United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-6743.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
I.D.P., a male juvenile, W.L.G., a male juvenile, Defendants-
Appellants.
Dec. 31, 1996.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama. (No. 95-164-RV-S), Richard W. Vollmer, Jr.
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and SMITH*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents two issues of first impression in this
circuit pertaining to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 ("the Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042. We
must resolve: (1) whether the government's certification that an
offense committed by a juvenile presents a substantial federal
interest giving rise to federal jurisdiction is subject to judicial
review, and (2) the government's burden of proof before the
district court as to whether the interests of justice militate in
favor of a juvenile's transfer to adult status. In addition, we
must decide whether the particular facts of this case support the
district court's order that the appellants be tried as adults. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
*
Honorable Edward S. Smith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
On August 22, 1995, the government filed a three-count
information charging I.D.P. and W.L.G. with armed robbery of a
motor vehicle ("carjacking"), conspiracy, and use of a firearm
during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2119, 2, 5032, 371, and 924(c). It is undisputed that
both I.D.P. and W.L.G. were juveniles at the time they allegedly
committed these offenses.1 The following recitation of facts
underlying the charges against I.D.P. and W.L.G. are assumed to be
true solely for the limited purpose of this appeal: On April 20,
1995, I.D.P. and W.L.G. approached a parked truck in which two
teenagers sat. W.L.G. pulled the individual seated in the
passenger side out of the truck, while I.D.P. pointed a gun at the
driver and ordered him to get out of the truck. Shortly
thereafter, I.D.P. and W.L.G. drove the stolen vehicle to a grocery
store accompanied by another juvenile. I.D.P. and the other
juvenile went into the store, demanded money from a cashier, and
shot the cashier in the abdomen when she did not immediately accede
to their request. The cashier was pregnant at the time I.D.P. shot
her. Another cashier gave I.D.P. and his companion the money they
had demanded.
On the same date on which the information against I.D.P. and
W.L.G. was filed, the government moved to proceed against each
1
Under the Act, a "juvenile" is defined as "a person who has
not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of
proceedings and disposition under [the Act] for an alleged act of
juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his
twenty-first birthday." 18 U.S.C. § 5031. "Juvenile
delinquency," moreover, is defined as "the violation of a law of
the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth
birthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult
or a violation by such a person of section 922(x)." Id.
juvenile as an adult. Consistent with the requirements set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the United States Attorney filed with the
district court (1) a certification stating that the offenses with
which I.D.P. and W.L.G. were charged were felonies and crimes of
violence and that there was a substantial federal interest to
warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and (2) certified
copies of each defendant's state juvenile record. I.D.P. and
W.L.G. each moved to dismiss the information for lack of federal
jurisdiction, claiming that certification was improper due to the
lack of a substantial federal interest. Following a court-ordered
psychological examination of each defendant, the court conducted a
closed hearing on each party's pending motion.
The court denied the motions to dismiss after finding not only
that the government's certification was not subject to judicial
review, but that even if the court were to review the
certification, the crime of carjacking—particularly under the
violent circumstances existing in this case—presented a substantial
federal interest.
The court next analyzed, again pursuant to the terms set forth
by federal statute, the age, social background, and psychological
maturity level of each juvenile, the nature of the offenses with
which they were charged, their respective juvenile delinquency
records, their respective responses to past treatment, and the
availability of programs designed to treat their particular
behavioral problems. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Based on its findings,
the court determined that the government had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the interests of justice weighed
more heavily in favor of transfer to adult status. Accordingly,
the court granted the government's motion to transfer with respect
to both I.D.P. and W.L.G.
I.D.P. and W.L.G. appeal the district court's determination
that they be tried as adults. Specifically, they contend that (1)
there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because the government's
certification erroneously characterized the carjacking offense at
issue in this case as giving rise to a "substantial federal
interest," (2) assuming certification was proper, the government
should have been required to show by clear and convincing
evidence—rather than by a preponderance of the evidence—that
transfer to adult status was proper, and (3) the district court
abused its discretion in concluding, based on the statutory factors
and the particularized facts of this case, that these individuals
should be tried as adults.
