IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 29, 2009
No. 09-30360 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the Matter of: BODENHEIMER, JONES, SZWAK, & WINCHELL L.L.P.,
Debtor
------------------------------
DAVID A. SZWAK,
Appellant
v.
DALE C. EARWOOD; MARY E. WINCHELL,
Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Before REAVLEY, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:
Appellant David Szwak appeals the district court's order affirming the
bankruptcy award to Appellee Dale Earwood of $45,227.53 for his services and
expenses as a state-law liquidator and later as a federally superseded custodian
of a now-bankrupt law firm. Because the bankruptcy court failed to consider
how Earwood's services and expenses met the terms of 11 U.S.C. § 543(a) and
No. 09-30360
benefitted the bankruptcy estate when determining whether they qualified as
an administrative expense, we hold the award to be error and an abuse of the
bankruptcy court's discretion. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for
further proceedings.
I.
In 2006, Szwak and Appellee Mary Winchell were the last remaining
partners in Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, and Winchell, a Shreveport, Louisiana,
law firm ("the Partnership"). In January 2006, Szwak filed a petition for judicial
dissolution and liquidation of the Partnership. At a subsequent hearing, a state
court judge appointed Earwood to serve as liquidator.
In April 2006, Szwak – in his capacity as a general partner – filed an
involuntary petition for commencement of bankruptcy proceedings against the
Partnership. Winchell – in her capacity as a general partner – opposed the
involuntary bankruptcy and sought dismissal of the case. Earwood, now a
federally superseded custodian of the Partnership, also opposed the bankruptcy.
To aid in his opposition to the bankruptcy, Earwood employed outside legal
counsel.
In July 2006, Earwood filed an application to recover his fees as liquidator
of the Partnership and superseded custodian of the bankruptcy estate, pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 543(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016.
Specifically, Earwood sought $47,189.78 for both his pre- and post-petition
services, $549.78 for his out-of-pocket expenses, and $23,227.85 for his attorneys'
fees in opposing the bankruptcy. In August 2006, over Szwak's objection, the
bankruptcy court authorized an interim payment of $28,000 to Earwood from the
estate, and stayed further proceedings with regard to the application.
2
No. 09-30360
A year later, in August 2007, Earwood and the estate's Chapter 7 Trustee 1
reached a settlement and compromise, in which the Trustee offered to pay
Earwood $21,500.00 to satisfy all remaining claims Earwood had against the
estate. Earwood agreed to the offer of settlement, and the Trustee filed a Motion
to Compromise. Szwak opposed the Motion to Compromise.
Later that month, the bankruptcy court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on the Trustee's Motion to Compromise. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court found that Earwood "was a poor choice for the liquidator in this case."
Specifically, the court found that "the manner and method in which he chose to
conduct his fiduciary statutory duties was wrong for this type of business. In
fact it jeopardized the client's well-being; it jeopardized individual attorneys'
well-being." Nevertheless, the court held that Earwood was entitled to
compensation for his work as a liquidator and superseded custodian, including
his hiring of counsel to oppose the bankruptcy. Specifically, the court stated that
"Earwood believed he was doing what he had been tasked to do, and I believe
that his belief was reinforced not once, not twice, but a number of times by the
presiding judge . . . ." Accordingly, the court stated "that whether I think he was
wrong or not is not an issue[.]" The court then informed the parties that it would
only approve a compromise that would take into consideration Earwood's
expenses for opposing the bankruptcy. Additionally, the court held that
Earwood did not need to show that his actions benefitted the estate to claim
compensation. Instead, the court held that "[i]t's only necessary that [Earwood]
show that the payment would be payment of reasonable compensation for
services rendered and cost and expenses incurred by such custodian." At this
point, the bankruptcy court dictated to the parties a final Compromise
1
All references in this order to the "Trustee" are to the court-appointed Chapter 7
Trustee and not to the United States Trustee or its appointed agent overseeing the
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 323 (outlining role and capacity of an estate's trustee).
3
No. 09-30360
Settlement to which Earwood and the Trustee agreed, once again over Szwak's
explicit objections.
