[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ JANUARY 17, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 99-13766 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 98-00953-CIV-GOLD
MCARTHUR BREEDLOVE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL W. MOORE, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 17, 2002)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
McArthur Breedlove, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Breedlove was convicted in the Dade County Circuit Court on March 2, 1979 of
first degree murder, burglary, grand theft and petit theft, and was sentenced to
death on the murder charge. In this appeal, Breedlove raises eight separate claims
of constitutional error relating to his conviction and sentence, and argues that the
district court erred in failing to grant him habeas relief on each of these claims. In
the alternative, Breedlove seeks an evidentiary hearing on his first claim, which
alleges that the state suppressed material evidence tending to impeach state
witnesses in violation of the rule established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). After carefully considering the briefs and the record, and after the benefit
of oral argument, we conclude that none of Breedlove’s claims of error warrant
relief. Furthermore, we conclude that an evidentiary hearing could not assist in the
resolution of Breedlove’s Brady claim, as he could not secure habeas relief on that
claim even if all of his factual allegations are proven. Therefore, we deny
Breedlove’s request for an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim, and affirm the
district court’s denial of habeas relief on each of Breedlove’s eight constitutional
claims.
BACKGROUND
A.
The charges in this case arise out of the burglary of a residence in Miami,
Florida on November 6, 1978. Frank Budnick, one of the occupants of the home,
2
was murdered in the course of the burglary. McArthur Breedlove, a local resident,
was arrested three days later, and shortly thereafter was indicted for the murder of
Budnick and the attempted murder of another occupant of the house, Carol Meoni.1
At trial, the State proceeded on a felony murder theory, with identity being
the only issue in dispute. Meoni, the surviving occupant of the house, was unable
to identify Breedlove as the assailant, though she did provide details of the struggle
between the assailant and Budnick, as well as testimony concerning both her own
wounds and the property that was stolen from the house (which included a
rhinestone watch). A neighbor testified that at approximately 2:30 AM, she saw a
man leaving the vicinity of the crime scene on a blue bicycle.2 The State then
presented testimony that a blue bicycle had been stolen that evening from a nearby
home. Investigators located a blue bicycle at Breedlove’s residence, some nine
blocks from the Budnick home.
The most critical portion of the State’s case against Breedlove came from
testimony offered by the two Miami-Dade police detectives who investigated the
crime, Julio Ojeda and Charles Zatrepalek. Ojeda testified that the two quickly
seized upon Breedlove as a suspect when they learned that Breedlove had been
1
Breedlove’s indictment also included counts of burglary, grand theft, and petit theft.
2
The witness admitted to some degree of uncertainty about the color of the bicycle.
3
arrested in the area on November 8 (on an unrelated charge), and had apparently
been elusive when asked about his identity. Ojeda stated that he and Zatrepalek
spoke with Breedlove’s mother and brother on that date at Breedlove’s residence,
and Breedlove’s brother claimed that Breedlove had returned home on a blue
bicycle on the morning of November 7 with a rhinestone watch in his possession
and blood all over his pants.3 At this point, their suspicions truly piqued, Ojeda
testified that he and Zatrepalek went to the Dade County jail to speak with
Breedlove himself.
Ojeda claimed the detectives began the questioning by inquiring about the
stolen bicycle found at Breedlove’s residence, which Breedlove adamantly denied
taking. However, Breedlove quickly changed his story, and suggested that he had
stolen it when he became tired while walking home after an evening out. Under
continued questioning about the murder of Budnick, Breedlove apparently became
agitated. Ojeda testified that Breedlove insisted that the police were trying to
frame him, and Breedlove noted that the police could not prove he had been in
Budnick’s house, as there would be no fingerprints. When asked why there would
be no fingerprints in Budnick’s house, Breedlove claimed it was because he was
3
Breedlove’s brother’s statements did not come in for their truth, but rather to show their
effect on Breedlove during subsequent questioning.
4
“wearing socks [on his hands].” At the conclusion of this interview, Ojeda and
Zatrepalek arrested Breedlove on suspicion of Budnick’s murder.