The government argues that certification is an administrative
decision that rests solely within the discretion of the Attorney
General and, therefore, is isolated from judicial review. The
government further suggests that even if we were to review the
certification, the carjacking offense that occurred in this
instance implicates a substantial federal interest sufficient to
warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Finally, the
government submits that the district court properly evaluated and
balanced the applicable statutory factors in reaching its
determination that transfer to adult status was justified with
respect to both defendants.
II. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, a brief overview of the applicable
provisions of the Act is necessary to our examination of the
questions presented in this appeal. To commence a juvenile
prosecution in federal district court, the Act mandates that the
government file with the court certified copies of the charged
individual's state juvenile records. In addition, the Attorney
General or her delegate2 must certify, after investigation, that
(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State
does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction
over said juvenile with respect to [the] alleged act of
juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available
programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or
(3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a
felony ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in
the case of the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal
jurisdiction.
18 U.S.C. § 5032. Here, the government chose to proceed against
both W.L.G. and I.D.P. under the third category provided by the
statute and certified to the court that "the offenses charged
against W.L.G., and I.D.P., male juveniles, are felony crimes of
violence and there is a substantial federal interest in this case
or the offenses to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction."
R2-7.
Although the government's certification to the court is
necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction, the decision regarding
whether to transfer a juvenile to adult status ultimately rests
with the court.3 Once the government moves for such a transfer,
2
The authority to certify on behalf of the Attorney General
has been delegated to the appropriate United States Attorney. 28
C.F.R. 0.57 (1995).
3
There is, however, a statutorily prescribed exception to
this general rule involving mandatory transfer to adult status
once certification has been filed. Such automatic transfer,
transfer is appropriate only if the court finds, after a hearing,
that a transfer would be in the interest of justice. The statute
details the considerations that the court must take into account in
reaching its decision:
Evidence of the following factors shall be considered,
and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the
record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the
interest of justice: the age and social background of the
juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and
nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the
juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological
maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the
juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of
programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
18 U.S.C. § 5032. While the court is statutorily required to make
findings with respect to all enumerated factors, it remains within
the court's discretion to determine what weight to give to each
one. United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989).
Again, it is important to emphasize that the government's
certification to the court regarding the statutory classifications
necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction is distinct from—and in no
way dispositive of—the question of whether a juvenile should be
tried as an adult. See United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d
1314, 1317 n. 4 (4th Cir.1996) quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 389 n. 10) (1983) ("Only if the criteria for retaining
federal jurisdiction over a juvenile in the first instance ... are
which precludes any discretionary determinations by the district
court, occurs when a juvenile is alleged to have committed an
offense that (1) would be deemed a felony if committed by an
adult, (2) involved the use or attempted use of physical force,
and (3) the juvenile was previously convicted of one of the
listed felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The government does not
contend that automatic transfer applies in this instance.
met, may there then be consideration of whether Federal
prosecution, as opposed to a Federal juvenile delinquency
proceeding, is appropriate.") Before reaching the issue of whether
the district court properly concluded that the interest of justice
weighed in favor of trying W.L.G. and I.D.P. as adults, therefore,
we first must decide whether the government's certification that
endows the federal court with jurisdiction over this case is
subject to judicial review.
A. Certification
In United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir.1984), we
examined whether the Attorney General's certification necessary to
invoke federal jurisdiction under either of the first two
statutorily prescribed categories—in other words, that the state
either does not have or refuses to assume jurisdiction over a
juvenile or, in the alternative, does not have programs available
to meet the needs of juveniles—was amenable to our review. We
resolved that certification under section 5032 generally was not
reviewable. Several exceptions to this rule were explicitly noted:
We acknowledged, for instance, that a court could review a
certification for formal compliance with the statute.4 We further
established that review was proper where the juvenile had alleged
that the government had certified the action in bad faith. See id.
at 1478.
