United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-3407.
Sylvia HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Wayland Clifton, individually and as the Chief of Police and agent
for the city of Gainesville, City of Gainesville, Defendants,
Gainesville, City of, a municipal corporation of the State of
Florida, Defendant-Appellee.
Feb. 14, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. (No. 91-10118-MMP), Maurice Mitchell Paul,
Chief Judge.
Before ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:
Sylvia Hill, a Police Officer, brought suit against the City
of Gainesville, alleging gender discrimination, equal protection
violations, and retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment
rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to the City on
all counts. Because the Police Chief was not the final
policymaking authority, and because there is no evidence that the
City Manager approved of any illegal or improper motive the Police
Chief may have had, we affirm the District Court's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Sylvia Hill became the first female Master Sergeant at the
Gainesville Police Department in 1986, the first female Lieutenant
in 1987, the first female Executive Lieutenant in 1988, and the
first female in Internal Affairs in 1990. She applied for a
promotion to Captain when positions opened up in 1987 and again in
1988, but each time she was passed over. In 1990, an experienced
male homicide detective was promoted to Acting Captain and
appointed to an inter-agency task force investigating the serial
murders known as the Gainesville Student Homicides. Hill filed an
employee grievance alleging gender discrimination, even though she
conceded that she had no homicide experience and was not qualified
to lead the task force. This grievance was denied by the City
Manager, Paul White.
In early 1991, Hill joined in initiating an internal affairs
investigation of the Police Chief, Wayland Clifton, Jr., regarding
his possible involvement in alleged misconduct by a group of police
officers and employees calling themselves "Hallucinations 2000".
City Manager White ordered an independent investigation by Lt. Roy
Dickey of the Tallahassee Police Department. His investigation
revealed that: 1) Clifton was not aware of the existence of the
group, 2) the group was innocuous and well-intentioned, and 3) it
had no effect on promotions.
Meanwhile, Hill had been transferred from Internal Affairs to
Patrol division, with no loss of rank, pay, or benefits. The City
alleges that Lt. Sherry Scott, after assuming command of Internal
Affairs, discovered that several investigations had not been
completed and that other files were in disarray. Clifton, in
consultation with City Manager White, ordered a performance audit
of Internal Affairs. According to the City, this audit uncovered
serious flaws: investigative files were missing, some cases were
never completed, some investigations were untimely or unauthorized,
certain findings were inconsistent with the evidence, and in some
cases Clifton's direct orders had been ignored.
By early June, both the audit and Lt. Dickey's investigation
into Hallucinations 2000 were complete. Hill alleges that at this
point Clifton was willing to transfer her to a more desirable
position within the police department, so long as she agreed not to
testify before a grand jury investigating Clifton and
Hallucinations 2000. In any event, in July, Hill and the two other
transferred Internal Affairs officers testified before the grand
jury.1 Soon after, in August of 1991, Clifton brought employee
misconduct charges against Hill. Hill claims these charges were in
retaliation for her gender discrimination claim and her testimony
before the grand jury. After investigation, almost all of those
charges were sustained, including numerous incidents of willful
neglect of duty, numerous incidents of incompetence, and one
incident of insubordination. Clifton demoted Hill and placed her
on probation. She appealed her demotion through the City's
administrative grievance procedures, but the City Manager
ultimately denied her relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Augusta Iron and
1
The grand jury subsequently rejected all of Hill's
accusations against Clifton.
Steel Works, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855,
856 (11th Cir.1988).
III. ANALYSIS
Municipalities may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an
official policy or custom of the municipality violates
constitutional requirements. Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Only those officials who have final
policymaking authority may render the municipality liable under §
1983. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89
L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Hill concedes that Clifton was not the final
policymaking authority in regard to the actions taken against Hill.
Thus the actions of Clifton cannot impose liability on the city.
Hill argues that White, the City Manager, was the final
policymaker2 as to such personnel matters and that White ratified
the actions of Clifton. A city may be held responsible where the
authorized policymakers "approve a subordinate's decision and the
basis for it." City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127,
108 S.Ct. 915, 926, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (emphasis added). Even
though White approved of Clifton's actions, and even assuming that
Clifton's actions were illegal because they were based on improper
motives, the city would not be liable because Hill has simply
presented no evidence that White approved of the basis for
Clifton's actions: the improper motives.
2
The District Court held that the City Commission, not the
City Manager, had final policymaking authority in Gainesville.
For the purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that
the City Manager has ultimate authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Clifton, the police chief, was not the final
policymaking authority, and because there is no evidence that
White, the City Manager, approved of any illegal or improper motive
Clifton may have had, we AFFIRM the District Court's decision.