United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-2255.
John ROONEY, III, John Rooney, Jr., Marsha Rooney, Keith Rooney,
By and Through his Next Best Friend, John Rooney, Jr., his father,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
George Lee WATSON, individually and in his official capacity,
County of Volusia, Defendants-Appellees,
Department of Public Safety, Volusia Co., Defendant.
Dec. 26, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 93-32-CIV), Anne C. Conway, Judge.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WOOD*,
Senior Circuit Judge.
HATCHETT, Chief Judge.
Following Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir.1986), the
court affirms the district court's granting of summary judgment to
a county and a deputy sheriff after finding that no constitutional
deprivations resulted from an automobile accident.
BACKGROUND
On January 23, l989, John Rooney III was driving his parents'
truck, and his younger brother, Keith Rooney, was a passenger.
George Watson, a deputy sheriff in Volusia County, Florida, while
on duty, was driving his patrol vehicle southbound on Highway 11
traveling at approximately 82 miles per hour. The Rooneys were
traveling northbound on Highway 11 and at Reynolds Road attempted
to make a left turn. Watson's patrol vehicle struck the Rooneys'
*
Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
vehicle. At the time of impact, Watson's vehicle was traveling
approximately 73 miles per hour. Watson was neither engaged in a
police pursuit nor responding to an emergency call, and he did not
have his lights or sirens operating. As a result of the accident,
Keith Rooney sustained severe head injuries and John Rooney
sustained bodily injuries and lost teeth. Watson was not seriously
injured.
On January l4, l993, John Rooney, Jr., Marsha Rooney, John
Rooney III, and Keith Rooney filed suit against Deputy Watson and
Volusia County claiming constitutional violations under section
l983 and state law negligence claims. Following the completion of
discovery, the appellees moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the appellees' motions for summary judgment on the
federal civil rights counts on January 23, l995, and in the same
order declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims. In granting the appellees' motions for summary
judgment, the district court relied on Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d
947 (11th Cir.1986).
CONTENTIONS
The Rooneys contend that Watson's conduct amounted to a
constitutional deprivation. They argue that their case is
distinguishable from Cannon because Volusia County had a de facto
custom and policy that encouraged indiscriminate speeding and
grossly negligent driving. They assert that Keith Rooney was
deprived of a normal life, John Rooney III was deprived of a normal
life, and John, Jr. and Marsha Rooney were deprived of their
property, the truck, due to Volusia County's longstanding policy of
allowing recklessness in the operation of patrol vehicles.
The Rooneys claim that the distinction between their case and
"police-chase" cases that refused to find a constitutional
violation is that this was not a "police-chase" case. In this
case, Deputy Watson was not engaged in any pursuit of any kind.
They contend that Volusia County's refusal to prevent reckless
driving among patrol vehicles could have led a reasonable jury to
find that it amounted to a deliberate indifference to the rights of
third parties. They also argue that the district court confused
the role of custom and policy in the allegation with the separate
claim against Volusia County for failure to properly train and
supervise, and as a result, the district court reached the wrong
result. The Rooneys assert that the trial court failed to make the
distinction between their claim for deprivation of life, liberty
and property through a policy or custom, and their claim for
deprivation of their constitutional rights through a failure to
train or supervise. They contend that the Supreme Court recognized
a "failure to train" as a cognizable civil rights claim in City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412
(1989).
Watson and Volusia County contend that the district court
properly granted summary judgment to them because the Rooneys
failed to prove a constitutional deprivation actionable under
section l983. They argue that in order for the Rooneys to state a
claim they must prove that a statute, ordinance, custom or policy
of the government caused the government officer or employee to
violate another's constitutional rights. Moreover, they argue that
Deputy Watson was not a policy maker for Volusia County; that the
Rooneys' claim of deprivation of substantive or procedural due
process is not triggered by mere negligence; that Deputy Watson's
actions cannot rise to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; and that under this court's decision in Cannon
v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir.1986), a negligent or even
grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a policeman
acting in the line of duty does not give rise to a cause of action
for violation of a federal right under section l983.
ISSUE
The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the
district court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellees
in finding that no constitutional deprivation occurred.
DISCUSSION
Our review of a district court's decision to grant summary
judgment is de novo. Hale v. Tallapoosa Co., 50 F.3d 1579 (11th
Cir.1995). We independently review the record to determine whether
summary judgment was appropriate viewing the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file
together with affidavits, if any, to determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In
making our determination, we view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and with all reasonable inferences
resolved in their favor. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1581.
I. Deputy Watson
The Rooneys brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § l983
claiming that both Deputy Watson and Volusia County violated their
constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, procedural due
process and rights to travel under the United States Constitution.
In order for the Rooneys to state a cause of action against Watson
in his official capacity, we must determine (1) whether Watson's
conduct alleged to have caused their harm occurred while he was
acting under color of state law, and (2) whether his alleged
conduct deprived the Rooneys of rights, privileges, or immunities
guaranteed under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68
L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by, Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); see
also Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840
F.2d 797, 800 (11th Cir.1988), aff'd by, Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990).
