United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8825
Non-Argument Calendar.
Ann McCAULEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Richard T. WINEGARDEN; Superior Court of Gwinnett, and Michael
J. Bowers, Attorney General, State of Georgia, Defendants-
Appellees.
Aug. 4, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:93-cv-2632-ODE), Orinda D. Evans,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, CARNES and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
As the district court's order of May 9, 1994 dismissing
appellant's second amended complaint indicates, appellant, who
allegedly suffers from a Chemical Hypersensitivity Syndrome,
brought this suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 ("ADA"), to obtain injunctive relief and
money damages because a Georgia superior court judge, appellee
Richard T. Winegarden, did not provide her a "chemical free or safe
environment" (a filtered environment) on two different occasions
when she appeared pro se to prosecute a suit she brought in the
Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. In this appeal,
appellant asks us to vacate the district court's final judgment and
to remand the case for further proceedings against appellees
Winegarden, Gwinnett County, and the State of Georgia on her claims
for money damages and for an injunction enjoining appellees
"permanently on any further violations of the ADA." Appellant's
Brief at 46. We find no merit in appellant's request and,
therefore, affirm.1
The district court dismissed appellant's complaint on the
basis of the following ADA regulation:
This part does not require a public entity to provide to
individuals with disabilities personal devices, such as
wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as
prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids; readers for personal
use or study; or services of a personal nature including
assistance in eating, toileting, or dressing.
28 C.F.R. § 35.135 (1993). We quote from the district court's
dispositive order:
[p]laintiff wanted Defendants to provide her with a "filtered
environment." The [second amended] complaint reveals that
Defendants would have had to provide Plaintiff with personal
devices in order to give here the accommodation she desired:
"life support systems,' (id., ¶ IV); "life-support bubble,'
(id.); "required medical aids,' (id.); "additional medical
aids,' (id.) Even absent the admissions in Plaintiff's
complaint, the conclusion is inescapable that providing
Plaintiff a filtered environment would have required
Defendants to provide her with personal devices. Indeed, in
this context, a filtered environment, viewed as a whole, may
itself be a personal device. Therefore, in view of § 35.135,
the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
under the ADA against Defendants.
We agree with the district court's analysis of the merits of
appellant's ADA claim, and therefore affirm its judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1
Appellant also sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
The district court rejected this claim; we do so likewise,
finding it to be frivolous.