In September 2007, the bankruptcy court issued an order making final the
$28,000.00 interim payment that the court originally awarded in August 2006,
identifying the funds as part of the Compromise Settlement. The bankruptcy
court also approved the Compromise Settlement between the parties. As part
of the Compromise Settlement, the bankruptcy court directed the Trustee to pay
Earwood full reimbursement for his legal fees of $23,237.85, which he had
incurred when opposing the bankruptcy. The court also directed the estate's
Trustee to pay Earwood his liquidator fees, but at an hourly rate significantly
less than that set forth by the state court, ultimately granting him a
reimbursement of $17,237.53. In October 2007, the bankruptcy court revised its
September order and stipulated which fees came out of the interim payment and
which fees remained to be paid. The second order also increased Earwood's
liquidator fees to $21,449.00, and added reimbursement for expenses of $549.78,
for a total of $21,999.68. This resulted in a total award for Earwood and his
counsel of $45,227.53, which remains the amount in controversy.
Szwak appealed the bankruptcy court's orders approving the Compromise
Settlement to the district court for the Western District of Louisiana. In his
appeal, Szwak argued that the bankruptcy court legally erred by refusing to
apply the "Direct Benefit Rule," a doctrine "which would have required Earwood
[and his counsel] to show that their services and expenditures benefitted the
estate as a prerequisite to approval of their requests for compensation and
reimbursement of expenses." Szwak also argued that the bankruptcy court
failed to consider all the necessary factors pursuant to Fifth Circuit precedent
when approving the Compromise Settlement. In March 2009, the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's orders.
4
No. 09-30360
II.
When reviewing a district court order that itself reviews a bankruptcy
court order, an appellate court applies the same standard of review as did the
district court. In re San Patricio County Cmty. Action Agency.2 Findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error.3 Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo. In re Nowlin.4 Mixed questions of law and fact are also reviewed de novo.5
When reviewing a bankruptcy court's approval of a compromise settlement, an
appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion. In re Foster Mortgage Corp.6
III.
Before reaching the merits of the case, we address Earwood's argument
that events subsequent to the bankruptcy court's approval of the Compromise
Settlement have rendered this case moot. We hold that they have not.
The doctrine of equitable mootness "is a prudential, not a constitutional,
doctrine that evolved in response to the particular necessities surrounding
consummation of confirmed [Chapter 11] bankruptcy reorganization plans."
In re Hilal.7 "An appeal is equitably moot when a plan of reorganization has
been so substantially consummated that a court cannot order effective relief
even though a live dispute remains among some parties to the bankruptcy case."8
2
575 F.3d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 2009).
3
Id.
4
576 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 344 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
5
San Patricio County, 575 F.3d at 557 (citing In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., 522 F.3d
575, 583 (5th Cir. 2008)).
6
68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995).
7
534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Grimland, Inc., 243 F.3d 228, 231 (5th
Cir. 2001)); see also In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1994).
8
Hilal, 534 F.3d at 500 (citing Grimland, 243 F.3d at 231).
5
No. 09-30360
When determining whether to declare a case equitably moot, the court applies
the following three factors: (1) whether a stay has been obtained, (2) whether
the bankruptcy reorganization plan has been "substantially consummated," and
(3) whether the relief requested would affect either the rights of parties not
before the court or the success of the plan.9 It is questionable whether the
doctrine of equitable mootness applies to Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidations.10
However, even if equitable mootness applies in some Chapter 7 bankruptcies, it
does not do so here.
Neither party contests that Szwak has failed to obtain a stay. Thus, the
first factor is satisfied in favor of mootness. Moreover, the Partnership has been
fully liquidated and all funds disbursed, thus appearing to satisfy the second
factor in favor of mootness.11 However, as part of the final liquidation of the
Partnership, Szwak and Winchell – who were the final remaining creditors of
the Partnership – entered into a comprehensive compromise settlement wherein
all issues regarding the Partnership were settled between them and with the
estate, except the instant litigation. Specifically, the Szwak-Winchell Agreement
stated:
Any other provisions or references notwithstanding, Szwak shall
retain the right to pursue and to receive as a portion of this
settlement compromise any recovery that might result for the
benefit of this bankruptcy estate or for the benefit of Szwak or
Winchell from In the Matter of: Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, &
Winchell L.L.P., Debtor, David A Szwak, Appellant, V. [sic] Dale C.
