United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-5300.
Fernando Alberto ORTEGA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
W. CHRISTIAN, Officer, individually, and as police officer for
Metro-Dade Police Department; Fred Taylor, individually as
Director/Chief of Police of Metro-Dade Police Department, Metro-
Dade Police Department, a political subdivision of Dade County,
Florida, Defendants-Appellee.
June 25, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 94-965-CIV-JLK), James Lawrence King,
Judge.
Before HATCHETT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and OAKES*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Fernando Alberto Ortega, appeals the district
court's order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of
appellees, Officer William Christian, Chief Fred Taylor, and the
Metro-Dade Police Department on his claims for false arrest and
false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse.
FACTS
On January 21, 1992, the Metro-Dade Police Department (MDPD)
received a report of a robbery and kidnapping. On January 23,
1992, a confidential informant informed the MDPD and Officer
Christian that an organized group of which he was a member
committed the robbery. The informant stated that he knew the
member who committed the robbery, provided the address of the
*
Honorable James L. Oakes, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
alleged robber's residence, and proceeded with Christian to that
address. That address belonged to Ortega's brother.
Upon arrival at the address, the informant identified Ortega
and his brother as the men who committed the robbery. Christian
immediately arrested both men and searched the residence. Ortega
proclaimed his innocence and requested an opportunity to prove a
case of mistaken identity. Christian refused to comply with
Ortega's request and failed to make any inquiries into the claims
of innocence. The MDPD held Ortega in custody for five months
without bond until Ortega's bond hearing on June 3, 1992. At the
bond hearing, the court ordered the release of Ortega from custody.
The victim of the robbery never identified Ortega as the
person who committed the robbery. Ortega, however, repeatedly
proclaimed his innocence and demanded an opportunity to appear in
a line-up or a photo spread. The MDPD scheduled and cancelled
Ortega for a line-up or photo spread on three separate
occasions—April 24, April 30, and May 14—during the five months of
his incarceration.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 22, 1994, Ortega filed a complaint in the state
courts against Officer William Christian, in his individual
capacity, Chief Fred Taylor, in his individual capacity, and the
Metro-Dade Police Department, seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and common law on claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment. The appellees-defendants removed the case from state
court to federal court. Accepting as true the facts presented in
Ortega's complaint, the appellees filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. After a time extension, Ortega filed a memorandum
in opposition to appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The district court granted appellees' motion for judgment on the
pleadings finding that probable cause existed to arrest Ortega;
therefore, Ortega could not prevail on a false arrest claim under
common law or section 1983. Additionally, the district court held
that Ortega's false imprisonment claim, which was predicated on the
false arrest claim, failed under common law and section 1983.
Ortega filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the order,
which the district court denied.
CONTENTIONS
Ortega contends that Christian lacked probable cause to arrest
him because Christian had no information that could have led him to
believe that Ortega participated in the robbery, or lived at the
address that the informant provided. Next, Ortega contends that
his detention, which followed the unlawful arrest, violated his
constitutional rights under section 1983, and that his false arrest
claim is separate and distinct from his false imprisonment claim.
Appellees, on the other hand, argue that the facts alleged in
the complaint show that Christian had probable cause to arrest
Ortega and that probable cause is a complete defense to both
Ortega's false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
ISSUES
The issues we address are: (1) whether Christian had probable
cause to arrest Ortega and (2) whether Ortega's detention
constituted a false imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
The district court granted appellees' motions for judgment on
the pleadings against Ortega and denied Ortega's motion for
reconsideration. The district court found that Christian had
probable cause to arrest Ortega, thus, precluding Ortega's false
arrest and imprisonment claims under section 1983. Judgment on the
pleadings is proper when no issues of material fact exist, and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(c). When reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, we accept the
facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Swerdloff v. Miami National
Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir.1978); General Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational
Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir.1989).1 Accordingly, a judgment
on the pleadings is a decision on the merits, and we review it de
novo. General Conference Corp., 887 F.2d at 230.
A. False Arrest
A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the
Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section 1983 claim. Marx
v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir.1990). An arrest made
with probable cause, however, constitutes an absolute bar to a
section 1983 action for false arrest. Marx, 905 F.2d at 1505.
Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge, of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe,
1
The Eleventh Circuit adopts as binding precedent, all
decisions which the former Fifth Circuit made prior to October 1,
1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir.1981).
under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed or is
committing an offense. Marx, 905 F.2d at 1505. Probable cause
does not require overwhelmingly convincing evidence, but only
"reasonably trustworthy information." Marx, 905 F.2d at 1506
(citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225-26, 13
L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). In this case, we must determine whether a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the
same knowledge as Christian could have believed that probable cause
existed to arrest Ortega for the suspected robbery. Pickens v.
Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir.1995).
As a basis for a finding of probable cause, Christian relied
on information from a confidential informant identifying the
perpetrator of a crime. Ortega argues that informant information
alone cannot sufficiently support a finding of probable cause. In
determining whether an informant's tip rises to the level of
probable cause, we assess the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1002 (11th Cir.1992);
United States v. Campbell, 920 F.2d 793, 796-97 (11th Cir.1991).
We consider the relevance of factors such as the informant's
"veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge." Gonzalez, 969
F.2d at 1003 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). In addition, the
corroboration of the details of an informant's tip through
independent police work adds significant value to the probable
cause analysis. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d at 1003.
