[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-8076
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D.C. Docket No. 1:96-CV-1414-MHS
CYNTHIA A. EVERETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, KENNESAW STATE COLLEGE,
a unit of the University System of Georgia; and
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(April 16. 1998)
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and GODBOLD and RONEY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Cynthia Everett appeals from the dismissal of her
claims against the Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia, Kennesaw State College, and Cobb County School District
alleging that she was discriminated against because of her
disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Because we find her claims
to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations we affirm
the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Cynthia Everett is a person with disabilities as defined by
the ADA. She has multiple sclerosis and bilateral SI joint
dysfunction, and although she can walk for periods of time using
a cane, she relies on an electrically-powered scooter for
mobility.
Everett attended Kennesaw State College from 1991 to 1994 to
obtain a degree in Early Childhood Education. During the spring
quarter of 1994, she began her student teaching assignment at
Kennesaw Elementary School in the classroom of Nancy Hardy.
Everett alleges that Hardy would not allow her to use her scooter
in the classroom. Everett also alleges that Hardy made frequent
comments concerning Everett’s disability and expressed her doubts
on whether the disability would allow her to be a good teacher.
Some time in May Hardy assigned Everett a grade of Unsatisfactory
(U) for the student teaching assignment, stating that to pass
Everett would be to admit that she that she was capable of
teaching in any situation.
On May 31, 1994 Kennesaw State faculty decided to change
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Everett’s grade from a U to an Incomplete (I) and allow her to
repeat the student teaching program the next year. On June 6,
1994 Everett received a letter from the same Board confirming
that the May 31 decision would stand and that she would be
assigned an I.
On June 6, 1996 Everett filed a complaint against the
defendants alleging discrimination because of her disability in
violation of Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. She also included state law claims alleging breach of
contract. The defendants moved to dismiss all of Everett’s
federal claims as time barred. The district court granted the ,
motion, finding that Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations
applied to all of Everett’s claim and that she had failed to file
suit within two years of the discriminatory acts complained of.
Everett filed this appeal, asserting that Georgia’s two-
year, personal injury statute of limitations is inapplicable to
claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and that
regardless of which limitations period this court chooses to
apply her action was timely filed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of review
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint de
novo. In doing so we view the facts in the light most favorable
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to the nonmovant. Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.
1995).
B. The appropriate statute of limitations
The issue of the applicable statute of limitations under
Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is an
issue of first impression for this circuit. Because causes of
action brought under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act are essentially identical, we will consider the two statutes
simultaneously and apply the same statute of limitations to both.
See Pottgen v. Missouri St. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d
926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that interpretations of the ADA
must be consistent with interpretations of the Rehabilitation
Act).
Where a federal statute does not contain a limitations
period courts should look to the most analogous state statute of
limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). Most
civil rights actions are essentially claims to vindicate injuries
to personal rights. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S.
656, 661 (1987)(action for discrimination is one for "fundamental
injury to the individual rights of a person"); Wilson, 471 U.S.
at 276 (claims which allege discrimination are best characterized
as personal injury actions).
Based on this guidance from the Supreme Court most circuits
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that have adopted a statute of limitations for ADA or
Rehabilitation Act claims have looked to the state’s limitations
period for personal injury actions. See, e.g., Soignier v.
American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir.
1996)(district court correctly applied Illinois' two-year statute
of limitations for personal injuries as the most analogous
limitations period for an ADA claim, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 771
(1997); Baker v. Board of Regents of State of Kan., 991 F.2d 628,
632 (10th Cir. 1993) (analogizing Rehabilitation Act claims to
personal injury claims); Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d
122, 127 (2d Cir. 1992)(“we now hold that actions under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the state statute of
limitations applicable to personal injury actions”); Hickey v.
Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1992).
