United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4100.
Barbara KORNBLAU, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DADE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant-Appellee.
June 20, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 94-655-CIV), Donald L. Graham, Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and RONEY and PHILLIPS*, Senior
Circuit Judges.
RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge:
The district court granted summary judgment in this case for
Dade County and against the plaintiff, who, by this suit, sought
access as a disabled person to a parking space in a private
employee parking lot that she would not have been entitled to use
even if she were not disabled. We affirm.
There is no issue of fact. The decision turns on the proper
interpretation of a federal statute and its regulations.
Plaintiff Barbara Kornblau, by virtue of her difficulty in
walking due to arthritis, is a disabled person entitled to the
benefits of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12132. The regulations that implement the Act provide
that where parking is provided for a public building, a certain
number of spaces must be provided for the disabled, located on the
shortest accessible route of travel to the entrance of the
*
Honorable J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit
Judge for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
building. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.6.2.
Metropolitan Dade County's Government Center Building
provides several public parking lots where plaintiff is entitled to
park. These parking lots meet the requirements for the number and
location of disabled parking spaces. The parking lot closest to
the entrance to the building, however, is reserved with marked
spaces for the county commissioners and certain senior management
officials of the County. Plaintiff, who is not a County employee,
wants the County to provide a disabled parking space in that
employees' private lot that would be available to her, basing that
claim upon the ADA.
The ADA was enacted to provide a national mandate "for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Although the Act must be
broadly construed, Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F.Supp. 547, 551
(E.D.Pa.), aff'd 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S.
----, 114 S.Ct. 1545, 128 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994), nothing in the Act,
its purpose, or the regulations can reasonably be read to give
disabled parkers access to areas that would not be available to
them if they were not disabled. The purpose of the Act is to place
those with disabilities on an equal footing, not to give them an
unfair advantage. In re Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131 (Del.1994). The
discrimination that must be eliminated is the discriminatory effect
that results because of the disability. As Judge Ryskamp said in
a decision granting a preliminary injunction enforcing the Act in
another context, to show a violation of Title II the plaintiff must
show disability, the denial of a public benefit, and that such
"denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the
plaintiff's disability." Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park
Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F.Supp. 986, 990
(S.D.Fla.1994).
Plaintiff seeks to gain an advantage over non-disabled
parkers through a confused interpretation of the Accessibility
Guidelines adopted as a part of the Department of Justice's
Regulations with regard to Title II of the ADA, contained in
Appendix A to Part 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, referred
to as "ADAAG." Regulations promulgated by the Department of
Justice interpreting the ADA are, of course, entitled to
considerable weight. Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F.Supp. 476, 483
(N.D.Ind.1993). See also, Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512, 1518
(11th Cir.1986); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed.2d 26
(1995); Thurber v. Browner, 3 AD Cases 1257, 1994 WL 395007
(N.D.Ill.1994). While we note the regulations cannot require more
than a reasonably interpreted Act can require, see Robbins v.
Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195 (7th Cir.1994); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 25 F.3d
1063 (D.C.Cir.1994), it is not necessary to fall back on that
principle here. The regulations here simply do not require what
the plaintiff claims they require.
We are satisfied that Judge Graham made a proper
interpretation of the regulations which we set forth in full as
follows:
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Dade County
is required by the ADA to provide disabled parking spaces for
visitors to the Government Center Building in an adjacent
parking lot reserved for County Commissioners and Senior
Management Officials. To determine this issue, the Court must
review the regulations contained in Appendix A to 28 C.F.R.
Part 36.
Kornblau argues that Dade County is not in compliance
with 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.6.2 and, therefore, is in
violation of the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 4.6.2 provides:
Accessible parking spaces serving a particular building
shall be located on the shortest accessible route of
travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance.
In parking facilities that do not serve a particular
building, accessible parking shall be located on the
shortest accessible route of travel to an accessible
pedestrian entrance of the parking facility. In
buildings with multiple accessible entrances with
adjacent parking, accessible parking spaces shall be
dispersed and located closest to the accessible
entrances.
