United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 93-9282.
Jeffery Jerome WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ronald FOUNTAIN; Fred Wilson; Michael Godwin; Aland A. Adams;
Albert G. Thomas; Lanson Newsome, Defendants-Appellees.
March 8, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia. (No. CV692-065), Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior
Circuit Judge.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
This is a § 1983 action brought by a prisoner, claiming that
he was subjected to disciplinary sanctions in violation of his
procedural due process rights. We hold that the prison
disciplinary proceedings complied with the minimum requirements of
due process.
I.
In August of 1991, Jeffery Jerome Williams, an inmate of the
Georgia State Prison at Reidsville, was sanctioned in prison
disciplinary proceedings for fighting with another inmate.
Williams was charged in a prison disciplinary report (filed by
prison official Ronald Fountain) with the "major infraction"1 of
engaging in a "physical encounter causing or intending to cause
serious injury" for striking another inmate in the head with a pool
1
This is the most severe of four categories of prohibited
acts, carrying the highest range of sanctions. See Georgia State
Prison, Dept. of Inmate Rules and Discipline, Policy Statement
No. 590.1, at 27-33 (1985).
cue during an altercation in the television room. An investigation
was conducted by hearings investigator Michael Godwin, who prepared
a report concluding that Williams was guilty as charged. The
report documents that this conclusion was based on the charging
staff's statements, confidential witness statements, and Williams's
own admission that he had participated in a fight with the other
inmate (though Williams denied that a pool cue was involved).
A disciplinary hearing was then conducted, prosecuted by
Donald Lewis and presided over by Fred Wilson. No witnesses were
presented by either side, 2 and the investigating officer did not
testify. The disciplinary committee, relying on the investigation
report, found Williams guilty and sentenced him to twelve months of
disciplinary confinement, 45 days of store restriction, and 45 days
of incentive privilege restriction. Neither the investigation
report nor the disciplinary committee report indicates that the
reliability of the confidential witness statements had been
evaluated. Williams filed an administrative appeal, which was
denied in turn by the disciplinary appeals officer (Aland Adams),
the prison warden (Albert Thomas), and the deputy commissioner of
the Georgia Department of Corrections (Lanson Newsome).
Proceeding pro se, Williams filed a complaint in federal court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Fountain, Wilson,
Godwin, Adams, Thomas, Lewis, and Newsome (collectively, "prison
officials") had deprived him of due process. Williams, who is
illiterate, also requested that counsel be appointed. The district
2
Williams declined to call any witnesses on his own behalf.
His explanation for this omission is that none of the inmates who
observed the altercation were on friendly terms with him.
court first ordered that the case be dismissed as frivolous,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), but then reinstated the case upon
Williams's filing of an amended complaint. After the prison
officials answered the amended complaint and requested summary
judgment, court-appointed counsel filed a second amended complaint
and a response to the summary judgment motion. These filings
argued that the prison disciplinary proceedings violated Williams's
procedural due process rights because Williams was not allowed to
confront or cross-examine witnesses and his conviction was not
supported by a written statement articulating the evidentiary basis
for the disciplinary action. The district court entered an order
adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate, granting
the prison officials' motion for summary judgment. Williams,
represented by new appointed counsel, now appeals.
II.
Williams raises two procedural due process issues.3 First, he
3
Recently, in Sandin v. Conner, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.
2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court clarified the
circumstances in which disciplinary changes in a prisoner's
conditions of confinement will deprive him or her of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest:
States may under certain circumstances create liberty
interests which are protected by the Due Process
Clause. But these interests will be generally limited
to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding
the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give
rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own
force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.
--- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (citations omitted).
The Court in Conner concluded that the sanctions
imposed on the inmate in that case did not impinge upon a
protected liberty interest. The majority noted that the
argues that his due process rights were violated by the prison
officials' failure to evaluate the credibility of confidential
informants who were relied upon in the investigation. Second,
discounting the confidential informant testimony, Williams argues
that the prison officials violated his due process rights by
failing to establish any record evidence in support of his
conviction.
Although inmates subject to disciplinary actions may be
denied the right to identify and cross-examine adverse witnesses
when prison officials are concerned about reprisals, Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2980-81, 41 L.Ed.2d
935 (1974), due process requires that the record of disciplinary
proceedings document some good faith investigation and findings as
to the credibility of confidential informants and the reliability
of the information provided by them. Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d
1386, 1390-91 (11th Cir.1982).4 The purpose of this requirement is
inmate was sentenced to only 30 days of segregated
confinement, the record showed that disciplinary segregation
mirrored conditions imposed on inmates segregated for other
reasons, and the inmate's disciplinary record was
subsequently expunged (thus preventing the offense from
affecting his chances of parole). --- U.S. at ----, 115
S.Ct. at 2300. Even on these facts, however, four Justices
would have held that the inmate was deprived of a protected
liberty interest. Because Williams's sanctions—especially
the full year of solitary confinement—represent
substantially more "atypical and significant hardship[s] ...