Only the Fourth Circuit has declined to apply the state
personal injury statute of limitations. In Wolsky v. Medical
College of Hampton Roads, that court held that because the state
of Virginia had passed a state anti-discrimination statute that
was identical to the federal Rehabilitation Act, the statute of
limitations contained in that statute should be applied as the
most analogous. Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1
F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 1993)(“Given that the Virginia Act is
modeled after the Rehabilitation Act, we break with the
conclusions of the other circuits to apply a personal injury
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statute of limitations”). Because Georgia has not passed a state
law identical to the Rehabilitation Act from which to borrow a
limitations period, we follow the lead of the other circuits that
have decided this issue and apply Georgia’s two-year statute of
limitations period for personal injury actions. See O.C.G.A. § 9-
3-33 (1982).
Everett assertions that this court should apply the twenty-
year statute of limitations found at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 are
without merit. This twenty-year limitations period applies to
“actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals
under statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law.”
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. The only authority Everett points to for
support of her position consists of cases decided prior to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Wilson and Goodman that § 1983 and §
1981 claims are to be governed by state personal injury
limitation periods. The cases cited by Everett apply other
statutes of limitations to federal civil rights actions and are
no longer good law. See Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority, 841 F.2d 1533, 1545-46, modified on other
grounds, 848 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that “[r]ecent
Supreme Court decisions have directed that the appropriate
statute of limitations for [1981 and 1983 actions] is the
personal injury statute of the state in which the federal court
is sitting”).
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Because other circuits that have decided this issue have
applied the personal injury statute of limitations period, and
because Everett has failed to cite any relevant authority that
convinces this court otherwise, we hold that Georgia’s two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be
applied to discrimination claims brought under Title II of the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
C. Is Everett’s complaint time barred?
Everett contends that even if this court finds that the two-
year limitation period applies to her claims, her suit should not
have been dismissed because it was timely filed within two years.
Specifically, she says that her claims of discrimination accrued
on June 6, 1994 when she received a letter from the school
confirming that she would receive an I in her student teaching
course and that she would have to repeat her student teaching
exercise. Her original complaint was filed on June 6, 1996.
Kennesaw State College and the Cobb County School District
assert that Everett’s claims accrued prior to June 6th. They
maintain that her claims accrued some time in May of 1994 when
she was assigned a grade of U by Hardy. Alternatively, they
argue that the latest date her claims could have accrued was May
31, 1994, because on that date Everett met with her professors
and they informed her that she would be given the grade of “I,”
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rather than “U” in her student teaching course and would not be
allowed to graduate. In dismissing Everett’s complaint, the
district court found that the letter Everett received on June 6
only confirmed what she had learned on May 31, and that her claim
had accrued no later than May 31 1994, thus barring her current
suit under the applicable two-year limitations period.
We agree with the district court. Claims of discrimination
accrue when the plaintiff is informed of the discriminatory act.
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)(period
commenced at time the tenure decision was made and communicated
to plaintiff, even though one of the effects of denial of tenure,
the eventual loss of a teaching position, did not occur until
later); Calhoun v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 705
F.2d 422, 425 (11th Cir. 1983)(“the statute [of limitations] does
not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of
action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a
reasonably prudent regard for his rights”); Soigner, 92 F.3d at
551 (7th Cir. 1996)(“[t]he statute of limitations begins with the
discovery of injury, not the date on which full consequences of
the actions became clear"); Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d
552, 556 (7th Cir. 1992)("An employer's refusal to undo a
discriminatory decision is not a fresh act of discrimination”).
Because Everett first learned that Hardy would give her a U
because of her disabilities in May, and because she learned of
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the I on May 31st at the meeting with professors, the district
court was correct in dismissing her claims as time barred.
The June 6 letter merely confirmed what happened at the May
31 meeting. At the most it only failed to undo the prior
discriminatory acts of both Hardy and Kennesaw State. Failure to
remedy a prior act of discrimination does not constitute a new
act of discrimination for the purpose of determining whether a
claim is time barred. See Lever,979 F.2d at 556. We hold that
Everett’s complaint was time barred by Georgia’s two-year statute
of limitations period. The district court did not err in
dismissing her claims.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Everett’s claims
under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
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