While Kornblau does not dispute Dade County's argument that
this section distinguishes between employee and visitor
parking, she insists that the regulations require that
disabled parking be provided at the shortest accessible route
which in this case would be the employee parking reserved for
the County Commissioners and Senior Management Officials.
Dade County contends that 28 C.F.R. § 4.6.2 must be read
in conjunction with 28 C.F.R. § 4.1.2(5)(a) which provides in
pertinent part:
If parking spaces are provided for self-parking by
employees or visitors, or both, then accessible spaces
complying with 4.6 shall be provided in each such parking
area in conformance with the table below. Spaces
required by the table need not be provided in the
particular lot. They may be provided in a different
location if equivalent or greater accessibility, in terms
of distance from an accessible entrance, cost and
convenience is ensured.
The starting point in statutory construction must be the
language of the statute itself. Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d
1418, 1420 (11th Cir.1993). A statute should be construed so
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part of
it will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.
Id. It is a court's duty to give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute. Id. This Court must
review both sections 4.6.2 and 4.1.2(5)(a).
With regard to section 4.1.2(5)(a), the first sentence
states "[i]f parking spaces are provided for self-parking
employees or visitors, or both, then accessible spaces
complying with 4.6 shall be provided in each such parking area
in conformance with the table below.' The following two
sentences in this section are logically conditioned on the
rule contained in the first sentence. The second sentence
need not be discussed because it refers to a table showing the
minimum number of accessible spaces require. The third
sentence, "[t]hey may be provided in a different location if
equivalent or greater accessibility, in terms of distance from
an accessible entrance, cost and convenience is ensured' is
referring to the spaces provided for employees or visitors in
compliance with the first sentence.
The regulations do not prohibit having separate lots for
employees and visitors. In fact, the regulations allow the
provision of three separate lots, one for employees, one for
visitors or one for both employees and visitors. Parking
spaces for the disabled must be provided in each lot on the
shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to
an accessible entrance. Therefore, for example, if a lot is
reserved for employees, a handicapped space must be reserved
within the lot. If a handicapped space is not reserved within
the lot, then it must be reserved at a location which is
equivalent or has greater accessibility in distance, cost and
convenience from the reserved lot.
The court finds that Dade County is in compliance with
section 4.6.2 as it provides accessible parking spaces for the
government center on the shortest accessible route of travel.
Dade County is also in compliance with section 4.1.2(5)(a).
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Dade County is
appropriate.
Kornblau v. Dade County, [No. 94-0655-CIV-Graham, slip op. at 6-8]
(S.D.Fla.1994).
In sum, to base a claim on the ADA, plaintiff must first show
she was denied a public benefit. She has failed to do that.
Two points are worth noting. First, although plaintiff has no
standing to claim that disabled parking places should be available
for the senior officials and county commissioners in their parking
lot, the ADA Technical Assistance Manual addresses this type of
parking facility. The Technical Assistance Manual on ADA's Title
III was published by the Justice Department in January 1993 and
prepared pursuant to ADA's Title IV, § 12206(c)(3). Technical
Assistance Manual's Section III—7.4300 reads in pertinent part:
Parking (ADAAG § 4.1.2(5)(b)).
ADAAG provides a table with the number of accessible
parking spaces required dependent on the size of the lot....
If a lot is limited to the exclusive use of employees,
and none of the employees are individuals with disabilities
requiring accessible parking, accessible spaces may be
assigned to employees without disabilities.
Second, plaintiff Kornblau, a lawyer, is a volunteer member of
the Dade County Commission on Disability Issues. It holds monthly
meetings. She is entitled to park in several visitor and
visitor/employee lots, all of which provide the requisite number of
disabled parking spaces. In addition, she may attend the meetings
by riding the Metrorail or Dade County's Special Transportation
Services without charge. The Special Transportation Services,
using mini-vans, sedans, lift equipment vans and small buses,
provides portal to portal transportation for Dade County residents
who are unable or who do not care to use the Metrorail. It
provides service to the Government Center seven days a week from
4:30 A.M. to 2:30 A.M.
The argument that plaintiff is entitled to valet service for
her car is frivolous and needs no comment.
AFFIRMED.