Zatrepalek testified that he went to speak with Breedlove alone at the
detention center on November 21, 1978. During this conversation, Breedlove
admitted that he was responsible for Budnick’s murder. Zatrepalek called in a
court reporter, and had Breedlove make a formal statement detailing the murder
and confessing his responsibility for it. The transcript of this confession was
introduced as evidence at the trial.4
Following the detectives’ testimony and the introduction of Breedlove’s
confession, the state concluded its case. The defense rested without calling any
witnesses, and the jury convicted Breedlove of first degree murder, burglary, grand
theft, and petit theft.5
At the penalty phase, the State called two witnesses. One, a Los Angeles
police officer, testified he had arrested Breedlove for burglary and assault with
intent to commit rape in 1968. A Deputy Medical Examiner testified that Budnick
drowned in his own blood, suffered considerable pain, and was conscious until he
4
Breedlove sought to suppress his confession on the grounds that it was obtained in
violation of his right to remain silent and that Detective Zatrepalek had beaten and coerced the
confession out of him.
5
The jury acquitted Breedlove of the attempted murder of Meoni.
5
stumbled out of his house and fell. The defense called three mental health experts.
Dr. Center testified that Breedlove suffered brain dysfunction and emotional
problems. Dr. Levy testified that Breedlove suffered from neurological
impairment, and that Breedlove had told him of a history of drug abuse which was
consistent with the expert’s belief that Breedlove was a schizophrenic. The final
expert, Dr. Miller, indicated that Breedlove was schizophrenic. The State
presented rebuttal experts who testified that Breedlove was not disturbed, did not
suffer from brain damage, and that he had the capacity to appreciate his criminal
conduct. The jury recommended that Breedlove be sentenced to death for the
murder of Budnick. The trial court concurred, and imposed the death penalty on
the murder charge.
B.
At the time of the investigation and trial in Breedlove’s case, Detectives
Ojeda and Zatrepalek were themselves involved in extensive and serious criminal
activity. A lengthy FBI investigation into the Miami-Dade Police Department’s
Homicide Division in the late 1970s and early 1980s revealed that some of the
Division’s detectives were regularly and repeatedly violating numerous federal
laws. In July of 1981, a federal grand jury handed down a forty-count indictment
alleging (among other things) that Ojeda and others had run the Homicide Division
6
as a racketeering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1967. Zatrepalek was not
charged, as he had been cooperating with the government for over a year, and
received immunity in exchange for his testimony against Ojeda and other
detectives in the Homicide Division.
At Ojeda’s federal trial, disturbing details concerning the extent of Ojeda’s
and Zatrepalek’s criminal activities came to light. Zatrepalek testified that he and
Ojeda used cocaine repeatedly, often at the Homicide Division’s offices. Another
detective cooperating with the state alleged that cocaine use among the homicide
detectives was rampant, and that he had used cocaine with Zatrepalek and Ojeda on
a number of occasions. The evidence concerning Ojeda’s and Zatrepalek’s
criminality went far beyond allegations of drug use. In September of 1978,
Zatrepalek and another detective stole cocaine from a homicide scene and sold it,
with each of them pocketing some six thousand dollars from the transaction. In
January of 1979, Zatrepalek, Ojeda, and others entered a private home under the
ruse of being involved in an official investigation, stole some ninety-eight
thousand dollars from the home, and pocketed thirty-six thousand of that, placing
the rest in police property room. Ojeda was eventually convicted of conspiracy to
conduct and conducting a RICO enterprise, two counts of unlawful arrest under
7
color of state law, two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
unlawful appropriation of property, conspiracy to defraud the government, and two
counts of tax evasion. Ojeda received a fourteen year prison sentence, and the
conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Alonso, 740
F.2d 862, 866 (11th Cir. 1984).
