[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 29, 2002
No. 01-12379 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00053-CV-T-23
JOHN BAILEY and FRANK DUNN,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
GULF COAST TRANSPORTATION, INC. and
NANCY CASTELLANO,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 29, 2002)
Before WILSON, RONEY and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The issue in this case is whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219, permits employees to obtain preliminary injunctive relief
restraining further retaliatory conduct by their employer and reinstating them to
their former positions. Although the district court found the employers’ conduct
in this case to be “plainly retaliatory,” the court denied the employees’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, holding that the Secretary of Labor has the exclusive right
to seek injunctive relief under the FLSA. We disagree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
John Bailey and other taxi cab drivers were terminated shortly after suing
Gulf Coast Transportation, Inc. and its general manager, Nancy Castellano
(together Gulf Coast), in a collective action for failing to pay them minimum
wages in violation of the FLSA.1 After their termination, the drivers filed an
amended complaint, including a claim for retaliation and a motion for a
preliminary injunction to reinstate the drivers who were terminated and to enjoin
Gulf Coast from further retaliatory conduct. The district court denied the drivers’
motion. The court stated,
[T]he evidence supporting the substantive merits of the requested
preliminary injunction is quite persuasive. Were preliminary
injunctive relief available to a private litigant in an FLSA case, the
plaintiffs would be entitled on this record to injunctive relief
preserving the status quo ante pending further litigation. The
defendants’ conduct is plainly retaliatory.
1
The parties disagree about the nature of their business relationship. The drivers claim
they were employees, while Gulf Coast claims they were independent contractors and were
terminated because they “disavowed their independent-contractor relationship.” We express no
opinion as to whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors, preferring that the
district court address this question in the first instance.
2
Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transp., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1363 n.6 (M.D. Fla.
2001). However, the court determined that it could not grant a preliminary
injunction because of this Court’s decision in Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678
(11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (stating “that the right to bring an action for
injunctive relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act rests exclusively with the
United States Secretary of Labor”). The drivers appealed.
DISCUSSION
The ultimate decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is reviewed
for abuse of discretion, but the determinations of law the district court makes in
reaching that decision are reviewed de novo. Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 993
(11th Cir. 1996).
In denying the drivers’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court
determined it could not grant the drivers the relief they sought because of this
Court’s statement in Powell that only the Secretary of Labor could bring an action
for injunctive relief under the FLSA. Bailey, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1363–64. In
Powell, we held that the Secretary alone could bring an action for injunctive relief
for violations of the FLSA’s wage and overtime provisions, but did not address the
question now before us: whether an employee may obtain injunctive relief for
3
violations of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision in § 215(a)(3).2 132 F.3d at
678–79. The plain language of § 216(b), which provides a private right of action
to employees to seek legal or equitable relief for an employer’s violation of the
antiretaliation provision, mandates that we answer this question in the affirmative.3
The remedies § 216(b) provides to employees for violations of the FLSA’s
antiretaliation provision are broader than those available for violations of the wage
and overtime provisions. Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 933–34
(11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 121 S. Ct. 1609 (2001). One significant
difference between the remedies available for violations of the wage and overtime
provisions and the antiretaliation provision is the availability of equitable relief.
For violations of the wage and overtime provisions, the FLSA does not list
2
The antiretaliation provision makes it unlawful for employers “to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter.” 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
3
While some courts have read Powell as prohibiting all employee suits for injunctive
relief even under the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA, e.g., Bjornson v. Daido Metal U.S.A.,
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 837, 843 (N.D. Ill. 1998), we find this approach to be contrary to the plain
language of § 216(b). Other courts have recognized – as we do here – that the FLSA does
provide a private right of action to pursue injunctive relief for violations of the antiretaliation
provision. See Bush v. State Indus., Inc., 599 F.2d 780, 782, 786–87 (6th Cir. 1979) (recognizing
that the FLSA provides a private right of action for an employee seeking reinstatement);
Martinez v. Deaf Smith County Grain Processors, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1200, 1212 (N.D. Tex.
1984) (granting an injunction to a private litigant and stating that the injunction was “consonant
with the remedies explicitly suggested under § 216(b)” because these remedies are meant “to
place the employee retaliated against in the same position he would have been in had the
retaliation never taken place”).
4
equitable relief as an available remedy in an employee suit.4 For violations of the
antiretaliation provision, however, the FLSA specifically provides for equitable
relief in an employee suit. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Section 216(b) provides that an
employer who violates the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision “shall be liable for
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of”
the antiretaliation provision and provides a private right of action to employees to
seek this relief. Id.