In the absence of a purely formal error on the face of the
4
Examples of non-compliance over which the court could
exercise review might be "where the verifying party is not a
proper delegate of the Attorney General ... [or] where the
certification is not filed in a timely fashion." Id. at 1477
(citations omitted).
certification or proof of bad faith on the part of the government,
we concluded that certifications made in accord with section 5032
customarily "must be accepted as final." Id. In reaching this
determination, we adopted the Second Circuit's approach to this
issue as articulated in United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857, 96 S.Ct. 107, 46 L.Ed.2d 82
(1975). In Vancier, the court's legal analysis was grounded in
part on the observation that section 5032 not only failed to set
forth standards by which the court could determine the
appropriateness of certification but also served to qualify
prosecutorial discretion rather than confer upon the courts the
power to decide in which forum to bring juvenile delinquency cases.
See Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380-81. Moreover, we found persuasive
the Vancier court's reference to other instances in which courts
have found decisions made by the executive branch in connection
with law enforcement matters to be non-reviewable. See United
States v. C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478 (citing Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1381
(collecting cases)).
Although our decision in United States v. C.G. necessarily
guides our disposition of this case, it does not resolve entirely
the matter before us. Significantly, the statutory language at
issue here—that is, a third possible basis for federal jurisdiction
provided by the Attorney General's certification that the offense
charged involves a "substantial federal interest"—was added to
section 5032 in 1984 subsequent to our decision in United States v.
C.G. We are convinced, however, that the reasoning underlying our
decision in United States v. C.G. obtains equally with respect to
the amended language presented in this instance. The statute, as
amended, specifies that the Attorney General shall certify to the
court that "the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a
felony ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the
case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal
jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The statute goes on to provide
that transfer is appropriate if the court finds, after a hearing,
that such a transfer would be in the "interest of justice." Id.
More importantly, the statute sets forth explicit and detailed
factors that the court must consider in evaluating whether a
transfer would be in the interest of justice; conversely, the
statute is virtually silent regarding any standard by which the
court may or must determine the existence of a substantial federal
interest. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, we
presume that this particular textual configuration by Congress was
intentional. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104
S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ("Where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.") quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472
F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972).
By the same token, it is apparent that the type of judgment
that must be exercised in deciding whether to prosecute a case in
federal court is supervisory in nature, particularly where the
interest at stake entails law enforcement concerns. See United
States v. C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478. In the context of certification
under this statute, the government's authority to ascertain the
presence of a substantial federal interest is no different from its
authority to decide whether to prosecute a case in a federal forum.
This type of decision falls squarely within the parameters of
prosecutorial discretion that previously we have held does not lend
itself to judicial intervention. See Jones v. White, 992 F.2d
1548, 1574 (11th Cir.) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)) ("[O]ur
criminal justice system accords prosecutors broad discretion as to
whom they prosecute, and ... this discretion is ill-suited to
judicial review."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 967, 114 S.Ct. 448, 126
L.Ed.2d 381 (1993). We find persuasive an illustration of the
policy nature of the "substantial federal interest" determination
offered by the district court in United States v. W.P., Jr., 898
F.Supp. 845 (M.D.Ala.1995):
[W]hile one bank robbery might involve only a small amount of
money, it could still meet § 5032's "substantial Federal
interest" requirement if it were part of a wave of bank
robberies, or if the crime of bank robbery reached a point
where it could be reasonably viewed as a national problem
comparable to "large scale drug trafficking, or significant or
willful destruction of property belonging to the United
States." An assessment of whether a single bank robbery in
this broader context is substantial enough to warrant the
exercise of federal jurisdiction would be an administrative,
not a judicial, undertaking, drawing on such subjective
assessment as the overall presence of crime, general
deterrence, and enforcement priorities.
