United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4403.
Carl Eugene WATTS, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Harry K. SINGLETARY, Respondent-Appellant.
July 18, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 94-6258-CIV-UUB), Ursula Ungaro-Benages,
Judge.
Before KRAVITCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
A habeas petitioner contends that his due process rights were
infringed when he was tried and convicted in state court for murder
while incompetent to stand trial. We hold that petitioner has
failed to prove a violation of his procedural due process right to
a competency hearing or his substantive due process right not to be
tried while incompetent.
I.
In 1987, Carl Eugene Watts was tried in Florida state court
and convicted by a jury of second-degree murder. Watts was asleep
through much of the five day trial.
On the first day of trial, the judge recorded his initial
observation of Watts's behavior: "I'd also like to make a
statement for the record at this time that during the entire voir
dire examination that I've conducted, since about 3:30 and it's 20
minutes to 5:00, that the defendant in this case, Mr. Watts, has
been sleeping at counsel table." Trial tr. at 69.
The next day, after two prospective jurors approached the
judge to express concern that Watts's sleeping would threaten their
ability to remain impartial,1 the judge questioned Watts about the
cause of his continuing somnolence:
THE COURT: First thing I'd like to put on the record is that
Mr. Watts for the second day in a row has slept through 90
percent of the ... questioning this morning and Mr. Blostein
[counsel for Watts] has on occasion had to wake him up. I'm
sure the jurors have all seen this. I'd like to ask some
questions at this time.
Mr. Watts, are you under the influence of any drugs or alcohol
or medication today?
WATTS: No, sir.
THE COURT: Is there any particular reason why you are
sleeping through this serious trial which is probably going to
effect your life?
WATTS: No, sir. I'm not sleeping through it.
....
THE COURT: You have your eyes closed. You have your head
down on your neck or your chest and it seems pretty obvious to
everybody in the courtroom that you are sleeping.
Trial tr. at 130-31.
As Watts continued to sleep, the judge initiated a similar
colloquy with Watts and his lawyer at least once on each subsequent
day of the trial. After estimating the percentage of the recent
proceedings through which Watts had slept, the trial judge would
ask Watts if he was under the influence of any drugs; Watts always
replied that he was not. When pressed for an explanation of his
inability to stay awake, Watts on one occasion suggested that he
was not sleeping, but praying—a characterization that both the
judge and Watts's attorney strongly doubted. On other occasions,
1
Neither of these two jurors was ultimately impanelled.
Watts professed to having no explanation for his sleeping,
disavowing physical illness, in addition to the use of alcohol,
medication, or drugs. In response to a question from the bench,
Watts indicated that he had never been treated for mental illness.
Watts's attorney at one point expressed frustration at his
inability to keep his client awake:
MR. BLOSTEIN: For the record, and for my own protection on
this, my thought is that Mr. Watts is also sleeping. I have
over the last three days had to wake him up on numerous
occasions including today and [addressed to Watts] if you were
praying you didn't even notice that I attempted to wake you
up.
THE COURT: On one occasion I saw you hit him in the shoulder
and he never even moved. He never budged.
MR. BLOSTEIN: Exactly. I'm doing the best I can to represent
Mr. Watts under the circumstances he's putting me in.
Trial tr. at 337-38. Nevertheless, Watts's attorney never raised
the issue of Watts's competency at trial or requested a competency
hearing.
Prior to closing arguments, the judge questioned Watts in an
attempt to ensure that he understood his decision not to testify on
his own behalf:
THE COURT: You are doing all right. Okay. You remember last
week when your attorney put a couple witnesses on for you; do
you remember that?
WATTS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I think your mother came in and testified and your
sister?
WATTS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I want you to understand that you have a right to
testify in this case if you want. Now your lawyer indicated
to us last week that you were not going to testify and I just
wanted to double check with you and make sure that that is
what you want to do; that you do not want to testify in this
case; is that true?
WATTS: That's correct.
THE COURT: Have you talked this over with your lawyer?
WATTS: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with him as your lawyer?
WATTS: Yes.
Trial tr. at 482.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury
as follows:
Before I get into the instructions, I would like to make
a comment about Mr. Watts and his obvious sleeping throughout
most of the trial. I don't know how that affected any of you
but I'm going to tell you under your oaths as jurors you must
not allow that to affect you in any way. I don't know why Mr.
Watts has slept and you don't either and no matter what the
reason was, even if we did know, that has nothing to do with
whether he's guilty or not guilty of the charge that he's here
on trial for today.
So you must not allow that to affect your decision in
this case and I'm going to tell you not even to discuss that
in any way during your deliberations.
Trial tr. at 529. Watts could not be awakened to stand as the jury
retired to deliberate.
In the interim between conviction and sentencing, Watts was
examined by a psychologist. Watts informed her that he had been
using drugs for seven years (since he was sixteen)2 and that he had
been smoking crack cocaine during the trial at night while he was
out on bond. According to the trial judge, the psychologist
attributed Watts's inability to stay awake at trial to his staying
up nights taking crack "as well as thinking and doing a lot of
2
Watts had been enrolled in a drug abuse program in 1984.
crying."3 Watts explained to the psychologist that he had not
admitted in court to taking drugs because his relatives were
present and he did not want to upset them.