9
Manges, 29 F.3d at 1039 (citations omitted).
10
See San Patricio County, 575 F.3d at 558 ("It is certainly arguable that equitable
mootness has no application to an appeal in a Chapter 7 liquidation."); Grimland, 243 F.3d at
231 n.4 ("Equitable mootness normally arises where a Chapter 11 reorganization plan is at
issue.").
11
See Grimland, 243 F.3d at 231 (recognizing the "substantially consummated" factor
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy satisfied when all of debtor's assets had been sold and proceeds
distributed).
6
No. 09-30360
Earwood; Mary E. Winchell, Appellee, currently pending before the
United States Court of Appeal [sic] for the Fifth Circuit. It is
further agreed that no recovery in that matter shall be had against
Winchell.
The Szwak-Winchell Agreement took place subsequent to the approval of the
Compromise Settlement at issue in this appeal. However, when determining
mootness, a court may review relevant evidence of subsequent events not
available to the trial court.12 Given Szwak's express reservation of rights to any
assets of the Partnership that this appeal may affect, the fact that the
liquidation has been "substantially consummated" does not militate in favor of
mootness. Accordingly, the second factor does not ultimately favor mootness.
However, even if the circumstances completely satisfied the first two
mootness factors, case law demonstrates that Earwood's claim for mootness may
still fail.13 "'The ultimate question to be decided [in a mootness inquiry] is
whether the Court can grant relief without undermining the plan and, thereby,
affecting third parties.'" 14 Currently, the only relevant party in interest not
before the court is the liquidated estate, which is not truly a "third-party" in the
bankruptcy but a central litigant whose assets remain at issue. Even though the
case would have to be reopened and the Trustee reappointed if we were not to
hold this case moot, the estate and its Trustee "are no strangers to the plan and
. . . have been on notice of this contingent exposure since early in the
confirmation process." 15 Their renewed involvement in this case is therefore not
12
Manges, 29 F.3d at 1041 (citing, e.g., Bd. of License Comm'rs v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238,
240, 105 S. Ct. 685, 686 (1985)).
13
See Hilal, 534 F.3d at 500-01; Grimland, 243 F.3d at 231-32.
14
San Patricio County, 575 F.3d at 558 (quoting In re SI Restructuring, Inc., 542 F.3d
131, 136 (5th Cir. 2008)).
15
Hilal, 534 F.3d at 500.
7
No. 09-30360
the kind of circumstance the mootness doctrine appears designed to protect.16
Earwood also argues that his full claim against the estate is larger than the
amount he ultimately received in the Compromise Settlement, and that
disturbing the Settlement would potentially expose the estate to liability that
would require a redistribution of other awards. However, given our holding in
this opinion that the bankruptcy court erred in awarding Earwood his claimed
fees without first determining if his actions benefitted the estate, it is unlikely
that any subsequent award on remand will be larger than the current amount
in controversy.
In conclusion, reopening the bankruptcy case to redistribute improperly
disbursed funds between the two current parties would not upset the liquidation
plan or disturb the settled interests of parties not before the court. In any case,
reopening the case is "not of the same nature or magnitude as the undoing of a
complicated [Chapter 11] plan of reorganization," and therefore does not warrant
a holding of equitable mootness.17
IV.
We now turn to the merits of the case. Szwak argues that the bankruptcy
court committed legal error by approving the Compromise Settlement without
first determining whether Earwood's services and expenses benefitted the estate.
We agree.
A bankruptcy case may commence where, as here, a general partner of a
firm files a petition for involuntary bankruptcy.18 At that moment, Earwood's
position and authority changed from state-law liquidator of a Partnership to a
16
See id.; San Patricio County, 575 F.3d at 559-60; see also 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) ("A
[bankruptcy] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer
assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.").