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," we
assume that he suffered a liberty deprivation and was
entitled to due process.
4
Other circuits have agreed with Kyle in requiring prison
disciplinary committees to conduct and document evaluations of
confidential informants' credibility. See Brown v. Smith, 828
F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir.1987); Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d
1287, 1293 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct.
2251, 90 L.Ed.2d 697 (1986); Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 502
not only to foster the reliability of prison investigations within
the constraints of unique institutional concerns, but also to
enable meaningful appellate review of prison disciplinary
proceedings.
In this case, there is no indication in the prison
disciplinary record that prison officials ever evaluated the
credibility of the confidential informants who provided information
in the course of Williams's investigation. Under Kyle, this
omission would be a clear violation of Williams's procedural due
process rights if the information provided by the confidential
witness statements were relied upon in determining Williams's
guilt. The government argues, however, that Williams's conviction
was not based on the testimony of confidential informants, as the
disciplinary committee report indicates that no confidential
information was considered by the committee. The committee report
also states, however, that the committee was relying on "charging
staff's statements and the investigation"; the investigation
report, in turn, states that the investigator's findings were based
on "confidential witness statements reviewed by this investigator."
By adopting the investigator's recommendation, therefore, the
committee, in determining guilt, indirectly relied upon the
confidential informant statements, the reliability of which had
never been explicitly established.
(3d Cir.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct.
864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); see also Russell v. Coughlin, 774
F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (noting that although the Second
Circuit has not ruled on the issue, numerous district courts
within that circuit have required inmate disciplinary committees
to comport with the requirements of Kyle ).
Nevertheless, the government is correct to this extent: if
the sanctions imposed by the disciplinary committee have a
sufficient evidentiary basis independent of any unreliable
information obtained from confidential informants, then procedural
due process concerns would be allayed. See Kyle, 677 F.2d at 1391
("The inquiry ... into the reliability of informers may be
diminished (or even satisfied) where there is corroborating
physical evidence of the information provided."); Young v. Jones,
37 F.3d 1457 (11th Cir.1994) (finding no due process violation
where confidential informant credibility not evaluated, but
sufficient corroborating evidence of the information supplied),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1437, 131 L.Ed.2d 317
(1995).
A minimum requirement of due process is that conclusions of
prison disciplinary bodies be "supported by some evidence in the
record." Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
"Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require
[a reviewing court's] examination of the entire record, independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing the
evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board." Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774.
The magistrate judge in this case found that the hearing
officer's "reasons may not have been extensive, but due process was
given. An appeals committee or other reviewing body, such as this
Court, can determine what evidence the hearing officer relied
upon." As far as this court can determine, the disciplinary
committee relied upon, besides information provided by confidential
informants, nothing other than Williams's own statement: "There
was no pool stick involved, but we did have a fight."5
On the unique facts of this case, however, this statement is
sufficient to meet the due process standard of Hill. Williams
admitted before the hearing officer that he engaged in the fight
during which the other inmate was injured; he only denies that he
hit the other inmate with a pool cue. (Williams asserts that the
other inmate was injured in the course of their "wrestling" or
"shoving" match when he slipped on spilled coffee. 6) The charge
against Williams was "physical encounter causing or intending to
cause serious physical injury." Williams does not dispute that the
other inmate suffered "serious physical injury," nor does he
dispute that the "physical encounter" he engaged in was the "cause"
of the injury, in the ordinary sense of causation. An adequate
factual basis for Williams's punishment was therefore established
when Williams confessed to participating in the fight. Although
the disciplinary committee may not have chosen to impose such a
5
The disciplinary committee report states only that the
finding of guilt is based on "charging staff's statements and the
investigation." The investigation report offers
"investigation/confidential witness statements reviewed by this
investigator," the (tautological) fact that the "investigation
was observed by the investigator," and the charging officer's
statement in support of its conclusion that Williams is guilty as
charged. It is undisputed that no prison officers witnessed the
altercation at issue. This leaves Williams's statement, recorded
in the committee report, as the only basis (aside from
confidential informant statements) for the disciplinary action.
6
Williams made this statement in an affidavit dated June 18,
1993, attached to his memorandum of law in opposition to the
prison officials' request for summary judgment.
severe sanction had the facts alleged by Williams been established,
it would have been within its authority to do so.7 Thus, although
the prison officials in this case tread precariously close to the
due process line, we cannot conclude that there is no evidence in
the record to support the disciplinary sanctions imposed on
Williams.
The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
prison officials is therefore AFFIRMED.
7
Disciplinary segregation of up to 24 months is warranted
for all offenses involving physical violence, with the exception
of "striking another person," which can only be punished with up
to six months of segregated confinement. See Georgia State
Prison, Dept. of Inmate Rules and Discipline, Policy Statement
No. 590.1, at 27-33 (1985).