United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-50247.
In the Matter of Hope G. CAMP, Debtor.
Wilburn C. McDANIEL, Independent Personal Representative of the
Estate of Betty J. McDaniel, deceased, Appellant,
v.
Hope G. CAMP, et al., Appellees.
Aug. 2, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before WISDOM, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court order voiding,
under the Texas Constitution's provisions governing homestead
rights, a pre-petition transfer of debtor Hope G. Camp's property.
Betty McDaniel, claiming title to the property, appeals the
district court's judgment. We reverse and remand.
I
Hope Camp was married to Betty McDaniel's father, who is now
deceased. In his will, McDaniel's father bequeathed to Camp title
to a house located on La Manda Street in San Antonio, Texas (the
"La Manda property"). Thereafter, Camp evicted McDaniel from the
La Manda property and sold it to David L. Gutierrez. At the time
Camp evicted her, McDaniel had lived in the house for approximately
six years.
McDaniel believed that she held superior title to the La Manda
1
property by virtue of a bequest from her grandmother, and sued
Gutierrez in a trespass to try title action. McDaniel successfully
obtained both possession of the house and a money judgment for back
rent against Gutierrez, and Gutierrez filed a breach of warranty of
title suit against Camp in state court.
Camp failed to file an answer in the breach of warranty suit,
and the state court entered a default money judgment in Gutierrez'
favor. In order to determine what properties Camp owned that could
be used to satisfy his money judgment against her, Gutierrez sent
post-judgment interrogatories and requests for admissions to Camp.
Gutierrez asked Camp to admit that she had "abandoned any homestead
claim [she] may have in and to" a house located on Linda Drive in
San Antonio, Texas ("the Linda property"). At that time, Camp was
living in the Linda property and had lived there for approximately
twenty-three years.
When Camp failed to answer the discovery requests, the state
court issued an order compelling her to answer. When Camp failed
to comply with the order, Gutierrez filed a motion for sanctions
against Camp. When Camp did not reply to the motion, the court
issued a sanctions order (1) deeming her to have admitted that she
had "abandoned any and all homestead claim she may have had" to the
Linda property, (2) declaring that the Linda property was not her
homestead, and (3) "prohibiting [Camp] from introducing into
evidence documents or testimony to support the exempt status of
2
[the Linda] property."1 The court also issued a writ of execution,
and the Bexar County Sheriff levied on the Linda property and
noticed it for sale. Gutierrez bought the property, and later
transferred title to McDaniel to satisfy the money judgment
McDaniel had earlier obtained against him.
After the sale of the Linda property, Camp filed a bankruptcy
petition and claimed the Linda property as her homestead. The
bankruptcy court refused to give res judicata effect to the
sanctions order that had declared that Camp had abandoned her
homestead claim to the Linda property. Instead, the court issued
an order declaring that the Linda property was in fact and law
Camp's homestead. The court also voided the sheriff's sale.
McDaniel filed an interlocutory appeal from the bankruptcy court's
order, and the district court affirmed. McDaniel appeals,
contending that both the sanctions order and subsequent judicial
sale of the Linda property were valid, and that the bankruptcy
1
In pertinent part, the sanctions order stated that the
Linda property and another house owned by Camp:
are not the respondent HOPE CAMP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY H. CAMP's homestead;
and are not exempt from execution, for all of which let
execution issue; and
2. The matters contained in the Plaintiff's Request for
Admissions directed to Respondent HOPE CAMP,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY H.
CAMP are deemed admitted;
3. The Respondent HOPE CAMP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY H. CAMP is shall [sic]
be prevented from supporting any claim she may have or
may ever have that the parcels of real property
described above are or ever were exempt from execution
as her homestead.
3
court should have given the sanctions order res judicata effect.
II
McDaniel contends that the bankruptcy court improperly reached
the question of the homestead character of the Linda property.2
The district court held that "the bankruptcy court's determination
that Camp satisfied her burden of establishing the initial
homestead character of the [property] was not clearly erroneous"
because "it was undisputed that Camp occupied the [property]
continuously as her homestead for approximately 23 years."
McDaniel argues that under the state court's sanctions order, Camp
was prohibited from claiming the Linda property as her homestead in
the bankruptcy court.