Id. at 849 (citation omitted). See also United States v. Juvenile
Male, 915 F.Supp. 789, 793 (W.D.Va.1995) ("[T]he decision as to
whether a federal interest is substantial enough to warrant federal
jurisdiction is more administrative than judicial in nature. It
calls for an assessment as to the overall presence of crime,
general deterrence effects, and enforcement priorities. As a
policy matter, the U.S. Attorney's Office is in a better position
to evaluate these variables than is the court.").5
The legislative history of the amendment to section 5032 is
also instructive in aiding our resolution of this issue. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report relating to the addition
of the "substantial Federal interest" language states that
"[t]his change adopts in part the recommendation of the
Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime that the
Federal Government assume original jurisdiction over Federal
Crimes by juveniles, and is substantially the same as a
provision in the Criminal Code Reform legislation approved by
the Committee in the last Congress." S.Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 389 (1983) (footnote omitted).
Regarding the referenced legislation on which the current amendment
was based, the Committee report stated:
The Committee has limited the provision to the more serious
Federal felonies in the belief that the Federal government
should still defer to State authorities for less serious
offenses by juveniles. The Committee intends that the Federal
prosecutor will consider the factors set forth in section 205
... in deciding whether there is a "sufficient Federal
interest in the case." It is believed necessary to afford the
Attorney General this authority when a serious crime occurs in
which there is a special Federal interest.
5
But see United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314,
1320-21 (4th Cir.1996) ("We find nothing in the statutory
language or legislative history that would overcome the
presumption of judicial review.... In short, we can and must
first satisfy ourselves that our jurisdiction has been properly
invoked. We do so by reviewing the stated reasons underlying the
government's decision to proceed in federal court."); United
States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 618 (8th Cir.1991) ("[W]e
reaffirm that a certification in compliance with section 5032 is
necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction under that section....
We now review whether this certification was in compliance with
section 5032."). While we recognize that the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits have interpreted section 5032 to require judicial review
of certifications, we believe that our decision in this case
comports with both the express language of the statute and our
own circuit precedent.
S.Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1179 (1981). Not only does
the report explicitly acknowledge that the legislation was designed
to afford the Attorney General the authority to decide whether a
federal interest exists but, perhaps more importantly, refers the
federal prosecutor to a different section of the bill setting forth
proposed criteria that a prosecutor should consider in deciding
whether to seek a federal prosecution. Again, as noted with
respect to the manner in which the statute ultimately was drafted,
Congress chose to leave intact an exhaustive description of
considerations to which the court must look before reaching its
decision regarding the "interest of justice," yet provided in
another statutory section factors to which the prosecutor must look
before deciding whether a "substantial federal interest" sufficient
to warrant federal jurisdiction exists in a given case. This
legislative background, coupled with the reasons previously noted,
convinces us that, absent allegations of bad faith or facial
non-compliance with the statute, judicial review of the Attorney
General's decision that a substantial federal interest exists under
section 5032 would not be appropriate.6
6
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gutierrez de
Martinez v. Lamagno, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d
375 (1995), does not alter our disposition of this question.
Gutierrez de Martinez concerned the Attorney General's
certification under the Westfall Act that a defendant-employee
was acting within the scope of his employment and that the United
States, consequently, could be substituted as a defendant in a
civil action. In concluding that such certifications were
reviewable by a federal court, the Court expressly noted that its
analysis was driven largely by two compelling factors:
First, the Attorney General herself urges review,
mindful that in cases of the kind petitioners present,
the incentive of her delegate to certify is marked.
Second, when a government official's determination of a
B. Quantum of Proof
I.D.P. and W.L.G. posit that the district court should have
required the government to prove the factors underlying its motion
to transfer to adult status by clear and convincing evidence rather
than a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude, however, that
the district court did not err in applying the preponderance
standard to its findings regarding whether the interest of justice
demanded that I.D.P. and W.L.G. be transferred and tried as adults.
It is worth noting that our conclusion is in accord with every
other circuit that has addressed and decided this issue. See,
e.g., United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.1995)
(stating that "[t]he clear and convincing standard is also
incompatible with the discretionary nature of the transfer
determination, which involves balancing the often conflicting goals
of promoting juvenile rehabilitation and protecting the public
fact or circumstance—for example, "scope of
employment"—is dispositive of a court controversy,
federal courts generally do not hold the determination
unreviewable.
Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2231. Here, unlike the
circumstances presented in Gutierrez de Martinez, the
Attorney General does not urge review; indeed, there is no
potential conflict of interest or "incentive" of the U.S.
Attorney to certify that a juvenile should be prosecuted in
federal court. Similarly, as we have stated repeatedly, the
prosecutor's certification is not determinative of the
transfer decision and thus is not dispositive of any court
controversy over which the court should exercise review.
Although we are mindful of the Court's admonition in
Gutierrez de Martinez that "judicial review of executive
action "will not be cut off unless there is persuasive
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress,' "
id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2231 (quoting Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18
L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)), we are convinced that persuasive
reasons exist to find the particular executive action at
issue in section 5032 unreviewable.
safety."); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 868 (2nd Cir.1995)
(reasoning that the clear and convincing standard would not be
required in a transfer proceeding because "[a] transfer hearing
under the JDA is not a criminal proceeding designed to explore the
defendant's guilt or innocence ... [n]or does the hearing under the
Act affect whether the defendant will be confined, either prior to
or after trial."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the use of the "clear and convincing" standard of proof is reserved
"to protect particularly important interests in a limited number of
civil cases," California v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454
U.S. 90, 93, 102 S.Ct. 172, 173, 70 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981), and has
approved the use of this standard in a restricted number of cases
involving such matters as civil commitment,7 deportation,8
denaturalization,9 and libel.10 Although we do not minimize the
importance of the interest at stake for these appellants, the
interest does not rise to the level of constitutional gravity
identified by the Court in those rare instances in which it has
found the "clear and convincing" burden of proof to be necessary.
See, e.g., Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122-23, 63 S.Ct. at 1335
("[The] right [of citizenship] once conferred should not be taken
away without the clearest sort of justification and proof ...
7
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60
L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).
8
See Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17
L.Ed.2d 362 (1966).
9
See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct.
1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943).
10
See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct.
1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).
[T]his burden must be met with evidence of clear and convincing
character that when citizenship was conferred upon petitioner ...
it was not done in accordance with strict legal requirements.");
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50, 91 S.Ct. at 1823 ("[T]he vital needs of
freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us that
allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis
of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use
reasonable care would not provide adequate "breathing space' for
these great freedoms.").
Perhaps more significantly, the determination at issue in this
case has no bearing on the eventual resolution of the underlying
case. Stated differently, in deciding whether the government has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest of
justice weighs in favor of transfer, the court solely decides
whether the defendants will be tried as juveniles or adults. It is
critical to emphasize that this determination neither influences
nor affects any issue regarding the defendants' innocence or guilt.
As we emphasized in the context of certification, the court's
findings with respect to transfer is the beginning—not the end—of
the adjudicatory process. We therefore conclude that the district
court properly required the government to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the interest of justice weighed in favor of
transfer.
C. Interest of Justice
Both I.D.P. and W.L.G. argue that the district court erred in
its final determination that the interest of justice militated in
favor of transferring each of them to adult status. The decision
whether to transfer a juvenile to trial as an adult under section
5032 is within the sound discretion of the trial court provided the
court makes findings as to the criteria outlined in the Act.
United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989). While we
review the court's factual findings for clear error, we review the
ultimate interest-of-justice determination for abuse of discretion.
See id. at 1255.
Here, it is undisputed that the district court conducted a
detailed examination of each of the requisite statutory factors.
Briefly, with respect to I.D.P., the court made the following
factual determinations: Prior to the events giving rise to the
instant charges, I.D.P. had experienced "numerous contacts with the
juvenile justice system." R2-23 at 18. CHINS (Child In Need of
Supervision) petitions were filed against him in July, 1988,
October, 1990, and November, 1990. In April, 1991, he received an
informal adjustment on a criminal mischief charge and in September,
1992, following another CHINS petition, was placed on probation.