Our decision in Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th
Cir.1986), directs our analysis in this case. In Cannon, a police
officer responding to a disturbance call at a local pool hall in
Columbus, Georgia, struck another vehicle killing the driver of
that vehicle. When responding to the call, the officer had neither
his flashing lights nor siren activated even though he was
traveling sixteen miles over the speed limit. Under Georgia law,
at the time of the accident, police officers responding to
emergency calls were allowed to exceed posted speed limits as long
as they used their vehicles' flashing lights and siren. The
decedent's family filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § l983 claiming that
the police officer and the city of Columbus deprived the decedent
of her life without due process of the law through reckless and
excessive speeding without the use of lights and sirens. In that
decision, this court held "that a person injured in an automobile
accident caused by the negligent, or even grossly negligent,
operation of a motor vehicle by a policeman acting in the line of
duty has no section l983 cause of action for violation of a federal
right." Cannon, 782 F.2d at 950. In reaching that conclusion,
this court noted that it could not find any cases supporting the
proposition that a police officer's negligence in operating his
vehicle deprives an injured person of due process of law and that
"automobile negligence actions are grist for the state law mill.
But they do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation."
Cannon, 782 F.2d at 949-50.
Under our reasoning in Cannon, Deputy Watson's single
accident, whether we characterize it as negligence or even gross
negligence causing the Rooneys harm, does not amount to a
constitutional deprivation. Although Watson was not responding to
an emergency call, we believe Cannon 's holding dictates the result
we reach. In this case, Watson was on duty and on patrol at the
time of the accident. Under the reasoning of Cannon, we do not
believe that any alleged negligence on Deputy Watson's part amounts
to a constitutional deprivation simply because he was speeding in
the absence of an emergency response or police pursuit. Perhaps
his driving at a high rate of speed in a non-emergency or
non-pursuit situation reveals gross negligence rather than
negligence, but it does not transform a state tort claim into a
constitutional deprivation under the circumstances of this case.
Therefore, in the absence of a constitutional deprivation, the
Rooneys cannot sustain a cause of action against Watson under
section l983.1
II. County of Volusia
The Rooneys also assert that Volusia County maintained a
custom or policy of allowing patrol vehicles to drive recklessly.
Consequently, they argue that they should be able to establish
their section l983 claim based upon Volusia County's custom or
policy that led to their constitutional deprivation. As the
district court correctly pointed out, an inquiry into a
governmental entity's custom or policy is relevant only when a
constitutional deprivation has occurred.2 See Vineyard v. County
of Murray, Georgia, 990 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1024, 114 S.Ct. 636, 126 L.Ed.2d 594 (1993).3 Since we
have determined that Deputy Watson's conduct did not cause the
Rooneys to suffer a constitutional deprivation, we need not inquire
into Volusia County's policy and custom relating to patrol vehicle
operation and training. Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799,
1
The Rooneys may still maintain a cause of action under
state law against Deputy Watson.
2
The Rooneys also allege that Volusia County's failure to
train officers for high speed vehicle operation leads to a
cognizable cause of action under section l983. The Rooneys
cannot maintain this cause of action, however, because the
automobile accident did not rise to a level of violating their
constitutional rights.
3
In Vineyard, we stated that "[o]nly when it is clear that a
violation of specific rights has occurred can the question of §
l983 municipal liability for the injury arise." Vineyard, 990
F.2d at 1211.
106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (finding that a
departmental policy or regulation authorizing the use of
constitutionally excessive force is not relevant when a person has
not been deprived of a constitutional right as a result of actions
taken by an individual police officer); see also Roach v. City of
Fredericktown, Mo., 882 F.2d 294, 297-98 (8th Cir.1989) (finding
that a municipality may be held liable under section l983 for
inadequate training only after determining that the plaintiff has
suffered a constitutional deprivation as a result of the municipal
employee's conduct). Therefore, our finding that the Rooneys did
not suffer any constitutional deprivation makes it unnecessary to
consider Volusia County's policy or custom.4
CONCLUSION
Because we have determined that Deputy Watson's conduct did
not deprive the Rooneys of any constitutional right, they cannot
maintain a cause of action under section l983. The district
court's decision granting Deputy Watson and the County of Volusia's
motions for summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the judgment. For the reasons indicated in Judge
Hatchett's opinion, I agree that Deputy Watson did not violate
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. I also conclude that Volusia
County did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. I note
that plaintiffs' only argument with respect to lack of training is
4
A similar result obtains with respect to the Rooneys' other
theories of liability based on a failure to train and
unreasonable seizure.
the lack of high speed training on the range. However, I do not
think that the lack of training on the range could be a
contributing cause in this case. Deputy Watson did not lose
control. Rather, the only possible causes of this accident are
readily subject to training in the classroom (e.g., the obvious
dangers of high speeds, especially at night, and in view of
oncoming traffic). I note also that plaintiffs' evidence about
speeding was vague and unhelpful and could not constitute the basis
of liability on the county's part for a constitutional violation.
In view of the evidence proffered by the plaintiffs in this summary
judgment record, I readily conclude that plaintiffs have failed to
show that Volusia County was deliberately indifferent in any manner
that could have caused the accident.