McDaniel contends that the sanctions order was a valid final
judgment, and that the bankruptcy court should have given res
judicata effect to the state court's decrees that the Linda
property was not Camp's homestead and that Camp be prevented from
"supporting" a homestead claim to the property. The district court
held that "the Sanctions Order did not establish that Camp had
"abandoned' her homestead claim to the [Linda property] as a matter
of law,"3 and that "post-judgment discovery is simply not capable
2
We review a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear
error; and when the district court has affirmed the findings,
our review for clear error is strict. In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546,
550 (5th Cir.1995). We review the bankruptcy court's conclusions
of law de novo. Id.
3
" "The right to a homestead in a particular tract of land,
having once vested by ownership and use, is presumed to continue
until there is affirmative proof of abandonment.' " Truman v.
Deason (In re Niland), 825 F.2d 801, 808 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting
McFarland v. Rousseau, 667 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex.App.—Corpus
4
of overriding the protection afforded to homestead claimants under
the Texas Constitution."
A court may invoke the doctrine of res judicata to bar
consideration of a claim already presented to a Texas court upon
finding: "(1) that the prior judgment was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) that there was a final judgment on the
merits; (3) that the parties, or those in privity with them, are
identical in both suits; and (4) that the same cause of action is
involved in both suits." Sutherland v. Cobern, 843 S.W.2d 127, 130
(Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied). If, however, the court
that rendered the prior judgment lacked jurisdiction, the judgment
is void and has no res judicata effect.4 A party may collaterally
attack a void judgment. See Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18
(Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) ("A collateral attack is proper
only if the judgment is "void in law.' "), cert. denied, --- U.S.
----, 114 S.Ct. 93, 126 L.Ed.2d 60 (1993); Dews, 413 S.W.2d at 805
Christi 1984, no writ)). Under Texas law, "[a]bandonment of a
homestead requires both the cessation or discontinuance of use of
the property as a homestead, coupled with the intent to
permanently abandon the homestead." Womack v. Redden, 846 S.W.2d
5, 7 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
4
See Sanders v. Brady (In re Brady, Tex., Mun. Gas Corp.),
936 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir.) ("Under Texas law, before the
doctrine of res judicata will apply, the court rendering the
prior judgment must have had jurisdiction over the dispute."),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 657, 116 L.Ed.2d 748
(1991); see also Poynor v. Bowie Indep. Sch. Dist., 627 S.W.2d
517, 519 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ dism'd) ("A void
judgment is not res judicata in a subsequent suit involving the
same parties and subject matter."); Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d
800, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1967, no writ) ("Where a court
rendering judgment does not have jurisdiction, the judgment is
void and cannot operate as res adjudicata; it neither binds,
bars, nor estops anyone." (emphasis omitted)).
5
("When the judgment is not merely erroneous, but an absolute
nullity, it can have no binding force or effect, either in the
tribunal in which it is rendered, or in any other in which it may
be brought in question." (emphasis omitted)).5 Under Texas law,
courts have no jurisdiction where they lack 1) jurisdiction over
the person of a party or the party's property, 2) jurisdiction over
the subject matter, 3) jurisdiction to enter the particular
judgment rendered, or 4) capacity to act as a court. Steph v.
Scott, 840 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir.1988); accord Austin Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973); Holloway,
840 S.W.2d at 18 (citing Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140
(Tex.1987)).
As a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over Gutierrez's breach of warranty
suit. See Tex. Const. art. 5, § 8 ("District court jurisdiction
consists of exclusive, appellate and original jurisdiction of all
5
Thus, the treatment of a void judgment differs from that of
a voidable judgment: "Absent one of those rare circumstances
that makes the judgment "void,' the mere fact that action by a
court ... is contrary to statute, constitutional provision or
rule of civil or appellate procedure makes it "voidable' or
erroneous." Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703
(Tex.1990). When a judgment is merely voidable, "[t]hat the
judgment may have been wrong or premised on a legal principle
subsequently overruled does not affect application of res
judicata." Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (Tex.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894, 104 S.Ct. 242, 78 L.Ed.2d 232 (1983);
see also Schein v. American Restaurant Group, Inc., 852 S.W.2d
496, 497 n. 1 (Tex.1993) (noting that "the fact that "a judgment
may have been wrong or premised on a legal principle subsequently
overruled does not affect the application of res judicata.' "
(quoting Victoria County Cooperative Co. v. National Steel Prods.
