United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2825.
William BOATMAN; Mary Jane Boatman, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
TOWN OF OAKLAND, Florida, Defendant-Appellant.
Feb. 28, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 92-254-CIV-ORL-18), Richard B. Kellam,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and HILL,
Senior Circuit Judge.
TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:
The dispute in this case is not grist for the mill of a United
States district court; rather, it belongs in state court. We
therefore vacate the district court's judgment and direct the court
to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
A.
The warring parties are the Town of Oakland, a small community
in Orange County, Florida, 1 and two of its residents, William and
Mary Jane Boatman. The dispute involves the Boatmans' attempt,
beginning in September 1991, to build and occupy a "manufactured
home" on a lot they own in one of the Town's residential
districts.2 After obtaining a building permit and constructing the
1
The Town of Oakland, which is located on the shore of Lake
Apopka, is 255 acres in size, and, at the time this suit
commenced, had a population of just over 700 persons.
2
The Boatmans had five adjoining lots, numbered 7 through
11, on East Henshen Avenue. Each lot measured 50 feet (along the
home, they asked the Town's building inspector to perform a final
inspection so that the Town could issue them a certificate of
occupancy. The inspector refused to perform the inspection. In
his opinion, the Boatmans had constructed a "mobile home" in
violation of a provision of the Town's zoning ordinance that
prohibited the placement of mobile homes on lots in the Boatmans'
residential district. Without a favorable final inspection, the
Town refused to issue a certificate of occupancy.
Instead of petitioning the circuit court in Orange County for
an injunctive order compelling the building inspector to perform a
final inspection, the Boatmans sought refuge in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Bypassing the
building inspector, they sought an injunction directing the Town to
issue a certificate of occupancy and an award of money damages and
attorney's fees.
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction did not lie, because the
plaintiffs and the defendant were citizens of the same state, so
the Boatmans invoked the court's federal question jurisdiction,
bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 They alleged in their
complaint that the Town's refusal to issue a certificate of
street) by 125 feet. A 100-year-old house and some out-buildings
occupied by the Boatmans were on lots 7 through 9. Lot 10 was
used for the manufactured home.
3
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1988).
occupancy was "arbitrary and capricious" and thus deprived them of
a "vested property right in their building permit" in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In responding to the Boatmans'
complaint, the Town did not challenge the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction or the complaint's legal sufficiency. Instead,
the Town simply denied that it had infringed any of the Boatmans'
rights.
Although the relief the Boatmans sought was primarily
equitable, they requested a jury trial.5 The Town did not object;
accordingly, the court convened one.
B.
The case was assigned to a visiting district judge for trial.
On the eve of trial, the judge grew concerned about the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. He shared his concern with counsel
just prior to the voir dire of the venire. The Town's attorney
stated that the case did not present a federal claim—that he "did
not understand why we were going to federal court with this in the
4
The Boatmans also alleged that the zoning ordinance's
prohibition against mobile homes that the building inspector
cited in refusing to inspect their home was invalid under state
law. They alleged, alternatively, that their manufactured home
was not a "mobile home" as mobile homes were defined in the
ordinance. Finally, the Boatmans alleged that the Town was
equitably estopped to deny the Boatmans a certificate of
occupancy.
5
At the time the Boatmans instituted this action, in March
1992, their manufactured home was still awaiting a final
inspection. By the time the case came to trial, the manufacturer
of the home had repossessed it, because without a certificate of
occupancy, the Boatmans could not finance their purchase of the
home. Because equitable relief—an order requiring the inspection
of the home and the issuance of a certificate of occupancy—would
gain them nothing, the Boatmans were left to their claim for
compensatory damages.
first place." The Boatmans' attorney disagreed. According to her,
the provision in the zoning ordinance barring mobile homes bore no
"reasonable relationship to the protection of the public health,
safety, welfare, and morals."6 The Town's enforcement of the
6
The Boatmans did not allege this constitutional claim in
their complaint. There, as we indicate, supra, they alleged that
the Town's refusal to issue a certificate of occupancy was
"arbitrary and capricious" and thus deprived them of a "vested
property right in their building permit." In the parties'
pretrial stipulation, the Boatmans, in stating their
constitutional claim, said that "the Town's zoning ordinance
prohibiting mobile homes had no reasonable relationship to
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community."
They also said that the "zoning ordinance is vague and ambiguous
as to the definition of "mobile home.' " Finally, they said that
"the Town's arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the ordinance
deprived the plaintiffs of constitutionally protected property
rights."
After contending that the case presented these
constitutional claims, however, the Boatmans and the Town
stated the issues of law that remained to be litigated as
follows:
A. Whether the home was a "mobile home" or
"manufactured home".
B. Whether the zoning ordinance was
constitutionally valid.
C. Whether any provision of the zoning ordinance
pertaining to mobile homes was preempted by federal or
state law.