17
See San Patricio County, 575 F.3d at 559.
18
See 11 U.S.C. § 303.
8
No. 09-30360
federally superseded custodian of a bankruptcy estate.19 As superseded
custodian, Earwood's authority and obligations were strictly circumscribed by
statute. Once Earwood had knowledge of the commencement of the bankruptcy
petition, he was specifically prohibited from
mak[ing] any disbursement from, or tak[ing] any action in the
administration of, property of the debtor, proceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits of such property, or property of the estate,
in the possession, custody, or control of such custodian, except such
action as is necessary to preserve such property.20
Earwood was also required to
(1) deliver to the [Chapter 7] trustee any property of the debtor held
by or transferred to such custodian, or proceeds, product, offspring,
rents, or profits of such property, that is in such custodian's
possession, custody, or control on the date that such custodian
acquires knowledge of the commencement of the case; and
19
Earwood was appointed liquidator of the partnership pursuant to LA . REV . STAT .
ANN . § 12:142 D (1994), which states:
If the shareholders or incorporators do not authorize conduct of the liquidation
out of court, the corporation shall file a petition with the court, praying that the
corporation be liquidated and dissolved under the supervision of the court,
whereupon the court shall appoint a liquidator, upon such conditions as to bond
and compensation as it may deem proper. Thereafter the liquidation
proceedings shall be conducted under the supervision and orders of the court.
The federal bankruptcy statutes define "custodian" as
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case
or proceeding not under this title;
(B) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors;
or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is
appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose
of enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general
administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 101(11).
20
11 U.S.C. § 543(a) (emphasis added).
9
No. 09-30360
(2) file an accounting of any property of the debtor, or proceeds,
product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property, that, at any
time, came into the possession, custody, or control of such
custodian.21
Once Earwood had performed these duties, the bankruptcy court was to
"provide for the payment of reasonable compensation for services rendered and
costs and expenses incurred . . . ." 22 A custodian's compensation for "services"
and "actual, necessary expenses" are an administrative expense of the estate and
are thereby entitled to priority in the bankruptcy proceedings.23 In addition to
compensation for services and "actual, necessary expenses," a superseded
custodian's compensation may include "reasonable compensation for professional
services rendered by an attorney" employed by the custodian to further an
"allowed" expense, as well as that attorney's "actual, necessary expenses."24
The record indicates that once Szwak had filed the involuntary petition for
bankruptcy, Earwood focused his efforts on opposing the bankruptcy.25 Indeed,
21
Id. § 543(b).
22
Id. § 543(c)(2).
23
Id. § 503(b)(3)(E). This statute states, in relevant part:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses,
other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including . . . (3) the
actual, necessary expenses . . . incurred by . . . (E) a custodian superseded under
section 543 of this title, and compensation for the services of such custodian[.]
(emphasis added).
24
Id. § 503(b)(4).
25
While Earwood submitted detailed records of his services between January 17, 2006
and April 3, 2006, he has submitted no record of his services after the commencement of the
bankruptcy. Indeed, nothing in Earwood's timesheets submitted with his application for
compensation indicates he was engaged in the authorized duties of a superseded custodian
outlined in § 543(b)(1)-(2). However, Earwood expressly asserts in various places throughout
the record that he engaged in what he called his "fiduciary duty" to oppose the bankruptcy.
Therefore, absent any record to the contrary, we are left to assume that his actions post-
10
No. 09-30360
all of his attorneys' fees, which comprise more than half of the amount in
controversy, stem from opposing the bankruptcy. However, nowhere in the
relevant bankruptcy statutes does it state that a superseded custodian is
authorized to oppose a bankruptcy petition or to employ the estate's resources
in doing so. Indeed, as mentioned above, the statute governing a superseded
custodian's post-petition duties states explicitly that unless the custodian is
expressly authorized by the bankruptcy court to continue in the administration
of the estate, the custodian is restricted to delivering all property to the trustee
and filing an accounting of all property that came into the custodian's
possession.26 Earwood was well aware of these obligations and the limits on his
authority because his application for compensation, reimbursement, and
attorneys' fees cited this section of the Bankruptcy Code as authority for his
entitlement. Nevertheless, Earwood failed to relinquish control of the estate
property until ordered to do so by the district court. Earwood also failed to file
an accounting of the estate's property. For Earwood to claim that he is entitled
to compensation for the ultra vires "service" of opposing the bankruptcy when
he failed to first complete his statutorily-mandated service of winding up the
estate borders on the absurd.27 Indeed, Earwood has made no credible argument
that his opposition to the bankruptcy was somehow "necessary" to preserve the
petition were largely confined to opposing the bankruptcy.