In January, 1993, he was ordered to serve two week-ends at a youth
center for violating his probation. In February, 1994, he was
adjudicated delinquent for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
I.D.P. again was found in violation of probation and placed on
electronic monitoring but removed the monitoring device and ran
away. He subsequently was ordered to attend a "boot camp"
treatment program and was placed in the custody of a legal
guardian.
The court also summarized psychological evaluations showing
that I.D.P. had received various forms of counseling since the age
of five but had continued to exhibit increasingly aggressive and,
at times, violent behavior with family members. One of the mental
health professionals that evaluated I.D.P., Dr. Chudy, found
I.D.P.'s prognosis to be poor to guarded, and suggested that he
would need to be in an environment where he could both be monitored
by the legal system and receive "constructive treatment." Id. at
21. The second psychiatric counselor, Dr. Alexander, noted that
I.D.P. suffers from an "evolving personality disorder" and
indicated that the "likelihood that further treatment efforts would
be successful is minimal to non-existent." Id. at 21. The court
acknowledged, however, that Dr. Alexander had provided a somewhat
inconclusive, incomplete report. The court also found that no
treatment programs to address I.D.P.'s behavioral problems were
available within the federal juvenile system.
The court balanced these findings, as required by statute, and
concluded that the risk of harm to society posed by placing I.D.P.
in the juvenile system outweighed his chance for rehabilitation
within that system. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
that I.D.P. had a documented history of aggressive behavior and had
not responded well to previous treatment. The court further noted
that the crimes with which I.D.P. was charged were serious. In
light of the lengthy and detailed analysis provided by the court
with respect to each of the factors it was directed to evaluate and
because the record contains adequate evidence to support the
court's findings, we cannot conclude that the court abused its
discretion in deciding that the interest of justice militated in
favor of the transfer of I.D.P. to adult status.
With respect to W.L.G., the court set forth the following
factual determinations: W.L.G. received an informal adjustment for
theft in 1990. Several months later, he again was charged with two
counts of theft. In 1991, he was charged with receiving stolen
property and placed on probation. In 1993, after a petition was
filed to revoke W.L.G.'s probation, he was committed to the custody
of a youth center. Following another probation revocation
petition, he was placed under house arrest, suspended from school
and found in violation of his curfew. In 1994, he was charged with
three burglaries and committed to the Department of Youth Services.
The same mental health professionals that evaluated I.D.P.
also evaluated W.L.G. Dr. Chudy found that W.L.G.'s prognosis
within the juvenile system was poor and that he would respond
better in a "highly structured environment." Id. at 14. Dr.
Alexander noted that W.L.G. had "cultivated his abilities as a
criminal and carries a gun with him in the community." Id. at 15.
Alexander concluded that it was unrealistic to expect that W.L.G.
could be rehabilitated by the juvenile justice system and feared
that his criminal behavior could escalate with time. The court
also observed that no attempt had been made to rehabilitate W.L.G.
within the state juvenile system and that no programs existed
within the federal juvenile system to treat his behavioral
problems.
Again, we cannot say that the findings made by the district
court are unsupported by the record. Moreover, in concluding that
adult status was appropriate in this instance, the court considered
both the seriousness and violence of the underlying charged offense
and the psychological profile of W.L.G. that emerged after two
psychological evaluations. In light of the broad deference that we
afford the district court in reaching its interest-of-justice
determination, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
I.D.P. and W.L.G. challenge the district court's order
granting the government's motion to transfer each juvenile to adult
status on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over this case, applied an incorrect standard of proof in
evaluating the propriety of transfer, and abused its discretion in
finding that I.D.P. and W.L.G. should be tried as adults. We
conclude that (1) the government's certification that the
underlying offenses charged in this action gave rise to a
substantial federal interest is not subject to judicial review, (2)
the court did not err in requiring the government to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the interest of justice weighed
in favor of transfer, and (3) the court did not abuse its
discretion in balancing the statutory factors required to reach its
determination that these juveniles should be tried as adults.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.