United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-3453.
Mary GEORGE; Charles L. Stovall; Martha Ray Bethel; W.O.
Wells, Reverend; Joann Stovall; Barbara Jenkins; Sylvester
Weaver, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF COCOA, FLORIDA: Cocoa City Council; Lester Campbell,
Mayor-Councilmember of the City of Cocoa; Ray Debord, John Lee
Blubach, Dave Salisbury, members of the Cocoa City Council, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
Ray Griffin, Member of the Cocoa City Council; Fred Galey,
Brevard County Supervisor of Elections, Defendants.
Feb. 29, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 93-257-CIV-ORL-18), G. Kendall Sharp,
Judge.
Before ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This case comes to us on appeal from the district court's
order denying the parties' joint motion to approve a consent decree
and enter judgment. We have jurisdiction and for the reasons set
forth in this opinion, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Factual and Procedural Background
On April 12, 1993, appellants filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; they
alleged that the at-large method of electing city council members
in Cocoa dilutes minority voting strength in violation of section
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1 In July 1993, the Cocoa City
Council appointed Rudolph Stone, one of the African-American
plaintiffs in the voting rights litigation, to fill a vacant
council seat. Immediately upon his appointment, Stone withdrew as
a plaintiff and was named a defendant. In November 1993, Stone was
elected under the at-large system to keep his council seat for
another three-year term.
Settlement negotiations in the voting rights litigation
ultimately led to an agreement. The Cocoa City Council voted to
replace the system of at-large elections for all five of its
members with a system under which four members would be elected
from single member districts and the fifth council member, who also
serves as the mayor, would continue to be elected at-large.
African-American voters would constitute a majority of the voters
in one of the proposed single member districts. Three members of
the city council, including Stone, voted in favor of the proposed
consent decree; the remaining two members voted against it.
On July 28, 1994, the parties to the voting rights litigation
filed a joint motion in the district court to enter the consent
decree. Four Cocoa voters, appearing asamici curiae in opposition
to the proposed consent decree, suggested to the district court
that Stone should have abstained from the city council's decision
whether to adopt the redistricting plan. The district court
ordered a hearing on the consent decree, and instructed the parties
and amici to limit their arguments to the issue of Stone's
1
Pub.L. No. 89-110, § 2(b), 79 Stat. 437, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
participation in the city council's consideration of the
redistricting plan. Following this hearing, the district court
concluded that Stone's participation in the vote constituted a
conflict of interest under Florida's ethics statutes, and that
Stone's vote could not be counted. In its October 25, 1994, order,
the court explained:
In this case, Mr. Stone was in a unique position to gain
from the redistricting decision made by the Cocoa City
Council. Mr. Stone had originally filed this suit as a
plaintiff seeking to increase the voting power of Cocoa's
black community. Though Mr. Stone had been dropped as a
plaintiff and had been elected along with the other council
members through the at-large process, as an African-American
candidate he stood to gain inordinately from the vote. The
consent decree's solution to the problem of increasing black
voting power would create a district where the black majority
was expected to elect a black representative, and Mr. Stone
would be a resident of that district. In short, by voting on
this decree, Mr. Stone facilitated his own chances for
reelection and involved himself in a situation fraught with
the potential for conflicting interests.
R2-40-6-7. With the disqualification of Stone's tie-breaking vote,
the remaining city council members were deadlocked (two-two) on the
redistricting plan. The district court thus held that the consent
decree was void and refused to enter judgment.
Discussion
The issue is whether the district court misapplied Florida law
in disqualifying Stone's vote on the redistricting plan.2 Neither
party argues in support of the district court's decision; both
parties agree that Stone's vote should not have been disqualified.
We also conclude that the district court erred.
Florida law imposes on elected officials an affirmative duty
2
We do not address the merits of the proposed consent
decree.
to vote on all matters before them; abstaining from a vote is
prohibited unless "there is, or appears to be, a possible conflict
of interest under § 112.311, § 112.313, or § 112.3143."
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 286.012 (West 1995). Section 286.012 speaks only
of when a public official may abstain from voting; it does not
describe the circumstances under which a public official must
abstain from voting. The statutory provision dealing with
mandatory abstention from city council voting is Fla.Stat.Ann. §
112.3143(3)(a) (West 1995); it provides that "[n]o county,
municipal, or other local public officer shall vote in his official
capacity upon any measure which would inure to his special private
gain or loss...." Under § 112.3143(3)(a), the identification of a
"special private gain or loss" to the city council member as a
result of his or her vote is a necessary condition for
disqualification.