The transcript of the federal trial, which has been made a part of the
appellate record in the instant case, indicates that there was conflicting testimony
concerning two points relevant for Breedlove’s appeal. First, it is unclear when
Detectives Ojeda and Zatrepalek began to suspect that their criminal activities were
being investigated by federal or state authorities. Zatrepalek testified that he was
not aware of any official investigations into any of his criminal activities until
November of 1979. He also testified, however, that Ojeda had told him earlier (the
exact date is unclear) that Ojeda felt that the Organized Crime Bureau was
investigating him for some reason. Ojeda had been questioned during an Internal
Affairs investigation of the Homicide Division in January of 1978; that
investigation was “suspended” in July of that year. It is unclear whether Ojeda
knew that the investigation had been suspended, or the extent of his alleged
suspicion that his activities were being investigated by the Organized Crime
Bureau or other divisions of the State Attorney’s Office.
8
The record is also unclear as to the extent to which the State Attorney’s
Office had direct knowledge of Ojeda’s and Zatrepalek’s crimes and investigations
into those crimes at the time of Breedlove’s arrest and trial. At Ojeda’s trial, the
lead prosecutor in Breedlove’s case, Richard Steltzer (who received immunity in
exchange for his testimony at the federal trial), admitted experimenting with
cocaine with detectives from the homicide division at some point between 1977
and 1979. Steltzer also testified that he had a “mental picture” of Ojeda using
cocaine on “one, two, maybe three occasions.” Steltzer later acknowledged that he
was aware of the FBI investigation into the homicide division’s operations, but he
was unsure when he became aware of that fact. The record thus reflects that the
State Attorney’s Office had some knowledge of drug use within the Miami-Dade
Police Department’s homicide division, but the extent of their knowledge of other
criminal activities, and their direct awareness of any investigations into those
activities, is unclear.
C.
The history of Breedlove’s case, spanning the more than twenty-one years
from his sentencing to the current appeal, is lengthy and complex. Our recounting
9
of it will be brief, with particular attention paid to the manner in which the Florida
courts resolved Breedlove’s Brady claim.
Breedlove’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982). Breedlove’s first motion for post-
conviction relief (filed in 1982) raised the Brady issue for the first time, alleging
that the prosecution suppressed evidence concerning Ojeda and Zatrepalek’s
criminal activities, and that this evidence could have been used to impeach the
testimony of both detectives. The trial court, without holding an evidentiary
hearing, rejected Breedlove’s Brady claim. The case later reached the Florida
Supreme Court. Breedlove v. State, 580 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1991) (Breedlove II).
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny relief
on Breedlove’s Brady claim. The court summarized Breedlove’s contentions on
appeal as follows:
Breedlove alleges that (1) Zatrepalek and Ojeda knew of their own criminal
activities; (2) an assistant state attorney [Steltzer] and a police officer knew
of Ojeda’s using cocaine; and (3) Zatrepalek and Ojeda knew that they were
being investigated by the internal affairs division. According to Breedlove,
knowledge of this information should be imputed to the prosecution, which
should be found to have suppressed the information. We agree with the trial
court that an evidentiary hearing is not required because, even if assumed to
be true, the facts alleged do not form a basis for relief.
Id. at 606.
10
The court’s holding in Breedlove II rested upon two analytically distinct
grounds. First, the court found that the record did not support the allegation that
the prosecution “suppressed” evidence of Ojeda and Zatrepalek’s criminal
activities, a necessary element of a Brady claim. In the alternative, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the allegedly suppressed evidence was not “material,” and
therefore could not be used as the basis for a cognizable Brady violation.
Breedlove’s petition for an evidentiary hearing was denied, as was his request for
post-conviction relief.
Breedlove filed his second post-conviction motion in 1991. Breedlove
raised a number of issues in this second collateral attack on his conviction and
sentence, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of his case. The trial court summarily denied Breedlove relief
after reviewing this second Rule 3.850 motion. However, the Florida Supreme
Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness at penalty phase claim.
Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1992) (Breedlove III). The opportunity
to present evidence on this claim did Breedlove little good, as the trial court denied
relief after holding the requisite evidentiary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed. Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1997) (Breedlove IV).