At the sentencing hearing, Watts's counsel and the judge both
said that they had suspected Watts had been taking drugs during the
trial. (Given that the parties had agreed before trial not to
mention Watts's use of drugs around the time of the murder, Watts's
counsel and the judge obviously were aware that Watts had used
drugs in the past. They also knew that Watts was out on bond
during the trial.) Watts himself expressed concern that the jury's
verdict had been influenced by his sleeping:
WATTS: The jury made the decision because of my sleeping
disorder.... They figured I didn't care.
THE COURT: Maybe you're right. I told them not to regard
that and not to consider that in their verdict.
WATTS: But you can't throw that out of a human mind.
THE COURT: You are probably right, Mr. Watts. See how
rational you are talking now. You've now got some good
judgment. You are thinking rational. Too bad that all this
had to happen.
Trial tr. at 584-85.
Watts's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal,
and he is currently incarcerated. Proceeding pro se, Watts filed
a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court in 1994,
claiming that, because he slept through most of his trial, he was
denied due process as a result of the trial judge's failure to
3
The psychologist determined that Watts did not have brain
damage; that his intellectual ability was at least average;
that he did not exhibit psychosis, hallucinations, or delusions;
and that he was not suffering from any major mental illness.
Trial tr. at 586-87.
order a competency hearing and as a result of his trial and
conviction while incompetent. A magistrate judge agreed. The
magistrate issued a report recommending that Watts's petition be
granted and appointed a Federal Public Defender to represent him.
The district court adopted the magistrate's report and
recommendation and vacated Watts's conviction and sentence pending
retrial by the State. The State now appeals.
II.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to
stand trial. A defendant is incompetent if he lacks "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding" or "a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court recently
has emphasized,
"[c]ompetence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it
depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a
fair trial, including the right of effective assistance of
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own
behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so."
Cooper v. Oklahoma, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376, 134
L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-
40, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1817, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). The competency inquiry, then, is a functional one.
It focuses on the criminal defendant's capacity to contribute
sufficiently to his own defense to allow a fair trial and,
ultimately, serves to protect both the defendant and society
against erroneous convictions.4
The issue of Watts's competency to stand trial implicates both
the procedural and substantive dimensions of the right. The
district court concluded, first, that Watts's procedural due
process rights under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836,
15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), were infringed by the state trial court's
failure to conduct a competency hearing on its own initiative and,
second, that Watts's substantive due process rights were violated
because he was in fact tried while incompetent. We will address
the procedural and substantive claims in turn.5
4
The ABA has usefully explained the functional,
trial-related nature of the competency inquiry as follows:
A finding of mental incompetence to stand trial may
arise from mental illness, physical illness, or
disability; mental retardation or other developmental
disability; or other etiology so long as it results in
a defendant's inability to consult with defense counsel
or to understand the proceedings.
....
Because the fundamental purpose of the rule [of
nontriability of incompetent defendants] is to promote
accurate factual determinations of guilt or innocence
by enabling counsel to evaluate and present available
defenses to factfinders, defendants should have at
least the intellectual capacity necessary to consult
with a defense attorney about factual occurrences
giving rise to criminal charges. Obviously, to
accomplish that, defendants require a minimal
understanding of the nature of criminal proceedings,
the importance of presenting available defenses, and
the possible consequences of either conviction or
acquittal.
ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards § 7-4.1(c) &
commentary (2d ed. 1986).
5
Both of these claims were exhausted in state court,
included in Watts's habeas petition, and decided by the district
court.
A. Procedural Due Process
Pate established that a criminal defendant's due process
rights are presumptively violated when a state trial court fails to
conduct, on its own initiative, a competency hearing in the face of
sufficient doubt about the defendant's competency.6 This circuit
has derived from Pate the objective standard that, in order to
trigger the trial court's obligation to order a competency hearing,
the court must have information raising a "bona fide doubt" as to
6
The due process violation is only "presumptive" because
this circuit has interpreted Pate to allow post-deprivation
process to suffice in some circumstances. If the trial court
fails to order a competency hearing at trial when one is
warranted, the state may still attempt to prove that the
defendant was in fact competent at the time of trial at a nunc
pro tunc competency hearing, so long as a reliable inquiry into
the defendant's competency can still be made; the burden is on
the state. James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1570-71 & n. 11
(11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 262, 126
L.Ed.2d 214 (1993); Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th
Cir.1987); Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1020 (1979). If a
reliable ex post evaluation is impossible, the defendant must be
retried, if then competent to stand trial, or else released.
Fallada, 819 F.2d at 1568; Zapata, 588 F.2d at 1020.
The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that attempts
to determine competency retrospectively by means of a nunc
pro tunc hearing, even "under the most favorable of
circumstances," face "inherent difficulties" which may
render them futile. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95
S.Ct. 896, 909, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); see also Pate, 383
U.S. at 387, 86 S.Ct. at 843 ("[W]e have previously
emphasized the difficulty of retrospectively determining an
accused's competence to stand trial. [citation to Dusky, 362
U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789] The jury would not be able to
observe the subject of their inquiry, and expert witnesses
would have to testify solely from information contained in
the printed record.").
Given that Watts was tried almost nine years ago, and
that his condition at the time of trial—influenced both by
his use of drugs and despair over the murder—would be
difficult to reconstruct ex post, we agree with the district
court that "it is unlikely that a meaningful nunc pro tunc
competency hearing ... could be had at this late date."
the defendant's competency.7 See James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d
1562, 1570 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct.