A "special private gain" described by the voting conflicts
statute almost always (if not always) refers to a financial
interest of the public official that is directly enhanced by the
vote in question. See Izaak Walton League of America v. Monroe
County, 448 So.2d 1170, 1173 n. 8 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1984)
(explaining that § 112.3143 does not apply "to bias or prejudice on
the part of a public officer based on other than private economic
interests or relationships" (quoting Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 79-14
(1979))); see also Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 90-20 (1990) (holding that
a city council member, whose property would be affected by proposed
special assessment, must abstain from voting, "[g]iven the direct,
personal financial effect striking the assessment would have on
[his] interests) (emphasis added); Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 79-14
(1979) (holding that a city council member may not abstain from
voting on matters involving his personal foe and stating that "it
is clear that, when adopting the Code of Ethics, the Legislature
was concerned primarily with the effect of a public official's
economic interests and relationships upon the performance of his
public duties, rather than the effect of his personal preferences
or animosities.").
Stone's vote on the redistricting plan did not result in any
direct financial benefit to him. If a "special private gain" under
§ 112.3143(3)(a) is limited to a financial gain, then Stone's vote
should not have been disqualified. The district court, however,
stated that it would be "inappropriate" to limit the application of
§ 112.3143 to conflicts surrounding finances,3 and held that
Stone's status as a potential African-American candidate in a
district in which the majority of voters were also African-American
was a "special case" that presented a "heightened potential for
conflict." R2-40-8.
Assuming arguendo that § 112.3143(3)(a) is not limited to
financial matters, we address potential non-economic "interests" of
3
The only authority cited by the district court for this
proposition is Garner v. State Com'n on Ethics, 439 So.2d 894
(Fla.App. 2 Dist.1983)—a case that has nothing to do with voting.
In Garner, the ethics commission considered a complaint alleging
that a college president abused his official position by seeking
sexual favors from female subordinate personnel. The ethics
commission found that this behavior violated Fla.Stat.Ann. §
112.313(6) (West 1994), which provides that "No public officer or
employee of an agency ... shall corruptly use or attempt to use
his official position ... to secure a special privilege, benefit,
or exemption for himself or others." The Florida appeals court
held that sexual favors constitute a "special benefit" within the
meaning of the statute. Garner, 439 So.2d at 895.
Stone. We can imagine only two such putative "interests" that may
have been affected by his vote: his ideological interests as an
African-American voter and former plaintiff in the voting rights
litigation; and his political interests as an incumbent city
council member planning to run for reelection. Neither of these
interests would have required Stone to abstain from voting.
Because Stone is a former plaintiff in the voting rights
litigation, it may be reasonable to infer that Stone has an
ideological interest in changing the way that city council members
in Cocoa are elected. The plaintiffs in the voting rights
litigation contended that the at-large electoral system unlawfully
diluted minority voting strength, and sought to have it replaced
with a system of single-member districts. Because the city's
redistricting plan adopts some of the relief requested in the
voting rights litigation, Stone's putative ideological interest was
no doubt furthered by his vote as a city council member.
Nevertheless, an ideological victory is not the kind of "special
private gain" that disqualifies an elected official's vote. The
Izaak Walton case clearly establishes that a person who holds a
preconceived and publicly expressed opinion on a particular matter
is not barred from voting on that matter as a public official. See
id., 448 So.2d at 1171 (holding that "political officeholders may
not be prevented from performing the duties they have been elected
to discharge [i.e., voting] merely because ... they have previously
expressed, publicly or otherwise, an opinion on the subject of
their vote"); see also Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 88-18 (1988) (same).
If ideology presented a conflict of interest situation, no public
official could vote on any of his or her campaign promises. More
specifically relevant to this case, there is precisely the same
inference of an ideological interest on the part of the other
council members arising from their status as defendants in the
litigation and the positions they apparently took in the case.
The district court recognized that Stone's ideological
interests as a former plaintiff in the voting rights litigation
could not serve as a valid basis for disqualification,4 and focused
instead upon Stone's political interests as an incumbent city
council member planning to run for reelection in one of the new
single member districts. The district court reasoned that Stone's
vote on the redistricting plan inured to his "special private gain"
because it "facilitated his chances for reelection." R2-40-7. To
constitute a prohibited voting conflict, however, the possibility
of gain must be direct and immediate, not remote and speculative.
In Op.Comm. Ethics 93-4 (1993), for example, a city council member
asked the ethics commission whether he could vote on rent increases
at the city's mobile home park, where he proposed to build a
similar park across the street. The ethics commission found that
the assumption that the city commissioner could charge higher rents
at his "still to be built" park was too remote and speculative to
create a voting conflict. See also Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 94-018
(1994) ("[W]here the official's ... gain (or loss) would require
many steps and be subject to many contingencies, with the outcome
4
See R2-40-5 ("Respect for a citizen's right to express
opinions on matters of public importance requires courts to
permit officials to vote on issues even when they have previously
filed suits to protest the burdening of their rights.").
by no means certain, any gain or loss would be remote and
speculative."). In this case, the district court speculated that
5
Stone planned to run for reelection in 1996 and that Stone's
chances for reelection were improved by the redistricting plan. As
an incumbent who won an election under the at-large system,
however, the transformation to single-member districts actually may
have impaired Stone's interests as a candidate by increasing the
competitiveness of elections. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia
County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (5th Cir.1984) (noting that at-large
electoral systems may deter candidacies, particularly by African-
American candidates, for elected office). In short, Stone's
interests as a potential candidate were too "speculative and
remote" to warrant disqualification of his vote.