26
See § 543(b). The bankruptcy court may excuse a custodian's compliance with
subsections (a) and (b) if, after notice and hearing, it finds that it is in the best interests of the
debtor or equity security holders that continued possession, custody, or control of the estate
remain with the pre-petition custodian. Id. § 543(d)(1). In the instant case, however, the
bankruptcy court made no such finding and gave Earwood no authorization to continue the
administration of the estate post-petition.
27
See. e.g., In re Posadas Assocs., 127 B.R. 278, 282 (Bankr. D.N.M.1991) (holding that
“where the custodian incurs costs not for complying with the turnover provisions of the Code
but for resisting turnover, the Court finds that prior court approval is necessary in order for
the fees and costs to be considered for administrative expense priority”).
11
No. 09-30360
property of the bankruptcy estate.28 Accordingly, a request for compensation in
this case that includes fees for opposing the bankruptcy cannot be considered
"reasonable compensation" under § 543(c)(2). Nor can we consider Earwood's
attorneys' fees to be derivative of an "allowable" expense under 503(b)(3)(E) and
thus compensable under § 503(b)(4). As the bankruptcy court explicitly
approved these fees as part of the Compromise Settlement, its decision to do so
was legal error.
In addition, when reviewing Earwood's fee application, the bankruptcy
court stated that it would not consider whether Earwood's services benefitted the
estate. In doing so, the bankruptcy court once again erred. While pre-petition
services are not governed by § 543, they are governed by § 503(b)(3)(E), which
allows payment from the bankruptcy estate to pre-petition custodians for
services and "actual, necessary expenses." 29 Earwood argues that because the
words "benefit to the estate" are not in 503(b)(3)(E), no such requirement exists.
However, we have interpreted the terms "actual" and "necessary" as requiring
a benefit to the estate under a related provision of § 503, despite the fact that no
corresponding language is found in that provision. See In re Jack/Wade
Drilling, Inc.30 As we have previously stated, "[t]he 'benefit' requirement has no
28
See § 543(a).
29
While § 503 generally only accords an "administrative expense" priority status to
claims for post-petition services, § 503(b)(3)(E) "expressly authorizes compensation for the
prepetition services of a custodian or receiver superseded under 11 U.S.C. § 543 and is an
exception to the general rule with respect to the allowance of compensation for exclusively
postpetition activities as an administrative expense." In re Snergy Props., Inc., 130 B.R. 700,
704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing In re Hearth & Hinge, Inc., 28 B.R. 595, 597 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983)); see also In re Statepark Bldg. Group, Ltd., No. 04-33916-HDH-11, 2005 WL
2589179, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 29, 2005).
30
258 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2001) ("In order to qualify as an 'actual and necessary
cost' under section 503(b)(1)(A), a claim against the estate must . . . [be] a result of actions
taken by the trustee that benefitted the estate.") (emphasis added) (citing In re TransAmerican
Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also In re H.L.S. Energy Co., 151
F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998); NL Indus., Inc. v. GHR Energy Corp., 940 F.2d 957, 966 (5th Cir.