Breedlove eventually filed a third motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that
11
certain language used in the jury instructions at the penalty phase of his case
unfairly prejudiced him. After the trial court ordered a new sentencing hearing, the
state appealed and the Florida Supreme Court reversed. See State v. Breedlove,
655 So. 2d 74, 76-77 (Fla. 1995) (Breedlove V).
Breedlove filed the current petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Southern District of Florida in 1998. The district court denied relief without an
evidentiary hearing on the Brady (or any other) issue. On the Brady issue, the
district court expressly found that the Florida Supreme Court’s application of
Brady to the facts of Breedlove’s case was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, federal law, and thus was entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (d)(1). Breedlove was granted a certificate of appealability on all issues, and
timely filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
A.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Hurley v. Moore, 233 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam).
12
After reviewing Breedlove’s petition, we find that seven of Breedlove’s
claims are without merit, and do not warrant extended discussion.6 The bulk of
this opinion will address the issues surrounding Breedlove’s Brady claim, and his
plea for an evidentiary hearing on that claim.
B.
Breedlove argues that the state failed to disclose material information
relating to Ojeda and Zatrepalek’s criminal conduct to the defense, and that this
failure amounts to a violation of the rule the Supreme Court articulated in Brady v.
Maryland. The Florida Supreme Court reached the merits of this claim, and
rejected it, without holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter. The district court
also declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, declaring that “an evidentiary hearing
would not aid in the resolution of the Brady violation claim.” Breedlove contends
that he is entitled to relief on the Brady claim; in the alternative, he argues that an
evidentiary hearing is warranted. Breedlove acknowledges that he has had no
6
Breedlove argues: (1) That the trial court admitted certain hearsay statements from
Breedlove’s mother and brother that violated his Sixth Amendment rights; (2) that his confession
should have been suppressed pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona; (3) that his defense counsel
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of his trial; (4) that the
Florida Supreme Court misapplied the harmless error standard articulated in Chapman v.
California when evaluating Breedlove’s claim of prejudicial jury instructions; (5) that defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of his trial; (6) that appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise certain arguments on direct appeal; and (7) that the prosecutor
made improper arguments at the penalty phase.
13
opportunity to prove any facts relevant to his Brady claim; therefore, granting the
petition on the basis of this claim, when so many facts remain in dispute, is
impossible. The remainder of this opinion will address the narrower issue of
whether Breedlove has made allegations sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary
hearing on his Brady claim.
We review a district court’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing for an
abuse of discretion. Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2000).
Breedlove filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the 1996
passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which
modified 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in a number of important ways. One significant change
the AEDPA brought to the terms of § 2254 concerns the standards governing
evidentiary hearings in federal habeas cases. One purpose of the AEDPA has been
to simplify and speed the federal habeas process; consistent with this goal, the
AEDPA added the following provision to § 2254:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state
court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that--
(A) the claim relies on
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
14
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2).
This provision places a fairly stringent limitation on the power of the federal
courts to order evidentiary hearings in habeas cases. Indeed, if a petitioner fails to
develop an adequate factual record in the state courts, an evidentiary hearing could
only be ordered if one of the two narrow exceptions to the general rule prohibiting
such hearings applied.
However, the question of what exactly constitutes a “failure to develop” the
factual basis for a claim in state court is one on which we have not spoken. The
Supreme Court, however, has addressed this question in a recent opinion, and
stated that a petitioner cannot be said to have “failed to develop” relevant facts if
he diligently sought, but was denied, the opportunity to present evidence at each
stage of his state proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000)
(Williams I). The Court noted that § 2254(e) requires habeas petitioners to be
diligent in presenting the factual bases of their federal claims to state courts, and
that a failure to do so will result in the denial of an evidentiary hearing in federal
court (unless the statute’s other stringent requirements are met). Id. However, the
Court also pointed out that:
15
comity is not served by saying a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual
basis of a claim” where he was unable to develop his claim in state court
despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not
barred by 2254(e)(2).