Gulf Coast contends that even if § 216(b) allows for some forms of equitable
relief, it does not allow for injunctive relief. Gulf Coast argues that § 217 governs
injunctions under the FLSA, and that § 211 provides that except under the child
labor laws, the Secretary has exclusive authority to bring proceedings under § 217.
Thus, Gulf Coast maintains that only the Secretary may seek injunctive relief under
the FLSA. We reject this argument as inconsistent with the plain meaning of §
216(b).5
4
The only remedies § 216(b) provides for violations of the FLSA’s wage and overtime
provisions in §§ 206 and 207 are “the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid
overtime compensation . . . and . . . an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” § 216(b).
5
The Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief supporting the drivers’ position that the
plain language of § 216(b) allows private plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief in retaliation suits.
The Secretary asserted that even if this Court found the FLSA to be ambiguous, her
interpretation is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–45 (1984). We need not reach this issue because we find that the plain meaning of § 216(b)
permits employees to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
5
Section 216(b) was amended in 1977 to allow employees to bring suit
seeking legal or equitable relief for violations of the antiretaliation provision. Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1245, 1252.
Before these amendments, employees who suffered retaliation had to rely on the
Secretary to file suit on their behalf, which “place[d] a heavy burden on the
Department of Labor’s resources” and left many wrongfully discharged employees
without a remedy when the Secretary declined to file suit. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1977: Hearings on S. 1871 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 15–16 (1977). The amendments provided
greater protection to employees who suffer retaliation by affording them a private
right of action to obtain legal or equitable relief, “including without limitation
employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
An injunction reinstating employees to their former position and restraining
further retaliation fits squarely within the relief available under § 216(b), which
allows an employee to obtain, “without limitation,” equitable relief that is
“appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the antiretaliation provision. An
injunction is a prototypical example of equitable relief. See Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (listing an injunction as its first example of
6
“those categories of relief that were typically available in equity” (emphasis
omitted)). Reinstatement is expressly available in § 216(b) and would be achieved
through an injunctive order. An injunction reinstating further retaliatory conduct
indeed may help to “effectuate the purposes” of the antiretaliation provision in a
case such as this, where the district court found Gulf Coast’s conduct to be “plainly
retaliatory” and where there was evidence that other drivers were fearful of
participating in the suit.6 The primary purpose of the antiretaliation provision is to
ensure that fear of retaliation does not “operate to induce aggrieved employees
quietly to accept substandard conditions.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
Gulf Coast also argues that even if § 216(b) does allow for injunctions, it
does not allow for preliminary injunctions, because it provides that only an
employer who “violates” the antiretaliation provision is “liable” for equitable
relief. Gulf Coast claims that this language indicates that an injunction should not
be issued against an employer until a lawsuit concludes with a finding of liability.
However, unless a statute “by a necessary and inescapable inference . . . restricts
the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
6
Several drivers declared that other drivers feared participating in the suit because of Gulf
Coast’s retaliatory conduct. One driver, Joseph P. Vaccaro, withdrew his Consent to Join form
with the understanding that he would be reinstated if he pulled out of the lawsuit.
7
recognized and applied” to “give effect to the policy of the legislature.” Id. at 291,
292 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the language providing for
equitable relief for violations of the antiretaliation provision is not restrictive, but
expansive (“including without limitation employment, reinstatement, [and]
promotion,” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added)), we do not find “a necessary
and inescapable inference” that Congress intended to restrict courts from issuing
preliminary injunctions to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the
lawsuit. The antiretaliation provision was meant “to foster a climate in which
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced” by
protecting employees who come forward with complaints. DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. at 292. Employees may be much less likely to stand up for their
substantive rights under the statute if they know that months or years will pass
before a court can act to halt prohibited intimidation by their employer. When an
employee has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and satisfied the
other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, allowing for such relief to put
the employee back in the position he held before the employer’s retaliatory conduct
is consistent with § 216(b) – it is a form of equitable relief that effectuates the
purposes of the antiretaliation provision.
CONCLUSION
8
We hold that the FLSA permits employees to obtain preliminary injunctive
relief to address violations of the Act’s antiretaliation provision. We leave to the
district court the questions of whether the drivers are independent contractors or
employees and whether the drivers have met the requirements for a preliminary
injunction in this case.
Accordingly, the district court’s order denying the drivers’ motion for
preliminary injunctive relief is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
9