Co., 704 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
6
actions, proceedings, and remedies...."). From this jurisdictional
base, the trial court properly entered a default judgment after
Camp's failure to answer. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 239 (governing entry of
default judgments). The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure further
allow a "successful party" at any time after rendition of judgment
to "initiate and maintain in the trial court in the same suit in
which said judgment was rendered any discovery proceeding
authorized by these rules for pre-trial matters." Tex.R.Civ.P.
621a. Camp's refusal to answer post-trial discovery requests and
the motion for sanctions led to the sanctions order entered by the
trial court. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 215 (governing sanctions for abuse
of discovery).
Accordingly, the trial court had general jurisdiction to
sanction Camp, but that does not end our inquiry. "[W]hen the
Legislature creates a right, it can also restrict the remedies
available and the means of determining their enforcement." Testoni
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 861 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.App.—Austin
1992, no writ) (noting, in benefits context, that trial court
lacked jurisdiction to render judgment on remedy when proceedings
were not in compliance with statutory restrictions). Concerning
homestead rights, the courts operate under limited jurisdiction.
Thus, even if a court has general jurisdiction to act, a judgment
is void if the actual action taken orders a remedy not within the
court's jurisdiction.6
6
See Crawford v. Kelly Field Nat'l Bank, 724 S.W.2d 899, 901
(Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding that although
jurisdiction to enter sanctions order existed, jurisdiction to
7
In this case, therefore, the issues require us to determine
whether the state trial court sanctions order declaring the Linda
property not Camp's homestead and the trial court's order of sale
contravened such a jurisdictional restriction. At first blush,
Rule 215 would seem to allow trial courts to enter "such orders in
regard to the failure [to respond to discovery] as are just,"
including "an order that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established" and "an order refusing to allow the disobedient party
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting
him from introducing designated matters in evidence." Tex.R.Civ.P.
215(2)(b). However, the character of the sanctions imposed by the
trial court—the declaration that the Linda property is not
homestead property, not exempt from execution, and order of
execution—requires us to examine the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the "subject matter"—namely the homestead—given the
language of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50
("The homestead ... shall be, and hereby is protected from forced
sale, for the payment of all debts [except those provided for in
this section]."); accord Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v.
Glover, 701 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("Since the purported equitable lien was imposed by judicial
order remedy that modified judgment no longer existed because
modification remedy no longer available if more than thirty days
had elapsed since judgment); cf. Downs v. City of Fort Worth,
692 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(stating, in discussion of appeal time limits, that "[i]f a
judgment were granted in contravention of a mandatory statutory
provision it would be a void judgment.").
8
decree, we must examine the jurisdiction of the trial court in that
case over the subject matter, to-wit: the homestead, in view of
the language of the constitution.").
The Texas Supreme Court has defined "jurisdictional power" in
this sense to mean "jurisdiction over the subject matter, the power
to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
particular matter belongs." Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212,
213 (Tex.1985). "[T]he constitutional provision against forced
sales of homesteads is of a mandatory character and it has been
held with considerable unanimity that forced sales of property
constituting a homestead are void and subject to collateral attack,
even when the homestead character of the property is not
affirmatively disclosed by the record." Curtis Sharp Custom Homes,
701 S.W.2d at 27. "[I]n dealing with the subject of the sale of a
homestead," a court is not acting under general powers, but "is
acting within a specially limited field of jurisdiction declared by
the Constitution and statutes." Cline v. Niblo, 117 Tex. 474, 8
S.W.2d 633, 638 (1928). Consequently, if the sanctions order and
order of sale constitute a "forced sale of homestead," the trial
court's judgment is void. See Niblo, 8 S.W.2d at 638 ("A decision
[under general jurisdiction] ... would be entitled to no force and
effect in so far as the court in rendering it overstepped its
acquired jurisdiction or its powers under the law.").