12
No. 09-30360
independent basis in the Code, however, but is merely a way of testing whether
a particular expense was truly 'necessary' to the estate: If it was of no 'benefit,'
it cannot have been 'necessary.'"31
Moreover, the "benefit to the estate" requirement for "services" of pre-
petition liquidators and post-petition custodians is supported by long-established
pre-Bankruptcy Code precedent. The "benefit to the estate" doctrine was first
recognized in Randolph & Randolph v. Scruggs, where Justice Holmes, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that a state-law assignee of a debtor's estate was
entitled to seek payment for services that he undertook prior to the adjudication
of the bankruptcy, inasmuch as those services benefitted the bankruptcy
estate.32 The Court added, however, that "[w]e are not prepared to go further
than to allow compensation for services which were beneficial to the estate.
Beyond that point we must throw the risk of his conduct on the assignee, as he
was chargeable with knowledge of what might happen." 33 The Court also
concluded that the assignee's decision to contest the bankruptcy once it had
commenced did not appear to be a benefit to the estate, and therefore resulting
fees were not allowable expenses entitled to priority.34
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Randolph, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Code. 35 Admittedly, Congress made no mention of the "benefit to
the estate" rule in the provisions of the Code governing the services of
1991) ("Courts have construed the words 'actual' and 'necessary' narrowly: the debt must
benefit [the] estate and its creditors.") (citations omitted and emphasis added)).
31
H.L.S. Energy Co., 151 F.3d at 437 (citing LAW RENCE P. KING , ED ., 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 503.06 [3] [b] (15th rev. ed. 1998)).
32
190 U.S. 533, 538-39, 23 S. Ct. 710, 712-13 (1903).
33
Id. at 539, 23 S. Ct. at 713.
34
Id.
35
See Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 503, 543, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
13
No. 09-30360
superseded custodians. However, "[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy
laws, it does not write 'on a clean slate.'" Dewnsup v. Timm.36 Indeed, we must
"not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear
indication that Congress intended such a departure." Cohen v. de la Cruz.37
There is no indication that Congress intended to overturn the "benefit to the
estate" doctrine when passing the statutes governing payment to superseded
custodians. Indeed, the legislative history points to the contrary.38
Nevertheless, Earwood argues that by including language that expressly
requires a bankruptcy court to employ a "benefit to the estate" analysis in other
Code sections, Congress signaled that it had abandoned this pre-Code practice
with regard to superseded custodians. Specifically, Congress has included
"benefit to the estate" language in § 330(a)(4)(A) and (B) when addressing the
services of an examiner, trustee under Chapter 11, and other professional
person. Congress has also included "benefit to the estate" language in
§ 503(b)(3)(B) when determining the compensation to a creditor recovering
property for the estate. However, none of these examples is dispositive of the
issue. As stated above, the presumption regarding pre-Code practices and their
continued viability runs counter to Appellee's argument; that is, these practices
remain controlling unless explicitly superseded.39 Moreover, the Court in
36
502 U.S. 410, 419, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (citing Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515,
521, 63 S.Ct. 687, 690-691 (1943)).
37
523 U.S. 213, 221, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1998) (quoting Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (1990)).
38
See 124 CONG . REC . 32398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("Section 503(b)(3)(E)
codifies present law in cases such as Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, which accords
administrative expense status to services rendered by a prepetition custodian or other party
to the extent such services actually benefit the estate."); 124 CONG . REC . 33997 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (same); see also In re Miami Gen. Hosp., 101 B.R. 361, 364 n.8
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) ("Congress codified Randolph at 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(E) . . . .").
39
See Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221, 118 S. Ct. at 1218.
14
No. 09-30360
Randolph specifically addressed the claims of a pre-petition assignee and his
pre- and post-petition services.40 However, the Court did not address claims
from the parties and services found in §§ 330(a)(4)(A),(B) and 503(b)(3)(B).
Accordingly, the Randolph ruling is not on point for parties and circumstances
addressed in these statutes, and Congress may have needed to clarify in these
sections whether a "benefit to the estate" analysis applied. At the very least, the
fact that the Randolph Court specifically addressed the "benefit to the estate"
test as it applies to a superseded custodian and his services makes its lack of
inclusion in § 503(b)(3)(E) less conspicuous.