Id.
In the instant case, the record clearly indicates that Breedlove sought an
evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim at every stage of his state proceedings. The
state courts denied him the opportunity to present evidence related to his Brady
claim; therefore, he was prevented from developing a factual basis for his claim in
state court. In light of this fact, § 2254(e)(2) does not preclude an evidentiary
hearing in Breedlove’s case.
While Breedlove’s diligent efforts to obtain an evidentiary hearing in state
court mean that a federal evidentiary hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2), it
would still be appropriate to deny him an evidentiary hearing if such a hearing
would not assist in the resolution of his claim. Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d
1547, 1555 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[N]o evidentiary hearing is necessary where the
proffered evidence would not affect the resolution of the claim.”). Both the Florida
Supreme Court and the district court found that Breedlove’s allegations, even if
true, would not lead to a successful Brady claim, and thus found an evidentiary
hearing unnecessary. Of course, we have also noted that “it is well established that
a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he or she alleges facts
16
that, if proved at the hearing, would entitle petitioner to relief.” Meeks v.
Singletary, 963 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks,
emphasis, and citation omitted).
Therefore, in order for Breedlove to obtain an evidentiary hearing, he must
demonstrate that he would be entitled to habeas relief on his Brady claim if his
factual allegations are proven. The Florida Supreme Court addressed this question,
and found that even if true, the facts alleged in support of Breedlove’s Brady claim
would not entitle Breedlove to relief. In the post AEDPA era, we do not conduct
an independent review of claims that have been addressed on the merits by the
state courts. The relevant standard for federal habeas review of such claims is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State Court . . .
unless adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the
state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by
Supreme Court precedent, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable
facts, arrived at a conclusion different from that of the Supreme Court. Bottoson v.
17
Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000). A state court’s decision amounts to an
“unreasonable application” of federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule from
Supreme Court case law, but applies that rule in an unreasonable manner to the
facts of petitioner’s case. Id. This could also occur if the state court unreasonably
extends, or declines to extend, a governing legal principle (as established by
Supreme Court case law) to a new context. Id. An unreasonable application of
federal law does not refer to an incorrect or erroneous application, but rather to one
that is objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Taylor, 529U.S. 362, 410-12 (2000)
(Williams II).
Therefore, Breedlove is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he can
demonstrate that his factual allegations, if proven, would indicate that the Florida
Supreme Court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established
federal law when it rejected his Brady claim. To conduct this analysis, it is
necessary for us to first articulate the relevant principles of Brady and its progeny,
as defined by Supreme Court case law. We can then examine the substance of
Breedlove’s factual allegations, and determine whether the Florida Supreme Court
acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, federal law in holding that the facts
alleged could never lead to relief on the basis of a Brady violation.
18
Brady places an affirmative duty upon the state to reveal any “material”
evidence in its possession that would tend to exculpate a defendant. Brady, 373
U.S. at 86-88. The state violates due process if it does not disclose any materially
exculpatory information it possesses, regardless of whether the failure to disclose
was in good faith. Id. at 87. The duty to disclose covers both exculpatory
evidence and evidence tending to impeach a state witness. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Exculpatory or impeachment evidence is material for
the purpose of Brady “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 682.
Several notes about the elements of a Brady claim are relevant for our
purposes. First, with respect to the “suppression” prong of the Brady test, the
prosecution team generally is considered a unitary entity, and favorable
information possessed by the police but unknown to the prosecutor is nonetheless
subject to the Brady test. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that
the Brady rule encompasses evidence “known only to police investigators but not
the prosecutor”).7
7
Kyles did not announce a new rule of law, and its holding is thus applicable to cases
that predate it. We recognized this fact in Neeley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 927 n.10 (11th Cir.