262, 126 L.Ed.2d 214 (1993); Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564,
1568 (11th Cir.1987). Relevant information may include evidence of
a defendant's irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, or prior
medical opinion; but "[t]here are, of course, no fixed or
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further
inquiry to determine fitness to proceed." Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).
In this case, Watts has failed to establish that there was a
bona fide doubt as to his competency during the trial. It is true
that Watts was conspicuously asleep through a large part of the
proceedings: the transcript supports the state appellate court's
finding that Watts "slept through about 70% of his murder trial."
Watts v. State, 537 So.2d 699, 699 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989). But
there is no constitutional prohibition against the trial and
conviction of a defendant who fails to pay attention in
court—whether out of indifference, fear, confusion, boredom, or
sleepiness—unless that defendant also cannot understand the nature
of the proceedings against him or adequately assist counsel in
conducting a defense. We have no doubt, furthermore, that both the
trial judge and Watts's attorney, who were aware of Watts's history
of drug use and his release on bond throughout the trial, suspected
7
The term "bona fide doubt" comes from the Illinois statute
considered in Pate. The Pate Court did not adopt "bona fide
doubt" as a constitutional standard; it simply found this state
standard to be constitutionally adequate. Nonetheless, the "bona
fide doubt" standard has managed to insinuate itself into the
opinions of this circuit and is now commonly quoted as the
nominal constitutional standard.
that Watts's sleeping was related to contemporaneous drug use. But
even had Watts admitted in open court that he could not stay awake
at trial because he was up all night smoking crack, this would not
necessarily be sufficient to require a Pate hearing.
In Fallada, this court noted that a defendant's use of drugs
(in that case, prescription drugs) does not, per se, necessitate a
competency hearing, but is "merely a relevant factor." 819 F.2d at
1569. Recognizing the functional focus of the competency inquiry,
the court in Fallada stated, "To be entitled to a hearing a
defendant must present evidence demonstrating that the dosage given
him has affected him sufficiently adversely as to raise a doubt of
his ability to consult with his lawyer and to have a rational
understanding of the proceedings against him." 819 F.2d at 1569;
see also Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (5th Cir.)
(information that defendant was a drug addict insufficient to
require Pate hearing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 299,
62 L.Ed.2d 310 (1979). The fact that a defendant is taking drugs
(whether proscribed or prescribed) during trial should alert the
court to a potential competency issue, but need not, in itself,
necessitate a competency hearing. Other information may convince
the court that a formal hearing is not necessary to be reasonably
certain that the defendant has the requisite capacity to understand
what is going on around him and to communicate with his lawyer.
Here, the only apparent effect of Watts's drug use was his
intermittent inability to stay awake at trial. When Watts was
awakened, he was able to provide, as the state appeals court found,
"lucid and not ... irrational" answers to questions from the bench.
Watts, 537 So.2d at 699. Certainly, Watts demonstrated his
understanding of the proceedings against him, as he repeatedly
8
expressed anxiety about being on trial for murder. There is no
reason to believe that Watts could not have engaged in the same
sort of coherent colloquies with his attorney about defense
strategy as he did with the trial judge about his sleeping problem.
Because legal competency is primarily a function of
defendant's role in assisting counsel in conducting the defense,
the defendant's attorney is in the best position to determine
whether the defendant's competency is suspect. Accordingly,
failure of defense counsel to raise the competency issue at trial,
while not dispositive, is evidence that the defendant's competency
was not really in doubt and there was no need for a Pate hearing.
See Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356, 1360 (11th Cir.1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S.Ct. 834, 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986). (For
the same reason, a defense counsel's request for a Pate hearing
must be taken seriously by the trial judge.) In this case, Watts's
attorney did not raise the issue of Watts's competency or request
a Pate hearing. Although he did make the comment, "I'm doing my
best to represent Mr. Watts under the circumstances he's putting me
in," the context of this remark implies that Watts's attorney was
primarily concerned that Watts's sleeping would prejudice the jury.
At no point during the trial did Watts's attorney suggest that the
8
See Trial tr. at 476-77, 484, 556. The dissent points out
that Watts "could not have had a factual understanding of the
proceedings against him" during the time he was asleep. Without
inviting metaphysical debate, we believe it is sufficient that
Watts did have such an understanding while he was awake, even if
the nature of the proceedings against him was not at all times
(sleeping or awake) the focus of his thoughts.
defense was suffering for lack of Watts's assistance.
Competency is contextual. 9 A criminal defendant represented
by counsel generally has limited responsibilities in conducting his
defense:10 primarily, recognizing and relating relevant information
to counsel and making the few trial-related decisions reserved for
defendants (i.e., whether to plead guilty, whether to request a
jury trial, whether to be present at trial, and whether to
testify). The defendant need not participate in the bulk of trial
decisions, which he may leave left entirely to counsel (how to
select jurors, which witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct
cross-examination, what motions to make, and similar tactical
9
It is also historical. During the formative period of the
competency doctrine in mid-seventeenth century England, virtually
all defendants charged with serious crimes represented themselves
at trial. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 2535, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ("While a right to counsel
developed early in civil cases and in cases of misdemeanor, a
prohibition against the assistance of counsel continued for
centuries in prosecutions for felony or treason."). This rule
remained in effect in England well into the nineteenth century,
though it was apparently abandoned in colonial America. See id.
at 824-27, 95 S.Ct. at 2536-37. During this period it was
obviously critical that the defendant be competent, for his
defense at trial was entirely in his own hands. Now that counsel
is constitutionally guaranteed in all serious criminal cases,
however, the common law basis for expansive competency rights is
largely outdated. See Bruce J. Winick, "Incompetency to Stand
Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for
Reform," 39 Rutgers L.Rev. 243, 260-61 (1987). Modern analysis
of the scope of competency rights must be guided not by
Blackstone but by a contemporary understanding of the
attorney-client relationship. See Richard J. Bonnie, "The
Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope," 47
U.Miami L.Rev. 539, 552-53 (1993); see also Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 469 (1897) ("It
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.").
