United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-6094.
Non-Argument Calendar.
Mateen FAWAAD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ronald E. JONES, Prison Commissioner, Larry Burton, Warden, Ron
Hightower, Regional Director, Paul Whaley, Director of
Classification, Kelly, Mail Personnel at SCCF, Davis, Mail Clerk at
St. Clair Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.
April 29, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama. (No. CV-93-N-1845-M), Edwin L. Nelson, Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and HATCHETT and BIRCH, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this pro se, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 appeal, state prisoner Mateen
Fawaad argues that the Alabama Department of Corrections policy,
requiring inmates to use both their religious names and their
commitment names on all incoming and outgoing mail, violates his
constitutional right to practice his religion freely under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). Following a nonjury trial, the district
court entered judgment for the prison officials and dismissed
Fawaad's complaint with prejudice, because the court determined
that the prison officials had a compelling state interest in
requiring inmates to use both their commitment and religious names
on mail. This case presents our circuit with its first opportunity
to address an inmate's constitutional right to practice his or her
religion freely following RFRA. We AFFIRM.
The material facts in this case are not disputed and are
presented fully by the district court. Fawaad v. Herring, 874
F.Supp. 350, 351 (N.D.Ala.1995). Subsequent to his incarceration,
Fawaad converted to the Islamic faith and legally changed his name
from Jeffrey Bell to Mateen Fawaad. It is undisputed that Fawaad's
religion requires him to abandon the name Jeffrey Bell and to adopt
his new religious name. The Alabama Department of Corrections
policy regarding inmates, who have legally changed their names
following incarceration, is to require inmates to use dual names on
all incoming and outgoing mail. Under this system, Fawaad is
required to refer to himself as "Mateen Fawaad, a/k/a Jeffrey
Bell." In 1992, another judge in the Northern District of Alabama
enjoined the Department of Corrections from changing the dual name
policy. Id. at 351 (citing Fawaad v. Thigpen, CV-90-AR-1993-M).
Fawaad contends that he should be allowed to use only his
religious name on all correspondence, and that the dual name policy
violates RFRA, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The district court held that, "[a]ssuming
without deciding, that the requirement that the plaintiff use both
his "committed' and religious names on his mail constitutes a
"substantial' burden on the practice of his religion, the court is
satisfied that no violation of Mr. Fawaad's rights to free speech
or religion has occurred." Fawaad, 874 F.Supp. at 352. The court
found that maintaining security and order in the prison constituted
a compelling governmental interest, and that the dual name policy
was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.1 Id.
It is well established that prison inmates are entitled to
bring actions based on free exercise rights protected by the First
Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974).
Other circuits have held that inmates have a First Amendment
interest in using their legally changed religious names, at least
in conjunction with their commitment names. See Malik v. Brown, 71
F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.1995); Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168,
1
The district court concluded:
It is difficult to conceive of a domestic governmental
interest which would be more compelling than that of
maintaining the security and order of a prison
institution housing more than 300 inmates with
sentences of life without parole. In such
circumstances, it is absolutely essential that prison
officials control the flow of contraband into and out
of the prison and to quickly and efficiently detect
violations of security regulations. Without doubt the
sure and immediate identification of the sender and
intended recipient of suspect mail is of paramount
importance. Furthermore, the use of dual names has the
commendable effect of allowing the plaintiff to use his
religiously adopted name while concomitantly providing
the means by which the defendants may control the use
of prison mail to further unlawful activities in a way
which is least restrictive of the plaintiff's exercise
of religion.
Fawaad, 874 F.Supp. at 352.
1170 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S.Ct. 677,
112 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991); Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517, 518-19 (5th
Cir.1987) (per curiam); Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 501
(4th Cir.1982). Because the issue is not before us in this case,
we assume without deciding that an inmate who sincerely holds a
religious belief that requires the legal adoption of a religious
name has a First Amendment interest in using that religious name in
conjunction with his or her commitment name.