Finally, the "benefit-to-the-estate" doctrine remains a nearly universally-
recognized interpretative scheme for § 503(b)(3)(E). Since the passage of the
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts have almost unanimously held that
Randolph controls custodian compensation, and they have interpreted
§ 503(b)(3)(E) to include the "benefit to the estate" doctrine regarding custodial
services.41 While this Court is not bound to follow any of these cases, the cases
are instructive of the evolution of bankruptcy practice. We decline to upend
decades of settled precedent in the bankruptcy courts absent a clear and
compelling legal reason to do so.
In conclusion, the language of § 543 clearly circumscribes the actions of
superseded custodians to those which are necessary to preserve the assets of the
40
See Randolph & Randolph, 190 U.S. at 535-36, 23 S. Ct. at 711.
41
See, e.g., In re Pris-mm, LLC, No. 08-16398-RAG, 2009 WL 2924166, at *3 (Bankr.
D. Md. Jul. 31, 2009); In re Lake Region Operating Corp., 238 B.R. 99, 102 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1999); In re 245 Assocs., 188 B.R. 743, 748 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re American Motor Club,
Inc., 125 B.R. 79, 81-82 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1991); In re Holden, 101 B.R. 573, 576 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1989); In re Kenval Mktg. Corp., 84 B.R. 32, 34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Valley Isle
Broadcasting, Ltd., 56 B.R. 505, 506 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1985); In re Jensen-Farley Pictures,
Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 570-71 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (collecting cases that followed Randolph prior
to enaction of Bankruptcy Code); In re Marichal-Agosto, Inc., 12 B.R. 891, 894 (Bankr. N.Y.
1981).
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No. 09-30360
estate once a bankruptcy petition has been filed. Earwood cannot demonstrate
that opposing the bankruptcy is an administrative expense to which he is
entitled. Moreover, given our prior cases interpreting "actual" and "necessary"
as the terms are used in the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court precedent
establishing pre-Code practice regarding superseded custodians, the legislative
history of § 503(b)(3)(E), and the nearly uniform practice of the bankruptcy
courts before and after the passage of the Bankruptcy Code, this Court would be
predicted to interpret § 503(b)(3)(E) to require a "benefit to the estate" when
awarding administrative expenses to a superseded custodian. Because the
bankruptcy court explicitly refused to consider these standards when approving
Earwood's compensation, the court committed legal error in approving the
Compromise Settlement.
V.
Regardless of the bankruptcy court's errors, Earwood argues that the real
issue is not whether the bankruptcy court properly applied the law, but whether
it abused its discretion by approving the Compromise Settlement that the court
ultimately found to be in the best interests of the estate.
When reviewing a bankruptcy court's approval of a compromise
settlement, the appellate court should ensure that the compromise settlement
is "'fair and equitable' and 'in the best interest of the estate.'" In re Jackson
Brewing Co.42 In making this determination we acknowledge that "[a]
bankruptcy court is ordinarily in the best position, as the trial court and as the
ongoing supervisory court for the bankruptcy proceeding, to determine whether
a compromise is in the best interest of the estate and 'fair and equitable.'" In re
42
624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders
of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S. Ct. 1157, 1163 (1968) ("TMT
Trailer")).
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No. 09-30360
Emerald Oil Co.43 Nevertheless, a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when
it bases its decision on legally incorrect principles.44
Here, the bankruptcy court dictated the terms of the Compromise
Settlement to the parties and specifically stated that it would only allow a
settlement that included compensation to Earwood for his opposition to the
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court also refused to apply a "benefit to the estate"
analysis regarding Earwood's services. In both pronouncements, the bankruptcy
court erred as a matter of law. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion when it approved the Compromise Settlement.
VI.
The district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's orders which
approved the Compromise Settlement is VACATED. Similarly, the bankruptcy
court's orders are REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the bankruptcy
court for further proceedings.
43
807 F.2d 1234, 1239 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing TMT Trailer, 390 U.S. at 432, 88 S. Ct.
at 1163).
44
See id. (compromise agreement not "fair and equitable" when claim against the estate
likely has no basis in law); see also Kane v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 384 (5th
Cir. 2008) (holding that a lower court abuses its discretion "'when it makes an error of law'")
(quoting In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2004)).
17