1998). Thus, the Florida Supreme Court order at issue in this case must comply with Kyles if it is
to be a reasonable application of the Brady standard, even though the court’s order predates
19
Secondly, the question of when evidence is “material” for Brady purposes
has engendered much Supreme Court discussion. The meaning of “materiality”
has been developed and refined in post Brady cases, notably in Bagley:
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The issue also came up in Kyles, in which Justice Souter
noted:
Bagley’s touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable probability” of a
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
As was discussed earlier ,the Florida Supreme Court rejected Breedlove’s
Brady claim on two distinct grounds. First, the court found that evidence of the
detectives’ criminal activities, and the investigation into those activities, could not
have been suppressed by the state, as the state had no access to the information.
Second, the court found that the evidence allegedly suppressed by the state could
not be “material” within the definition of Brady and its progeny. Our task is to
Kyles by some four years.
20
determine whether Breedlove’s factual allegations, if true, would demonstrate that
these bases for rejecting the claim were contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, Brady and its progeny.
Breedlove’s allegations, both before the Florida Supreme Court in his state
collateral petition and in his federal habeas petition, can be succinctly stated. He
alleges that: (a) the prosecution knew that Ojeda and Zatrepalek were involved in
crime, and knew of past investigations into that crime, and (b) Ojeda and
Zatrepalek obviously knew of their own criminal activities, and were anxious about
prospective investigations into their misconduct. Breedlove claims that had he
known of these criminal activities, or of any investigations into those activities, he
could have questioned the detectives about it, and perhaps demonstrated that their
testimony against Breedlove was motivated in part by a desire to curry favor with
law enforcement authorities. Breedlove was a defendant charged with capital
murder, and prosecuting a capital case is an extremely serious and sensitive
undertaking for any State Attorney’s Office. According to Breedlove, assistance in
securing a conviction in a capital case is a plausible means of earning trust and
support with relevant law enforcement authorities; therefore, Breedlove argues that
if Ojeda and Zatrepalek thought that they were under threat of indictment, they
may have wished to use Breedlove’s case to build favor within the State Attorney’s
21
Office. If Breedlove’s claims are true, and the detectives really were seeking to
bolster their standing with law enforcement by ensuring Breedlove’s conviction,
the credibility of the State’s case (virtually all of which came through Ojeda and
Zatrepalek) arguably could have been undermined.
Taking these factual allegations as true, we turn first to the “contrary to”
prong of the § 2254 standard. The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Breedlove
II easily satisfies the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1). The court correctly
identified Brady as providing the governing legal principle; it also correctly listed
all of the elements of a successful Brady claim. Breedlove II, 580 So. 2d at 606.
Breedlove does not cite any pre-1991case in which the Supreme Court arrived at a
conclusion different from that of the Florida Supreme Court when faced with
materially indistinguishable facts, and we are not aware of any such case. Given
these facts, there can be no serious claim that the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion
is “contrary to” clearly established, pre-existing federal law.
Breedlove argues that both components of the rationale the Florida Supreme
Court offered in denying his Brady claim are unreasonable applications of federal
law, as that term is defined by § 2254(d)(1). The Florida Supreme Court couched
its holding in the alternative, meaning that it found that either one of the bases of
its decision in Breedlove II would have been sufficient standing alone to deny
22
Breedlove relief. Therefore, in order to prevail in his effort to obtain an
evidentiary hearing, Breedlove must show that both components of the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision are unreasonable applications of federal law. We need
not address the first base of the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Breedlove II
(finding Breedlove could not show that state suppressed evidence) because
Breedlove cannot demonstrate that the second base of that holding, relating to the
materiality of the allegedly suppressed information, was objectively unreasonable.
The Florida Supreme Court found that questions into the potential biases of
the Detectives (as they related to the detectives’ misconduct) would be
inadmissible under Florida’s law of evidence. The court noted Breedlove’s
contention that the detectives’ testimony may have been motivated by a desire to
receive favorable treatment if the state were to proceed against them, and the court
acknowledged the broad scope litigants were generally given under Florida
evidentiary law to inquire into the possible biases of state witnesses. Id. at 607-08.