10
Of course, the demands placed on the defendant may vary
significantly, depending on the complexity of the case, capacity
of counsel, and other factors. The competency inquiry is
necessarily fact-specific.
decisions). In this case, the judge monitored Watts throughout the
trial, in particular confirming that Watts understood and stood by
his decision not to testify, and verifying that Watts was
communicating with his attorney. See Trial tr. at 482. We might
speculate that Watts was unable to be of much use to his attorney
in monitoring the testimony of witnesses and providing responsive
information that could be useful for cross-examination. If Watts's
attorney had encountered unforeseen or problematic testimony,
however, there is no reason to believe that he could not have
awakened Watts—requesting a recess if necessary—to explain and
discuss the matter.11 The record reveals nothing to suggest that
Watts was incapable of providing the level of input necessary to
mount an adequate defense.12
The competency determination, because it looks to the
capacity of a particular defendant to play a fact-specific role at
trial, requires case-by-case assessment. See Drope, 420 U.S. 162,
180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908 ("There are, of course, no fixed or
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further
11
Thus, the dissent's concern that our view would "justify
the trial and conviction of a defendant who had been rendered
comatose on the eve of trial" is baseless. Unlike Watts, such a
defendant could show that he lacked the capacity to respond to
his attorney's structured requests for assistance during the
course of the trial. (Watts replied rationally to the trial
judge's questions on each day of his trial). And of course a
comatose defendant, unlike Watts, would lack the capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him during
trial.
12
The dissent asserts that Watts "was unable to contribute
anything at all to his defense during the majority of his trial."
This, however, does not differentiate Watts from most other
criminal defendants, who likewise contribute nothing to their own
defenses through the vast majority of the proceedings.
inquiry to determine fitness to proceed."). Not surprisingly,
then, the numerous opinions addressing defendants' competency from
this and other circuits fail to establish a rigid standard of
competency that could be applied uniformly across cases. Nor do
cases presenting superficially similar facts necessarily dictate
the same conclusions as to competency.
For example, in Whitehead v. Wainwright, 609 F.2d 223 (5th
Cir.1980), the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that
the habeas petitioner, Whitehead, had been incompetent to stand
trial. Whitehead had been agitated and nervous during the first
day and the morning of the second day of his two-day murder trial,
attempting to discharge his attorney several times and to take part
in the cross-examination of witnesses. He was then given an
antihistamine and two prescription tranquilizers (two doses of each
within two hours). As a result, during the afternoon of the second
day of trial Whitehead "seemed drunk, sleepy, staggering, and
glassy-eyed." He fell asleep in court, his speech was slurred, and
later he could not remember making statements attributed to him in
the transcript. See Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F.Supp. 898, 899-
901 (M.D.Fla.1978) (reciting facts).
In this case, Watts displayed none of Whitehead's
pre-medication aberrant behavior. Moreover, whereas Watts could be
awakened into drug-free lucidity—as confirmed by the trial judge on
each day of the trial—Whitehead was under the chemical influence of
drugs during most of the second day of his trial, apparently
rendering him unable to comprehend the proceedings or communicate
with his attorney even when he was awake. Watts's situation is
simply too dissimilar to Whitehead's for a meaningful analogy to be
drawn.13 More than this, the comparison of the two cases only
serves to illustrate the need for the competency inquiry to be
functional and case-specific, not formalistic and rule-driven.
In sum, we are convinced that the trial judge afforded all the
process due to make reasonably sure that Watts was competent to
stand trial. Clinical evaluation of Watts in a formal
Pate hearing
simply was not necessary for the trial judge to make the functional
determination that Watts was competent.
This is not to say that the trial judge's determination was
necessarily the correct one, however. Whether Watts was, in fact,
competent is a separate question, to which we now turn.
B. Substantive Due Process
Even though Watts was not entitled to a Pate hearing based on
the information available at trial, he has an independent due
process right not to be tried and convicted while incompetent. See
Pate, 383 U.S. at 377, 86 S.Ct. at 838. In asserting this right,
the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was incompetent at the time of trial. James, 957
F.2d at 1571. We have warned that " "[c]ourts in habeas corpus
13
Irrespective of the distinguishing facts of Whitehead, the
inconsistency among competency cases makes analogizing to a
single case somewhat arbitrary. Compare Whitehead with United
States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1564 n. 8, 1568-70 (11th
Cir.1987) (no due process problem with trying defendant who
suffers from brain damage causing dizziness, seizures,
disorientation, inability to think clearly, and amnesia) and
Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir.1986) (Pate
hearing not required for defendant who had kept witness locked in
closet for a week and jumped on corpse of nine-year-old victim in
her presence, exhibited inability to communicate with his
attorney before trial, and sat throughout trial with his fist
raised in some sort of salute).
proceedings should not consider claims of mental incompetence to
stand trial where the facts are not sufficient to positively,
unequivocally, and clearly generate a real, substantial, and
legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the petitioner.' "
See Sheley v. Singletary, 955 F.2d 1434, 1438 (11th Cir.1992)
(quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir.1973)).