Before the enactment of RFRA, the constitutionality of prison
regulations was subject to a "reasonableness" test. Turner, 482
U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that "prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional
rights are judged under a "reasonableness' test less restrictive
than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
constitutional rights." Id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. at 2404. The
legislative history of RFRA reflects Congress's specific intent "to
restore traditional protection afforded to prisoners' claims prior
to O'Lone." S.Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899.2 RFRA now would require
2
The Senate Report provides that:
Prior to O'Lone, courts used a balancing test in cases
where an inmate's free exercise rights were burdened by
an institutional regulation; only regulations based
upon penological concerns of the "highest order" could
outweigh an inmate's claims....
....
The committee does not intend the act to impose a
standard that would exacerbate the difficult and
complex challenges of operating the Nation's prisons
us to apply strict scrutiny to the prison regulation.3
In Felix, the Fifth Circuit determined that "[t]he adoption of
Muslim names by inmates practicing that religion is generally
recognized to be an exercise of both first amendment speech and
religious freedom." 833 F.2d at 518 (citingBarrett, 689 F.2d 498;
Akbar v. Canney, 634 F.2d 339 (6th Cir.1980) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 1712, 68 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981)).
Applying strict scrutiny to a prison regulation that required
inmates to use their committed name at least in conjunction with
their religious name, the Fifth Circuit reached the following
conclusion:
The state's legitimate interest in prison security requires an
efficient system of identification and administration of
prisoners within its custody. So, while the state cannot
reasonably deny prisoners privileges simply because they have
chosen to adopt a new name, the use of their "committed name,"
as an alias, for the purpose of identification of the
prisoner, does not of itself violate the prisoner's
and jails in a safe and secure manner. Accordingly,
the committee expects that the courts will continue the
tradition of giving due deference to the experience and
expertise of prison and jail administrators in
establishing necessary regulations and procedures to
maintain good order, security and discipline,
consistent with consideration of costs and limited
resources.
S.Rep. No. 111, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899-1900.
3
The Fifth Circuit recently held that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to enact RFRA and that
RFRA "does not usurp the judiciary's power to interpret the
Constitution." Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th
Cir.1996). Several other circuits have avoided addressing the
constitutionality of RFRA. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Schriro, 74
F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.1996). Because the constitutionality of RFRA
is not before us, we find it unnecessary to address that issue in
order to decide this case. Significantly, the prison regulation
challenged by Fawaad meets both the former reasonableness
standard and the higher strict scrutiny standard established by
RFRA.
constitutional rights.
Id. at 519 (footnote omitted).
The evidence presented at the trial in this case reflects the
importance of an efficient identification system as discussed in
Felix. At trial, the Warden of St. Clair Correctional Facility in
Springville, Alabama, where Fawaad is incarcerated, testified that
requiring inmates to use both their committed names and religious
names on correspondence is essential to maintain prison security.
Q: What is the reason for wanting both names in his
prison files—
A (Warden): To keep track of the correspondence in and
out. We've had money order scams; we've found pistols in
apple pies; we've found cocaine in the Cracker Jacks;
marijuana in Christmas cards. So, we like to know who it
comes from and where it goes out from.
R2-41-22. The district court noted during the trial that:
[I]f an inmate comes in with one name and at some point the
name is changed and all the records from that point forward
reflect the new name and the records from that point backward
reflect the old name, it would be necessary to try to put
together an entire record, that might be difficult to do, it
might be made more difficult by name changes.
R2-41-36.
Assuming without deciding that RFRA is constitutional, we
agree with the district court that maintaining security in a prison
constitutes a compelling governmental interest. The control of
contraband into and out of the prison is a fundamental part of
maintaining prison security, and the requirement of dual names on
incoming and outgoing mail is the least restrictive means of
satisfying that compelling interest. Therefore, the judgment
entered by the district court for the prison officials is AFFIRMED.