[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
_______________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 13, 2000
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 99-13681 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
_______________________
D. C. Docket No. 97-03284-CV-PAS
JOSEPH SUCCAR,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
d.b.a. Dade County Public Schools,
Defendant–Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 13, 2000)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The single issue raised in this appeal is whether harassment inflicted upon an
employee by a co-worker with whom that employee had a consensual sexual
relationship is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, under a “hostile work environment” theory of recovery.
We agree with the district court and hold that, under the circumstances of this case,
it is not.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995, Defendant-Appellee Dade County School Board (the “School
Board”) hired Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Succar as a full-time teacher. In that
same year, Succar, who was married, commenced a consensual sexual relationship
with Clemencia Lorenz, a fellow teacher. Near the end of the one-year
relationship, Lorenz began making threatening overtures towards Succar’s wife
and son; in response, Succar’s wife obtained a restraining order against Lorenz.
Thereafter, the relationship between Succar and Lorenz deteriorated rapidly and
eventually ended.
Lorenz’s behavior towards Succar following the termination of their
relationship was at best acrimonious. She verbally and physically harassed Succar
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and sought to embarrass him in front of colleagues and students. Succar insists
that he did nothing to encourage this behavior and took steps to quell it, including
avoiding Lorenz whenever possible and reporting the incidents to the school’s
principal. Succar maintains that the principal took insufficient steps to remedy the
situation, thereby allowing the harassment to continue unabated.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Succar filed a complaint with
the district court pursuant to Title VII in which he alleged “hostile work
environment” sexual harassment. The School Board subsequently filed a motion
for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying
the same standards as the district court. Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102
F.3d 516, 518 (11th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is only appropriate where
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.
Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Harris, 102
F.3d at 518.
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III. ANALYSIS
To establish a claim of “hostile work environment” sexual harassment, a
plaintiff-employee must allege and eventually prove five elements: (1) that the
employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on the employee’s sex;
(4) that the harassment affected a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment;
and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed
to intervene. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir.
1982). After reviewing the record and the well-reasoned order of the district court,
we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Succar failed to establish the third
element, that is, that his sex was the underlying reason for the harassment he
allegedly suffered.
Although this court has not previously addressed a factual scenario similar to
the one presented here, we have observed that “Title VII prohibits discrimination;
it is not a shield against harsh treatment at the work place. Personal animosity is
not the equivalent of sex discrimination . . . . The plaintiff cannot turn a personal
feud into a sex discrimination case . . . .” McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 610
(11th Cir. 1986) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). We do not
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disregard this precept of sexual harassment law simply because the plaintiff and the
alleged harassing party had a past sexual relationship. Regardless of the factual
context, our analysis focuses only on whether the complaining employee was
targeted because of his or her gender. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (“Title VII does not prohibit all
verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at
‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.’”); DeCintio v. Westchester County
Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1986) (sexual harassment must be “based
on a person’s sex, not his or her sexual affiliations”); Heubschen v. Department of
Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir. 1983) (no liability for sexual
harassment where supervisor’s “motivation [for recommending that plaintiff be
terminated] was not that [plaintiff] was male, but that he was a former lover who
had jilted her”).
Viewing the undisputed material facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
we agree with the district court’s finding that Ms. Lorenz’s harassment of Plaintiff
was not the result of Plaintiff’s gender “‘but of responses to an individual because
of her former intimate place in [that individual’s] life.” Succar v. Dade County
Sch. Bd., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (quoting Keppler v Hinsdale
Township High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp. 862, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In other
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words, Lorenz’s harassment of Succar was motivated not by his male gender, but
rather by Lorenz’s contempt for Succar following their failed relationship; Succar’s
gender was merely coincidental.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the School Board.
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