This caution resonates with the difficulty of making competency
determinations ex post, as well as with our reliance on the more
readily policed procedural dimension of the due process right.
In this case, the only difference between the merits of the
procedural and substantive claims is with respect to the relevant
factual bases: in determining whether Watts was actually
incompetent, we are not limited to the information available to the
state trial court before and during trial, as we are in evaluating
the procedural claim. See James, 957 F.2d at 1572. For Watts,
however, this is not a difference that makes a difference. As
discussed previously, even given the fact, revealed at sentencing,
that Watts slept through much of his trial as a result of smoking
crack at night, the record—devoid of substantial evidence that
Watts could not adequately understand the proceedings or assist
counsel in his defense—does not unequivocally generate a
substantial doubt about his competency to stand trial.
The district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus is
thus REVERSED.
CARNES, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The issue in this case is whether the Constitution permits the
trial and conviction of a defendant whose condition is such that he
is not aware of what is going on during seventy percent of his
five-day trial. The majority thinks so. I think not.
I.
Before discussing my disagreement with the majority about the
issues that are presented in this appeal, it might be helpful to
discuss why we all agree that one issue is not presented. An
explanation is in order because that issue seems so clearly raised
by the facts of this case. It is, but the State of Florida chose
not to argue the issue to us. The issue I am speaking of involves
the self-induced nature of Carl Watts' condition during his trial.
Watts did not know what was going on during most of his murder
trial and, according to his trial counsel, was not able to assist
counsel during that time, because Watts stayed up all night every
night of the trial obtaining and smoking crack cocaine. At the
time, Watts was a twenty-three year old crack addict, having been
hooked on cocaine for seven years. He had shot his best friend to
death with a shotgun—after having prepared a sandwich for him a few
hours earlier—as a result of an argument over ten dollars worth of
a twenty dollar bill. Watts admitted the shooting but claimed self
defense. He was out on bond during the trial, and he was scared,
depressed and anxious about what he had done, and about his
prospects. So, Watts did what crack addicts do: he spent all the
time he could scrounging around for and smoking crack.
And Watts lied about it. Crack addicts do that a lot, too.
Astonished by Watts' bizarre behavior of sleeping though the trial,
the judge periodically asked him point blank if he had been taking
drugs, and Watts point blank told him no. The judge suspected
Watts was lying, but let it go. He did not order Watts examined,
and he did not revoke his bond, which would have (hopefully) cut
off his access to crack.
Nonetheless, no one held a gun to Watts' head and forced him
to run around smoking crack each night of the trial. And no one
forced him to lie repeatedly to the judge about his condition.
Thus the facts frame the issue of whether self-induced incompetency
is to be treated differently or, to put it another way, whether one
whose own deliberate actions throughout the trial caused his
incompetency has waived his right not to be tried while
incompetent. Arguments can be made both ways, and it is an
interesting issue. But it is not one that has been presented to
us.
On direct appeal, the State of Florida argued that because
Watts had intentionally induced his condition at trial, he was
barred from complaining about being tried while in that condition.
The Florida appellate court rejected that contention, holding that
the Florida Supreme Court had previously foreclosed it. Watts v.
State, 537 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (citing Lane v.
State, 388 So.2d 1022, 1026 (Fla.1980) ("Intentional action by a
defendant does not avoid or eliminate the necessity of applying the
test of whether a defendant has the sufficient present ability to
assist counsel with his defense and to understand the proceedings
against him.")).
The Florida appellate court ruled in the State's favor in this
case anyway, affirming Watts' conviction. The federal district
court did not, however, and the State could have chosen to argue
the self-inducement, or waiver, position to us. After all, we are
no more bound by the Florida courts' holdings on such an issue than
those courts would be bound by an earlier holding of this Court on
some federal constitutional issue. Nonetheless, the State chose
not to argue self-inducement or waiver to this Court. It is not
mentioned in the State's initial brief or in its reply brief, and
the attorney representing the State tenaciously resisted our
efforts to explore the issue at oral argument. For that reason,
the majority does not address the issue, and I cannot say that the
majority is wrong for failing to do so. See, e.g., Hartsfield v.
Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir.1995) ("We note that issues
that clearly are not designated in the initial brief ordinarily are
considered abandoned." (quotation marks and citation omitted));
Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1298 n. 2 (11th Cir.1995)
("Issues not clearly raised in the briefs are considered
abandoned."), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. March 22, 1996) (No.
95-9105); 16 Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
3974, at 421 n. 1 (1977) ("An issue not raised or argued in the
brief of the appellant may be considered waived and thus will not
be noticed or entertained by the court of appeals."). Whether a
defendant who induces his own incompetency can successfully assert
it as a bar to trial is an issue for another day. I turn now to
the issue that is presented to us, the issue for this day.
II.
"It has long been accepted that a person whose mental
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95
S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). A defendant is not mentally
competent to stand trial unless he has "a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824
(1960) (quotation marks omitted). The majority does not quarrel
with the statement of these fundamental precepts, and it
acknowledges that Watts was asleep during seventy percent of his
trial. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that it was
constitutionally permissible to try him in that condition.