Furthermore, every one of the incumbent city council members,
not just Stone, had an interest in shaping districts favorable to
his or her reelection. For example, district boundaries may have
been drawn to avoid future contests between incumbent city council
members. Cf. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740, 103 S.Ct.
2653, 2663, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (describing the avoidance of
contests between incumbents as a "legitimate objective" in
legislative redistricting); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
752-54, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2331-32, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973) (recognizing
that legislators involved in redistricting decisions inevitably
take into account various "political considerations" in drawing
5
The record indicates that Stone was elected under the
at-large system in November 1993, and that city council members
in Cocoa serve three-year terms. Stone would therefore be up for
reelection in November 1996—more than two years after the
district court entered its order in this case.
district lines). In this regard, there is no difference in
principle between Stone and the other city council members: each
member's chances for reelection was directly affected by the
drawing of district lines. It would be absurd to interpret
Florida's voting conflicts statute in such a way that would
disqualify all members of legislative bodies from participating in
legislative redistricting decisions. Cf. United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (construing the
judicial disqualification statute as implicitly incorporating a
common-law "rule of necessity" exception, which applies when all
federal judges have an interest in the outcome of a case);
Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 86-57 (1986) (advising that the threat of a
lawsuit arising from a vote does not require disqualification;
"otherwise, any person might be able to disqualify an entire
board").
In its order disqualifying Stone's vote, the district court
appears to understand that its interpretation of Florida's voting
conflicts statute could undermine the ability of all legislators to
participate in the redistricting process.6 To distinguish Stone
from the other city council members, the district court reasoned
that Stone was somehow in a "unique position to gain from the
redistricting decision." R2-40-6. However, the district court was
vague in its identification of Stone's supposed unique position.
As demonstrated above, there is no legitimate basis to distinguish
Stone from the other council members.
6
The court cautioned that "[t]his holding should not be
construed to disqualify all legislators from participating in all
issues related [to] voting and elections." R2-40-7.
If the district court relied on Stone's race to distinguish
Stone and disqualify his vote,7 that reliance was inappropriate.
Any benefit enjoyed by hundreds of African-American residents of
Cocoa is not a "special private gain" within the meaning of
Florida's voting conflicts statute, § 112.3143(3)(a). See
Op.Fla.Comm. Ethics 93-012 (pension board trustee, who is also a
participant in a class action against the city regarding the
7
In the hearing on the proposed consent decree, counsel for
amici (Mr. Meros) repeatedly emphasized Stone's race as a basis
for distinguishing him from the other city council members. When
asked by the court what "stake" Stone had that would create a
"special private gain," Mr. Meros responded as follows:
His stake was, number one, as a voter of the
council, which is more general. Number two, as an
African-American. He was asserting that he, that his
rights as an African-American were not sufficiently
protected and as a result of that he wanted the
opportunity to have his vote enhanced by virtue of the
creation of single member districts. That is a
personal stake by Councilman Stone.
....
What personal stake did he have in this? His
personal stake as an African-American.
R3-6-7.
In closing his argument, Mr. Meros repeated:
I would suggest that when you talk about a "special
private gain," special means as opposed to communal,
individual as opposed to group, and Councilman Stone in
this litigation asserted that he had a private direct
interest in this litigation, clearly special and
individual due to his race as an African-American.
R3-13.
Although some of the district court's language could be
construed to indicate that the district court accepted the
foregoing invitation to consider race, we decline to believe
that. Rather, we surmise that the district court simply
failed to think the matter through thoroughly.
pension plan, is not disqualified from voting on measures
concerning the lawsuit, because the number of persons who stand to
benefit from such measures (297) is sufficiently large that any
gain to the trustee would not be "special"). Moreover, any
interpretation of § 112.3143(3)(a) that disqualifies an elected
official's vote on a matter of public concern because of race
obviously could not withstand scrutiny. Cf. Brown v. Moore, 583
F.Supp. 391, 395-96 (M.D.Ala.1984) (African-American school
commissioner is not disqualified from voting on a school
desegregation consent decree on the basis that the plaintiff class
is composed of members of his race). We therefore hold that race
could not be a valid basis for disqualifying an elected official's
vote under § 112.3143(3)(a).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.