However, the court pointed out that inquiries into potential bias are not unlimited
in the Florida courts; such inquiries must not “unfairly prejudice the trier of fact
against the witness or mislead the trier of fact.” Id. at 609. Inquiry into collateral
matters will not be permitted under Florida law unless it would promote the ends of
justice. Because the detectives’ criminal conduct was completely unrelated to the
23
charges against Breedlove, and because the detectives had not been indicted or
convicted of any crime at the time of Breedlove’s trial, the court found that
questions concerning Ojeda and Zatrepalek’s criminal activities would do nothing
more than “raise the possibility that [the Detectives] had engaged in bad acts.” Id.
Given this finding, questions about Ojeda’s and Zatrepalek’s misconduct, and
their knowledge of any investigations into that misconduct, would have been
inadmissible at Breedlove’s trial. With questions addressing the alleged bias
inadmissible, the court held that Breedlove had failed to demonstrate that the
suppressed evidence met the materiality prong of the Brady test.
Even assuming all of Breedlove’s factual allegations are true, we cannot say
that this decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. The Florida Supreme Court is the final arbiter of Florida evidentiary law;
federal courts must respect that law absent a constitutional violation. Hunt v.
Tucker, 93 F.3d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). A federal habeas court
may not issue the writ on the basis of a state’s interpretation of its own laws and
rules, absent extreme circumstances. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42 (1984);
McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535-36 (11th Cir. 1992).8 In the instant
8
In some circumstances, a totally unsupportable construction of state law by a state court
will be subject to review by the federal courts, if the construction amounts to an obvious
subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal claim. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691
n.11 (1975).
24
case, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted Florida’s law of evidence as limiting
certain sorts of queries into the prospective biases of state witnesses. We cannot
review this decision unless it amounts to an egregious, unsupportable application
of state law designed to frustrate Breedlove’s Brady claim. Plainly, it is no such
thing. Indeed, two years before Breedlove II, we noted that similar evidence of
unrelated illegal activity by a police officer testifying for the state would likely not
have been admissible under Florida’s law of evidence, and thus immaterial for
Brady purposes. See Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285, 298 (11th Cir. 1989). The
Florida Supreme Court’s decision that the allegedly suppressed evidence was
inadmissible was completely consistent with prior Florida evidentiary law, and
cannot be disturbed by this court.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably
apply the Brady standard when it found that this inadmissible evidence was not
material. Brady’s materiality standard defines evidence as “material” only if there
is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have affected the outcome of
the proceeding. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Inadmissible evidence could only rarely
meet this standard – indeed, no Supreme Court case, either before or since the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Breedlove II, has found inadmissible evidence
25
was material for Brady purposes.9 In light of this fact, it was certainly not
objectively unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to assume that
inadmissible evidence, such as the evidence at issue in Breedlove II, was not
material under the standard articulated in Bagley.
In sum, Breedlove cannot demonstrate that the Florida Supreme Court was
objectively unreasonable in holding that the evidence that the state allegedly
suppressed was inadmissible, and thus immaterial, under Brady and its progeny.
None of Breedlove’s allegations, if proven, could change this fact. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Breedlove an evidentiary
hearing on his Brady claim, as nothing proven at that hearing could possibly assist
in the resolution of Breedlove’s petition for habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly denied Breedlove’s petition on each of his eight
claims. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Breedlove an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim. Breedlove’s allegations with
9
In Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995) (per curiam), the Supreme Court
considered the question of whether inadmissible evidence could be material under Brady. In that
case, the Court found that inadmissible evidence of a polygraph result would not have been
material under Brady, though the court did not rule that inadmissible evidence could never
satisfy Brady’s materiality prong. We have held that inadmissible evidence may be material for
Brady purposes if the suppressed evidence would have led to admissible evidence. Spaziano v.
Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1044 (11th Cir. 1994).
26
respect to the Brady claim, even if true, would not provide a basis for relief.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Breedlove an evidentiary
hearing, and we affirm the district court’s denial of Breedlove’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
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