The foregoing statements as to the nature of the
Boatmans' constitutional claim(s), considered in the light
of what the Boatmans alleged in their complaint, are
confusing at best and no doubt explain why the district
court was still trying to get a handle on what the Boatmans
were contending on the day the trial began.
In their supplemental brief to us, they sought to
justify the ambiguous presentation of their constitutional
claim(s) by relying on the notice pleading permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
In pleading their arbitrary and capricious due process
claim, the Boatmans were required by Rule 8(a)(2) ...
to provide only a "short and plain statement' that
provision was therefore arbitrary and capricious and in violation
of the Boatmans' due process rights. The court decided to wait
until it had heard the parties' evidence before ruling on the
issue, and the trial proceeded. As it turned out, the court never
revisited the question of its subject matter jurisdiction.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties moved the court
for judgment as a matter of law. The court reserved ruling on
their motions and sent the case to the jury on special
interrogatories. The first interrogatory asked the jury to
determine whether "the Boatmans' home was a mobile home under the
Oakland zoning ordinance." The jury answered yes, and moved to the
second interrogatory, which asked: "In denying the Boatmans a
certificate of occupancy, was the Town of Oakland's action
arbitrary and capricious, and in violation of the zoning
ordinance?" The jury answered no, and thus did not move to the
third interrogatory, which dealt with damages. Given these
answers, the court entered judgment for the Town.7
would give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
was and the grounds upon which it rested.... There is
no "heightened pleading standard" in civil rights cases
alleging municipal liability under § 1983.... [Their]
complaint clearly met federal pleading requirements.
Concluding this argument, they said that the "allegations
were clearly sufficient to place [the Town] on notice of
what the Boatmans' claim was and the grounds upon which it
rested." We have described the sort of pleading in which
the Boatmans have engaged in this case as "shotgun"
pleading. See Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116
L.Ed.2d 131 (1991).
7
The court concluded that the verdict also disposed of the
Boatmans' pendant state claims; accordingly, it gave the Town
judgment on those claims as well.
The Boatmans then renewed their motion for judgment. The
court granted it, concluding as a matter of law that the Boatmans'
manufactured home was not a mobile home within the meaning of the
Town's zoning ordinance. Following this ruling, the parties agreed
to let the court decide the amount of damages. After hearing
evidence on that issue, the court awarded the Boatmans compensatory
damages in the sum of $42,320 and attorney's fees of $36,786. The
court awarded the attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), even
though it had not based the Boatmans' recovery on a constitutional
violation and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 Following the entry of final
judgment, the Town took this appeal.
II.
In concluding that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this controversy, we first consider the Town's
zoning ordinance. That ordinance prohibits the use of property in
the Boatmans' residential district as the site for a mobile home.
A mobile home is described in the zoning ordinance as:
A mobile living unit equipped with built-in furnishings and
fixtures for use as a dwelling upon connection to outside
water and electrical power. It requires no foundation and is
not considered a permanent building, but is designed to be
drawn by a passenger vehicle from one parking site to another
where power connections are available.
The district court found that the Boatmans' home was not a mobile
home within this definition. As the court observed, the Boatmans'
home
was not equipped with built-in furnishings and required a
8
In any action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
permanent foundation which had been installed by [the
Boatmans]. Second, the structure was considered as a
permanent building, and was not designed to be drawn by a
passenger vehicle from one parking site to another. After the
structure had been delivered to the site, there was
considerable carpentry work to be performed. For instance,
siding of the structure was to be installed, as well as other
substantial carpentry work. It was placed on permanent
footings.
Building Inspector Nelson erred when he told the Boatmans that
he would not perform a final inspection of the home because the
zoning ordinance prohibited mobile homes. Faced with the
inspector's interpretation of the ordinance, the Boatmans could
have sought a ruling from the Town's Zoning Board of Adjustment
that their structure was not a mobile home. Or, if the Zoning
Board disagreed, they could have requested a variance, which the
Board had the power to grant. The Boatmans knew of these options
9
because Mrs. Boatman was a member of the Zoning Board. The
Boatmans eschewed these options, however, and went to the Town
Council instead. They asked the Council to arrange for their home
to be inspected and, if it passed inspection, to issue a
certificate of occupancy. The Council referred the matter to its
attorney for an opinion. He concluded that Boatmans structure was
a mobile home as defined in the zoning ordinance. The Council
accepted its attorney's opinion, and informed the Boatmans that a
final inspection would not be made.
The Boatmans sought legal advice from a private attorney. The
record, of course, does not indicate what advice the Boatmans
9
The record reveals that Mrs. Boatman was a member of the
Zoning Board in 1991, at the time the present controversy began.
She resigned in June 1992, a few months after the Boatmans
brought this suit.
received. We do know, however, that the Boatmans did not seek
relief in the Orange County circuit court. The Boatmans concede
that the circuit court could have ordered the building inspector to
perform a final inspection; that court, like the district court,
could have concluded that their structure did not fall within the
zoning ordinance's definition of a mobile home. And if, after a
satisfactory inspection, the Town Council nonetheless refused to
issue a certificate of occupancy, the same court could have ordered
the Council to do so.