It is plausible to suggest that because the sanctions order
declaring that the Linda property was not Camp's homestead does not
in and of itself "force" the sale of the property, the declaration
9
cannot contravene the constitutional restriction. The sanctions
order, however, operated in the nature of an equitable lien,
thereby creating a cloud on Camp's title. See Henderson v. Belknap
(In re Henderson), 18 F.3d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir.) (holding that
judicial order was equitable lien and impaired exemption under
federal law because created cloud on title to homestead property
even though unenforceable), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.
573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994). Moreover, because the validity of the
order of sale depends on the validity of the declaration,7 we
cannot view each action in isolation. Thus, if the declaration
improperly impaired a homestead right, we will not ignore "the
practical real life effects of an unenforceable judicial lien on a
Texas homestead." In re Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1310; see also In
re Niland, 825 F.2d at 814 (denying equitable lien against
homestead because otherwise would render constitutional protections
"almost meaningless" (citation omitted)).
McDaniel argues that the sanctions order is valid as a proper
determination of homestead. Courts of general jurisdiction do have
jurisdiction to determine whether a property is a homestead,8 and
7
"[A] properly abstracted judgment never attaches to a
homestead so long as it remains homestead property." In re
Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1308. Thus, if the Linda property is
Camp's homestead, the order of sale cannot attach. If the
declaration is valid, however, the Linda property is no longer
Camp's homestead. Consequently, the order of sale would not be
acting upon a homestead and would not contravene the
constitutional prohibition. However, the overall effect, if the
property is indeed Camp's homestead, would be a sale of homestead
property.
8
See Pace v. McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816, 819
(Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (holding that
10
once such a determination is made, res judicata can apply. See
Mosley v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 875 S.W.2d 10, 11
(Tex.App.—Eastland 1994, writ denied) (noting that res judicata
applies to homestead dispute only if prior court had subject matter
jurisdiction through a proper adjudication and upholding prior
judgment because it was in compliance with constitutional
protections).9 There exists a distinction, however, between the
determination of whether an existing, proper lien was correctly
applied and the imposition of a new lien without a prior
determination of its propriety. See Mosley, 875 S.W.2d at 11
(noting distinction between "the adjudication of an existing lien
and the imposition by the court of a previously non-existing
lien"). In the former situation, the prior court exercises its
jurisdiction to determine whether a property was a homestead, and
then if, and only if, the property is not a homestead, the court
imposes the lien. In the latter situation, the court imposes the
lien without conducting the required homestead determination; it
is this lien that the constitutional provision prohibits.
Accordingly, res judicata can apply only if the trial court
actually and properly determined the homestead question prior to
trial court had jurisdiction "to determine that the property in
question was not [claimant's] homestead").
9
Cf. Johnson v. Whatley, 45 S.W.2d 766, 768
(Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1932, writ ref'd) (refusing to allow
party to retry homestead issue because prior court had conducted
full trial of that issue); Tuerpe v. George W. Saunders Live
Stock Commission Co., 259 S.W. 649, 650-51 (Tex.Civ.App.—San
Antonio 1924, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (same).
11
issuing the order of sale.10
McDaniel argues that by failing to answer, Camp waived her
right to contest the propriety of the trial court's homestead
determination at a later date and to prove that jurisdiction was
lacking. Although parties must plead jurisdiction, waiver can
apply. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 90. (governing waiver of pleading
jurisdiction). This waiver, however, applies only to the pleading
of jurisdictional facts, not to their existence. See Trevino v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) ("[W]aiver of pleading of a fact does not constitute
waiver of proof of that fact."); Northrup v. O'Brien, 474 S.W.2d
614, 617 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, no writ) (stating that waiver
"does not dispense with proof of essential jurisdictional facts").
"An omission of, or defect in, the jurisdictional allegations will
be waived if the defendant fails to call it to the court's
attention before judgment, provided that the proof upon the trial
establishes the court's jurisdiction." Mercer v. Phillips Natural
10
See Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, 701 S.W.2d at 27 ("[T]he
former judgment [ordering sale] can stand only when the record
discloses that the issue of whether homestead exists has been
determined adversely to the one claiming the homestead
exemption...."); Tucker v. Cole, 215 S.W.2d 252, 255
(Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (requiring "an
affirmative showing in the decree that the question was
adjudicated in the judgment leading up to the sale"); Johnson v.
