United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4509.
Andrew KASPRIK, Nancy Kasprik, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, U.S. Department of the Navy, Military
Sealift Command, Defendants,
OMI Ship Management Corp., OMI Corp., Defendants-Appellees.
July 9, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 93-6642-CIV-WJZ), William J. Zloch,
Judge.
Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and FAY and GIBSON*, Senior
Circuit Judges.
FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:
Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Kasprik appeal the District Court's Final
Order of Dismissal as to defendants-appellees, OMI Ship Management
Corporation and OMI Corporation. We AFFIRM.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises from an incident which occurred while
Andrew Kasprik was performing his duties as a second assistant
engineer aboard the U.S.S. Cape Charles, a public vessel owned by
the United States and operated, pursuant to contract, by OMI Ship
Management Corporation and OMI Corporation. Kasprik was employed
by the United States as a crew member of a vessel owned by the
United States through the Maritime Administration. As noted in the
District Court's order, it is undisputed that both OMI Ship
Management Corporation and OMI Corporation were acting as the
*
Honorable Floyd R. Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
agents of the United States at the time of the incident which forms
the basis of this action.
Kasprik allegedly injured his wrist while attempting to
manually engage the turning gear lever of the main engine and
incurred medical and support expenses as a result of his injury.
Kasprik filed suit against the United States claiming liability for
his injury, and against the United States and OMI for alleged
arbitrary and willful denial of maintenance and cure. OMI moved to
dismiss Kasprik's claim on the grounds that the claim is barred by
the exclusivity provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act ("SAA"), 46
U.S.C.App. § 745. The District Court entered a Final Order of
Dismissal as to OMI, holding that under the exclusivity provision
of the SAA, plaintiffs-appellants were barred from bringing an
action for maintenance and cure and the failure to pay such against
OMI as agents of the United States.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim is de
novo. Hunnings v. Texaco, 29 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir.1994).
III. DISCUSSION
The issue raised for our consideration in this action is one
of first impression in this circuit, that being whether the
exclusivity provision of the SAA prevents a seaman from seeking
punitive damages from an agent of the United States for arbitrary
and willful denial of maintenance and cure.
It is a well recognized rule in admiralty that when a seaman
is injured or becomes ill while employed aboard a vessel, he is
entitled to daily subsistence and medical treatment until his
maximum cure has been reached.
A seaman's right to maintenance and cure is implicit in
the contractual relationship between the seaman and his
employer, and is designed to ensure the recovery of these
individuals upon injury or sickness sustained in the service
of the ship ... Maintenance and cure are due without regard
to the negligence of the employer or the unseaworthiness of
the ship.
Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting
Pelotto v. L & N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir.1979)).
As noted above, Kasprik's claim against OMI is for straight
maintenance and cure payments and for punitive damages for the
arbitrary and willful denial of these benefits. Hines v. J.A.
LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir.1987) is the leading case in
our circuit and is consistent with traditional admiralty law which
provides the highest safeguards for a seaman's right to maintenance
and cure. Hines considered whether a seaman could recover punitive
damages from a private vessel owner, in addition to reasonable
attorney's fees, for the arbitrary and willful denial of
maintenance and cure payments. Id. We held that "both reasonable
attorney's fees and punitive damages may be legally awarded in a
proper case." Id. at 1189.
Nevertheless, Hines is distinguishable from the instant case
in that this action lies against an operator of a vessel owned by
the United States, rather than a private vessel owner. This being
so, seaman's claims arising from employment aboard vessels owned by
the United States are governed by the Clarification Act, and
enforced pursuant to the terms of the Suits in Admiralty Act.
McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 26, 72 S.Ct. 17, 18-19, 96
L.Ed. 26 (1951), Gordon v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 835 F.2d 96,
98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825, 109 S.Ct. 73, 102
L.Ed.2d 50 (1988). The SAA does not provide a cause of action
against the United States but rather constitutes the United States'
limited waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to admiralty
suits. Trautman v. Buck Steber, Inc., 693 F.2d 440, 444 (5th
Cir.1982). The United States cannot be sued for punitive damages
unless Congress explicitly authorizes such liability. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 593, 65 L.Ed.
1087 (1921). Sovereign immunity has not been waived with respect
to punitive damages.