In reaching its holding that Watts, although asleep during
most of his murder trial, was nevertheless mentally competent to be
tried, the majority discounts the constitutional importance of a
defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against him, and
to aid in his defense. It minimizes a defendant's role in his
murder defense by characterizing it as one of "limited
responsibilities," involving "few trial-related decisions reserved
for defendants (i.e., whether to plead guilty, whether to request
a jury trial, whether to be present at trial, and whether to
testify)." See Majority op. at 2675-76. The majority then reasons
that, because "[t]he defendant need not participate in the bulk of
trial decisions, which may be left entirely to counsel," a
defendant capable of making those few strategic decisions that only
a defendant can make is capable of "providing the level of input
necessary to mount an adequate defense," and therefore is competent
to stand trial. See Majority op. at 2676. Under the majority's
view, once a defendant has made those few strategy decisions, his
presence at trial, or at least his awareness of what is happening
during trial, is of no constitutional significance. I disagree.
The requirement that a defendant be mentally competent to
stand trial is a long-held tenet of common law. See, e.g., Medina
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 444, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d
353 (1992) ("The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent
should not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our
common-law heritage."); Drope, 420 U.S. at 171, 95 S.Ct. at 903;
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir.1899)
(recognizing mental competency requirement and that, "[t]o the same
effect are all the common-law authorities"). "The competency rule
did not evolve from philosophical notions of punishability, but
rather had deep roots in the common law as a by-product of the ban
against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant,
though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded
no opportunity to defend himself." Stone v. United States, 358
F.2d 503, 507 n. 5 (9th Cir.1966) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). The rule against trying the mentally incompetent does
embrace concerns that a defendant be able to make major decisions
that may determine his fate. As Blackstone wrote, one who becomes
"mad" after the commission of an offense should not be arraigned
for it "because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and
caution that he ought." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *24.
But the rule extends beyond pleading concerns. Blackstone also
wrote that if a defendant becomes mad after pleading, he should not
be tried, "for how can he make his defence?" Id.; see also 1 M.
Hale, Pleas of the Crown *34-*35 (same). The prohibition against
trying a defendant whose condition renders him unable to
participate in his defense is an important safeguard "fundamental
to an adversary system of justice," and incorporated into the Due
Process Clause. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 95 S.Ct. at 904; see also
Cooper v. Oklahoma, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376, 134
L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) ("We have repeatedly and consistently recognized
that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due
process." (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815
(1966) ("[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process....").
Faced with the long and distinguished pedigree of the right
not to be tried while incompetent, the majority struggles to
diminish the importance of that right, and its struggle produces a
remarkable conclusion. Citing a law review article, whose title
suggests a cost-benefit analysis, the majority engages in a
"[m]odern analysis" using "contemporary understanding" and reaches
the conclusion that "the common law basis for expansive competency
rights is largely outdated." Majority op. at 2676 n. 9. The
competency rights recognized in courts of Blackstone's day are too
liberal for us, it seems. But see Cooper, --- U.S. at ----, 116
S.Ct. at 1376 ("No one questions the existence of the fundamental
right that petitioner invokes.... Nor is the significance of this
right open to question.")1
1
The majority opinion quotes Holmes for the proposition
that, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." Majority
We sometimes speak of "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society," but I always thought it
understood that the evolution was supposed to be forward. This is
the first time I have heard it suggested that our standards have
progressed in such a way that contemporary understanding in the
last decade of the twentieth century would deny an American citizen
the full benefit of an important trial right guaranteed Englishmen
at least as early as the middle of the seventeenth century. Some
understanding. Some progress.
The majority's opinion today reduces the important safeguard
against being tried while incompetent to one that merely requires
that a defendant be able to make a few strategic decisions, and it
is apparently enough for the majority if those decisions are made
before the trial even begins. But see Cooper, --- U.S. at ---- -
----, 116 S.Ct. at 1381-82 ("After making the profound choice
whether to plead guilty, the defendant who proceeds to trial ...
also is called upon to make myriad smaller decisions concerning the
course of his defense. The importance of these rights and
decisions demonstrates that an erroneous determination of
op. at 12 n. 9 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 469 (1897)). That is a nice quote. But
Holmes, as he said, had in mind such things as "the technical
rule as to trespass ab initio, as it is called which I attempted
to explain in a recent Massachusetts case." Holmes, supra, at
469 (footnote containing citation omitted). He was not thinking
of or speaking about any of an accused's criminal trial rights,
and certainly not about a criminal trial right so "fundamental to
an adversary system of justice," Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 95 S.Ct.
at 904, as to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause,
Cooper, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1376. Nor did Holmes
disparage the use of history as part of the process of
determining the law. Indeed, in the same article he said, "The
rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of
history." Holmes, supra, at 469.
competence threatens a fundamental component of our criminal
justice system—the basic fairness of the trial itself." (quotation
marks and citations omitted)). Apparently, under the majority's
view, the necessary decisions can be made at any time, and once
they are made, any claim of incompetency is foreclosed. Thus the
majority's position quickly reduces to the absurd. It would, for
example, justify the trial and conviction of a defendant who had
been rendered comatose on the eve of trial, provided only that he
had communicated his views on the necessary strategic decisions to
his counsel beforehand.
