United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 96-3662
Non-Argument Calendar.
Thomas H. DALE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John H. MOORE and State of Florida, Defendants-Appellees.
Sept. 9, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. (No. 95-40131-
WS), William Stafford, Judge.
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Thomas H. Dale ("Dale") appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his
complaint wherein Dale alleges that the defendants discriminated against him in violation of the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12133, et seq. during their review of his
application for admission to the Florida Bar. Because we conclude that under the Rooker-Feldman1
doctrine, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Dale's complaint, and the ADA does
not authorize independent federal appellate review of final state court decisions, we affirm the
district court's judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Dale, an attorney currently licensed to practice law in the State of Florida, filed an amended
complaint in federal district court alleging that the State of Florida and John Moore, the Executive
Director of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners ("FBBE"), discriminated against him by hindering
or precluding his admission to the Florida Bar on account of an alleged disability. Dale, who
initiated this action while his application to the Florida Bar was pending, alleges that he was
diagnosed with "bipolar dysfunction" disorder in 1989. Dale contends the defendants obtained his
1
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d
206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).
medical records and, thereafter, prepared a document referred to as "Specifications" that summarized
his medical condition. Dale alleges that the document was a "gross and intentional distortion"
evidencing an "intent to impugn plaintiff's ability to practice law." (R1-225 at 2.) Additionally,
Dale alleges that the defendants contrived his disability and illegally considered the disability as a
factor in evaluating his application to practice law. Dale sought monetary and injunctive relief under
the ADA.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. Specifically, the State of Florida noted that the
FBBE recommended Dale for admission to the bar and the Supreme Court of Florida confirmed the
FBBE's recommendation and admitted him to the Florida Bar on June 21, 1995.
The case was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended that the district court dismiss
Dale's complaint. The magistrate judge found that the confirmation by the Florida Supreme Court
of the FBBE's recommendation constituted a state court decision. Thus, the magistrate judge
concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine because it would be required to review a final state court judicial decision to adjudicate
Dale's complaint. The magistrate judge also found that the ADA does not provide an independent
source of federal jurisdiction over Dale's cause of action.
None of the parties filed objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
Consequently, the district court adopted the report and dismissed Dale's amended complaint with
prejudice. Dale then perfected this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Dale contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable because the confirmation
by the Florida Supreme Court of the FBBE's recommendation to accept his application for bar
admission did not constitute a state court decision. In addition, he argues that because he
commenced his suit before he was admitted to the Florida Bar, his subsequent confirmation is
irrelevant. Moreover, Dale asserts that he seeks relief only from the defendants' intentional
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discrimination in falsely portraying him as disabled, impaired, or otherwise unfit for admission to
practice in the Florida Bar. He specifically states that his complaint does not seek review of the
Florida Bar admission process.
The defendants respond that because Dale does not make a constitutional challenge to
Florida's general rules and procedures governing the admission to the state's bar, that the district
court properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In any event, the defendants argue
that Dale's allegations are inextricably intertwined with the Florida Supreme Court's final decision
on Dale's application.
This court reviews a district court's finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1060 (11th Cir.1994). It is well-settled that a federal
district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision. See
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 1311; Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. at 150.
As a preliminary matter, contrary to Dale's assertions, the confirmation by the Florida
Supreme Court of the FBBE's recommendation to accept Dale's application to the Florida Bar is a
judicial proceeding that constitutes a case and controversy. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 478-79, 103
S.Ct. at 1312-13 (citing In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 567-69, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 1311-12, 89 L.Ed.
1795 (1945)). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable to this case.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the authority to review final decisions from the highest
court of the state is reserved to the Supreme Court of the United States. See Hollins v. Wessel, 819
F.2d 1073, 1074 (11th Cir.1987). Federal district courts may not exercise jurisdiction to decide
federal issues which are inextricably intertwined with a state court's judgment. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Maryland, Inc. v. Weiner, 868 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir.1989). A district court engages
in impermissible appellate review when it entertains a claim that the litigants did not argue in the
state court, but is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483
n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1316 n. 16. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies as long as the party had a
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reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in the state court proceedings. Wood v. Orange
County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1983). If the party had no reasonable opportunity, this court
considers "that the federal claim was not "inextricably intertwined' with the state court's judgment."
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir.1996).