Echols, 21 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1929, writ
ref'd) ("[A] judgment foreclosing an attachment lien on land is
not conclusive of the defendant's homestead rights in the
attached lands where no issue regarding such homestead rights has
been made by the pleadings of either party."); Tobar v. Losano,
25 S.W. 973, 974 (Tex.Civ.App.1894, no writ) ("It is well settled
that the foreclosure of an attachment does not adjudicate the
homestead right, unless that issue is raised in the suit in
connection with which the attachment is foreclosed.").
12
Gas Co., 746 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, writ denied).
Accordingly, a party's waiver is not effective if the underlying
facts of jurisdiction are absent. See Mercer, 746 S.W.2d at 939
(looking to whether jurisdictional facts existed, not merely
whether they were pled); Poynor, 627 S.W.2d at 519 (noting that
parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdictional defects). If,
therefore, the proceedings resulting in the sanctions order did not
raise the issue of whether the property was Camp's homestead, the
sanctions order was not a determination of homestead and the trial
court would have had no jurisdiction to issue the order of sale.
In the request for admissions, Gutierrez asked Camp to admit
whether she had abandoned any homestead claim in the Linda
property. "When homestead rights are once shown to exist in
property, they are presumed to continue, and anyone asserting an
abandonment has the burden of pleading and proving it by competent
evidence." Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797, 801
(Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Abandonment is a question of fact. See Coleman v. Banks, 349
S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("[A]bandonment of a homestead is a question of fact to be
determined in each case from the entire evidence before the court
or jury....").
A party may attempt to satisfy its burden to prove factual
issues by requesting an admission from the opposing party. See
Tex.R.Civ.P. 169(2) ("Any matter admitted under this rule is
conclusively established as to the party making the
13
admission...."). If the opponent fails to answer the request, the
factual issue is deemed admitted. See Marshall v. Vise, 767 S.W.2d
699, 700 (Tex.1989) ("An admission once admitted, deemed or
otherwise, is a judicial admission, and a party may not then
introduce testimony to controvert it.").11 Should the deemed
admissions supply the necessary elements of the requesting party's
proof, a court may enter judgment on the requesting party's cause
of action.12 Consequently, resolution of a question solely on
11
See also Ramsey v. Criswell, 850 S.W.2d 258, 259
(Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) ("[W]hen timely response is
not made to a request for admissions, the matter is admitted
without the necessity of a court order."); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Bragg, 670 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that questions were deemed
admitted with or without a court order if no answer to request
for admissions); Frierson v. Modern Mut. Health & Acc. Ins. Co.,
172 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1943, ref'd w.o.m.)
("[T]he effect of a party's failure to answer inquiries in
adverse party's written request for admission ... is comparable
to a "legal admission' made in the applicable pleadings of a
party, so as to preclude his denial of such facts on the trial of
the case.").
12
See Ramsey, 850 S.W.2d at 260 (holding that when party's
deemed admissions supplied all elements necessary to support
judgment, judgment was proper); Agristor Credit Corp. v.
Donahoe, 568 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that when deemed admissions established all
elements of claim, claim had been established as a matter of
law); Frierson, 172 S.W.2d at 393 (holding that because admitted
facts "established in favor of [requesting party] every fact
tendered by its pleadings, ... it was the duty of the trial judge
to apply the law to the facts so established and render judgment
accordingly"); see also Parras v. McLelland, 846 S.W.2d 44, 46
(Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) ("[T]he legal effect
of a party's failure to answer inquiries in its written request
for admissions ... is to present the case to the trial court on
the agreed statement of facts ... [and] it is the trial judge's
duty to apply the law to the facts so established and render
judgment accordingly.").
14
deemed admissions constitutes adjudication of that question.13
Allowing Camp to challenge that adjudication in the bankruptcy
court would eviscerate the protections Texas law provides to a
party who properly obtains and relies on judicial admissions.14
Camp essentially contends that because the Texas courts
liberally construe the constitutional restriction against forced
homestead sales,15 we should make an exception and disregard the
ordinary legal effect of her admissions. We decline. The Texas
13
We have held in other circumstances that under Texas law,
a discovery sanction operates as a determination on the merits.
See Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488, 1493-94
(5th Cir.1993) (stating that discovery sanction—dismissal with
prejudice—operated as a determination on the merits under Texas
law (citing Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1991);
Logan, 736 S.W.2d at 931); Dillard v. Security Pacific Brokers,
Inc., 835 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that dismissal as
sanction for discovery abuse qualified as judgment on merits).