The majority does not justify its cribbed reading of the
competency requirement, a reading which affords no protection to a
defendant such as Watts who was unable to contribute anything at
all to his defense during the majority of the trial. The Supreme
Court has instructed us that "it is not enough ... that the
defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some
recollection of events." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 788-
89 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Instead,
the critical inquiry is into "whether he has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id.
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quotation marks
omitted). Watts was neither oriented in time and place, nor able
to consult with his lawyer during seventy percent of his five-day
murder trial. He could not have had a factual understanding of the
proceedings against him during that time, because he was not
cognizant of those proceedings or of anything else, save perhaps
for what he may have been dreaming. Because of his condition,
Watts was unable to contribute sufficiently to his defense.
Contrary to what one might infer from reading the majority
opinion, Watts' attorney could not communicate with him whenever he
thought it necessary, and the judge did not verify that counsel
could. Although the record shows that counsel could sometimes
awaken Watts, it also shows that on more than one occasion during
the trial, counsel was unable to wake him up, and the court noted
that fact for the record. At one point, defense counsel said to
Watts: "[Y]ou didn't even notice that I attempted to wake you up,"
and the judge observed, "On one occasion I saw you hit him in the
shoulder and he never even moved. He never budged." (Trial Tr. at
337-38). As the majority concedes, "Watts could not be awakened to
stand as the jury retired to deliberate." Majority op. at 2671.
Nor is it accurate to infer, as one might from the majority
opinion, that when counsel stated in exasperation, "I'm doing the
best I can to represent Mr. Watts under the circumstances he's
putting me in," Majority op. at 2671, that counsel was simply, or
primarily, concerned that the jury might be prejudiced by seeing
Watts sleep through his trial. At sentencing, which occurred just
eight days after the trial, defense counsel made the following
representation to the judge:
I went through a trial where my client was literally
unable to help me, whatever. I was unable to even talk to him
because I couldn't wake him up. That was the reason why.
(Trial Tr. at 567-68). The trial judge did not express any doubt
about the accuracy of counsel's statement, nor did the state
appellate court. After considering the record as a whole, and
crediting defense counsel's statement, the district court concluded
that "there were lengthy periods during critical stages of his
murder trial that [Watts] was unable to assist his attorney."
(Report of Magistrate Judge at 19).2 That is a factfinding of the
district court, and it is certainly not clearly erroneous.
The prosecution presented thirteen witnesses against Watts,
many of whom described the scene where the killing occurred, or his
actions near the time of it. However, there were no eyewitnesses
to the actual killing, other than Watts, who did not testify. The
evidence presented a close issue about self defense—the man Watts
shot was much larger than he, had a violent nature, and was
advancing on him inside Watts' own apartment when the shooting
occurred. Because of the closeness of that issue, and the nature
of the testimony, Watts' ability to assist his counsel with the
facts as the testimony unfolded was critical. Yet Watts was unable
to assist his lawyer in formulating cross-examination, because he
did not hear most of the testimony.
Watts may have been able to contribute generally to his
lawyer's cross-examination strategy hours or days in advance of it.
In the same way, he was able to make certain strategic decisions in
advance—such as his decision not to testify, which he communicated
to his lawyer more than a week before the trial began. However,
Watts was not presently able to assist his lawyer during the
majority of his trial. Nor was he able to reconsider any of his
2
The magistrate judge's report and recommendation was
adopted and approved in its entirety by the district court.
strategic decisions, such as his decision not to take the stand, in
light of the testimony against him; he was not able to do that,
because he did not hear most of the testimony against him.
The majority's holding in this case is contrary to this
Court's decision in Whitehead v. Wainwright, 609 F.2d 223 (5th
Cir.1980). In that case, Whitehead, the defendant, had taken
Benadryl for his allergies, and also the tranquilizers Valium and
"Roche 66." With the court's permission, those tranquilizers had
been prescribed by a doctor who examined Whitehead and treated him
for a nervous condition during the trial. As a result of taking
that medication, Whitehead became extremely drowsy during one
afternoon of his two-day trial. Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447
F.Supp. 898, 900-01 (M.D.Fla.1978). Whitehead's lawyer later
testified he could not recall the nature or extent of his
communication with his client during the afternoon of the second
day of trial, but he thought it had been as much as was necessary.
He did remember that Whitehead had his head on the table in front
of him at times during the afternoon, and that, toward the end of
the trial, he had rested his head in his arms much of the time.
Id. at 901. Two family members testified that Whitehead had
"seemed drunk, sleepy, staggering, and glassy-eyed." His lawyer
would "punch" him to awaken him. Id. Whitehead himself later
testified that he had fallen asleep at the defense table. Id.
As a result of that testimony, the district court in Whitehead
held that the defendant, because he had been groggy or asleep
during one-fourth of his trial, had been unable to consult
sufficiently with his lawyer, had lacked a sufficient rational or
factual understanding of the proceedings against him, and therefore
had been incompetent to stand trial. The district court granted
habeas relief. Id. at 902-03. On appeal, we affirmed the district
court's holding that the defendant had been incompetent on the
afternoon of the second day of his trial, and affirmed its grant of
relief. We concluded by saying:
While we are convinced that the state trial judge did all he
could to assure petitioner a fair trial, short of dismissing
the jury and starting anew at a later date, the district
court's finding of incompetence is supported by the record and
must be left undisturbed.
Whitehead, 609 F.2d at 224.
