second prong of the analysis by demonstrating that the
officers' actions violated clearly established law.
In order for the law to be clearly established for purposes
of qualified immunity, "the law must have earlier been developed in
such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to
all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that
"what he is doing' violates federal law." Lassiter v. Alabama A &
M Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034,
3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). "When considering whether the law
applicable to certain facts is clearly established, the facts of
cases relied upon as precedent are important. The facts need not
be the same as the facts of the immediate case. But they do need
to be materially similar." Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's
Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1575 (11th Cir.1992) (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting), approved en banc, 998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir.1993). Mere
recitations of general rules or abstract rights do not demonstrate
that the law was clearly established at the time of the relevant
conduct. Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150; see also Post v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1993) ("If case law, in
factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity
almost always protects the defendant."), modified on other grounds,
14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir.1994).
The Fourth Amendment is violated by an arrest without
probable cause. E.g., Lowe v. Aldridge, 958 F.2d 1565, 1570 (11th
Cir.1992). Probable cause exists if "the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably
trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe,
under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Von Stein v.
Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990). However, the
appropriate inquiry for qualified immunity is not whether there was
probable cause, but whether there was "arguable" probable cause to
arrest. E.g., Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 996
(11th Cir.1995); Post, 7 F.3d at 1558. In other words, we "must
determine whether reasonable officers in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed
that probable cause existed to arrest...." Von Stein, 904 F.2d at
579 (emphasis added); see also Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d
1495, 1497-98 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113
S.Ct. 1049, 122 L.Ed.2d 357 (1993).
The district court did not question, and Pickens does not
dispute, that the warrants which the deputies executed by arresting
her were supported by probable cause at the time they were issued.
In other words, the warrants were valid on their face insofar as
the affidavits attached to the warrants provided probable cause to
believe that Pickens had committed the offenses charged. Thus,
this is not the typical false arrest/Fourth Amendment case where
the merits issue is probable cause and the qualified immunity issue
is arguable probable cause.
Instead, the issue in this case arises because the deputies
had at least some reason to believe—and for present purposes we
assume that they knew—that the statute of limitations period had
expired at the time they served the warrants by arresting Pickens.
The merits question then is whether it violates the Fourth
Amendment for law enforcement officers to arrest based upon a
warrant supported by probable cause if they know that the statute
of limitations period has run. But this case is not here for a
review on the merits; it is here for a review of the district
court's qualified immunity ruling. The qualified immunity issue is
whether, when this case arose in 1992, the law was clearly
established that the Fourth Amendment forbade an arrest based upon
an otherwise valid warrant if the arresting officers knew the
statute of limitations period had run.
Pickens relies upon Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct.
1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), and Garmon v. Lumpkin County, Ga., 878
F.2d 1406 (11th Cir.1989), but those cases are not helpful. Both
dealt with qualified immunity where an "officer caused the
plaintiffs to be unconstitutionally arrested by presenting a judge
with a complaint and a supporting affidavit which failed to
establish probable cause." Malley, 475 U.S. at 337, 106 S.Ct. at
1094; see Garmon, 878 F.2d at 1410 (rejecting claim of qualified
immunity for officer who had no "objectively reasonable basis for
believing that his investigator's affidavit established probable
cause to arrest"); see also Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1553-55
(11th Cir.1994) (discussing these and related cases). Malley and
Garmon clearly establish that a police officer is not protected by
qualified immunity if he applies for an arrest warrant where "a
reasonably well-trained officer ... would have known that his
affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not
have applied for the warrant." Garmon, 878 F.2d at 1410 (quoting
Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. at 1098). But that is not this
case. As we have already discussed, everyone agrees that the
warrants in this case were issued upon probable cause to believe
that Pickens had committed the charged offenses. Moreover, these
two deputies did not cause the warrants to be issued, all they did
was execute them by arresting Pickens. See, e.g., Fullman v.
Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 561 (11th Cir.1984) (executing officer
entitled to immunity where warrants valid on face and supported by
probable cause).
Although Malley and Garmon are not very helpful in resolving
the issue at hand, two other decisions are. The first one is Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979),
where the plaintiff was arrested and held in jail for three days
before the sheriff discovered that the wrong man had been
imprisoned. Id. at 141, 99 S.Ct. at 2693. The Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the sheriff's failure to
investigate his protests of misidentification constituted a
violation of due process, and explained:
Given the requirements that arrest be made only on probable
cause and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do
not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by
the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of
innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or
a defense such as lack of requisite intent.... The ultimate
determination of such claims of innocence is placed in the
hands of the judge and the jury.