The Texas courts have acted similarly. See, e.g.,
Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 725 S.W.2d 427, 430
(Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(giving res judicata effect to default judgment entered as
sanction for discovery abuse); Tucker v. Cole, 215 S.W.2d
at 254-56 (holding that settlement decrees constituted full
adjudication of homestead question).
14
See Logan v. First Bank, 736 S.W.2d 927, 930
(Tex.App.—Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[S]anctions ...
serve to deter violations of the discovery rules."); id. at 931
("We believe that the sanctions imposed by the trial court would
be meaningless if the [sanctioned party] were allowed to raise
the same matters again in this case.").
15
See Simank v. Alford, 441 S.W.2d 234, 237
(Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating "generally
accepted rule that homestead laws are to be liberally construed
to effectuate their beneficent purpose"); Gann v. Montgomery,
210 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) ("The courts have always given a liberal construction to
the Constitution and Statutes to protect the homestead rights.
However, the courts cannot protect that which is not
homestead.").
15
courts explicitly have given admissions their ordinary legal effect
in the homestead context, both to award and to deny a finding of
homestead.16 Camp's admission that she had abandoned her homestead
interest in the Linda property thus established the factual basis
for the trial court's determination that the Linda property was not
her homestead. Consequently, the constitutional homestead
provisions no longer applied, and the trial court had jurisdiction
to impose execution on the Linda property.
Because the sanctions order and order of sale complied with
the first Sutherland requirement of jurisdiction, we turn to the
remaining elements—finality, identity of parties, and identity of
cause of action. The parties17 and the issues are identical;
therefore, the remaining question is whether the sanctions order
and order of sale constituted a final judgment. "A post-judgment
order disposing of all matters placed before the trial court in the
16
See, e.g., Steenland v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
648 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(allowing additional proof of homestead only because admissions
did not preclude facts necessary to determine homestead issue);
Cox v. Messer, 469 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, no
writ) (using admissions to establish homestead facts); Alexander
v. Alexander, 373 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi
1963, no writ) (finding conclusive judicial admission that
conceded homestead right to another party); Summers v. Butler,
284 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding that once admissions established that property was
homestead, "the fact issue as to whether the [property] was
homestead went out of the case").
17
After Gutierrez prevailed in the breach of warranty action
against Camp, he assigned his interest in the property to
McDaniel to satisfy a judgment McDaniel had against him.
Accordingly, both the state court action and the bankruptcy
proceeding share the same parties in interest. Indeed, Camp does
not challenge this point.
16
post-judgment motion is a final and appealable order." Wolma v.
Gonzalez, 822 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ)
(citing Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.1986)); see also
Collier Servs. Corp. v. Salinas, 812 S.W.2d 372, 374
(Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (stating that postjudgment
discovery order was final and appealable if it "finally disposed of
the newly asserted claims"); Transceiver v. Ring Around Prods.,
581 S.W.2d 712, 712 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, no writ) (holding
that postjudgment order was final and appealable because disposed
of all issues); cf. Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 500 n. 5
(Tex.1982) ("Trial court orders granting or denying particular
postjudgment discovery requests are not appealable until a final
judgment is rendered disposing of all issues between the
parties."). The sanctions order and order of sale disposed of all
questions raised by Gutierrez, that is, whether he could levy on
the Linda property to satisfy the judgment on his breach of
warranty claim. Accordingly, the orders are final.18
We therefore hold that the sanctions order and order of sale
constituted a valid judgment under Texas law that complied with all
the requirements for application of res judicata. A Texas court
would therefore have barred Camp from raising the homestead claim
in subsequent actions. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court should
have acted likewise and have given the sanctions order and order of
18
The orders are also final for the purposes of collateral
attack because Camp did not appeal them. See Curtis Sharp Custom
Homes, Inc., 701 S.W.2d at 24 (stating that prior judgment was
final because no appeal was taken from it).
17
sale res judicata effect. See In re Besing, 981 F.2d at 1494
("[F]ederal courts must give the Texas judgment the same preclusive
effect it would have had in a Texas court.").
III
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the
district court, and we REMAND to the district court with
instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
18