In this case, we find that the informant's tip lacked
essential elements that would have given Christian probable cause
to believe Ortega participated in the robbery. Appellees argue
that the information Christian received from the informant
established probable cause because the informant made statements
against his penal interests and as a member of the gang had
personal knowledge of the perpetrators. First, making a statement
against one's penal interests without more will not raise an
informant's tip to the level of probable cause required under the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 325 (5th
Cir.1980). Second, no evidence in the complaint demonstrates a
past history between the informant and Christian or the MDPD, which
could lend support for the informant's veracity and reliability.
Third, although the informant admitted having membership in the
gang, no evidence shows that the informant actually knew Ortega,
that Ortega belonged to the gang, that a gang existed, or that
Ortega participated in the commission of the crime. United States
v. Reyes, 792 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir.1986) ("an informant's tip is
buttressed [through] the fact that it is based on his own personal
observation rather than hearsay"). Lastly, the complaint does not
reveal that Christian took any independent steps to investigate the
informant's tip or had any evidence prior to arresting Ortega which
would have corroborated the informant's identification of Ortega as
a perpetrator in the commission of the crime. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d
at 1003; see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80
S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) (an officer "may rely upon
information received through an informant ... so long as the
informant's statement is reasonably corroborated [through] other
matters within the officer's knowledge.").
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Christian lacked
probable cause to arrest and detain Ortega. Cf. Swint v. City of
Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 996-98 (11th Cir.1995) (probable cause to
arrest and detain one suspect does not extend to another person in
mere propinquity to that suspect). We also hold that Ortega has
made a valid false arrest claim under section 1983 against
Christian. We dismiss, however, the false arrest claims against
Taylor and the MDPD. Taylor and the MDPD cannot be held liable for
the unreasonable actions that Christian, the arresting officer,
pursued. No evidence exists here that indicates Taylor or the MDPD
approved of Christian's decision to arrest based on the limited
information he possessed. Hill v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1150, 1152
(11th Cir.1996) ("A city may be held responsible where the
authorized policymakers "approve a subordinate's decision and basis
for it.' "); Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1565 ("it is
difficult to see how the Sheriff would have final authority over
who each deputy arrest and whether a deputy has probable cause to
arrest and/or hold arrestee" (quoting Cannon v. Macon County, 90V-
1132-E (Dec. 19, 1990))).
B. False Imprisonment of Ortega
Because we have already determined that Christian lacked
probable cause to arrest Ortega, we now hold that Ortega's
detention pursuant to that arrest constituted false imprisonment
under section 1983.
A detention on the basis of a false arrest presents a viable
section 1983 action. Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th
Cir.1979) (section 1983 claims for false arrest and false
imprisonment presented where, without probable cause, officers
arrested and detained stroke victim in belief he was intoxicated);
see also Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562 ("a detention on the basis of
misidentification may present a viable section 1983 claim"). A
false imprisonment claim under section 1983 is based on the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivations of
liberty without due process of law. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2693-94, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Where a
police officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee
has a claim under section 1983 for false imprisonment based on a
detention pursuant to that arrest. Groman v. Township of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir.1995). This false imprisonment
claim under section 1983 is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable seizures. Groman, 47 F.3d at 636;
see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 868-69,
43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (The Fourth Amendment requires a timely
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
detention of a prisoner arrested upon information filed by the
state prosecutor). Additionally, we note that, under certain
circumstances, a detention following a valid arrest may present a
viable section 1983 claim where the detainee protests the detention
on the basis of misidentification. Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562 (citing
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694-95, 61
L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)).
Under section 1983, Ortega must meet the elements of common
law false imprisonment and establish that the imprisonment resulted
in a violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562-63 (citing Douthit v. Jones,
619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.1980). The complaint contains facts that
satisfy the section 1983 standard for false imprisonment. The
complaint demonstrates that as a result of the unlawful arrest,
appellees detained Ortega for five months without conducting a
line-up or affording other opportunities for him to prove his
innocence. Ortega had a constitutional right to be free from
detention where the circumstances and facts under Christian's
consideration demonstrated that Christian clearly lacked probable
cause to make an arrest. Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563. In light of the
sparse information Christian had when he made the arrest, Christian
knew or should have known that the imprisonment of Ortega may have
constituted an unlawful imprisonment under section 1983 in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563.
From the facts and law in this case, we hold that Ortega has
established a valid false imprisonment claim under § 1983 against
Christian. As to the claim against Taylor and the MDPD, we cannot
determine from the facts as set forth in the complaint whether
those parties are subject to section 1983 liability for Ortega's
detention. Although Ortega simply makes "boilerplate allegations"
about those parties' involvement, we remain uncertain about all of
the circumstances surrounding Ortega's five month detention.
Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662, 668-669 (7th Cir.1992). We
believe that Ortega's vague allegations sufficiently state a cause
of action requiring further proceedings to fully develop the
2
Ortega must prove (1) intent to confine, (2) acts resulting
in confinement, and (3) consciousness of the victim of
confinement or resulting harm.
record. Sivard, 959 F.2d at 668. Accordingly, we hold that Taylor
and the MDPD are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law at the
pleadings stage on the false imprisonment claim under section 1983.
Swint, 51 F.3d at 999-1000; Swerdloff, 584 F.2d at 60; Sivard,
959 F.2d at 668-69 (reversing summary judgment because of the
"inexplicable nature of [plaintiff's] detention").
C. Qualified Immunity and Ortega's Section 1983 Claims
Due to the posture of the case, the district court did not
discuss qualified immunity. Consequently, that issue is not ripe
for our review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Ortega established
valid claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under section
1983 against Christian. We affirm the dismissal of the false
arrest claim against Taylor and the MDPD and remand the false
imprisonment claim under section 1983 against Taylor and the MDPD
for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.