As this discussion clearly demonstrates—and as the district
court acknowledged—the Boatmans' claim turned solely on a question
of state law: whether their structure was a "mobile home" as
defined in the Town's zoning ordinance. Needless to say, a suit
for injunctive relief in the Orange County circuit court would not
have engendered anything close to the expense and delay that these
proceedings have generated.10
Nonetheless, the Boatmans say that their claim arises under
the Constitution of the United States. According to the Boatmans,
their claim has two constitutional underpinnings. First, as their
attorney informed the district court prior to the commencement of
10
In a supplemental brief to us on the question of the
remedies that would have been available to the Boatmans in state
court, the Boatmans argue that the Orange County circuit court
could not have provided them the damages relief they sought in
the district court. Their argument is disingenuous at best. We
take judicial notice that the Orange County circuit court is a
court of general jurisdiction and thus had the authority to
compensate the Boatmans with money damages. See Fla. Const. art.
V, §§ 5(b), 20(c)(3); Fla.Stat. § 26.012(2) (Supp.1994). Had
the Boatmans repaired to the circuit court in a timely manner,
however, it is likely that they would have suffered no
loss—except for a brief delay in obtaining a certificate of
occupancy, providing their structure passed inspection.
voir dire, in banning mobile homes from the Boatmans residential
district, the Town exceeded its police power. Banning mobile
homes, they said, bore no "reasonable relationship to the
protection of the public health, safety, welfare, and morals." The
Boatmans cite no constitutional or statutory provision or judicial
precedent for this proposition, and we find none. They point only
to the rules that the Florida Department of Community Affairs uses
to determine whether a local government's comprehensive growth plan
complies with state law.11
We see nothing in the Department's rules that could support
the Boatmans' argument. It is true that the rules require local
governments to include in their comprehensive growth plans various
"goals," "objectives," and "policies" that address the need for
mobile home sites in their communities, and that the Department
urges them to provide for such sites. When, in 1990, the Town
submitted its plan to the Department for approval, the plan
indicated that the Town's zoning ordinance prohibited mobile homes
in residential districts.12 The Department objected to the lack of
provision for mobile homes sites; it recommended that the plan
include a specific, measurable objective based on relevant
data and analysis, to provide adequate sites for housing for
low and moderate income families and for mobile homes. The
Town must permit mobile homes in single-family and
multi-family residential areas or it may designate land for
11
The Department of Community Affairs is the state agency
charged, among other things, with approving or disapproving the
comprehensive growth plans of the state's local governments.
12
Mrs. Boatman participated in the preparation of the Town's
plan. She also participated in the Town's response to the
Department's objections to the plan, including the Department's
recommendation, set out in the text, infra, concerning the need
to provide for mobile homes.
mobile home subdivisions and mobile home parks[.]
The Town, in response, advised the Department that provisions in
the plan addressed the issue. The Department accepted the Town's
response and approved its plan in 1991. In view of this
acceptance, it can hardly be contended that the zoning provision
barring the location of a mobile home on the Boatmans' lot was
beyond the Town's police power to enact.
The Boatmans contend that the second underpinning for their
constitutional claim is that the Town's refusal to direct the
building inspector to perform a final inspection was "arbitrary and
capricious" and thus deprived them of their property without due
process of law. In their supplemental brief, they describe their
claim as an " "as applied' arbitrary and capricious due process
claim." The Boatmans do not tell us, however, whether this claim
falls within the substantive or the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the claim falls under the procedural component, it is
meritless because the state provided the Boatmans all the process
they were due. See, e.g., McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555-60
(11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.
898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995). The state gave them the right to
repair to the Orange County circuit court; there, as we point out,
supra, they could have sought an order compelling the building
inspector to do his job.13
13
The order could have been in the form of an injunction or
a writ of mandamus. A writ would have issued if the circuit
court concluded that the performance of a final inspection of a
new building was a ministerial act—that is, whether the Boatmans'
structure was barred by the Town's zoning ordinance was a matter
We likewise have no doubt that the claim is not cognizable
under the substantive component of the clause. The notion that the
Constitution gives a property owner a substantive right to a
correct decision from a government official, such as the building
inspector in this case, is novel indeed. According to the
Boatmans, the right is triggered whenever an administrative
decision is clearly mandated but the government official fails to
act. In that situation, the official, in refusing to follow the
clear mandate of the law and to perform what is essentially a
ministerial act, would be deemed to have acted "arbitrarily and
capriciously." Again, the Boatmans' theory is novel. It is
frivolous, as well.
III.
In conclusion, we find no federal constitutional claim in the
case that the Boatmans presented to the district court. The court
therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it. On
receipt of our mandate, the court shall dismiss the case.
SO ORDERED.
for the Zoning Board, not the inspector, to decide. In any
event, we have no doubt that, as we explain, supra, the circuit
court would have decided the state law controversy before us.