Id. at 145-46, 99 S.Ct. at 2695. Although the plaintiff in Baker
did not challenge the validity of his arrest or bring a claim under
the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court's decision in that case
does suggest that the two deputies in this case—who otherwise had
probable cause to arrest Pickens pursuant to facially valid arrest
warrants—did not have a duty to investigate and decide the
potential viability of a defense, such as the statute of
limitations, before arresting Pickens.
Our own decision in Williams v. City of Albany, 936 F.2d 1256
(11th Cir.1991), provides even stronger support for that
conclusion. In Williams, a § 1983 action was brought against two
police officers based, in part, on the allegation that they had
presented their criminal investigation of the plaintiff to the
district attorney "with the knowledge that the statute of
limitations for the charge had expired." Id. at 1260. We rejected
the plaintiff's argument that these facts were sufficient to
withstand summary judgment:
[The police officers] should not be held personally liable for
presenting this evidence to the district attorney who has the
authority to make the ultimate decision whether to seek an
indictment. Whether the statute of limitations bars a
prosecution is a question of law. The officers properly
deferred legal decisions to the district attorney.
Id. at 1260 (emphasis added); see also Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1552 (the
Constitution "imposes no obligation upon law enforcement officers
to second guess prosecutors....").
The present case involves the execution of an arrest warrant
rather than the presentation of an investigation to the district
attorney. However, we believe that Williams makes clear that
police officers have no responsibility to determine the viability
of a statute of limitations defense when executing a valid arrest
warrant. The existence of a statute of limitations bar is a legal
question that is appropriately evaluated by the district attorney
or by a court after a prosecution is begun, not by police officers
executing an arrest warrant. Our conclusion to that effect is
reinforced by the knowledge that whether a valid statute of
limitations defense exists is not a cut and dry matter. For
example, the statute of limitations for a criminal proceeding in
Georgia is tolled during the time the "accused is not usually and
publicly a resident within" Georgia. Ga.Code Ann. § 17-3-2(1)
(Michie 1990); see Danuel v. State, 262 Ga. 349, 418 S.E.2d 45
(1992). An arresting officer is not in a position to make that
type of determination, nor is he required to know the law relating
to statute of limitations issues. At the very least, Baker and
Williams establish that the law was not clearly established when
this arrest was made in 1992 that an officer had a duty to
correctly decide any statute of limitations issues before executing
an arrest warrant. That is sufficient to dispose of the issue
before us. The district court should not have rejected the
qualified immunity defense on grounds relating to the statute of
limitations having run at the time of the arrest.
In addition to her argument regarding the statute of
limitations, Pickens contends that notwithstanding the otherwise
valid warrants, the deputies lacked probable cause to arrest once
she told them that she had reported that the checks had been stolen
from her car and forged. That contention is foreclosed byBaker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. at 145-46, 99 S.Ct. at 2695, where the Court
held, "we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is
required by the Constitution to investigate independently every
claim of innocence." Pickens' contention that her checks were
stolen was a claim of innocence, and at the very least, the law was
not clearly established in 1992 that the officers were required to
investigate and determine whether she was guilty or innocent before
they executed the arrest warrants.
The ultimate success of Pickens' statute of limitations
defense changes nothing about the issues we have resolved. It does
not mean that her arrest was not based upon arguable probable
cause, or even probable cause. Nor does it mean that the arrest
was unconstitutional under clearly established law at the time, or
even now. Cf. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, 99 S.Ct. at 2695 ("The
Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be
arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for
every defendant acquitted—indeed, for every suspect released.");
Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 578 n. 9 (" "Probable cause' defines a
radically different standard than "beyond a reasonable
doubt'....").
Deputies Wilson and Hollowell request that we review the
district court's denial of Rockdale County's motion for summary
judgment, but we are foreclosed from doing so by Swint v. Chambers
County Comm'n, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60
(1995), which held that we have no pendent party appellate
jurisdiction. They also request that we review the district
court's denial of their own motion for summary judgment in their
official capacities. The existence of pendent issue jurisdiction
is uncertain in the wake of Swint, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 115
S.Ct. at 1211-12, but even assuming we have that kind of
jurisdiction, we exercise our discretion not to employ it in this
case.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court's denial of Wilson and Hollowell's motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is REVERSED.