[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
______________________ MAY 03, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
No.01-16629 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
______________________
D.C. Docket No. 00-00469-CV-TWT-1
JAMES W. SWAN,
Movant-Appellant,
C. T. AKINS,
Plaintiff,
versus
WALTER S. RAY,
ROY M. BARNES,
Defendants-Appellees,
BOBBY K. WHITWORTH, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
______________________
(May 3, 2002)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James T. Swan appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
joinder to an action filed by another inmate, C.T. Akins. In the lawsuit brought by
Akins which Swan had unsuccessfully attempted to join, Akins sought to enforce
our earlier decision in Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991), where we
held that the 1985 amendment to the rules promulgated by the Georgia’s Board of
Pardons which increased the interval between proceedings to reconsider for parole
those inmates serving life sentences after their initial denial of parole was a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
After being successful in the first lawsuit, Akins filed his second suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to enforce the earlier decision granting him annual
reconsideration among other things. In his second lawsuit, the State of Georgia
consented to a permanent injunction in which it would give Akins an annual
reconsideration, and the district court entered final judgment on August 20, 2001.
After final judgment had been entered in Akins’ second lawsuit, Swan moved to
join it. The district court denied Swan’s motion because Swan had not been a party
to the first lawsuit filed by Akins and thus the issues Swan raised were not
common to those raised in Akins’ second lawsuit and because Swan had filed his
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motion after the entry of judgment in Akins’ lawsuit. Swan contends that neither
reason warrants the denial of his motion and that such denial is an abuse of
discretion. We disagree.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion only for joinder for abuse
of discretion. See Alexander v. Fulton County, Georgia, 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2000). The district court has broad discretion to join parties or not and that
decision will not be overturned as long as it falls within the district court’s range of
choices. See In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he abuse of
discretion standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long as that
choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). In this case, the court’s decision to deny joinder falls squarely
within its range of permissible choices.
A district court may join a person to an action when the person seeking
joinder asserts a right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with the party
who filed the action, that right to relief arises from the same underlying transaction
or series of transactions, and the claims have a common factual or legal basis. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 20(a). In making a joinder decision, the district court is guided by the
underlying purpose of joinder, which is to “promote trial convenience and expedite
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the resolution of disputes, thereby eliminating unnecessary lawsuits.” Alexander,
207 F.3d at 1323.
A review of the record and arguments in Swan’s case lead us to conclude
that his claims must be tried in a separate proceeding and that joinder is
inappropriate and would add nothing to judicial efficiency. First, Swan does not
have a right to the same injunctive relief as Akins claimed in his second lawsuit,
the one Swan wanted to join. In that lawsuit, Akins enforced an earlier decision he
had obtained. Because Swan was not a party to Akins’ first lawsuit, he was not
eligible for the injunctive relief sought by Akins in his second lawsuit.
Accordingly, Swan cannot satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 20(a).
Second, Swan may not be entitled to the same relief granted in Akins’ first
lawsuit and enforced by Akins in his second lawsuit—annual parole
reconsideration. After we decided Akins, the Supreme Court in Garner v. Jones,
529 U.S. 244, 257, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000), overruled Akins, holding that
retroactive application of the 1985 amendment to the schedule of parole
reconsideration does not necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Under
Garner, if the 1985 amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, it is because
application of that amendment to a particular inmate and that inmate’s sentence
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creates a significant risk of increasing the sentence. Garner, 529 U.S. at 255, 120
S. Ct. at 1370. Thus, while Georgia voluntarily entered into a consent agreement
with Akins to give him annual reconsideration, that relief is not necessarily
required by the Constitution for all inmates serving life sentences. The State of
Georgia did not agree to give annual consideration to all inmates serving life
sentences when it entered into the consent decree with Akins.
The particularized inquiry into the effect of the amended rule on a inmate’s
sentence required by Garner ensures that Swan’s claims cannot have a common
factual basis with the claims in Akins’ second lawsuit. If Swan thinks the 1985
amendment as applied to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, he can attempt to
establish that in a separate lawsuit.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Swan’s motion for joinder and that order is AFFIRMED.
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