This court has previously applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to actions brought by
rejected applicants to the Florida Bar. In Berman v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 794 F.2d 1529
(11th Cir.1986), an unsuccessful applicant to the Florida Bar filed a § 1983 action in federal district
court seeking admission to the Bar. This court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action
on jurisdictional grounds, holding that:
[i]n essence there are two types of claims which a frustrated bar applicant might bring in
federal court: (1) A constitutional challenge to a state's general rules and procedures
governing admission to the state's bar; or (2) A claim, based on constitutional or other
grounds, that a state court's judicial decision in a particular case has resulted in the unlawful
denial of admission to a particular bar applicant. Federal district courts have jurisdiction
over the first type of claim but not the second.
Id. at 1530; see also Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 102 (11th Cir.1995) ("The district court
correctly determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction only over [plaintiff's] facial challenge to
the constitutionality of Florida's general rules and procedures governing admission to the bar[.]");
Johnson v. State of Kansas, 888 F.Supp. 1073, 1081-86 (D.Kan.1995) (unsuccessful applicant to
Kansas Bar with chronic bipolar affective disorder alleged discrimination under the ADA; court
held that applicant's claims were inextricably intertwined with Kansas Supreme Court's decision not
to admit applicant to Kansas Bar), aff'd, 81 F.3d 172 (10th Cir.1996) (Table). Thus, it is clear that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids frustrated Florida bar applicants from seeking an effective
reversal of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in federal district court.
This case differs from Berman, Kirkpatrick, and Johnson in that the Florida Supreme Court
admitted Dale to the Florida Bar. Dales does not seek reversal of that decision. Instead, he seeks
relief under the ADA for the FBBE's alleged disability discrimination against him in conducting a
judicial inquiry into his fitness to practice law in Florida pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court
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of Florida Relating to Admission to the Bar.2 Resolution of Dale's ADA claim would require the
federal district court to review the application of these rules to the particular factual circumstances
of Dale's case. Dale's claim is inextricably intertwined with the state judicial proceeding.
Moreover, Dale had an opportunity to raise his claim in the state court proceeding. Dale was
given notice of the "Specifications" report detailing his alleged mental problem before he was
admitted to the Florida Bar and before he filed this suit. Article 3, § 3(d) of the Florida Supreme
Court's Rules Relating to Admission to the Bar allows an applicant to file an answer to the
Specifications. Dale's answer could have complained that the FBBE's consideration of his alleged
mental illness violated the ADA. Additionally, Article 3, § 4(b) of the Rules permits an applicant
"who is dissatisfied with the Board's recommendation" to file a petition with the Florida Supreme
Court. Although the FBBE recommended that Dale be admitted to the Bar, Dale was nonetheless
dissatisfied with the FBBE's recommendation and could have filed a petition.
In sum, Dale's ADA claim is inextricably intertwined with the state's judicial proceedings
relating to his bar admission. The Florida Supreme Court's bar admission rules afforded Dale an
opportunity to challenge the FBBE's consideration of his alleged mental illness. Therefore, we agree
with the district court's dismissal of Dale's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
B. Independent Federal Appellate Review—ADA.
Without citing any authority, Dale argues that the ADA provides an independent source of
federal court jurisdiction. In response, the state contends that the ADA provides no such exception
to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Defendant Moore contends that whether the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to civil actions filed under the ADA is academic as it pertains to
him, because this court has held that the ADA does not provide for individual liability, only for
employer liability. See Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.1996) ("[T]he Disabilities
Act does not provide for individual liability, only for employer liability.").
2
We do not decide whether such a claim would have merit under the ADA.
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An exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine exists where a federal statute authorizes
federal appellate review of final state court decisions. See, e.g., Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225,
1230 (7th Cir.1996). For example, Congress has authorized federal district courts to review state
court decisions in habeas corpus proceedings. See id.; see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-
44, 101 S.Ct. 764, 767, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981).
There have been relatively few cases involving bar applicants who filed civil actions under
the ADA relating to bar admission procedures and decisions. These cases, however, have uniformly
held that the ADA does not provide an independent source of federal court jurisdiction that overrides
the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Johnson, 888 F.Supp. at 1080 ("Subjecting
public entities to the terms of the ADA is not the same as giving federal district courts appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments."); McCready v. Michigan State Bar Standing Comm. on
Character and Fitness, 926 F.Supp. 618, 620 (W.D.Mich.1995) (plaintiff alleged that defendants
might discriminate against him by conducting a hearing on his fitness and considering evidence of
his alcoholism and personality disorders; court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint, holding
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred all claims arising from the ADA), aff'd, 100 F.3d 957 (6th
Cir.1996) (Table). We agree with these cases that the ADA does not authorize federal appellate
review of final state court decisions.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
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