The majority attempts to deal with the binding precedent of
the Whitehead decision in two ways, neither of which is convincing.
First, the majority suggests that Whitehead, the defendant in that
case, had been in materially worse shape than Watts was in this
case, because, the majority says, Whitehead was "unable to
comprehend the proceedings or communicate with his attorney even
when he was awake." Majority op. at 2677. That would be news to
Whitehead's attorney and to the courts that decided the case.
Whitehead's lawyer testified that, in his opinion, Whitehead had
been aware of what was happening in the courtroom, and that he
thought he had been able to communicate with Whitehead as much as
was necessary during the afternoon in which his condition was in
question. 447 F.Supp. at 901. Nonetheless, the district court
held that Whitehead had been incompetent to stand trial, and we
affirmed.
The second way the majority attempts to deal with the binding
precedent of the Whitehead decision is by suggesting that there can
be no binding precedent in this area of the law. That is so, the
majority implies, because "the inconsistency among competency cases
makes analogizing to a single case somewhat arbitrary." Majority
op. at 2677 n. 13. This proposition, if true, bodes ill for the
rule of law. Surely our circuit law is not so confused and
inconsistent that decision by analogy, i.e., by rule of law, has
been reduced to a "somewhat arbitrary" process that justifies
throwing up our hands and simply picking a result that seems to
comport with our feelings at the time. If the majority were right
that our precedents are so inconsistent that following them was, at
best, "somewhat arbitrary," then the situation cries out for en
banc review, and this case can be a vehicle for it.
Even if our decisions in this area of the law are as
inconsistent as the majority believes, however, there is no
inconsistency as it relates to the specific issue in this case. At
least not until today. Before today, neither this Court, nor any
other court that I am aware of, had ever held that a defendant who
is not aware of what is going on during most of his trial is
competent to stand trial. Our holding in Whitehead was that a
defendant who is groggy, sleepy, and asleep during one afternoon of
his two-day trial is incompetent to stand trial. That holding
cannot be reconciled with the majority's holding in this case that
someone who is asleep during most of his trial is not incompetent.
A defendant who is not consciously aware of what is happening
during seventy percent of his trial, whether because he is in a
drug-induced stupor or simply asleep, cannot rationally and
factually understand the proceedings during that time, nor can he
react to any testimony or other evidence and communicate with his
lawyer about it.
In Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), withdrawn,
573 F.2d 867 (5th Cir.1978),3 we affirmed the district court's
grant of habeas relief to a petitioner who became deaf between the
time of the murder with which he was charged and the time of his
trial. In the brief period from the onset of his deafness to his
trial, Ferrell did not learn to read lips or to understand sign
language. His counsel asked the court to provide stenographers who
could contemporaneously transcribe the words spoken during the
trial. The judge denied the request. We affirmed the grant of
habeas relief. Although Ferrell was able to communicate with his
lawyer from time to time (by exchanging notes), and was therefore
able to make important strategic decisions regarding his defense,
he was not able to understand contemporaneously the testimony
against him.4 In this case, Watts' inability "to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding," and
obvious lack of "a rational as well as factual understanding of the
3
Our decision in Ferrell was withdrawn upon discovery that
the petitioner had died three months before the decision was
released. Because it was withdrawn, the Ferrell decision is not
binding precedent, but I discuss it here because the reasoning is
persuasive and the facts pose such a thought-provoking
hypothetical.
4
The Court in Ferrell did not reach the issue of whether
Ferrell's incompetency deprived him of substantive, as
distinguished from procedural, due process. The Court conceived
of other alternatives, besides stenographers (who would have
slowed down the trial), that would have given Ferrell the ability
to contemporaneously understand the proceedings. The Court
concluded that "Ferrell's rights were reduced below the
constitutional minimum," because the district court failed to
explore such other possibilities. Id. at 1133.
proceedings," Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789, was at least
as profound as Ferrell's.
Although supported by the binding precedent of the Whitehead
decision and by the withdrawn opinion in Ferrell, my position is
not dependent upon either of them. Instead, it rests on its own
simple logic: A defendant who is contemporaneously unaware of what
is going on during most of his trial does not have a rational as
well as factual understanding of what is occurring, as it is
occurring, and lacks the present ability to consult with his
attorney during the trial and in response to its events.
Therefore, the trial and conviction of a defendant who suffers from
such a condition is unconstitutional. I would affirm the district
court decision granting Watts relief for the violation of his
substantive due process right not to be tried while mentally
incompetent.
III.
Because I conclude that Watts was tried while incompetent,
which violates his substantive due process rights, it is
unnecessary for me to decide whether a violation of his procedural
due process rights also occurred because the trial judge did not
conduct a hearing into Watts' competency to stand trial.
However, I do note that the judge knew that Watts was a drug
addict, knew he was out on bond, knew he was behaving strangely
during trial, was told by defense counsel at the time that he was
"pretty sure" Watts was using drugs (Trial Tr. at 564, 566), and
the judge did not believe Watts' denials. As the judge stated on
the record at sentencing, "everybody that was a witness to Carl's
conduct had some suspicions that he was probably taking some kind
of drugs." (Trial Tr. at 567). Suffice it to say, in view of all
of the circumstances, it seems to me that the judge not only should
have had, but actually did have "a bona fide doubt" as to Watts'
competency to stand trial.
IV.
I dissent from the Court's reversal of the district court's
grant of habeas relief. We should affirm.