Section 745 of the Suits in Admiralty Act provides:
Where a remedy is provided under this chapter it shall
hereafter be exclusive of any other action by reason of the
same subject matter against an agent or employee of the United
States or of any incorporated or unincorporated agency thereof
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
46 U.S.C.App. § 745.
To date, the Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to have
determined the precise issue which is now before us. However,
before addressing Manuel v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1253 (4th Cir.1995), we
want to recognize Shields v. U.S., 662 F.Supp. 187 (M.D.Fla.1987),
a noteworthy opinion written by then District Court Judge Black,
the first to have addressed this particular issue. With facts
analogous to those in the instant case, the court in Shields found
that the exclusivity provision of the SAA does not preclude a
seaman's claim for punitive damages against an agent of the United
States for willful and arbitrary failure to pay maintenance and
cure. Id. We find the reasoning of the Shields decision
persuasive. First, the court reasoned that no "remedy" is provided
by the SAA "[w]ith regard to the "subject matter' of an arbitrary
and willful denial of maintenance and cure benefits." Id. at 190.
Judge Black saw a clear distinction between the simple failure to
provide maintenance and cure, for which a "remedy is provided," and
the arbitrary and willful denial of such, for which no such remedy
is provided.1 Further, the opinion in Shields noted that
"arbitrary claims handling is an entirely different subject matter
from the negligent conduct for which the SAA provides a remedy."
Id. The Shields opinion is easily understandable. However, we are
also aware that its reasoning has been questioned and rejected.
Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253 (4th Cir.1995); Farnsworth
v. Sea-Land Serv. Inc., 1989 WL 20544 (E.D.La. Mar. 7, 1989);
Fratus v. U.S., 859 F.Supp. 991 (E.D.Va.1994); Smith v. Mar, 896
F.Supp. 75 (D.R.I.1995); Stewart v. U.S., 903 F.Supp. 1540
(S.D.Ga.1995); Manning v. U.S., No. 93-6711 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 8,
1994).
In Manuel, the Fourth Circuit conducted an exhaustive review
of the legislative history behind § 745 and found that "the
exclusivity provision in 46 U.S.C. § 745 was intended to require a
seaman injured aboard a government-owned ship to bring his
maintenance and cure action against the United States." Manuel, 50
F.3d at 1259. More specifically, with respect to the terms of §
745, the court concluded that the SAA does indeed "provide a
remedy" against the United States for failure to pay maintenance
1
The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One
and Two seeking damages from the United States for, inter alia,
breach of its obligation to provide maintenance and cure.
Shields, 662 F.Supp. at 189.
and cure. Id. at 1260. The court further found that "[t]he
"subject matter' of this claim under the SAA is the seaman's
entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from his injury while
employed aboard the ship" and that "[a]lthough the claim against
the operator highlights the wrongful conduct of the operator's
administrative employees, the action nonetheless arises from the
seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from his
injury while employed aboard the ship." Id. at 1259.
Although we ultimately agree with the reasoning in Manuel, we
recognize that this resolution draws a fine line of distinction.
We simply conclude that the phrase "by reason of the same subject
matter" is the key factor in this matter. Any claim for failure to
pay maintenance and cure, even one alleging the arbitrary and
willful denial of such, is "by reason of the same subject matter"
as the seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from
his injury. Consequently, Kasprik's claim against OMI for the
arbitrary and willful denial of maintenance and cure has been
effectively abolished by Congress under the exclusivity provision
of the SAA.2
Therefore, we conclude that the exclusivity provision of the
Suits in Admiralty Act precludes any action for punitive damages
2
If we have erred in our interpretation of this provision of
the SAA Congress can clarify or change the legislation. As so
clearly recognized by the court in Manuel, such a decision gives
private operators managing ships owned by the United States the
ability to willfully and arbitrarily deny maintenance and cure
without suffering any consequences. Manuel, 50 F.2d at 1260.
The court further noted that should Congress consider this to be
an unjust result, "it can correct the problem by carving out a
maintenance and cure exception to the exclusivity rule, by
waiving the United States' sovereign immunity, or by taking some
other legislative action. Id.
against OMI as the agent operating a vessel owned by the United
States. Instead, any action for maintenance and cure lies solely
against the United States.3
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly granted OMI's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Therefore, we AFFIRM the order of
the district court.
3
Although "[a]ttorney's fees are available to a plaintiff
when [a private party] refuses to provide maintenance and cure in
bad faith, callously, or unreasonably," Nichols v. Barwick, 792
F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir.1986), attorney's fees may not be
awarded against the United States in the absence of specific
statutory authority. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 267-68, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1626-27,
44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Our examination of the terms of the Suits
in Admiralty Act reveal no explicit authorization for such an
award.
However, with regard to compensatory damages, this
court has held that "seaman have a claim for compensation
for the suffering and for the physical injury which follow
when the failure to give maintenance and cure aggravates the
[injury]." Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1190
(11th Cir.1987). See also, Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, 287 U.S. 367, 53 S.Ct. 173, 77 L.Ed. 368 (1932)
(aggravation of injury caused by failure to pay maintenance
and cure gives seaman a right of action for the injury with
recovery not limited to necessary expenses, but also
compensation for the hurt.)